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Abstract 
This dissertation discussed Cuba’s processes of economic reform and political 
liberalization, and their impact on Cuba’s foreign policy’s adaptation to the post-Cold 
War. The first part of the dissertation explains economic reform and political 
liberalization from the perspective of partial reform equilibrium as a result of the Cuban 
Communist Party’s focus on domestic stability and international legitimacy. The second 
part of the dissertation focused on Cuba’s foreign policy dynamics associated to the 
domestic reform, the changes in the international system after the end of the Cold War 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
“Ultimately this transfer won’t work” – Thomas Shannon, U.S. undersecretary for 
Hemispheric Affairs commented about Cuba’s presidential succession in the summer of 
2006-  
There is no political figure inside of Cuba who matches Fidel Castro…You have 
to understand that authoritarian regimes are like helicopters. There are single fail 
point mechanisms. When a rotor comes off a helicopter, it crashes. When a 
supreme leader, disappears from an authoritarian regime, the authoritarian regime 
flounders…And I think that’s what we’re seeing at this  (Shannon 2006) 
 
Undersecretary Shannon’s words expressed a conviction about post-revolution 
Cuba that was dominant in Washington at the time when Fidel Castro fell sick. Not only 
the United States Administration but other governments, even those with a close relation 
with the island-nation such as Spain under Aznar in Europe, and Mexico under the 
administration Fox-Castaneda in the Americas subscribed this point of view. The central 
premise of such vision was that Cuba’s political system was dependent on Fidel Castro’s 
charisma. According to it, the Cuban Communist Party was a simple addendum to Fidel 
Castro’s appeal; the ideology of the Cuban revolution and its appeals to nationalism and 
Leninism, a simple mantle for Castro’s interests; the command economy, one of Fidel’s 
caprices in his communist zealotry.  
On a typical pathology of asymmetric relations, sub-attention within the great 




sub-attention was sporadically broken by the personalization of the conflict in the figure 
of Fidel Castro, a tool that help to simplify and mobilize public opinion about the issue. 
Rather than a policy towards Cuba, the United States have a policy towards Castro. Since 
Fidel Castro was- in the dominant view- the system’s corner stone, Cuba’s regime 
collapse was a matter of time. Fidel would eventually die, and as “a single fail point 
mechanism”, the post-revolution political order would end.   
It is not the first time history proved wrong those who underestimate the Cuban 
socialist resilience. In addition to the explanations based on Fidel Castro’s centrality, 
different theories about why communist regimes failed in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union served to build consensus about Cuba’s regime’s pre-ordained replacement by a 
capitalist market economy and multiparty democracy  (Oppenheimer 1992). A system of 
state socialism with a command economy and a Leninist vanguard party cannot survive-
according to this logic- ninety miles off the shores of Florida in the post-Cold War age of 
globalization.  
For reasons attributable to its historic conflict with the United States and insertion 
in the Cold War, before 1991, Cuba was perceived as wholly dependent on the 
Communist bloc led by Moscow. The idea was that revolutionary Cuba had survived U.S. 
hostility just because the Soviet Union has supported the Cuban revolution.  After the end 




Castro’s charisma took center of the scene. Twenty-five years later and nine years after 
Fidel Castro’s exit from power; it is fair to say that history proved the previously 
described diagnostics as wrong. After Raul Castro replaced his brother, Fidel at the 
presidency, the Cuban regime is not only standing but also addressing some of its most 
important economic and political vulnerabilities.  
This research answers the puzzle of why and how the Cuban Communist Party 
regime adapted to a post-Cold War and post-Fidel Era. How did the regime led by the 
Cuban Communist party adjust and change its economy, politics and foreign policy to 
preserve domestic stability and international legitimacy?  Rather than discussing the 
question of post-totalitarian resilience in terms of what did not happen (a liberal 
democratic transition), I explain what happened:  three intertwined processes of economic 
reform, political liberalization and foreign policy adaptation to globalization. Which were 
the drivers (independent variables) that explain the outcomes of partial economic reform, 
political liberalization without democratization and ambivalent integration to the regional 
and world liberal order? I explain political change (adoption of a mixed two-track 
(market and command) model, political liberalization and a status quo- friendlier foreign 
policy) in a context of continuities (preservation of the leading role and domination by 
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1The list of five drivers and independent variables are listed on a ranking order. Notice 
that the two drivers directly connected to the international system are 3 and 4. Taking into 
account Cuba’s condition as a small developing country, I don’t begin my analysis from 
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outcomes in terms 
of political order.  
                                                          
2The concept of acknowledgement for deference refers to a compromise in which the 
United States acknowledges Cuba’s sovereignty restraining itself from interfering in 
Cuba’s internal affairs in exchange for Cuba’s deference to the U.S. states as a Great 
Power with a leading role in a World liberal order. The basis for this concept were 
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The adaptation processes were more clearly stated by Raul Castro’s presidency at 
the VI Congress of the Cuban Communist Party but they were already in motion during 
the nineties. In 1992, when the Cold War ended, Cuba’s political system faced two 
important crises. First, there was a crisis of Cuba’s lack of integration into a globalized 
world. The demise of its main ideological, economic and political alliance with the Soviet 
Union and the communist bloc left Cuba vulnerable to U.S. policies of sanctions, 
reducing the appeal and power of the Cuban party-state. For a small country with an open 




legitimacy and the viability of the Leninist “vanguard” one- party rule. Second, it faced 
an economic crisis that threaten long-term domestic stability, related to the exhaustion 
and incapacity of the command economy model to attend in a sustainable manner the 
minimal needs of the Cuban people in terms of food, transportation, and housing. Cuba’s 
GDP shrank 30-35 % between 1989 and 1992. The task of the Cuban Communist Party 
was defined in its IV Congress in 1991 in terms of survival/control with only long term 
perspectives of development.  
By the early 2000, the Cuban government had found important palliatives to its 
original isolation with a growing alliance with the People’s Republic of China and 
Venezuela. Domestically, the regime replaced the command economy model with a two 
tracks hybrid in which the command economy structures coexisted with walled segments 
of market and private property mechanisms (foreign investment and local small 
businesses). In support of these new economic structures, the Cuban government opened 
its economy to remittances from the Cuban overseas community mainly in the United 
States and tourism from all over the world, mainly Europe and Canada. The opening 
towards the Cuban American community outbalanced the increasingly hostile U.S. policy 
codified in the 1992 Cuba Democracy Act (also known as Torricelli law) and the 1996 




But survival and sustainable development are different challenges. Cuba’s new 
insertion in the global economy became dependent on a political relation with Venezuela. 
Although the command economy under a national security state helped the government to 
distribute scarce products, maintain political control and resist U.S. regime change 
policy, development requires different political stability, market incentives and rule by 
law-predictability. The two-track economy with the dollar as the hard currency and a 
growing inequality gap took a toll on the Cuban government’s popularity. .  
By 2006 when Fidel Castro fell ill the system has not solved the structural 
challenges associated with the previously mentioned crises.  Two new challenges piled 
up on the ones of economic viability and integration. First, the crisis of leadership 
associated to the replacement of Fidel Castro’s charismatic rule highlighted the need for  
a more institutional rule and second, an inter-generational transition in the upper echelons 
of power, still in the hands of octogenarian revolutionary veterans.   
In addition there was a crisis of trust. By 2006, the so-called special period (Cuba 
after 1991) had drained zones of political legitimacy cultivated by the Cuban Communist 
party at home and abroad with its welfare and development programs sponsored with 
Soviet support in the 1970’s and 1980’s. New generations of Cubans had grown up in a 
country with segmented markets, more inequality and economic crisis. For the younger 




More relevant than this is their vision about the future. A growing segment of the Cuban 
population doubted the capacity of the dominant conceptions, particularly communism, to 
offer a developmental path and a way out of the crisis.  
There is a compounding interrelation between these two new challenges and the 
previously mentioned unresolved issues of the end of the Cold War. The economic, 
ideological and political crisis of 2006 faced by the Cuban regime when Fidel Castro 
couldn’t continue as Cuba’s president expressed not only the exhaustion of the 
communist model but also the consequences of almost two decades of inner 
contradictions in the path of gradual partial reform.  
Summary of the dissertation argument: 
The dissertation is a case-study of Cuba as a country in transition from a 
command economy to a mixed one, from a totalitarian system to a post-totalitarian one, 
and from a revolutionary foreign policy centered on promoting a communist world order 
to one focused on constructing a friendly international environment for a post-
revolutionary nationalist reform project. The post Cold War resilience of the CCP is 
discussed in two parts showing how the processes of partial economic reform, political 
liberalization and intergenerational leadership succession have increased the chances 
for domestic political stability while openness and foreign policy adaptation have 




 In the first half, I discuss the quest for political dynamic stability as a contrasting 
concept with static stability
3
. The CCP achieved dynamic domestic stability through three 
processes, each of one is accounted for in each of the first three chapters: 1) partial 
economic reform and transition from command to mixed economy, 2) political 
liberalization through institutionalization and social decompression, 3) institutionalization 
of intra and inter-generational leadership succession mechanism as a response to the end 
of Fidel Castro’s charismatic authority (term and age limits). 
 In the second half, I explain the pursuit for international legitimacy with a   re-
balancing of the Cuban Communist regime’s foreign policy. The new strategy reinforces 
Cuban nationalist resistance against U.S. regime change policy by emphasizing the 
adaptation to the post-Cold War world order. The Cuban narrative is presented in terms 
of a search for an acknowledgement for deference solution to the asymmetric conflict 
between the two countries. This second half is also divided in three chapters; the first one 
discusses changes and continuity in Cuba’s foreign policy identity and strategies, the 
second one explains U.S.-Cuba relations and the last one proposes a triangular structure 
of  Cuba’s relations with regional and great powers as balancers to Havana’s conflict with 
the United States. 
                                                          
3 The concept of dynamic stability in contrast to static stability refers to the preservation 
of political order not by blocking necessary changes in Cuba’s politics and economy but 
by channeling hem through proper institutions and using a timing and sequence that 




The processes of Cuba’s domestic reform and foreign policy adaptation are 
mediated by a national- security rationality (A supreme concern for closing security 
vulnerabilities to U.S. hostility), central to the CCP view of the world. In this national 
security rationality, domestic political stability and international legitimacy are the 
fundamental antidotes against U.S regime change policy. The political management of 
partial economic reform and the institutionalization of the one-party rule seek to produce 
modern arrangements and policies according to the changing structural conditions. The 
goal of the CCP leadership remains the same:  to restrain the liberalizing political impacts 
of these unavoidable transitions and reduce its vulnerabilities to U.S. policy of regime 
change.   
The rebalancing of foreign policy identities
4
 in favor of nationalism seeks to 
secure a friendly environment for Cuba’s reform by constructing cooperative relations 
                                                          
4The concept of Cuba’s foreign identities refers to the different dimensions that identify 
Cuba as a state actor in international society. Cuba is a communist-revolutionary, Latin-
American, Caribbean, and third world state. These identities are shaped by the specific 
character of the Cuban state in domestic politics but also by the interactions between 
Cuba and other states. Foreign policy identities are expressed in specific foreign policy 
ideologies and principles. In the case of Cuba the two most important ideologies are 
communist-revolutionary (centered around the principle of “revolutionary solidarity”) 
and nationalism (centered in the principle of national sovereignty). Specific 
implementations of foreign policy led to the exercise of other identities such as rival, 
enemy and friend, or revisionist or status quo state. Constructivist international relations 
theory does not take foreign policy identities as given and constant. On the contrary they 





with actors within the U.S. and other fundamental players in the regional and global 
balance of power.  Cooperation with global status quo forces such as international capital 
provides the ground for a new insertion within the current world order. However this 
rebalancing of functional identities does not mean the abandonment of the internationalist 
revolutionary impulse
5
 but its moderation. Equally important, normalization of relations 
with the United States does not mean a return to these bilateral ties’ past. The solution to 
asymmetric conflict is not domination or submission but a new compromise in which the 
United States acknowledges Cuba’s sovereignty.  
The Cuban regime elites widened the policy frontiers of their system about the 
role of markets, political institutions, and optimal interaction with the rest of the world 
but they did it in their own terms. Adaptation was done following internal power 
dynamics, in response but never determined by outside agendas of regime change by 
coercion (U.S. approach) or by inducement (Canada and the European Union).  The 
Cuban political establishment adopted a more market friendly attitude, adjusted the CCP 
dominance to a less vertical relation with civil society and launched a foreign policy more 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
5 The concept of internationalist revolutionary impulse refers to the ideological solidarity 
of Cuban communists with ideological partners in the world who share their revisionist 
preference for an alternative, socialist oriented world order. Fred Halliday wrote 
extensively about the role of the internationalist impulse in the context of revolutionary 




compatible with the liberal world order, without giving up its core project of a nationalist 
and Leninist state.   
Structure and agency 
The dissertation works at the intersection of international politics and comparative 
politics. In coming to grips with international and domestic factors to explain the survival 
of Cuba’s political regime, I look at structural and agency arguments. Although these 
camps are not easily delineated there is a reasonable hierarchy in the levels of analysis.  
The most encompassing structural level is the international system that constrains 
the options of a national state like Cuba, which is not a great power. Following Alexander 
Wendt’s social theory of international politics, states come to international interactions 
with elements of a defined identity but after the first encounter state’s identity, roles and 
interests are reproduced or changed (constructed in the terminology of constructivism) 
socially (Wendt 1999). There is also a hierarchy in the international system. Cuba does 
not generally play a fundamental role in the creation of the culture of inter-states relations 
at the global or regional level. In the development divide, Cuba is an underdeveloped 
country with limited industrialization and reduced competitiveness in the world market. 
During the Cold War, Cuba was capable to play at times the role of a mid-size power 




possible because of a mixture of Fidel Castro’s international initiative combined with 
Soviet backing.  
Foreign policy identity is a function of history, geography, and relative 
capabilities. After the demise of European communism, the Cuban state saw its agency 
restrained by an adversarial international structure in which its main allies were defeated. 
Cuba’s agency is guided in the international system by a history originated in the 1959 
revolution. As result of this historical origin, the ideational paradigms that guide Cuba’s 
foreign policy combine nationalism as the pursuit of national interests and values (first of 
all the preservation of sovereignty) with a revolutionary internationalist impulse
6
.  
Such combination was at times problematic because on the one hand Cuba 
defended the ordinal principle of state sovereignty while on the other practiced a strategy 
of active solidarity at times even military support for ideological partners and insurgent 
groups against other sovereign states. The post-Cold War era was a period of 
normalization and alignment with the core of international security norms.  
The second structural level is national. Cuba’s political and economic agency at 
the world level is conditioned by its historic adoption of a command economy and a one-
party system after the 1959 revolution. The ideological paradigms of communism and 
                                                          
6For a theory about the balance between national interest and internationalist 
revolutionary solidarity as part of the discussion about the role of revolution in the 
international relations see Fred Halliday’s “Revolution and World Politics. The Rise and 




nationalism impose structural policy frontiers to what the Cuban elites might adopt as 
responses to the challenges they faced domestically and internationally.  
Within the national structure of Cuba’s political system, the most powerful agent 
responsible for Cuban political elites’ political education and responses to domestic and 
international challenges is the Cuban Communist Party.  And yet, when one searches for 
actors and trends  within Cuba’s power structure, the Cuban Communist party-state 
appears as a political ground in which factions driven by affinities, trajectories and 
preferences based on functional, generational and regional interests engage in debate and 
internecine struggle. In terms of factions, I distinguish three functionally organized 
groups within the party-state: the military establishment of the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces (FAR), the party apparatus officials gathered around the Organization 
Department, and the government officials in charge of non-security state functions.  
These three factions negotiate a compromise that combines their sectarian interests in a 
hierarchy that prioritize the defense of Cuba’s sovereignty versus the U.S. regime change 
policy.  
In principle, first explanations for causality are sought at structural levels. Agency 
based explanations become more important when responding questions of how something 
becomes possible and probable. Since structural explanations at the international and 




elimination, the continuity of the regime should be explained by: 1) agency variables 
associated to the Cuban leadership and its adaptation strategies in domestic and 
international affairs, 2) structural dynamics of secondary importance at the world level 
but conferring advantages to Cuba in asymmetrical conflicts. 3) Changes in macro-level 
structures that provide new opportunities for Cuba’s survival after the demise of the 
Communist bloc in 1991.  
It is not surprising that regardless of Cuba’s leaders’ declarations describing the 
process of reforms as limited to the economic realm, the central task of political 
liberalization has focused on limiting and managing the political effects of the economic 
changes. Cuba’s politics and economy are a system.  
We are dealing with a system when (a)a set of units or elements is interconnected 
so that changes in some elements or their relations produce changes in other parts 
of the system, and (b) the entire system exhibits properties and behaviors that are 
different from those of the parts” (Jervis 1997, 6) 
 
When Cuban Communist leaders change one piece of the system everything else 
doesn’t remain equal. That explains their use of control mechanisms but also the lifting 
up of prohibitions to decompress the political effects of the economic changes, insulate 




of control (gatekeeper state
7
) and assign new roles to their core institutions (The Armed 
Forces as major manager of economic reform). It also explains the balancing of the 
ideology of the Cuban revolution more along nationalist developmental lines without 
abandoning the internationalist socialist impulse.   
But the study of systems shows that the direct and immediate effect of a policy is 
not necessarily the only or the dominant one. Reforms frequently activate mechanisms 
that led to unintended consequences. Changes in ideas do not translate immediately in 
changes of policy but create intangible dynamics that remove taboos widening the scope 
of the frontiers within which policies are proposed and discussed. When Cuba opened to 
international tourism, trade and investment, the effects of these factors were not limited 
to the economy. Almost equally important are the impacts of integration to the 
international economy in cultural, educational and social ties with the rest of the world.  
Higher interaction between the Cubans in the island and those in the Diaspora are not 
limited to remittances and travel. These interactions contribute to changes in values, 
lifestyles, mutual perception, popular culture and last but not least political views.   
Furthermore, “unintended effects” of the reform processes can become main 
effects in virtue of uncertainty, lack of anticipation, or delayed feedback. Illiberal 
                                                          
7For a discussion of the concept of the gatekeeper state in the context of limited reforms 
see Javier Corrales’ article on the topic (Corrales 2004). The gatekeeper state dominates 
society by “fragmenting the economy” and “determining which citizens have access to 




reformers might not want to widen the space for political participation but the rising 
inequality (racial, regional, urban-rural, gender) associated to market oriented reform 
impose growing tensions between those who receive the benefits (not necessarily the 
traditional base of the revolution) and weak groups such as migrants from the Eastern 
provinces in Havana. Some early winners of the reform such as the new private sector are 
not necessarily co-opted immediately lacking effective channels for interest 
representation. Cuban economists, bloggers, social scientists and security officials have 
alerted the authorities about the risk of rising public dissatisfaction combined with 
pushing aggrieved people to voice their interests only in protests.  
Why Predictions of Cuban communism’s demise were greatly exaggerated 
Several theories about democratic transition, problems of communism and 
command economies, and realism in international relations theory forecasted the end of 
the Cuban communist regime based on structural reasons. Here I discuss these theories 
and its implications for the analysis of the Cuban case.  
Realism is the most revered school of international relations theory. It sustains 
that relative power differentials determine the outcome of political disputes between 
countries. As Thucydides remembered in the Melian Dialogue: “right as the world goes, 
is only a question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can, and the 




one’s equals, to behave with deference towards one’s superiors, and to treat one’s 
inferiors with moderation” (Thucydides 1972). According to realist logic, facing 
American hostility, Cuban communism without Soviet Union’s support was at the mercy 
of American diktat.  
The theories about how a change in the international system helped or determined 
the end of communism in Eastern Europe came in different flavors.  For some it was the 
defeat of the Soviet empire in its economic and military competition against the West 
(Matlock 1995). For others it was a matter of “democratic convergence” at the regional 
level with the European Union playing a fundamental incentive (Whitehead 2001). There 
are references to the diffusion effect of democratization in other parts of Eastern Europe, 
the positive evaluation of democracy in the Catholic thought (Weigel 1992, 67-74) and 
the democratic subversion of hegemony provoked by Gorbachev’s perestroika and new 
thinking (Matlock 1995). Other authors highlight the role of human rights norms 
entrepreneurs, foreign policy democracy promotion programs (Carothers 2004)or 
international agreements such as the Helsinki Conference of European security and 
cooperation (Hungtington 1991, 85-100). Linz and Stepan pointed the importance of 
Zeitgeist, “the spirit of the times”, “when democratic ideologies have no powerful 




All the effects described in these theories of democratization and collapse of 
communist regimes as caused by international change applied to Cuba: the substantive 
loss in military, energy and food security associated to the loss of Soviet support, the 
diffusion effects of the changes in the whole communist bloc community transported to 
Cuba by publications and the presence in many of these countries of large communities 
of Cuban workers and students, the pressures from Gorbachev’s perestroika and new 
thinking, the democratization emulation effects arisen from the transitions in Latin 
America, and the democracy promotion programs at higher levels than those used against 
many of the countries in Eastern Europe (The United States had a radio and TV channel, 
radio-TV Marti just for Cuba, and had spent as average more than 10 million dollars 
every year in democracy promotion programs.). Finally sanctions with the pretext of 
promoting democracy and regime change have been a central tool in the American 
arsenal against the Cuban regime.  
The fact that Cuba didn’t collapse in the presence of these factors does not 
disprove the validity of these theories, it simply warn against a deterministic reading of 
them and call for an in-depth study of the Cuban case searching for omitted variables. 
Paradoxically some arguments about Cuban non-transition emphasize the role of the 
international factors, particularly the U.S. policy of embargo as feeding the Cuban 
narrative of nationalist resistance against imperial imposition and exiles’ revenge 




East Asian communist countries in which communist parties were identified with 
nationalist causes.  
There are other three main theories that explain communism collapse in Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union based on domestic dynamics. The first one of these theories 
is modernization. Since the publication by Seymour Martin Lipset of its seminal article in 
1959 (Lipset 1959), many political scientists have subscribed the view that social and 
economic conditions such as industrialization, urbanization, and higher levels of 
education create a platform that make representative democracy probable. According to 
this view a sustained period of market oriented economic growth is the ferment for social 
values such as trust, pluralism and tolerance from which democratic norms emerged.  
The Cuban case is a puzzle for the modernization theory point of view because 
many of the social and economic conditions for democracy of Lipset’s theory are present. 
Cuba has social standards in urbanization, health, and education that already crossed 
modernization thresholds indicated by scholars as entering a zone of increasing 
challenges to non-democratic structures in other countries
8
.  Today, only 21 % of the 
Cuban population is employed in agriculture representing 5 % of GDP (2012). Cuba has 
the highest levels of literacy in Latin America with an 80 % of gross enrollment in 
                                                          
8Minxin Pei (Pei 1994)argued that China is entering into a zone of challenges to 
authoritarian structures due to the growth of GDP, education, urbanization and social 
mobility. He argued that the Soviet Union was forced to democratize after reaching this 




tertiary education and 90% in secondary education. ECLAC estimates Cuba’s GDP per 
capita (in current U.S. dollars) as 6,288. Health indicators are typical of a developed 
country: life expectancy for women is 80 years and 76 for men with low birth rates (1.7 
per couple).  
Several scholars such as Carmelo Mesa-Lago and Jorge Perez-Lopez had disputed 
the validity of the data of the Human development index for Cuba. The main target of 
their questions is the GDP per capita. Curiously their suggested adjustment for GDP per 
capita (3500-5500$) would make Cuba’s probability for a democratic transition higher 
not lower in the past two decades according to the studies of Limongi and Przeworski:  
If the theory that democracy emerges as a result of economic development is true, 
transitions to democracy would be more likely when authoritarian regimes reach 
higher levels of development. In fact, transitions are increasingly likely as per 
capita income of dictatorships rises but only until it reaches a level of about 
$6,000. Above that, dictatorships become more stable as countries become more 
affluent. Dictatorships survive, or at least succeed one another, 12 almost 
invariably in the very poor countries, those under $1,000. They are somewhat less 
stable in countries with incomes between $1,001 and $4,000 and even less so 
above $4,000. But if they reach the level of $6,000, transitions to democracy 
become less likely. As the lower panel of Table 1 (PAD column 4) shows, the 
probability of any dictatorship dying during any year is 0.0206; for those 
dictatorships with incomes over $1,000, this probability is 0.0294, over $5,000 it 
is 0.0641, over $6,000 it is 0.0484, over $7,000 it is 0.0333. Huntington, it seems, 
was correct with regard to dictatorships: they exhibit a "bell shaped pattern of 
instability. (Przeworski and Limongi 1997) 
 
But the absence of liberal democratization in Cuba does not disprove 




measure to mitigate and control the liberalizing effects of social and educational 
development before 1991 and the market oriented steps of its economic reform. It is 
difficult to identify the existence of a coherent and autonomous middle class (Lipset 
1959) receptive to an agenda of political contestation. There is no industrialist class 
committed to the organization of an independent economic society (Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2006)facing the challenge of independently organized labor. The Cuban 
revolution ended the power of the landlord classes but installed in its place the power of 
the communist party.  
Even after the economic reform process took traction, Cuba lacks three of the 
essential components modernization theory identified as sources of democratic demands:  
a entrepreneurial organized elite, a widespread middle class and an autonomously 
organized labor movement.   
Richard Feinberg has identified a set of emerging private entrepreneurs and 
middle classes:  
Cuban society has become increasingly heterogeneous and complex. Just as 
analysts have recently discerned a large and growing “middle class” in Latin 
America and other developing regions, it is now possible to identify emerging 
middle classes in Cuba. These middle classes overlap with the private sector, but 
as in other societies also include many public-sector employees-managers, 
professionals, skilled technicians-that fit the various definitions of middle class…. 
For example, majorities of Cubans boast characteristics typically ascribed to the 
middle class: high educational attainment, marked female participation in the 




security enrollment (but not the possession of many household consumer items) 
(Feinberg 2013, 3).  
 
But the existence of entrepreneurs and middle classes is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for the translation of social and economic modernization in a political 
democratization trend. Bueno de Mezquita and Downs has explained the importance of 
“strategic coordination” and how non democratic governments have became increasingly 
skilful in restraining “coordination goods, those public goods that critically affect the 
ability of political opponents to coordinate, but that have relatively little impact in 
economic growth” (Bueno de Mezquita and Downs Sept-Oct, 2005).   
The experience of the Cuban economic reforms shows a clear pattern in which 
coordination among potential opponents of the government has been strategically 
blocked.  That is why any political discussion of the post 2006 changes in Cuba is 
incomplete without the study of  the agency deployed by the Cuban government in the 
management of the processes of economic reform and political institutionalization with 
the central purpose of insulating and mitigating their liberalizing effects. Rather than 
disproving modernization arguments, the research show how the communist party 
channeled political institutionalization, expansion of market structures, the social 
decompression associated to increasing civil rights of religion and travel. Political 
liberalization worked as an alternative path to deter or slowdown of a potential 




Department of the Communist Party institutionalizing collective leadership and cohesive 
elites’ renewal across the party-state.  
One other relevant social theory to discuss not the direction of political change 
but how it takes place, it is Jack Goldstone’s study of revolutions from the view of 
demographic changes
9
 (Goldstone 1991).  Cuba’s median age of 38.7 years presents an 
aging population conditioned by the referred long life expectancy and high levels of 
migration, mainly but not only to the United States (The U.S. government by virtue of an 
agreement provides at least 20 000 visas every year to Cubans in addition to more than 10 
000 who annually take advantage of the wet foot/dry foot implementation of U.S. 
immigration policy towards Cubans). The over-65 population accounts for 13 percent of 
the population while those below 14 are only 17 per cent (The rest of Latin America has 
7 and 28 % respectively). These demographic patterns are not correlated to demands for 
revolutionary or radical changes but to preferences for gradualism and stability.  
It is difficult to argue against the thesis about economic crisis as a source of 
regime change
10
. The biggest challenge to the Cuban government came associated to the 
                                                          
9Goldstone claims that his model refers to revolutions in the early modern period but the 
logic he explains about the impact of a population predominantly young as a condition 
that increases the probability of drastic political change is applicable in other cases.  
 
10 There is a long list of scholars who explain the demise of communism based on issues 




severity of the 1993 economic crisis when the country experienced in one year (1992 to 
1993)a reduction of 35 % of its GDP. Economic hardships undermined public support for 
the revolution but in the 1994 summer public protests crisis the government diverted a 
significant part of the discontent towards migration to the United States. The regime also 
proved its resilience by appealing to the nationalist sentiment of the population with a 
discourse that recognized past economic mismanagement but blamed U.S. hostility and 
“Soviet betrayal” of socialism for the difficulties.  The alliance with Venezuela after 2002 
played an important role in alleviating the effects of the economic crisis. Chavez’ support 
to Cuba in the mid-2000 when the oil prices hiked, provided Cuba with a strategic energy 
security base.  
Yet, Cuba’s communist regime resilience remains extraordinary in comparison 
with other non-democratic cases. In their comparative study of democratic transition and 
consolidation, Linz and Stepan concluded that “non-democratic regimes” are more 
vulnerable to economic downturns than democracies. Based on data collected by Limongi 
and Przeworski about South American countries’ political trajectory between 1945 and 
1988, Linz and Stepan claimed that 
                                                                                                                                                                             
economies. The most quoted is Kornai(Kornai 1992) but many others deserve to be 
mention. Some emphasized the absence of private property and free markets while others 
point out to the problems of economics of information, lack of competition, the existence 
of monopolist structures and the absence of commitment not to bail out failed managers 
and state companies (Stiglitz 1996). Richard Pipes (Pipes 2001) highlighted the role of 
the constraints on private property limiting rule of law, initiative and freedom of 




they (Limongi and Przeworski) found that the probability that a a non-democratic 
regime would survive three consecutive years of negative growth was 33 %, 
whereas the probability that a democratic regime would survive three years of 
negative growth was 73 %. More dramatically, their data show that no 
nondemocratic regime survived more than three years of consecutive negative 
growth. (Linz and Alfred 1996, 79) 
 
After 1989, Cuba had four years of negative GDP growth (1989-1993) and 1994 
achieved a meager 0.5%
11
. The same regime has survived without a total recovery of the 
1989 output levels for more than twenty years. Such trajectory suggests looking at the 
Cuban regime not as a democratic one but with important stabilizing mechanisms of 
public consultations and socioeconomic decompression as presented by Emily Morris in 
her evaluation of Cuba’s economic performance (Morris 2014).  
Finally, there is plenty of evidence that Cuba’s command economy followed the 
described inefficient, wasteful and uncompetitive production and distribution patterns 
typical of the communist countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Adam 1996). 
In fact, Cuba’s indicators of productivity were worse than in almost all the countries 
integrated in the COMECON. Cuba’s economic structure was in 1991 more centralized, 
less market oriented and with less participation of private sector industries and agriculture 
than the European Communist world (Mesa-Lago and Fabian, Analogies Between East 
European Socialist Regimes and Cuba 1993). After 1991, the communist government 
                                                          
11These data is based on information published by the Economist Intelligence Unit and 





introduced important reforms to be discussed in the first chapter of our dissertation but 
still by 2004, the central structure of the economy was dominated by command 
mechanisms (Mesa-Lago and Perez-Lopez 2005).  
The economic underperformance pattern associated to communism has been 
compounded in the post-Cold War era by the partial reform logic of the transition from 
command to market economy. This logic was dictated by the gradualist approach and the 
dual track structure by which Fidel Castro tried to use the opening of some areas to 
foreign investment and market oriented sectors as palliatives to save the command 
economy structures. This situation is changing in connection with the more 
developmental, less controlling orientation of the reform after Raul Castro’s 
consolidation in power. From a tool to preserve the command economy under Fidel 
Castro in the 1990’s-early 2000’s period, the Raul Castro’s presidency transformed the 
two track economic system into a vehicle of transition to a mixed economy. The 
economic adjustment was managed first and foremost from national security logic but in 
the course of the reform, it acquired a more developmental less command orientation.  
In contrast to all the theories about the inevitability of communism collapse, there 
are few theories that explain non-democratic resilience in the Cuban context.  Most 
explanations place the central emphasis in the charismatic role of Fidel Castro and the 




survival on 1) the political dynamics of a partially market oriented economic reform 
guided by a national security logic, 2) the decompression associated not only to 
nationalism but also the implementation of a political liberalization agenda, and 3) the 
adaptation of Cuba’s foreign policy in a way that did move to a less hostile position 
towards the international order, but also capitalize in past revolutionary policies in the 
developing world, particularly in Africa and Latin America.  
Gradualism and partial economic reform logics: 
One slogan frequently used by Raul Castro to describe the rhythm of the reform is 
the phrase “Sin prisapero sin pausa” (slow but steady). This Cuban elites’ preference for 
gradualism is based on their positive reading of the Chinese experience of economic 
growth versus the calamitous record of the Russian big bang under Yeltsin and 
Gorbachev. There are also reformers within Cuba’s power class, intelligentsia and the 
religious communities that subscribed Samuel Huntington’s idea about an optimal 
sequence of liberalization in which the precedence of economic opening facilitates and 
stabilizes political liberalization and democratization.  
The following table shows the matrix of expected effects of each scenario of 
reform/non reform on domestic stability, international legitimacy and risk of conflict. 




within the government solve the issue of selecting their governing strategy in which 
gradualism prevailed over any shock therapy.  







Risk of conflict 
Status Quo Decreasing Decreasing Low 
















Two determinants of the path taken by the Cuban elites in favor of partial reform 
were the minimization of risk and the taming of expectations of change. However these 
two concerns are not sufficient to contain the expansive logic of reform. Partial 
transformation of the command economy has path dependence effect and pressures arise 
in favor of complementary steps.  This logic is not automatic because although partial 




quo and the evaluation of risk, it can evolve into a design when early winners of the 
changes realize their rent opportunities associated to their advantageous position in it. As 
result they try to delay more comprehensive changes because such strategy diminishes 
returns for them with the adoption of competition, consumer’s protection, and other smart 
regulation policies.  The conflict with the United States and national security arguments 
in the debate about reform contributes to keep partial reform equilibrium. 
But gradualism is not exempted from risk. One of the main problems associated to 
gradual strategies of reform is the existence of partial reform equilibrium in which 
transitions get trapped. The discussion on the dissertation about this problem is informed 
by three main sources: Joel Helsman’s article about the rent seeking behavior of early 
winners and the negative consequences for economic growth and inequality of a 
transition trapped in partial reform equilibrium (Hellman 1998).  Minxin Pei’s 
documented book about China’s trapped transition (Pei, China's trapped transition: the 
limits of developmental autocracy 2006) in which he presented the alternatives of a 
developmental state versus the possible conversion of reform into a path to a predatory 
state
12
. My own readings of the Taiwanese experience and the positive role in it of a 
                                                          
12Minxin Pei sees the paralisis of partial reform as a very likely outcome because of three 
main factors: “First, the initial conditions provide the ruling elites an overvhelming 
advantage in political organization, patronage and collective power. Second, the process 
of selective withdrawal creates strong incentives for the ruling elites to defend their last 
stronghold of economic and political privileges. Third, gradualism allows the ruling elites 




national security establishment leaded by Chan ChingKuo, an enlightened autocrat, 
pushing against corruption, for a coherent economic reform and political liberalization as 
a way to preserve some social equality, political stability and minimal international 
legitimacy.  
Although I am not constantly citing these sources in the text, since I have done 
my own reading of them and study the Cuban experience on its own merits; these 
references informed my fundamental understanding of the issue. I don’t attribute the 
logic of partial reform in the Cuban case to the mere defense of privileges and rent by the 
early winners although this is a major factor in its reproduction. In Cuba, partial reform 
equilibrium has a political origin. Rent seeking bureaucrats couldn’t shift the balance in 
favor of partiality and gradualism and against comprehensive reform without Fidel 
Castro’s defense of the command economy and the one-party system and the demands of 
political control and unity associated to the pervasive national security logic of the 
asymmetrical conflict with the United States. As expressed by Cuban nationalist and 
communist intellectuals, there is a belief that an integrated to the world economy, 
unregulated market oriented sector in the island would necessarily gravitate towards the 
world’s largest market, only ninety miles north. Although this market logic could ease up 
                                                                                                                                                                             
while creating an incentive structure that reward cooperation with the anti-reform 
elements and penalizes opposition to those elements” (Pei, China's trapped transition: the 




the economic constraints to development, it will undoubtedly make Cuba’s security and 
self-determination dangerously vulnerable.  
Gradualism and partial reform equilibrium in Cuba arise as political consequences 
of the disparity of power between the United States and the Cuban state, and between the 
Cuban state and its Cuban opponents in the exile and in the island. The pro-economic 
reform coalition emerged in Cuba from within the state rather than from an alliance 
between factions within the state and organized groups in civil society. There are groups 
in civil society such as the Roman Catholic Church and the National Council of Churches 
that supported the gradual reforms route but they are not major drivers or deciders of the 
changes. These and other organizations of civil society together with the think tank 
intellectuals raised awareness about the need for reform and suggested specific measures 
to change the status quo for decades. But they never have the capacity to implement it or 
were called, with some exceptions
13
, to lead and implement it. The Armed Forces and the 
CCP cadres had been and are in control of the reform.  
                                                          
13Examples of exceptions that confirms the rule are Osvaldo Martinez, who was the 
Director of the Center for the study of the World Economy who was appointed minister 
of the Economy in 1994 -and resigned shortly after because of health issues. Jose Luis 
Rodriguez, who was vice-director of the same think tank and served as minister of 
finances and prices and later as minister of the economy, and Alfonso Casanova, who 
served as vice-minister of economic planning after his tenure as Director of the Center for 




Three factors explain why gradualism and partial reform logic became dominant 
in Cuba’s reform trajectory. First, the political initial conditions are overwhelmingly 
favorable to the elites of the CCP. Although they faced a terrible economic crisis this 
never translated in a challenge to their rule. The CCP kept the high nationalist moral 
ground against American coercive policy of the embargo, and its advantageous disparity 
of power in terms of organization, repressive power and state patronage in relation to all 
political alternatives. Second, gradualism and partial reform allows the CCP to create a 
gatekeeper state increasing the possibilities of co-optation of the new elites, rewarding 
those who cooperate with their political position and punishing deviant or opposition 
behavior. Third, it provides national security rationality to more cynical and mundane 
interests focused on defending economic and political privileges. As Hellman (Hellman 
1998) explained for the cases in Eastern Europe these interests are not necessarily 
connected to the old command economy but might be connected to the early winners of 
the reform process.  
But this research explores also the risk, challenges and uncertainties posed by 
partial reform and gradualism to the survival of the system. The logic of partial reform 
and gradualism is not friendly to the creation of coalitions between reformers from the 
state and civil society mobilization. This situation left pro-reform officials and 
intellectuals within the system in an unfavorable position. Unless the reform crossed 




they would continue to be at the mercy of conservative and national security officials that 
embrace market oriented steps only as a mechanism of last resort.  
Due to such a balance of political power, which favors the status quo, reform is 
very uncertain and dependent on the will of an enlightened autocrat (Raul Castro has 
played at times this role but he is not Lee Kuan Yew or Chiang ChingKuo) or on 
accompanying political institutionalization of elites’ renewal. Chapters II and III study 
the process of institutionalization of collective leadership and the renewal and 
presidential succession mechanism. I highlight the progresses in institutionalizing term 
limits and renewal at the lower and intermediate levels of CCP power while pointing out 
the lack of age limits and the uncertainties of the inter-generational transition at the cusp.  
Political Liberalization as a process in its own merits: 
The democratic revolutions that ended the Cold War in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union represented the end of the economic, military and ideological competition 
between communism and capitalism. Yet Fidel Castro and the Cuban communist leaders 
did not accept the defeat of communism as definitive and insisted on presenting an 
alternative at least in the Latin American scenario to the neoliberal dominant trends of the 
time. To the point that Cuba is still ruled by a regime heir of the 1959 revolution and an 




Of central relevance for this outcome is Cuban nationalism as the main ideology 
of the post-revolutionary regime and the symbolism of its resistance to the U.S. policy of 
embargo. There were other issues of cardinal importance in Cuban politics such as the 
creation and sustenance of a welfare system and the achievement of some minimal 
economic sustainability. That said, the success or failure of the revolution was defined 
early in the sixties as surviving and persuading the United States as a great power of the 
convenience of not invading sovereign Cuba.  
Once the Soviet Union disappeared, the achievement of this accommodation was 
inconceivable without the strategic adaptation developed by the Cuban elites through the 
processes of economic reform and political liberalization. These processes were 
conceived as a departure from the old model of communism that failed in Eastern Europe 
and as alternative to liberal democracy. Although these processes have accelerated after 
the retirement of Fidel Castro from active public life in 2006, there are important lines of 
continuity focusing on the issues of domestic stability and international legitimacy that 
began with the IV Congress of the Cuban Communist Party in 1991 and last until today 
implementation of the Economic and Social guidelines adopted by the 2011 VI Congress.  
These lines of continuity are: a) Institutionalizing collective decision making at 
the elite level without giving up the one party system but increasing participation, 




orientation as necessary to return to a developmental path without renouncing to the 
predominant role of state property as the economic base of the Cuban Communist Party 
political monopoly, c) A less vertical new state-society relation based on social and 
political decompression to mitigate the most oppressive and controlling policies of the 
totalitarian phase incompatible with the economic transformation, the new 
communication technologies and the opening to tourism and foreign investment and 
trade, d) A soft landing transition from the founding revolutionary veteran generation to a 
successor group of the elites.  
For the purpose of this research, liberalization means the relaxation of social, 
economic and political controls of Cuba’s post-totalitarian system with the intention of 
making more sustainable the core of the Leninist one party rule. Marketization, new 
spaces for private property, a foreign policy that lean more towards national interests and 
less to internationalist revolutionary impulse, new individual and group rights of travel 
and religion are brought by the underlying goal of the CCP connected elites to enhance 
its political legitimacy and public support. The fact that the goal is not a liberal 
democratic transition doesn’t make the process less deliberate and consequential.  
Liberalization is best explained as originating within the regime not as imposed to 
it. Obviously the balance of forces within the regime is not completely disconnected of 




guides the liberalization process is internal to the party-state. That is why the nature of 
the change is gradual, incremental and partial. Political change is conceived in function 
of preserving stability understood not as the status quo but as orderly adaptations.  
Many Cuba observers have pointed out that changes are occurring and the Cuban 
elites are not static in their defense of their system of interests, values and privileges
14
. 
Yet most of them highlight the reluctance (Perez-Stable 1999) to adopt comprehensive 
economic reform and the limited magnitude of political changes as an attempt to sustain 
the old totalitarian system. One exception is Jorge Dominguez who wrote about a change 
of the political system towards authoritarianism after the reforms of 1992 (Dominguez, 
The Cuban Political System in the 1990's 2000).  
                                                          
14For arguments in American political science about changes within a context of regime 
stability see Jorge Dominguez’ “The Secrets of Castro’s Staying Power” (Dominguez 
Spring 1993), Marifeli Perez-Stable’s “Caught in a Contradiction: Cuban Socialism 
between Mobilization and Normalization” (Perez-Stable 1999), EusebioMujal and Joshua 
Bushby, “Much ado about something: Regime Change in Cuba” (Mujal and Bushby 2001 
Nov-Dec), EusebioMujal and Jorge Saavedra, “El post-totalitarismocarismatico y el 
cambio de regimen :Cuba y Espanaenperspectivacomparada” (Mujal and Saavedra, El 
post-totalitarismo carismatico y el cambio de regimen: Cuba y Espana en perspectiva 





The process of liberalization seeks the consolidation of a post-totalitarian system 
based on the Leninist character
15
 of the Cuban communist party. The 1992 ideological re-
balancing between nationalism and communism is centrally important in the adoption of 
political reform and the management of economic reform and foreign policy. Regardless 
of the role played by Fidel Castro’s charisma, the CCP is today a mature and consolidated 
Leninist party in terms of organization and program to govern. It conceives itself as a 
vanguard party with a Cuban reading and interpretation of Marxist Leninism. The more 
favorable attitude towards markets, private property, foreign investment and globalization 
happened as result of the widening of policy frontiers within the ideological balance 
adopted by the party-state after 1992 not as result of its abandonment.  
The changes in intra-party ideological and factional balance are setting the limits 
of economic and political reform. The project of partially market oriented reform with 
political decompression within the limits of one-party rule serves the interests of the 
dominant factions within the party state. What imposed the partiality and apparent 
incoherence to the reforms process is not the resistance of the associates to the old 
                                                          
15The Leninist character of the Cuban Communist Party is determined by its role as a 
“vanguard party”. This role is defined by a proclaimed commitment to a historical 
“mission” of realizing the goals of the working class, and the Cuban nation. The 
vanguard group of enlightened political cadres establishes in virtue of its superior class 
conscience a vertical relation with the Cuban people since it supposed to know better how 
to promote their interests. As explained by FerencFeher, Gyorgy Markus and Agnes 
Heller (Feher, Markus and Heller 1986) in Leninist regimes, people’s sovereignty is 




command economy system but the preferences of the factions that prevailed first in post-
Cold War Cuba and later in the post-Fidel era.  
Cuba’s transformation highlights the relevance of illiberal reformers within the 
system in contrast to opposition activists. The language of liberalization is essentially 
different to the one used in democratization. It is not that Cuban conversations ignore the 
discourse about international human rights but the convincing logics in the arguments are 
essentially instrumental. The more powerful arguments for more freedom to travel or 
more freedom to own private property or develop market activities were not based on a 
contrast to the Universal declaration of human rights model but on the effects they 
produce in economic development, political stability, or international legitimacy.  
The structure of the process of liberalization and its actors warn us against the 
rosy assumption that partial reform, liberalization and a more nationalist foreign policy 
are the preamble to comprehensive adoption of a market economy, democratization and 
the total abandonment of the internationalist revolutionary impulse. In fact the deliberate 
purpose of “just enough but not too much” reform is to avoid such outcomes. The 
uncertainty of the changes rather than a conservative attitude is the central explanation 
for policy reversals and totalitarian crackdowns for a number of months or years.  
Partial reform dynamics are also expressed by attempts to insulate the economic, 




interconnected, illiberal reformers design their policies with the purpose of controlling 
the liberalizing expansion from one zone to the other. Political society is clearly separated 
between forces of security and order, passive and active supporters of the system and the 
rest. 
Liberalization, Foreign Policy and Asymmetric Relations:  
In the second section of the dissertation, I discuss Cuba’s foreign policy 
adaptation, the change on narratives and perceptions in Cuba and the United States as 
well as the strategic triangular dynamics that made possible the outcome of December 17, 
2014. The explanations are based on the theories of asymmetric relations and strategic 
triangles. 
Partial economic reform and political liberalization are central to the rebalancing 
of Cuba’s foreign policy’s two main components since the triumph of the revolution in 
1959: the nationalist criteria and the revolutionary internationalist impulse. As long as the 
regime claims the revolutionary origin and ideology in its DNA, the internationalist drive 
would never be zero. Political liberalization and economic reform demand a friendlier 
world for those processes but Cuba’s foreign policy would still be defined by revisionist 
attitudes towards a liberal world order. There are changes in the policy frontiers not on 




But Cuban revolutionaries are not- in the words of Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, one 
of Cuba’s foreign policy gurus- “Joan of Arc hearing voices”.  Economic reform and 
political liberalization bolstered the possibility of a compromise with the United States of 
acknowledgement of Cuban sovereignty in exchange for deference towards the U.S. great 
power status. Such compromise will always be dynamic and Cuban nationalism would 
try to minimize dependence from the United States and diversify its ties with other great 
powers and allies.  
I also conclude that Cuba has overcome the international isolation phase brought 
upon its system by the end of the Cold War. Cuban Foreign policy have complemented 
the processes of economic reform and political liberalization with initiatives of 
rapprochement with different segments of the United States establishment and society 
(including the Cuban American community) together with improvements of its position 
in strategic triangles that include the regional scenario and other great powers. Implicit in 
the discussion in this dissertation about Cuba’s foreign relations is a chronology that talks 
about the lack of synchronization between Havana and Washington in terms of 
possibilities of an asymmetric compromise: 
1)  Before the end of the Cold War, revolutionary Cuba insisted on 
policies, domestic and international, that reinforces its revisionist identity clashing 




States’ policies and grand narratives of anti-communism containment were 
directly at odds with Cuban sovereignty
16
.   
2) After 1991 Cuba began a process of partial reform with a 
significant adjustment of its foreign policy in ways compatible to an AFD solution 
of its asymmetric conflict with the United States. Due to pathologies of under 
attention, insensibility and domestic politics prevalence over foreign policy 
rationality, American strategy towards Cuba institutionalized hostility with the 
Torricelli and Helms-Burton laws, locking itself in an imperial coercive policy. 
Cuba’s over attention to the bilateral ties and comprehensive diplomacy with 
other great powers and international actors allowed Fidel Castro’s government to 
defeat American policy of isolation achieving an asymmetric stalemate. 
3) By 2006-09, Cuba reached a new phase of its process of partial 
economic reform and political liberalization. It benefitted also from a new 
political juncture in Latin America and renewed ties with U.S. great powers 
rivals, China and the United States, as well as improved status with American 
allies, Canada and the European Union. In this juncture, President Barack 
Obama’s shift to a more multilateral U.S grand strategy empowered a new policy 
                                                          
16This does not mean that there were not chances and missed opportunities for better 
relations. Leogrande and Kornbluh have demonstrated that many good opportunities of 
rapprochement were lost (Leogrande, William & Kornbluh, Peter 2014). What I claim is 
that the structure of Cuba and the United States foreign policies grand strategies were set 




towards Cuba of a persuasive-hegemonic character.  On its side Cuba progressed 
on a new balancing of its foreign policy in favor of nationalism, making its 
revolutionary impulse more compatible with a liberal world order. This situation 
increased the probability of an AFD compromise, leading to the events of 
December 17, 2014, with the establishment of diplomatic relations between the 
two countries.  
Organization and Methods: 
The dissertation is a case study of the dual transition from a command economy to 
a market oriented one, from a charismatic-half institutionalized post totalitarian system to 
a liberalized institutionalized one and from a revolutionary foreign policy stance to a 
nationalist and AFD relationship with the U.S. The research is divided in two parts, one 
dedicated to the study of the domestic politics and economy of the change and the second 
one focused on Cuba’s foreign policy adaptation.  
The first part uses a comparative politics methodology by tracing the evolution of 
Cuba’s economy and political system and contrasting its fundamental features across 
time. Ocassionally I also compare Cuba with other communist cases that either collapsed 
(Eastern Europe) or adapted into a more market oriented, international society friendlier 
form (East Asian communist party ruled countries except North Korea). This approach 




variations among them. Describing the trajectory of Cuba’s change in economy, politics 
and leadership illuminates the sources of adaptation of the CCP rule and the strengths and 
challenges of the new context.  
International comparisons of Cuba with other socialist experiences serve to 
identify different responses to the withdrawal of Soviet support. Such a procedure shed 
light about important differences such as their starting position for reform (presence of a 
revolutionary first generation charismatic leader, predominance of urban population, 
relevance of a conflict with the United States as the first great powr in the post-Cold War 
world, etc). It also serves to identify common paths of reforms, time and sequence with 
possible and probable evolutions in Cuba’s trajectory. 
The section is divided in three chapters. Chapter one studies the process of 
economic reform, chapter two political liberalization and chapter three, leadership 
renewal. The sources for these chapters are mainly analysis about the Cuban revolution, 
and the phases of reform after 1992 in relation to the role of the two track system (1992-
2000, 2000-2006, and 2006-2009) , as well as studies about democratization, economic 
transition form plan to market, liberalization and development. I relied heavily on my 
observations and interviews with Cuban and other countries’ scholars who had followed 
the country for decades. I personally have travelled to Cuba at least twice every year 




thirty two years of my life and lived some of the described processes from within the 
revolutionary camp, first, and later from a more skeptical civil society and academic 
point of view.  
The second part covers Cuba’s foreign relations and therefore it is guided by 
foreign policy and international relations theory. I discussed this issue from the centrality 
in Cuba’s foreign policy of its asymmetric conflict with the United States. The research 
uses Brantly Womack’s theory of asymmetric relations to study the possible variants and 
possible trajectories to an arrangement of Acknowledgment of sovereignty for deference 
to great power status between the United States and Cuba.  
Chapter IV studies the fundamental connections between the domestic process of 
political change and economic reforms and the demands and challenges of Cuba’s foreign 
policy. Chapter V centers on Cuba’s foreign policy adaptation strategies to a post-Cold 
War world. When discussing Cuba’s foreign policy adaptation strategies I engage in a 
dialogue with general theories that present bandwagoning or balancing as the most 
probable foreign policy responses to disadvantageous balance of power situations.  
Chapter VI studies the conflict between Cuba and the United States. I emphasize 
the role of narratives and institutions of hostility reproducing and expanding dynamics of 
conflict beyond the root causes. Using the asymmetric relations perspective I discuss the 




VII discussed the strategic triangular dynamics of U.S.-Cuba relations in connection to 
the regional scenario and other great powers. There I complement the asymmetric 
relations analysis with Lowell Dittmer’s theory of strategic triangles. I contrast Cuba’s 
position in strategic triangles of interactions including the United States in contraposition 
to its strategic rivals, Russia and China; and its allies, Canada, and the European Union. I 
look also at the variations of Cuba’s position in the regional contexts of Latin America 
and the Western Hemisphere.   
In discussing Cuba’s position in the international system, the research emphasized 
in historical trajectories, the creation of anti-Cuba or pro-Cuba lobbies in foreign capitals, 
and the impact of the process of political change and economic reform in the island-
nation’s foreign ties. The sources are mainly books that cover Cuba’s foreign relations, 
primary documents, speeches of leaders from Cuba, the United States and other parts of 









Chapter Two: Economic Reform 
2.1 Introduction 
The end of the Cold War affected Cuba’s position in the world system with a 
drastic fall of 35 % of its Gross Domestic Product between 1989 and 1994 and a major 
disruption of its insertion in the world economy (Perez, 2004, p. 49).   This crisis of epic 
proportions sparked the beginning of a process of partial economic reform. After 1992, 
the Cuban Communist Party implemented waves of measures that partially altered the 
tenets of the classical command economy installed in Cuba after 1961 and consolidated 
with the abolition of most non agricultural private property in 1968.  By 2006 when Raul 
Castro ascended to Cuba’s presidency, the Cuban economy was already a command 
economy with a big segment of its most dynamic sectors operating with a market 
orientation. Although those sectors were not comprehensively integrated to the rest of the 
economy and some of them were managed by a heavy visible hand of the CCP and the 
Armed Forces, a new pattern of growth and integration to the world economy was 
already established.  
This chapter discusses the economic reform in two major ways: 1) as the project 
of the Cuban communist party (CCP) to revive its legitimacy
17
by showing a positive 
                                                          
17Raul Castro couldn’t say it more clearly when he said that “the economic battle is today, 
more than ever the main task and the center of the cadres’ ideological work, because the 




economic performance, adapting to the new conditions, 2) as a concrete 
implementationof policies to reform the economy (market transformation) and 
refurbishing the CCP’s institutional capacity to manage it.  
The guiding hypothesis of the chapter is that Raul Castro’s reforms have 
transformed the dual track system
18
adopted as part of the reform in the 1990’s, 
from a tool of survival to a mechanism of transition to mixed economy. This 
transition is signed by the logic of partial reform equilibrium in which the pace and scope 
of change is determined by the interests of early winners, and dynamics of national 
security and political control, not by dynamics of complementarities, interdependence 
and social gains. Partial reform equilibrium reinforces trends to inequality, lack of 
transparence and corruption as well as opportunities of arbitrage by the most powerful in 
society.   
 
 
                                                          
18My discussion of this issue is fundamentally informed by Roland, Gerard (2000), 
Transition and Economics, MIT Press, Cambridge and Naughton, Barry (1995) Growing 





In contrast to the experiences of China and Vietnam
19
, the Cuban case 





. The next chapter will discuss political liberalization
22
 as another 
main zone of legitimacy developed by the CCP in the post-Fidel era. The order of the 
                                                          
19For a comparative analysis of the experiences of reform in Cuba during the 1990’s and 
the transformation of other socialist economies, see Burki, ShahidJaved, and Erikson, 
Daniel P.  (2005) Transforming Socialist Economies, Palgrave macmillan, New York. 
Particularly the chapter “Cuba’s Economic Transition: Successes, Deficiencies and 
Challenges” by Jorge Dominguez (Dominguez, 2005).  
20I here use the term “post-totalitarian” because I believe that the Cuban, Vietnamese and 
Chinese regimes fits better on this definition than the frequently used ones of totalitarian 
or authoritarian. I think the same about China but would like to use Nathan’s discussion 
about the resilience of non-democratic regimes under post-totalitarian conditions. I 
follow the definitions of non-democratic regimes used by Linz and Stepan. (Linz, Juan 
and Stepan, Alfred, 1996) 
 
21Andrew Nathan (Nathan, 2003) was a pioneer questioning the assumption that non-
democratic regimes couldn’t survive under conditions of “advanced modernization and 
integration with the global economy” (p.16). On the contrary, Nathan discussed how the 
Chinese communist party made authoritarianism a “viable regime form” despite the 
significant economic and political changes that took place in the Asian giant. Lately, 
Nathan has revised some of his original theses.  In a second article, Nathan (Nathan, 
Authoritarian Impermanence, 2009)described how the challenges to the PRC’s 
leadership- he compared it to “a team of acrobats on a high wire”- are becoming more 
difficult by day.  
 
22Political liberalization implies the consolidation of pluralism in the social, economic, 
ideological and cultural arenas without institutionalizing political contestation through 
competitive election between freely organized political parties. Liberalization is a central 





chapters is not random. It reflects the priorities and segmentation strategy
23
, between 
economic and political reform adopted by the CCP under Raul Castro’s rule in 
continuation of what was a very visible Fidel Castro’s hand in the previous period. Under 
Raul Castro, there is a friendlier attitude towards market mechanisms and non-state forms 
of property but the segmentation strategy to reform, a driving force for the partiality of 
the approach remained dominant.  
The trajectory of the Human Development Index is indicative of some Cuban 
historical continuity before and after 1959. Cuba has combined a relatively high 
performance in the Health and Education indicators with a sustained increasing 
divergence with the industrialized countries in terms of the GDP per capita growth since 
the 1920’s. As Ocampo and Bertola showed, Cuba moved in Latin America “from its 
ranking as the economy with the fourth highest per capita income level in the region in 
1913 to one of the lowest ranking countries in this respect now. This trend has been in 
evidence both before and after the Cuban revolution” (Bertola & Ocampo, 2013, p. 16). 
The growth slowdown was not reversed by improvements in education and health 
indicators. Still, Cuba’s improvement under Castro’s revolution in terms of education, 
health, and public security standards represents zones of legitimacy for the regime. 
                                                          
23A central consequence of the role of the Revolutionary Armed Forces in the partial 
economic reform is the strategy of segmentation by which the non-liberal democratic 
reformers have attempted to contain the liberalizing political effects of the pro-market 




Simultaneously, the lack of economic growth and the low income of most of the 
population represent a source of discontent and relative deprivation feeding desires for 
political change and emigration particularly among the youth.  
Economic reform-in the Cuban context
24
-means the transformation from a 
command economy into a mixed one
25
. The core of this transformation is essentially the 
replacement of the plan as the fundamental coordination mechanism by market prices, 
preserving a significant regulatory and distributive capacity in government’s hands. The 
central symbol of Cuba’s command economy is the ration card. This system of subsidized 
                                                          
24This is an important precision because the term “economic reform” is generally 
associated with the Washington Consensus (Williamson, 2003) or the formula of 
Washington Consensus plus institutions and good governance model. Reform in Cuba 
was justly defined as a transition from a command economy but also an alternative to the 
Washington Consensus and its use as a paradigm of adjustment in many transitional post-
communist economies.  
 
25Here it is important to distinguish between market economies as a general concept, and 
free market economies as one variant of the general set. Cuba is not discussing nor 
planning a transition to a free market economy. In fact, the CCP has reiterated in every 
major document a rejection to any adoption of it in the IV, the V, and the VI Congresses. 
The distinction is also relevant for the use in this dissertation of the literature of 
transitional economics. Given the Cuban context political constraints imposed on the 
transition to market economy by the socialist and nationalist paradigms, there is little use 
for the Hayek-Friedman school discussion about the liberating role of markets. In 
contrast, comparative studies with a less biased view about the role of the state in the 
economy might offer important insights about thedynamic of transition and viability of 
transition to a market oriented state led economy. One particularly useful book to have a 
general reference of comparison and theory was Transition and Economics: Politics, 





food distribution is paired by a strict government control of most official salaries in 
Cuban pesos in its different versions of CUP and CUC
26
.  
It is symptomatic that the CCP reform program proposes the replacement of the 
ration card for a more market friendly system of subsidizing people in need not a basket 
of products for everyone. This will be a market friendly solution to the issue of poverty 
alleviation.  In the past two decades, Cuba’s transformation from the command economy 
to a mixed one became a trend. The CCP has shown the necessary ideological flexibility 
and technical capacity to accomplish it.  
As Emily Morris (Morris, 2014) of The Economist Intelligence Unit 
demonstrated, the Cuban economy performed around the median standards in the set of 
post-communist economies, remaining in the upper quintile in terms of social indicators 
of health and education. Morris emphasized that Cuba’s adaptation took place under 
severe financial restraint due to the U.S. embargo while most of the post-communist 
economies had a friendlier international economic environment. Morris went as far as 
suggesting that Cuba’s experience “has shown that, despite contradictions, and 
difficulties, it is possible to incorporate market mechanisms within a state-led 
                                                          
26Cuba has two currencies, the CUP or Cuban Peso and the CUC or Cuban Convertible 
Peso. The CUC was used for the dollar stores markets. One of the most important 




development model with relatively positive results in terms of economic performance and 
social outcomes” (Morris, 2014, p. 44).  
Although I agree with Morris in her positive assessment of Cuba’s partial 
reform’s performance under the constraints of the U.S. embargo, I differ significantly 
with the terms of her conceptual framework. The Cuban economy is not a state-led 
development model within the universe of market economics as one might qualify the 
cases of “socialist market economies” of Vietnam and China.  On the contrary, the dual 
track model is one of a command economy with a parallel creation of a market track.  
From this very different conceptual reading I look at the partial reform’s 
trajectory of the Cuban economy as proving exactly the contrary of what Morris 
affirmed: The impossibility of successfully incorporating market mechanisms to a 
command economy in the long run and the perverse incentives embedded in partial 
reform equilibrium. The Cuban government avoided the worst case scenario of a big bang 
approach but it is still facing the dilemma of either to adopt a state led development 
model of market economy or succumb to the corruption, lack of transparency and rent 
seeking behavior of partial reform winners. These partial reform winners had 
accumulated sufficient power to transform the post revolutionary command economy into 




The dual track survival strategy adopted by Fidel Castro in the 1990’s 
unintentionally planted seeds for a gradual ideological reformation within the CCP that 
led to a more market friendly attitude in the 2011 VI congress. This process is traceable 
in the documents and discussion of the IV Congress (Cuban Communist Party, 1991), 
and the V Congress of the CCP (Partido Comunista de Cuba , 1997) in 1991 and 1997.  
The changes in the 1990’s opened a discussion about the proper role of private property, 
decentralization, cooperatives, employment in private businesses, rejection of 
igualitarianism and acceptance of inequalities, the new role of remittances, and the 
opening to foreign investment.  
The processes of partial privatization and decentralization of Cuba’s economy 
dismantled important CCP’s control mechanisms over the population and a re-balanced 
its ideology and attitude towards markets. For decades, the power of the party-state over 
careers, jobs and wealth restrained the autonomy of Cubans who dissented from the 
policies and rule of the Communist party. There was always a black market, but illegality 
does not amount to a pluralistic well institutionalized economic society. Since the early 
1990’s, the CCP faced the challenge of dismantling and replacing an ideological platform 
that dismissed foreign investment, competition and private property as features of 




A central part of the CCP’s process of strategic adaptation consisted in the search 
for a new economic model viable without losing power over the state. Such reform 
entails the rise of significant economic plurality and a new culture of negotiation, 
bargaining, contracts and persuasion that is germane to the totalitarian nature of the 
typical command economy.  
 
2.1.1 The starting intellectual and political point of the economic reform 
The discussion about a transition to a market oriented economy in Cuba begins 
from a set of institutions, behaviors and expectations associated to the command system. 
CCP policymakers have serious biases against markets and private property due to the 
revolution rejection of Cuba’s capitalist past. There is also a Cuban national security 
logic that looks at command economy mechanisms as optimal to resist, from the 
conditions of a developing country under a U.S. embargo, the overwhelming impact of 
the globalization of politics, economics and culture. Arguments in favor of state controls 
against the absorbing hegemony of international markets shape the views of the CCP 
policymakers and their socialist and nationalist bases. 
The transformation from central plan distribution to market prices is 
inconceivable without the development of new institutions, culture and relations between 




what Linz and Stepan called an “economic society” (Linz, 1996). Cuba’s economic 
society was until the early 1990’s, one of scarce pluralism and no market culture. In 
addition, despite its victory in the Cold War, capitalism has not worked successful 
everywhere, particularly in many developing countries. Therefore Cuban officials and 
intellectuals are conscious of the importance to carefully distinguish successful examples 
from failed ones of market economies.  
Price liberalization (the quintessential feature of a market economy) requires four 
important interrelated policy goals, essential for the institutional architecture of a mixed 
economy. There are important differences in the way Raul Castro’s team and the CCP 
have assumed these policy goals. Here I discuss briefly the policy goals in terms of 
differences and continuities between Raul and Fidel Castro’s administrations: 
1) Macroeconomic stabilization and management of transitional costs. Cuba has 
been a relatively quiet and politically stable country with low crime rate for the 
last sixty years. Cuba’s unemployment is low (3.8% in 2012). This is in part due 
to the fact that government employs close to 80 % of the labor force at very 
depressed wages. The island has also an extensive network of health and 
education that although it has deteriorated in recent years, it still enrolls the 




One lesson frequently reiterated in the analysis of the CCP about the disastrous 
record in terms of economic and social indicators for most former Soviet Republics was 
the importance of preserving political stability. This is a reiterated thought by many 
Cuban intellectuals, and civil society actors such as the Catholic Church
27
.  Cubans and 
Cubans observers such as Jon Lee Anderson from the New Yorker look at problems in 
their immediate neighborhood and pointed out the importance of preserving the 
revolution’s social achievement (Zuluaga, 2015)not only due to their intrinsic value but 
also because economic growth would be difficult in situations of explosive 
unemployment, inflation, disseminated corruption and organized crime.  
Raul Castro’s team had followed this same discourse about political stability and 
the importance of gradualism but it has expressed a higher conscience of the urgency of 
some important changes. Cuba is also in the middle of a drastic demographic transition 
with an aging population that challenges the viability of its already precarious social 
security system.  
2) A new structure of incentives and corporate governance to make firms 
respond efficiently to market signals and competition. In the Cuban context, 
this means to develop a new entrepreneurial and regulatory culture. Since the 
                                                          
27One clear example of this concern for political stability is the pastoral letter “Love 
expects everything” (“El amortodo lo espera”) of Cuba’s Conference of Bishops in 1993 
(Crahan, 2003). The same message was promoted by the three Popes John Paul II, 




CCP is not interested on allowing the displaced pre-revolutionary capitalist elites 
to recover their power in Cuba, it has to encourage the creation of market-trained 
local and foreign firms and managers.  
Between 1961 and 1992, Cuba dismantled most of the institutions and educational 
capabilities of a market economy that existed before 1959. For three decades, managers 
operated in a context in which skills and connections for a successful career were 
different from those required in market economies. After 1992, the Cuban people had 
witnessed the partial introduction of market mechanisms in the country’s economy.  
This introduction of market mechanism has been gradual and in a two track 
system in which the command economy survived as the favorite one. New mechanisms 
such as dual currency system useful at a time for monetary stability ended creating 
important distortions and disincentives (Recio, 2014). Raul Castro’s team had expressed 
a vision less reluctant to the adoption of market incentives and proclaimed an open 
interest on correcting the distortions associated to the dual economy accepting that such 
correction would necessarily imply an expansion of the role of markets
28
.   
                                                          
28For instance, Minster of the economy Marino Murillo stated that the purpose of 
currency unification and reform of the state owned enterprises is to align the system of 





3) Opening space for new sectors (foreign investors, cooperatives and private 
firms) while developing proper government institutions to protect their legal 
rights and integrate them as a whole economic system.  
One of the main differences between the type of reform announced in the VI 
Congress of the CCP and the 1990’s reform refers to the question of the integration 
between public and private sectors.  Cuba’s changes in the 1990’s were closer in practice 
and goals to the experiments of command economy reform implemented by the Eastern 
European communist countries (Poland, Hungary and the German Democratic Republic) 
in the 1970’s and 1980’s. The Cuban vision exhibited a clear aversion to private property 
and a bias in favor of the state owned companies.  
For almost the first two decades after 1991 the party-state did not attempt to 
integrate the private sector to the general economy. Cuba’s partial reform approach 
inserted segments of markets within a general command economy despite the fact that 
this were already proven to be a failure in Eastern Europe to make sustainable communist 
party rule. From a strictly economic perspective, partial reform prevented a faster 
economic takeoff by obstructing positive synergies and complementary measures, but 






. In his views, foreign investment, and small private ownership carry 
capitalist seeds to be contained.  Such policy implied the stigmatization of the non-state 
sector, bounding it to a mere response to crisis.  
Raul Castro’s seek for economic growth and improvement of living standards as a 
source of political legitimacy made necessary an institutional and legal framework in 
which the government integrates private and public sectors to the central focus on 
economic growth. Policies of enfant industry, promotion of exports, loans to the private 
sector need institutions trained and regulated for such endeavors in a market setting.  
4) The decentralization of authority necessary for the autonomy 
and regulation of new economic agents growing out of the plan. 
One great difference between Cuba and the socialist experiences of East Asia 
refers to the starting institutional point of decentralization. In China and Vietnam the 
central unit of the Command Economy was the province, while Cuba was closer to the 
                                                          
29There is a consensus among most economists of development and plan to market 
transition about the disadvantages of partial reform. In the study of Cuba’s economy one 
exception is Emily Morris who claimed that partial reform and critical views of markets 
“picking winners” were important components of Cuba’s successful survival and 
updating strategies in the 1990-2000 period(Morris, 2014). Morris developed a strong 
argument that for the specific conditions Cuba faced in the studied period and the 





East European Soviet model
30
, in which ministries organized economic activities 
vertically from up to bottom. In China and Vietnam, economic and political 
decentralization produced inmmediate efficiency gains by unleashing the initiative of 
town owned companies, and by promoting competition and emulation of good practices 
from one province or village to another
31
.  
Raul Castro at the time of his ascent to power in 2006 had to deal not only with 
the flaws of a command economy and the exhaustion of the charismatic leadership but 
also with the growing presence of significant plurality of economic actors and the 
dissemination of ideas of openness and marketization in Cuban society, including within 
the ranks of the CCP and the military.  
                                                          
30There are comparison about decentralization between China and Vietnam and Eastern 
European communist experiences. One of the most comprehensive discussion is done by 
Gerard Roland in Transition and Economics (Roland, 2000). Another discussion of this 
topic is provided by Barry Naughton in “Growing out of the Plan: China’s Economic 
Reform 1978-1993, (Naughton, 1995). Naughton describes the dual track system in ways 
that are quite similar to the characteristics of the economic reform in Cuba with the 
central difference that under Fidel Castro’s leadership, the Cuban government did not 
accepted the idea of ending in a market economy and imposed strict constraints of the 
market track. In the new phase of the reforms, Raul Castro had indicated a friendlier 
attitude towards market mechanisms and private property.  
 
31Here it is convenient to remember that provinces in Vietnam and China might be larger 
than the entire Cuba. Such idea however does not deny the importance of different 
starting institutional point because within provinces, China and Vietnam had larger 
decentralization and autonomous administrative rule than in the traditional Soviet model 




2.1.2 The Dual track System 
At the center of Cuba’s gradualism is the dual track system
32
. Raul’s position 
about markets and the interaction between the state and the non-state sectors of the 
economy is not path-breaking in political terms but it is a path changing shift in economic 
terms.  The end of political stigmatization of markets and private property does not 
weaken the power of the CCP in the short term but forces a more pluralistic framework 
than the current economic society in the long run.  
A process-tracing explanation of the transformation of the cultural and 
institutional nature of the two tracks system reveals the scope of the economic change 
that is taking place. The two-track system has its origins in the survival strategy 
enunciated at the IV Congress of the CCP in 1992. There, Fidel Castro announced painful 
measures to attract hard currency to Cuba in response to the collapse of the country’s 
foreign trade in the previous year.  The strategy took shape with the legalization of the 
dollar as a currency for domestic market transactions in parallel to the use of the Cuban 
peso for all plan based activities. 
                                                          
32For a discussion of the dual track system as a transitional device see Roland, Gerard 
(2000) Transition and Economics. Politics, Markets and Firms. MIT Press (Roland, 
Transition and Economics: Politics, Markets and Firms, 2000). For a discussion of the 
dual track system strategy of transition in China, see, Naughton, Barry (1995), Growing 
Out of the Plan (Naughton, Growing out of the Plan, 1995).  Naughton identified this 






, not a big bang approach
34
, was a relative easy choice for 
the Cuban leadership. Gradualism was the Cuban leadership’s consensus because of two 
main reasons: 1) on conditions of uncertainty, gradualism has lower reversal costs than a 
big bang approach if reform brings a loss of political control or a failed economic policy. 
2) The implementation of a reform in one sector or region can provide information to the 
CCP about the expected outcome of the program if implemented in other areas, 
identifying complementarities of changes and strengthening the capacity of the system to 
adapt without surrendering its political controls.   
Gradualism provides also a venue for Fidel Castro’s  anti-market bias. It implied a 
will not to privatize unless it was strictly necessary (as it was the case with the attraction 
of foreign investment to get technology, markets and fresh capital). It also minimizes the 
expansion of new private actors since they were antithetical to the command economy, a 
central pillar of the CCP rule.  The focus then was on improving the performance of state 
sector firms and use foreign investment to acquire capital, markets and experience to 
                                                          
33A gradual strategy of transition from command economies to market ones emphasizes 
the cultural and institutional challenges of building a well founded market economy. 
Advocates of this strategy point out to the importance of a given sequence of reforms to 
reduce transition and reversal costs in conditions of uncertainty.  
 
34The big bang approach of transition from command economies to market ones implies a 
simultaneous and quick adoption of market and private property principles and 
mechanisms. In the case of Cuba this option was openly rejected first of all because the 
CCP, the central policymaker body was a reticent reformer not even desiring the adoption 




reactivate the state sectors throughout the creation of joint ventures. Gradualism was also 
a way to minimize great uncertainties, and defend government controls over the 
economic life of society. Counting on Fidel Castro’s charisma and Venezuelan support 
after 2003 with oil prices over one hundred twenty dollars a barrel, the CCP could afford 
taking time for savaging the command economy system.  
Fidel’s idea of the two track system consisted on the combination of a command 
economy track, based on the old structure and a new track integrated to the world 
economy, with a different set of regulations and a gradual liberalization of prices. The 
clearest manifestations of the dual track system are the existence of different prices for 
the same product or service, and the parallel functioning of two and at times three 
different currencies (To change “convertible” pesos into hard currency, companies needs 
an approval of the Central Bank).  This official two tier price regulation system should 
not be confused with a large black market in which many products of the official 
economy were also traded at higher prices than those of the subsidized through the ration 
card
35
 using any of the three currencies.  
                                                          
35Obviously the existence of the dual track system offered additional rent opportunities 
for black market agents who profit from the arbitrage opportunities offered by the 
inconsistencies of official policies but this is a different issue. Something that I discussed 
later i show the adoption of a market orientation by the reforms under Raul Castro 
reduces the size of the black market precisely because it allow prices to regulate supply 




At the moment of its adoption, the dual track system served stabilization: the 
fiscal deficit was out of control at 24.3 % average of the GDP between 1990 and 1993. 
Facing major disorganization and massive inefficiencies in the command system, 
dollarization was originally a spontaneous response of part of the population and later a 
governmental directive to insulate the sectors that could drive growth from the rest of the 
economic mess. The government began to change the economic structure of some areas 
(tourism, bio-technology, Grupo de AdministracionEmpresarial (GAE) of the Armed 
Forces) of the economy while trying to keep the old command principles in the rest of the 
economy.  
The V Congress of the CCP in 1997 expressed clearly in its economic resolution 
the purpose of the changes: it was to restore macroeconomic equilibrium without 
renouncing to the “socialist” (command) economy. The importance of the state owned 
companies and the emergency plans as the main economic structures were reiterated 
while the non-state sector and the opening to tourism and foreign investment were 
presented as mechanisms of last resort to weather the economic crisis (Castro F. , Informe 
al V Congreso del Partido Comunista de Cuba, 1997).  
The creation of the dual track system impacted Cuba’s power structure at the 
technical and political levels. The necessary opening to the outside world and the 




regulation sparked new debates within Cuban economists, politicians, the military and the 
population in general.  To implement the opening to foreign investment and keep it under 
control, Fidel and Raul Castro moved powerful actors in terms of reputation, loyalty and 
political networks to the new sector. These new or recycled elites from the state economy 
or the Armed Forces began to develop their own visions and interests in deepening the 
reforms. Simultaneously, those who remained in the old structures began to see 
possibilities of improving their standing by changing lanes to the market oriented track.  
Fidel Castro and his most ardent followers committed to the defense of the 
communist ideas were also “caught in a contradiction”. “Rooted in Castro’s charismatic 
leadership,”-Perez-Stable wrote in 1999-  
the ideological cannon of sovereignty and equality, and some level of mass 
mobilization, this mode of governing prevents the interactions of state, markets, 
and society-“the master process”- from fully taking hold and transforming Cuban 
state socialism in ways similar to eastern Europe, China and Vietnam. The Cuban 
regime has yet to embrace a program of economic transformations that fully 
sustain these interactions (Perez-Stable, Oct. 1999). 
 
For showing a light at the end of the tunnel, the CCP had to highlight the 
successes of the new market oriented sectors. For restraining the impact of the new 
structures they had to lower its relevance with anticapitalist mobilization and propaganda. 
Politically, Fidel insisted on reducing the profit opportunities for the new managers in 




favored command structure, low competition and monopolistic structures in the market 
oriented track, precisely the type of partial reform equilibrium in which corrupt practices 
and rent seeking found fertile ground.  
The positive feedback about the performance of market-oriented structures 
brought to the political system a heated debate about market opening in the national 
development strategy.  Equally important was the negative feedback coming from the 
managers of the state owned companies interested on strengthening the public sector. The 
lack of congruity of the two tracks system generated predatory practices and distortions 
that reduced the possibility of measuring properly the efficiency of the public sector. 
Productivity of government employees was affected by salaries in a lower value 
currency. Development institutions providing public goods like health, and education 
became underappreciated because their value was assessed in Cuban pesos, the weakest 
currency.  
The retirement of Fidel Castro presented a new reality to the CCP that forced it to 
rethink not only an economic policy but also the economic model in which its political 
rule was based. Until he fell sick, the adjustment of the two tracks system was subjected 
to Fidel’s veto powers. But the debate about the function of the two tracks was taking 




economy system or be the platform to launch a new CCP rule with a market oriented 
economic model integrating the two sectors in a mixed economy? 
 The two track system has different meanings when it was used as an instrument 
for stabilization under Fidel’s leadership, as an attempt to rationalize the command 
economy; and when it turns a tool for economic transition to a mixed economy, as it 
became after the VI Congress of the CCP. Raul Castro’s program is not path breaking (it 
preserves communist party rule and the dominant role of the state in the economy) but it 
is path changing because it implies: a) the overcoming of the two-track system 
throughout currency unification and open channels for integration between the private 
and the public sector, b) In the field of ideas, it ends the stigmatization of private property 
and markets, c) it accompanies the economic reform with an erosion of the boundaries 
between the foreign owned segment of the economy and the one under strict Cuban 








2.2 Tracing economic reform as a political option for the Cuban Communist 
Party (CCP) 
2.2.1. Fidel Castro’s two tracks strategy in defense of the Command 
Economy 
The dual track strategy was not- in Fidel Castro’s purpose- the beginning of the 
road to a market economy but its end. In the 1990’s, no major actor within the CCP ever 
expressed a desire for a transition to a comprehensive market economy. To stimulate the 
economy, the CCP changed:  
1) The employment policy, allowing several categories of self-employment with a 
limited opportunity for hiring family members. 
 2) The agricultural policy, transforming many state owned companies in 
cooperative units and beginning a land-leasing program.  
3) The policy towards remittances and foreign investment opening the country to 
private hard currency inflows.  
These openings existed in parallel to a dominant command economy in control of 
everything else. As Emily Morris said: “This implies a more flexible policy framework 




Economists and policymakers alike expressed these parameters in terms of principios
36
, 
rather than Marxist-Leninist dogma or a ‘party line”(Morris, 2014, p. 12). These 
principles were essentially the two central ideological pillars of the revolution, 




The nationalist impulse drives towards expanding the reforms and centering 
public policy on the idea of economic development. The communists were interested 
primarily in the survival of their one-party system and therefore the totalitarian structures 
in which control of society is based. 
                                                          
36Morris described how “These principles invariably included upholding national 
sovereignty, preserving los logros de la revolucion- the gains or achievements in health, 
education, social equality and full employment; often referred to simply as los logros- 
and maintaining ‘revolutionary ethics’, which has involved a strong official stand against 
corruption and disapproval of ostentatious display” (Morris, 2014, p. 12) 
 
37The importance of communism and nationalism as the ideational parameters within 
which the economic policy is decided is one of the most underestimated factors by the 
traditional analysis about Cuba in the United States. Scholars such as Carmelo Mesa 
Lago (Mesa-Lago, 2004), and others do not seem to recognize the fact that Cuba’s 
economic decisions are taken from a bounded policy frontier in which pragmatism or 
ideological rigidities do not exist in abstract. Mesa-Lago has developed a theory of cycles 
associated- according to him- to periods of pragmatism versus those signed by idealistic 
rigidities. As I discuss here the issue is not of pragmatism versus idealistic goals but 
about ideological balances between nationalism and communism, development or state 





As a leader, Fidel Castro balanced different nationalist and communist 
approaches
38
 within the CCP. But his speeches at the IV and V Congress of the Cuban 
Communist Party revealed his preferences for preserving state socialism, even when 
“painful concessions” were necessary. The central goal under his aegis consisted on 
preserving state control over the economy while reluctantly tolerating some 
compartmentalized pockets of markets in search for more efficient technology, 
management and capital.  
Both factions (nationalists and communists) concurred on the great importance of 
food security, a sustainable agricultural policy that reduces Cuba’s excessive dependence 
on food imports; and energy security that was precarious at the beginning of the 1990’s 
due to the end of the special relations with the Soviet Union
39
. In these two issues, the 
                                                          
38 The Cuban Communist Party contains different factions in a spectrum of opinions, 
regions, and functional groups. In terms of ideology, I emphasized here the two 
recognized pillars of the CCP in this field: nationalism and communism as two currents 
that overlaps but at times are contradictory. The central category of nationalism in this 
context is the national interests defined as sovereignty and development. The central 
category of communism is the party as a proletarian vanguard defined by the goals of 
totalitarian controls and promotion of social equality. This is obviously a methodological 
simplification difficult to verify with surveys because the CCP principle of “democratic 
centralism” does not recognize even the existence of factions.  
 
39Although Cuba assured its energy supply in the 2000’s with the special relationship 
with Venezuela, and the agreement of oil for medical and educational services, food 
security is still a mere aspiration. According to former minister of the Economy Jose Luis 




Cuban military endorsed policies of opening due to their relevance for national security. 
In 1994, Raul Castro toured the country’s three armies, meeting provincial party leaders 
and advocating an agriculture markets reform. The move was symbolic because three 
years earlier, Fidel Castro has rejected these same policies in his concluding remarks at 
the IV Congress of the CCP
40
.   
The reform measures in the 1990 (mostly between 1993 and 1996, although there 
were some reforms in the financial sector later in the decade) fit a pattern of 
rationalization within the command economy. Even the dollarization and the dual 
currency system were part of a strategy of survival not of systemic transformation. It 
includes the expansion of a minuscule non-state sector, some partial liberalization of 
prices, the de-collectivization of part of the agricultural state owned companies that were 
transformed into heavily regulated cooperatives, and a new law of foreign investment in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
of the prices of the products, not in volume. This is one of the most important 
vulnerabilities of Cuba’s economy. (Rodriguez, 2014) 
 
40Gail Reed presented a friendly but essentially objective narrative about the IV Congress 
of the CCP and the debate associated with it in “Island in the Storm: The Cuba 
Communist Party’s Fourth Congress” (Reed, 1992). For a more pessimistic narrative 








. The changes represented also a reorientation of the development strategy from 
the priority on some industries that served Cuba’s integration to the extinguished 
COMECON such as the sugar industry to tourism and services, with emphasis on 
biopharmaceutical technologies and products.  
As soon as some market oriented measures produced positive results, the appetites 
for more changes were expressed at the intellectual
42
 and street level where new small 
businesses began to mushroom. But Fidel Castro’s political authority and Hugo Chavez’s 
Venezuela’s economic support after 2003 cooled off these pro-market impulses. Between 
                                                          
41Here I don’t have the space to discuss the specificities of the changes in the Cuban 
economy during the 1990’s. For an exhaustive discussion of these processes, the reader 
might follow the annual research compendium of the Center for the Study of the Cuban 
Economy (Centro de Estudios de la EconomiaCubana (CEEC), and the books by 
Carmelo Mesa Lago (2012), Cuba en la Era de Raul Castro, Ed. Colibri, Madrid. Mesa 
Lago discussed the changes and some reversal in the late 1990’s, early 2000 as part of his 
theory about pragmatic (pro-market) and idealistic (statist) cycles in the post 1959 history 
of the Cuban economy. A great edited volume with important insights from Cuban 
economists from the island and Cuba scholars in the outside world is Dominguez, Jorge 
and Perez-Villanueva, Omar (200.), TITLE, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge2003?????. For comparisons between the Cuban changes and the reforms in 
Russia, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Vietnam and China, see Burki and Erikson, 
Transforming Socialist Economy: Lessons for Cuba and beyond.  
 
42The most prominent advocacy group for more market oriented changes but committed 
to the socialist values of the system was the Center for the Study of the Americas (CEA), 
a CCP- affiliated think tank that was restructured in 1996 as result of a purge initiated by 






1996 and 2006, the most communist sectors
43
 of the Cuban elites slowed down the 
market oriented changes. Rather than promoting a state led modernization within a 
market friendly mixed economy, the 1997 V Congress of the CCP prioritized political 
control over economic dynamism.  
A pause was imposed to bridle the political liberalizing effects of the previously 
adopted economic changes.  Between 1996 and 2005, the CCP strengthened the case by 
case approach to new licenses for self-employed businesses. Inspectors raided the 
existing ones, not to enforce the law with penalties but to close many of them. The 
number of licenses decreased dramatically because the regulators eventually ceased to 
issue them almost completely.  
One of the worst command economy feature reinforced by the backsliding was 
the state aversion to competition when it affected state owned companies. The first 
targets of economic repression were those businesses that competed with state owned 
companies, including small restaurants near inefficient hotels.  Fidel Castro was 
particularly adamant against any integration between the public sector and its private 
counterparts.  
                                                          
43Here I take the ideological position of leaders within the CCP as expressed by them. 
There are cases of communist hardliners who are among the most corrupt in the party 
ranks. That was the case of the group of the Battle of ideas, integrated predominantly by 
young defenders of austerity and sacrifice. After Fidel Castro fell sick government 
investigators found that several defenders of the radical view were involved in corruption 




One unexpected help to the communist faction after 2001 came from George W 
Bush’s presidency. As soon as the Cuban American pro-embargo sector in Florida 
criticized the republican president for his inaction about Cuba, Bush intensified his 
surveillance and sanctions against financial institutions that used dollars in their 
transactions with Cuba, increasing the penalties imposed to Cuba and its partners for this 
concept. Bush’s economic war reinforced the national security logic that feed anti-market 
bias and partial reform equilibrium. In 2004, the Cuban government withdrew the U.S. 
dollar from circulation, receiving a onetime rainfall of dollars by changing those already 
in the island to a currency called CUC, or Cuban Convertible Peso. The government 
imposed a 10 percent tax in the use of dollars, affecting remittances and incentivizing 
travelers to change their hard currency to Euros or Canadian dollars.   
But the drive for a transition to a market economy was never put to rest.  The 
changes of the 1990’s
44
 and the debate about deeper reforms expanded the policy frontier 
for a more comprehensive adoption of a coherent mixed economy. Market oriented 
changes were strong enough to feed up the spirits of foreign investors and new Cuban 
entrepreneurs. Every time the government opened channels for people to ventilate their 
                                                          
44The transition from a command economy to a mixed economy is primarily an 
institutional change. Cuba needs to replace the implicit taxation of a command economy 
over all state owned companies by a normal system of explicit government revenues and 




policy preferences, the consultation revealed support for a gradual but consistent opening 
to market oriented structures.  
 
Expressions of well-known revolutionary intellectuals and artists and publications 
associated to think tanks and civil society groups such as the Churches revealed a wider 
spectrum of nationalist ideas
45
. The urgency of changes in food and energy security 
carried on an acceptance of more pluralistic visions about the economy that was not 
instantly transferred to politics. As result, Cuban economists working for the government 
began to flout alternative economic proposals that were not associated and did not form 
part of the political opposition. Some market oriented proposals passed the official filter 
of nationalist and socialist ideologies.  
The market oriented sectors expanded. The gradual emergence of institutions, 
culture and education began to make viable a market economy. The self-employed 
workers and the sectors opened for foreign investment, particularly tourism and nickel 
mining became the most dynamic ones of the Cuban economy. The creation of the 
ONAT (the National Office of Fiscal Administration) had a demonstrative effect about 
                                                          
45Different more pro-market positions are traceable in publications such as 
EconomiaCubana, the bulletins of the Center for the Study of the Cuban Economy, the 
Center for the Study of the Americas’s journal “Cuadernos de Nuestra America”. From 
the churches, there was magazine “Caminos” associated to the leftist Protestantism in the 
Martin Luther King Center, and Palabra Nueva, Espacio (later Espacio Laical) and Vitral 




the possibilities of collecting government’s revenues and preserve social services in a 
market oriented context. The Schools of economics, accounting and business 
administration began to prepare managers and economists in market economics courses. 
Spain, Canada and Mexico offered fellowships programs to prepare Cuban scholars, 
officials and managers for performing functions associated to a market economy. 
By the mid 2000’s, there was conscience in the Cuban elites and population 
against a return to the old command economy and the need of second reform wave. The 
successes of China and Vietnam in which economic growth together with minimal 
political liberalization enhanced the legitimacy for Communist parties to remain in power 
gained sympathy among non liberal reformers and changed the views of some of the most 
doctrinarian party apparatchiks.  Several of the most internationally connected Cuban 
economists and CCP intellectuals called for an analysis of the lessons of the East Asian 
communist experience.  
Cuba’s national security establishment saw the impact on the debate of U.S. 
policy towards Cuba of the opening of a food trade loophole in the U.S. Trade embargo 
in 2000. American farmers became an unbeatable force for the Cuban American pro-
embargo lobby.  Cuba’s Foreign Policy establishment also saw how foreign investors 
from Europe and Canada operated as promoters of economic reform in Cuba while 




in Latin America provided an atmosphere of opportunities for deepening the economic 
reform, because of the presence of a friendly government to a reform driven Cuba in 
Lula’s Brazil.  
2.2.2 The economy under Raul Castro before the VI Congress of the CCP in 
2011 
Fidel Castro’s retirement was of primordial importance because it unlocked some 
of the political bottlenecks stopping the reform. Fidel has been a bulwark of the strategy 
based on permanent mobilization. The absence of his charisma as a source of political 
legitimacy propelled a new discussion within Cuba’s upper echelons about the need for 
the comprehensive adoption of a mixed economy. Fidel’s ultimate goal, as the supreme 
agenda setter
46
, was not economic growth or development, even under the CCP rule as it 
was the case with its Chinese and Vietnamese homologue, but the preservation of 
                                                          
46The concept of agenda setter is more adequate to Fidel Castro’s role in the Cuban 
political system than the one of “veto player”. Fidel Castro had not only the capacity to 
veto any proposal but he settled the agenda with “take it or leave it” proposals. He 
typically had the “first mover” capacity that constitutionally was in the hands of the State 
Council but in the end he had the last word. See Tsebelis George (2002), Veto Players: 
How Political Institutions Work, Princeton University Press. Princeton, NJ. “Veto Players 
are individual or collective actors whose agreement is necessary for a change of the status 
quo” (p. 36).  I am conscious about the fact that Tsebelis presented his argument in the 
context of democratic political system. That said, there are process of public policy 
deliberations and decision making in post-totalitarian settings in which some of his 




“communism”. This totalitarian pattern is shaped more by ideology than by economic or 
political demands. 
 
Harvard University professor Jorge Dominguez synthesized the state of the Cuban 
economy just before Raul Castro took power in the following way:   
Cuba’s economic reforms introduced in the first half of the 1990s were 
successful. The government responded pragmatically and effectively to the 
economic crisis. The reforms stopped the crisis, set the basis for economic 
recovery, stabilized both fiscal accounts and the political system, and retained, 
albeit frayed, a social safety net. The political regime persevered and changed 
little, remaining highly centralized and dependent on a key leader. It continued to 
invest in health and education and it made significant movements towards energy 
self-sufficiency. These results gained political support at a time of great peril for 
the regime….  
Yet Cuba suffered an economic debacle from which it has yet to recover. It may 
not reach the 1985 GDP per capita levels until this century’s second decade. The 
economy is populated by industrial dinosaurs, and Cuba remains an ineffective 
exporter of agricultural products. Its balance of payments is unsustainable because 
it is financed through the non-payment of international financial obligations. Its 
fiscal situation is out of balance because inflation is repressed and partly hidden 
through illegal markets and dualistic markets. There is no sustainable equilibrium 
in its domestic and international accounts (Dominguez, 2005). 
 
This unsustainable combination determined the starting point for Raul’s reform in 
2006. The Cuban economy was not anymore a classical command economy but still had 




sectors and institutions in which private property and isolated market structures were not 
an anomaly but market prices were rejected as the central coordination mechanisms.  
 
Fidel Castro left an ideological legacy in which the use of market was only an 
instrument of last resort. Given the secrecy with which his sickness was managed, and the 
fact the he distributed his functions to several leaders, of which Raul Castro was a primus 
inter pares, there was apprehension to launch a process of changes that he could condemn 
if he has returned to his presidential functions. Fidel Castro’s “Battle of Ideas” Campaign 
stigmatized market and private property as a “Trojan horse” capable of destroying 
socialism.  Non-state economic actors existed but they lived under a permanent fear of 
policy reversal and predatory taxation that can put them out of business.  
Fidel Castro’s revolutionary authority was also important in forming an 
intellectual tradition within Cuba’s policy circles that rejected copying from the 
experience of other communist countries. He shaped the nature of the economic opening 
not only with his anti-market biases but also by rightly warning about the political, 
cultural and economic differences between Cuba and the China/Vietnam experiences.  
Some of the options available to China/Vietnam are not available to Cuba for structural 




distribution differences, and the U.S. embargo make the adoption of the low wage 
manufacturing export-platform model inadequate for Cuba.  
Fidel Castro was also important in changing the attitude to foreign investment at 
least at the level of discourse to a more instrumental approach. As Richard Feinberg 
explained:  
For revolutionary Cuba, foreign investment has been about more than dollars and 
cents. It’s about cultural identity and national sovereignty. It’s also about a model 
of socialist planning, a hybrid of Marxism-leninism and Fidelismo, which has 
jealously guarded its domination over all aspects of the economy. During its five 
decades of rule, the regime’s political and social goals always dominated 
economic policy; security of the revolution trumped productivity (Feinberg, 2012, 
p. 1).  
 
In the 1990’s, journalists bombarded Fidel Castro in almost every tour with 
questions about his opening to foreign investment combined with his fiery nationalist 
rhetoric. He provided many answers that although were not satisfying for Western 
audiences, gave important guiding spaces for Cuban officials and intellectuals who 
viewed direct foreign investment as a tool for development.  
But the partial reform trajectory had also created by 2006 its own legacy. The 
dollar and later the CUC were used as domestic currencies. There were some experience 
and state institutions that have already worked with the emerging non-state sectors. Using 




market economy had consolidated. In interaction with the foreign investors, a new 
entrepreneurial class of managers, accountants, other workers and even military officers 
were acting as a constituency less averse to markets. There was also an economic class of 
winners of the partial reform strategy, taking credit and profiting from arbitrage 
opportunities and non-competitive structures.  
Foreign investment was critical in the reanimation of tourism, energy, 
communications and mining. Tourism became the first source of hard currency for 
several years. From receiving over 600 000 international visitors every year in 1994, 
Cuba jumped to receive more than two million after 2008. Most of the new hotel 
capacities were developed with some type of association with foreign partners. Mining, 
particularly nickel in the Eastern province of Holguin, was rescued from a depressed 
situation by the creation of a major joint venture with Sherritt International from Canada. 
From $ 201 millions, foreign investment deals lifted Cuba’s mining exports to $599 
million in 2000.  
The shift on the official attitude towards foreign investment opened an important 
door for further discussion of the issue. The Cuban Ministry of Basic Industries under 
reform oriented minister Marcos Portal (who was removed from power in 2002) invested 
most of the profits from the mining business in expanding its energy sources from 




in the association with Sherritt and the development of a generation of efficient managers 
trained in modern market oriented skills
47
.  Cuba produced 671000 tons of oil in 1990 
and 3.6 million tons in 2002. It produced less than 20 million cubic meters of gas in 1996 
and 585 million in 2002.  
The Cuban Diaspora became an integral part of the survival of the Cuban 
economy
48
. A central paradox of the Cuban situation is that the same community that 
includes the most rabid defenders of the U.S. embargo is also in virtue of its remittances, 
family support, travel and phone bills an essential support of the Cuban economy. Before 
1993, having dollars was illegal in Cuba. After the emigration of several hundreds of 
thousands Cubans after 1994, including more than 200 000 in the last five years, the flow 
of remittances is calculated between $ 800 million and a billion at least (some people talk 
                                                          
47In 2003-, after a dispute with Fidel Castro and Carlos Lage, then vice premier, and some 
major electricity blackout, the Politburo accorded Marcos Portal’s removal from his 
position as minister of the Basic Industries. In 2009, Raul Castro removed Carlos Lage 
from his position as vice premier and member of the Politburo.  
 
48This is an area in which it there were significant changes beginning in the late 1970’s 
but particularly after the 1990’s. To have an idea of the issue, it is worth to remember that 
Overseas living Cubans were not allowed to visit their country of origin even for a visit 
between 1959 and 1978. Then the government imposed a quota of 100 per month with 
compulsory conditions about paying hotel rooms, etc. This quota was expanded and in 
the 1990s the government relaxed all the number limitations (Some exiles are still 
excluded). In October 2012, the government approved new decrees that changed the 
migratory law allowing far more flexibility for travelling, including the end of the exit 
visa. Cuban migrants sending remittances, helping their relatives or traveling to the island 




about even two billion). After the government legalized the possession of dollars, it 
created a monopoly network of three hard currency stores (TRD) chains to collect 
revenues associated to the mentioned flow. By 2004, the Cuban government made the so 
called “convertible peso” (It is not always convertible) or CUC (It is pronounced “cook”) 
into the only currency to use in the hard currency stores.  
There are also demographic considerations that explain Cuban aversion to drastic 
economic reforms. Cuba has a relatively high human capital endowment (for a 
developing country) in terms of life expectancy and education
49
 combined with low wage 
rates. But in the absence of a market culture and structure, many of the human capital 
assets have been wasted. Entrepreneurship has been limited and the attraction of the U.S. 
proximity and social ties had attracted many to immigrate to the United States in relative 




                                                          
49Life expectancy at birth was in 2012 79.1 years with 99.8 % of adult literacy rate. 
Primary school enrollment rate is 98.4 and secondary school enrollment rate is 86.6. 
(UNICEF, 2012) 
 
50Cubans who enter legally to the U.S. territory are allowed a path to legal residency after 
one year. The law has been questioned by the Cuban government several as a teaser for 
all type of emigration from Cuba. Simultaneously, the Cuban hard line right has 
promoted a change on the law as part of its rejection of new emigrants who tend to 
oppose the embargo once they become citizens and return to Cuba and send remittances 






 is becoming already a problem to the healthcare and social 
security system because the population is relatively old. Demographers predict that Cuba 
is approaching a second transition of population decrease since 2006. It has the 
characteristics of a developed country without the levels of industrialization and income 
per capita of it. Compare to the cases of East Asia, the labor force is older and less 
responsive to reform induced changes. 75 % of the population lives in the urban areas and 
is currently depending on the food rationing system. They are reticent to move back to 
the countryside or the Eastern provinces even if the conditions and incentives in these 
areas were more propitious for growth.  
Two critical obstacles to rapid growth, never solved by the limited changes of the 
1990’s and the relative improvement of the general situation in the mid 2000’s, were the 
poor performances in agriculture and sugar industry (it used to be Cuba’s first industry
52
).  
After 1993, the government instituted a conversion from state owned agricultural 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
51According to data of ECLAC, Cuba’s population is in the road to be the oldest of the 
whole region. Life expectancy is 7- for women and 7- for men. In 2010. The percentage 
of population older than 60 was in 2010 17.8 % and it is forecasted to be 26.1%. See 
Mesa-Lago, Carmelo (2012)  Table 25, p. 198  
 
52A brief but substantive discussion about the situation of the Sugar Industry in the 
previous years to the beginning of the reform is provided by Mesa-Lago, Carmelo (2012) 
Cuba en la era de Raul Castro. Editorial Colibri, Madrid. Pp-75-82 (Mesa-Lago, Cuban 




enterprises into Basic Units of Cooperatives Production (UBPC). The new units had a 
better property definition structure but failed to change a hostile environment in which 
the state procurement system (acopio) distorted the prices of agricultural products and 
limited the incentives for profits. A political decision by Fidel Castro of dismantling half 
of the Sugar industry of the country and dedicate the rest of the land to new agricultural 
activities caused fatidic disruption in uncultivated land, de-capitalization of the industrial 
base of the country
53
.   
“While the Cuban economy as a whole has surpassed the production level of 
1989, - Cuban economist Anicia Miranda wrote- the agriculture sector has failed to 
produce at more than 60 % of 1989 levels” (Miranda, 2010)Such disastrous performance 
had significant consequences for Cuba’s external sector and it is the worst threat to the 
survival of the regime. Rather than provide exports earnings as it was the case in the 
whole Cuban history, the debacle in Agriculture forced an unsustainable trend to growing 
food imports just to guarantee minimal levels of nutrition to the population. Without a 
drastic reversal of this tendency, it is impossible to conceive any rational strategy of 
economic growth or development. As Miranda explains, “It is no accident, therefore, that 
agriculture has been chosen as the battlefield on which reform of the Cuban economic 
model will begin” (Miranda, 2010, p. 156). 
                                                          
53For a discussion of the situation of the Cuban Agriculture before and after the 1990’s 
reform see Nova, Armando (2010), “Cuban Agriculture in the “Special Period” and 




By the mid 2000’s another important external factor entered into Cuba’s 
economic equation: Cuba’s position got strengthened with the alliance with Venezuela’s 
charismatic president Hugo Chavez and its favorable position in the oil market. By 2006, 
Cuba began to enjoy a surplus in its current account balance as result of the trade of 
doctors and teachers services for oil with the South American nation. This trade was 
expanded after the creation of the ALBA (The Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas) 
along the Havana-Caracas Axis but incorporating other countries (Bolivia, Nicaragua and 
Ecuador) that elected leftist leaders or depended on Venezuela’s oil (Several islands in 
the Caribbean).   
By the summer of 2006, when Raul Castro assumed the presidency, Latin 
America was showing historical growth rates, in part because of a commodities boom. 
Most hemisphere elites looked at Cuba as a country in an economic transition.  Cuba 
couldn’t take full advantage of these favorable developments because of its own 








2.2.3 The FAR: an army for Raul Castro’s reform 
Facing the 1990’s crisis, the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) were the best 
prepared institution to deal with the hardening of the budget
54
. This peculiar situation of 
the military promoting a specific type of adjustment has path dependence implications for 
the accompanying debate about economic reform within the current one party system. No 
other institutional actor is more constitutive of the logic adopted since the 1990’s:  one 
that is partial, driven by national security and domestic stability needs, with strong 
monopolistic structures, and ambiguous in terms of adapting Cuba to the world order.  
This is particularly relevant for several reasons: 1) because of its military 
organization, the FAR is what Gerard Roland has called “a fast moving institution”, it 
does not necessarily change often but can change quickly”(Roland, Understanding 
Institutional Change: Fast Moving and Slow Moving Institutions, 2004), 2) The FAR is a 
core institution designed as a bulwark of the one party system. As long as the Castros, 
their supreme commanders, are in charge; their national security mission would be 
indistinguishable from their loyalty to the party, 3) Since national security is their 
priority, economic development is in their agenda because it is instrumental to serve such 
supreme goal. This instrumental logic creates a balance in policymaking in which partial 
                                                          
54Hal Klepak explained how the FAR budget was cut down drastjcally as part of the 
survival strategy of the 1990’s while at the same time, the institution gained new 
functions and autonomy from the CCP (Klepak, Cuba's Revolutionary Armed Forces: 




reform is the most probable outcome. 4) The FAR and its minor partner, the Ministry of 
Interior, operate in a context of monopoly and opacity. They have the monopoly of the 
use of force in Cuba’s territory and classify most of its organic life as state secrets, 
subject fundamentally to the supervision of its own control organizations, like the 
military counterintelligence (CIM).   
The primordial role of the military in the design and implementation of the 
economic reform has its origins in Fidel Castro’s response to the budget cuts associated 
to the end of the Soviet Union. Despite the infamous Cause 1 and Cause 2 of the 1989, 
Fidel Castro trusted the Armed Forces as his favorite cadres. As part of the government 
reshuffling of leaders and unification of ministries to cope with the Special period, 
military officers were appointed as ministers or vice-ministers in key civilian government 
and political posts.  
As the longest minister of defense in world history, Raul Castro implemented new 
policies within the military and developed a set of industries and activities to release the 
national budget from the burden of providing most supplies to the Armed Forces. 
Logistics was a central concern. Cuba’s high command developed its own set of 
companies to deal with the need for its own officers, food, resting facilities and military 
supplies. Facing some  of economic difficulties of the 1980’s due to instability in the 




(“perfeccionamiento empresarial” in Spanish) with the purpose of a) aligning its practices 
with greater incentives for productivity and international accounting, b) educating 
managers and giving them more autonomy in decision-making.  
In the context of the crisis of the 1990’s, the military expanded its role in the 
economy to areas such as hotel management for international tourists, tourists’ 
transportation, airports and marinas, and recently port administration. The army provided 
at times the labor force to deal with critical situations in agriculture, when some harvests 
were at risk because of efficiency flaws or after the passing of hurricanes. The Civil 
Defense, a military organization included in the FAR system in charge of response to 
natural disaster proved to be an efficient body despite the economic difficulties of the 
country. This is important because of the frequency with which hurricanes and tropical 
storms hit Cuba has increased.  
The FAR began the 1990’s with the prestige associated with the triumph of the 
Cuban military forces in Southern Africa over the regime of the Apartheid but the 
economic crisis and the collapse of communism was politically more challenging than 
any of its previous tasks . The almost fifteen years of a large presence of Cuban troops in 
Angola allowed the military to create corporations to alleviate the economic burden of 




in association with the Angolan state or private sector were already working with little 
transparence but oriented to the world market.  
The return of the troops shifted FAR priorities from its previous participation in 
the African wars to the domestic arena.  In 1992, the FAR created the National Defense 
College as an educational center in which members of the high command and career 
officers discuss national strategic issues together with rising politicians and bureaucrats 
from the CCP and the government. The College gave special emphasis in its classes to 
the discussion of the economic problems of the country and the interaction between new 
provincial party czars (first secretaries) and the then mid rank officers in charge of 
regiments and brigades.  
Hal Klepak described how the Special Period was at its core a challenge to the 
institution as it was designed by the system. Without the political system originated in the 
revolution of 1959, FAR couldn’t continue its central role in Cuban politics.  
The FAR is a great institution. And like all human institutions its members are 
prone to error. But they have an enormous amount, as a military and a national 
institution without pair, of which to be proud. And much of their role in the 
Special Period falls into that category. There continue to be errors, but it is my 
view that they are small compared to the challenges of the tasks at hand. Few 
indeed are the institutions that can claim to be without members who are not up to 
the dignity of their charges, and the often horrendous conditions of the Special 
Period have sorely tested the armed forces’ code of honor, loyalty and 
professionalism. But they have not yet found it wanting as an institution even if 
individuals within it have been discovered to lack that sense of honor and 
professionalism for which the FAR have become famous (Klepak, Cuba's Military 





The FAR was not a promoter of the reform in the sense of political advocacy. 
What it did was to show a different way to run its economy, more market oriented but not 
market driven. Just by showing the chances of moving the country in a less ideological 
drive without losing its essences, FAR’s performance provided ammunition to those 
inside the regime advocating for a reform course. Given the totalitarian constraints placed 
upon the Cuban elite by its Marxist-Leninist ideology, the national security establishment 
played an ambiguous role in the impulse for more economic reform. On one hand, the 
military were among the most ardent advocates of changes in agriculture and the 
adoption of market oriented management techniques because of the implications for food 
security and its impact on domestic stability. Although the general orientation was to 
prevent market practices from taking control over the politics of the country, the adoption 
of market routines reduces the general aversion to them.  
On the other hand, preferences for partial economic reforms and the gradualist 
approach were justified in terms of Cuba’s resistance to U.S. economic aggression and 
the need to digest changes with social stability, step by step. The military elites behaved 
as classical partial reform winners promoting reforms for themselves but cooperating in 
the crackdown against marketization under other ministries: First, the military economic 
elites did not object and even support the restraints imposed by Fidel Castro to the reform 




Second, when in the late nineties the domestic political situation improved and Fidel 
Castro slowed down the changes, the military did not stop its internal reforms but 
cooperated from the ministry of interior in the partial dismantlement of the established 
small business sector. Third, the FAR-MININT complex cut out an economic space for 
themselves in which they had an advantageous insertion in the global economy and 
tourism. 
The military leadership supported and expanded command economy controls and 
monopolistic structures in the form of state capitalism.  Military actors who had 
benefitted from their loyalty credentials profited in political and economic terms from 
their advantages as early comers in partial reform equilibrium. The FAR has also 
institutional design advantages to deal with the two track system; the rising of market 
structures and the persistence of command ones. Given their insulation from the 
inadequacies of the general command economy, the managers of the FAR economic 
system could deal through military instructions with the institutional incongruence of the 
two track system. For instance, for incentives to their workers, the military opened 
parallel distribution channel, in a clear discrimination to the rest of the economy.  
When Raul Castro acknowledged that a Fidel in command model was 
unsustainable without Fidel Castro at the helm of the state. all the FAR high command 




those of the CCP to show how the FAR high command reached the conclusion that the 
CCP needed an adaptation strategy in which it can rely less on totalitarian political 
mobilization if it was able to show an efficient economic performance. It is not necessary 
because the whole high command of the FAR was already present in the Politburo of the 
CCP.  
The FAR and the CCP upper echelons coincide not only in policies but also in 
personalities. It is not difficult to see the FAR national security logic behind the 
explanations of Raul Castro and his minister of Economy Marino Murillo about how 
economic growth might compensate the political losses associated to the passing of the 
revolutionary generation. The deepening of the economic reform was a demand by the 
CCP cadres and FAR regional and units’ commanders because they saw synergies 
between political stability, national security and economic growth. The military is keenly 
aware of the positive experience of the provinces with higher foreign investment and 
more market oriented sectors.  
Politically, economic growth- their thinking is- might help to redesign the CCP 
bases for domination in a more pluralistic political system as well. That is why the new 




its virtues, but represents a major watershed
55
. The question of the economic system to 
adopt became essentially a political not an ideological question.  The two tracks strategy 
that began as a temporary act of survival for the command economy began to be seen by 
military policymakers as a stage in the consolidation of a new model, more market 
oriented.  
2.3 The VI Congress of the CCP: A change of strategy within the dual track 
system 
In 2008 Fidel Castro retired explicitly from power marking the end of charismatic 
rule. The CCP political position deteriorated radically in the second half of the 2000’s as 
a combination of endogenous and exogenous factors. The special relation with Venezuela 
reached its limits. The years in crisis had affected the credibility of the organization as a 
capable actor to put back the country in a path of economic growth with equality.  
In a memorable session of the National Assembly in August 2010, Raul Castro 
said that if the CCP does not put the economy in order, “the revolution” will sink 
(“noshundimos”) in the abyss.  The 2000’s had shown signals of recovery but compared 
to the magnitude of the 1992 debacle, a 3 % average growth of Cuban GDP was far from 
                                                          
55In a discussion at the magazine Temas of the Cuban ministry of Culture, former Cuban 
Ambassador to Brussels Carlos Alzugaray criticized Che Guevara’s quote about “the 
impossibility of building socialism and development using capitalist tools”. Alzugaray 
declared that the country has paid a heavy price for not questioning this “official truth”. 




the minimum discussed by economists and officials around 5-7 %. The government was 
also victim of its own successes avoiding a shock therapy “big bang” scenario.Cuban 
economists Omar Everleny and Pavel Vidal described the situation: “the cost of the crisis 
was thus distributed among all the state employees as an alternative to massive 
unemployment and sending thousands to abject poverty”(Everleny, 2013). This partial 
reform diffusion of the losers across the economic spectrum made demands for deeper 
changes to pile up.  
The VI Congress of the CCP took place in 2011, fourteen years after the fifth in 
1997(The party supposed to have a congress every five years) and was divided in two 
sessions: the first main part to discuss a plan for economic reform, and elect a new 
leadership, mainly at the Central Committee, not so much at the Politburo, and a second 
conference to discuss the adjustment the reform and new circumstances bring to the party 
life.  
Economic reform was a central theme of the congress that insisted on preserving 
the one party system. The party declared the end of egalitarianism, as a deviation from 
the socialist search for equality, and criticized its previous stigmatization of market and 
private property. Yet, it insisted that state property was the central bulwark of socialism, 




explicitly expressed in the “Economic and Social Guidelines” of the VI Congress of the 
CCP.  
From a leadership point of view, Raul Castro was in a privileged position to 
launch a new phase of the economic reform. He was the leader of the military. His 
loyalists, Jose Machado Ventura in the first place, had the organization department and 
provincial party czars under their control. No one in the Cuban nomenclature could 
outflank him from the left, given his revolutionary credentials. He counted also with 
FAR, the organization he has been for almost five decades the supreme commander.  
Raul Castro led the CCP to change its conception of the dual track system from a 
temporary tool to sustain the command economy to a strategy of transition to a mixed 
economy. In the new vision, market related efficiency gains increases the chances of the 
CCP to remain in power. The new economic model was presented as an adaptation of 
socialism and planning to the new circumstances but it implies substantive change to the 
political treatment of market oriented structures. It is worth to quote the ten general bases 
for the new model approved by VI Congress of the CCP (the italics are mine):  
1.     The socialist planning system will continue to be the main national 
management tool of the national economy. Its methodology and organization and 
control must be modified.  Economic planning will influence on the market and 
take into account its characteristics. 
2.     The management model recognizes and encourages socialist State-owned 
companies – the main national economic modality - as well as the foreign 




association contracts), cooperatives, small farming, usufruct, franchisement, self-
employment and other economic forms that may altogether contribute to 
increased efficiency.  
3.     In the forms of non-State management, the concentration of property in the 
hands of any natural or legal person shall not be allowed.  
4.     The structural, functional, organizational and economic changes in the 
business sector, State-funded entities and the entire State administrative apparatus 
will be introduced on the basis of a schedule, in an orderly and disciplined way 
and in compliance with the policy that has been approved.  Workers shall be 
informed of the process and their recommendations shall be listened to, all of 
which will require training at every level to facilitate their implementation. 
5.     Planning shall include State-owned companies; the Government funded 
entities, the international economic associations, and also regulate other 
applicable forms of non-State management.  Planning shall be more objective at 
all levels.  The new planning methods will modify economic control methods.  
Territorial planning shall take into consideration these transformations.  
6.     The separation between State and business functions shall be a gradual and 
orderly process.  The definition of standards is key to the satisfaction of the 
proposed targets.  
7.     It is necessary that the country’s business system be made up of efficient, 
effective and well organized firms and new oversight business management 
organizations be established.  Intercompany cooperation shall be promoted for 
higher efficiency and better quality.  Legal instruments shall be defined to 
regulate the above.  
8.     The increase in the powers vested upon entity managers shall be associated 
with their higher responsibility for efficiency, effectiveness and for their control 
of labor utilization, financial and material resources, coupled with the requirement 
on the executives to account for their decisions, actions and omissions that lead to 
economic damages.  
9.     Markets shall be created for the wholesale provision and lease of equipment, 
supplies and implements without subsidies to enterprises, State-funded entities 
and non-State organizations. 
10.   The business relations between companies, State-funded entities and non-
State organizations shall be formalized in economic contracts.  The quality of the 




claims arising from their terms and the oversight of their compliance shall be a 
requirement and an essential tool for economic management (Cuban Communist 
Party, 2011). 
 
The logic of partial reform continued together with gradualism as the approach for 
an orderly change concerned first with domestic stability. The CCP proclaimed its 
opposition  to concentration of property and reiterated the primordial value of “socialist-
state owned companies”.  But the trend became also clear: A combination of a state-led 
development with a growing role for contracts, and commitment to higher market 
discipline (elimination of subsidies, separation of state and managerial functions in the 
State owned companies, integration of the non-state and state sectors.  
Even the issue of resistance to concentration of property operated more as a 
declaration than a reality. The promotion of the non-state sector, and the liberalization of 
prices and salaries create space for capitalist accumulation by segments of the elites 
disenchanted with communism and released from Fidel Castro’s ideological discipline. 
The CCP might not endorse these trends and fight them but it will have to confront 
segments of its own base empowered by the economic reform adopted policies.  
One unresolved political problem for the CCP was how to develop a coherent 
policy towards a growing economic pluralism, typical of a post-totalitarian society. In 
addition to the command economy legacies of inefficiencies and hyper centralization, 




two-track system. The most important one was the dual currency. The salaries for most 
government employees allowed them just to attend their minimal needs and many goods 
and services were not even available for those in possession of the official currency of the 
country.  
By 2013, Granma, the CCCP official newspaper announced the beginning of the 
process for reunifying the different currencies in one. The goal of currency reunification 
figured prominently in the Economic and Social Guidelines approved by the Cuban 
Communist Party in its VI Congress. The Guideline 55 says: 
Progress will be made toward the establishment of a single currency on the basis 
of the labor productivity and effective distribution and redistribution mechanisms. 
The complexity of this goal will require rigorous preparation and implementation, 
both objectively and subjectively (Cuban Communist Party, 2011) 
 
The reunification of the currency included a partial liberalization of prices for a 
large group of state owned companies (Murillo, 2014). It could represent a major step in 
the transition to a comprehensive mixed economy. The official note in Granma subtlety 
highlighted the need to give back to the currency functions that are typical of a market 
economy.  “It is imperative to re-establish the Cuban peso’s value and its role as money, 
which is as a unit of accounting, means of payment, and savings” (Granma, 2013). 
The Guidelines do not constitute a precise reform plan or a coherent design of 




economic changes under Raul Castro were not the outcome of an improvisation or 
launched on an accidental or unsystematic way. All the major decisions taken had in 
common a more market friendly orientation than the previous situation under Fidel, but 
without abandoning the partial reform logic  of control. The promotion or declaration of 
purpose of integrating non-state and state sectors, unleashing rather than limiting the 
expansion of the non-state sector, have been a consistent response to bottlenecks and 
crisis in the implementation of the reforms.  
The move to a mixed economy was accompanied by vertical mechanisms of 
political deliberation and consultation with the population. In Fritz Scharpf’s 
terminology
56
, the CCP procured to combine “output legitimacy” (by performance, 
preserving social stability and achieving economic growth
57
) with an “input legitimacy” 
                                                          
56It is important to clarify that I am using Fritz Scharpf’s concepts (Scharpf, 1999) out of 
the democratic contexts for which they were conceived. This might appear as a heresy for 
some researchers of non-democratic regimes because they don’t acknowledge any 
legitimacy to them. In my view input legitimacy (political equality for instance, 
deliberation, and accountability) is a matter of degree, not a dichotomy.  
 
57Bruce Gilley (Gilley, 2009)argues that performance legitimacy is an “oxymoron” or a 
“redundant concept” because legitimacy is “a particular type of political support that is 
grounded in common good or shared moral evaluations”.  As I presented in the 
introductory chapter, the CCP was at the same time a communist and a totalitarian 
nationalist party. Nationalism as a matrix of values represents a notion of common good 
that serve as stamp of legitimacy when goals such as political order, social peace, 
economic development and preservation of sovereign rights, connected to it, are 
achieved. This line of thought connects with Samuel Huntington’s idea that while “in the 




(based on consultation and deliberation within the boundaries of the dominant ideologies 
of socialism and nationalism). These consultations serve to channel demands that the 
CCP tries to transform in outcomes and also to gain support by providing a nationalist 
space. (In Easton’s terms (Easton, 1965), the strengthening of the feeling of belonging to 
a common political community, , and the belief on the capacity of the one-party system to 
cope with the polity problems.)  
Ideologically, the CCP guided debate gives a positive twist-although not without 
due regulation- to small and medium private property, market competition, and foreign 
investment. This trilogy was considered in the old system at least “remnants of 
capitalism” destined to disappear and at worst counterrevolutionary
58
.  The consultation 
served also as a feedback mechanism to plan the time and sequence of the changes 
aligning the specific conditions of the regional and sectorial elites tied to the party.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
legitimation for non-democratic rule… In modern times authoritarianism has been 
justified by nationalism and by ideology” (Hungtington (1991) The Third Wave: 
Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, University of Oklahoma Press. P. 46).  
 
58One interesting sample of the tensions in the debate about these issues was the 
roundtable in the Cuban magazine Temas(Chiappi, 2014)about the 1968  as a decisive 
year in the history of the revolution and particularly the conversation about the 
“revolutionary offensive” when Fidel Castro in March 13  of that year (Castro F. , 1968) 
launched a campaign to nationalize most small and medium size businesses labelling 
them seeds and remnants of capitalist exploitation and gatherings of anti-socialist 
elements. The panelist, economist Rogelio Torras concluded that the “offensive” was a 
mistake of “idealism” in which the revolutionary leadership took control of the small 




Raul Castro criticized past stigmatization of markets and non-state economic 
actors but without punishing anyone responsible of the previous policies since they were 
the party line. Many of the cadres responsible for the old policies were rewarded with the 
responsibility for the new ones, not only because of their loyalty but also due to their 
vigilance against the political consequences of adopting market structures. Terms such as 
marketization, economic reform, private property, competition are frequently avoided 
with the use of more obscure concepts such as actualization (updating) for reform, non-
state sector for private and cooperative companies, self-employed (cuentapropistas) for 
small entrepreneurs.  
One major problem of the silence about market economics is the almost absence 
of a discussion about competition. Monopolistic governmental structures controlled by 
the state consolidatedin the form of companies associated to the military like GAESA or 
corporations controlled by the Council of State. Cuba’s government apparatus and CCP 
bureaucrats have received the impact of the programmatic statements of the VI Party 
Congress and the subsequent legislation to expand private business, attract foreign 
investment, create the Special Economic Zone of Mariel, privatize cafeterias and 
restaurants in the form of cooperative and stop stigmatizing private owners and markets. 
At the same time, they “muddled through”(Lindblom, 1979), solving problems 
incrementally without engaging in a massive rationalization change of the business-labor 




Between 2011 and 2015  the economic transformation crossed a point of no 
return: a) it lifted limits to the hiring of workers by private entrepreneurs, b) it expanded 
the land leasing programs and the amount of land to be assigned to peasants (by October 
2013 1 588 000 hectares were already leased under Law-Decrees 259 and 300),c) In 
January 2013, the authorities implemented law 113 providing some coherence and 
organization to the incipient tax system created in the 1990’s with the law-decree308 
about norms and procedures for tax payments. d) In May 2013, the Council of Ministers 
adopted resolution 7 387 creating financial incentives to private activities, including 
house repairing, agriculture and constructions, e) Between 2011 and 2014, the 
government proposed and designed a legal system for the creation of second degree 
cooperatives, a type of associations that small owners and simple cooperatives can use to 
expand their production. f) In 2013 the government announced a plan to end the dual 
currency system and began to implement a sliding system of exchange rates with the 
declared purpose of ending the distortions to market efficiency and assessments 
associated with the use of the CUC. g) In January 2014 with Brazilian cooperation, the 
government inaugurated the Special Economic Zone of Mariel with the expressed 
purpose contained in Law-decree 313 (2013) of attracting foreign capitalist investors with 
incentives that reduces or avoid the level of regulation, taxing and red tape bottlenecks 




The continuation of the logic of partial reform is reflected in Richard Feinberg’s 
diagnosis about the Cuban government’s attitude towards foreign investment in 2012:  
Since assuming the presidency in 2008, Raul Castro has sent contradictory signals 
regarding foreign investment. In principle, Cuba’s foreign investment laws offer 
favorable conditions and- as the case studies reveal- some JVs are successfully 
navigating the Cuban economic system. But the government has been keeping 
many suitors waiting for the final green light. The owners of the prime 
commercial office space in Havana have been unable to secure authorization for 
next-phase construction. An international hotel chain that offered to refurbish the 
shabby downtown Havana Libre hotel was refused an equity share. Brazilian 
negotiators have been urging Cuba to allow large investment in sugar mills and 
associated ethanol plants, only to bre frustrated by “political symbolism”-
lingering fears of compromising the sacred gains of the revolution and 
endangering national security. (Feinberg, 2012, p. 5) 
 
Government’s response to those concerns about Cuba’s commitment to opening 
the economy to foreign investment was the approval in March 2014 by the National 
Assembly of law 118. The law provides property rights guarantees for foreign investors 
against undue nationalization (only for public interest) and requires due compensation. 
Government officials explained to potential foreign investors how the law attempts to 
align Cuban regulations with international best practices of approving and implementing 
new investment projects together with a friendly environment for business actors in terms 





The choice for a mixed economy is expressed as a transition to a more integrated 
relationship between the non-state sector and the government owned companies. Even in 
the financial sector where reforms have been slow, a segment of credits has been oriented 
towards private actors. Between 2011 and 2013, state banks gave 218 400 credits to 
private citizens mainly for house reparations. The loans were very insufficient but 
indicated a decision of the government to get out of some business and subsidies allowing 
citizens to contract services and pay for them directly.  
 
2.3.1Towards the end of the dual track system: a mixed market oriented 
economy 
The dual track system is not limited to the state/non state ownership divide. The 
most important duality is not of ownership but of coordination mechanism (plan/market). 
Both tracks have operated within most sectors of the industry, agriculture and services
59
. 
Farmers and companies are assigned by the government some planned production- as it 
was the case in the classical command economy- to sell at controlled prices but once they 
                                                          
59I will exclude partially most of the foreign investments particularly in tourism because 
these companies operated fundamentally in the market with the exception of the salary 
fund that is also dual. The foreign investors paid to the government for the workers’ labor 
and the government pays the Cuban labor force. The foreign investor also pays some 
extra salary or bonus to the Cuban worker to guarantee its efficiency.  As I said, a 
technical and exhaustive discussion of the Cuban economy is beyond the goal and 




produce it, the reforms have allowed flexibility to sell their above plan production at 
higher prices in different markets with a declining scale of regulation and state 
intervention.  
The 1990’s reform idea under Fidel Castro was that firms would sell their above 
plan production at higher prices still regulated by the government, not at market prices. 
The goal seemed to be to provide incentives for higher production but limit market 
incentives, autonomy of the actors, competition and inequality. But with the new 
conception, there is a qualitative difference; the goal is to guarantee a production under 
control and regulation of the government to assure a minimal plateau of resources and 
services for government and social obligation. Beyond that, market is becoming 
dominant in the margin, potentially changing the structure of incentives for the behavior 
of the economic agents.  
From been a survival tool for macroeconomic stabilization, the dual track system 
was shifted to be a transitional mechanism in which the Cuban economy would 
eventually “grow out of the plan”
60
.  Now the policy discussion leans towards allowing 
farmers, cooperatives and state companies to sell at market prices once a minimal 
assigned production is achieved. This is a qualitative change with the expected effects (it 
                                                          
60This is the title of Barry Naughton’s book about China that discussed the issue in China 
in details. In Cuba, the dual track system did begin as a mere stabilizing and survival tool 
but eventually is already conceived as “a transitional device” (Naughton, Growing out of 




is already happening) of a reduction of the black market since prices in the official 
economy align in the margin with market equilibrium.  
The current reform under Raul Castro introduces four major new adaptations with 
far reaching implications for the character of the economy: 
First, the government reduced the size of the plan by withdrawing state owned 
companies from vast segments of the services (cafeterias, taxis and other transportation, 
restaurants, etc).The consequence of this withdrawal is marketization of social relations.  
Second; the government allowed state firms to trade and cooperate with non-state 
firms, allowing them autonomy to set their wages and contracts. The interactions between 
the two types of firms goes beyond previous mere coexistence and affect the behavior of 
both.  
Third, the new law of cooperatives of 2011 provides non state firms with a legal 
venue to increase their output levels and coordination. Self-employed actors (small 
private owners) can create market driven cooperatives, and cooperatives can create 
second degree cooperatives (A cooperative of cooperatives).  
Fourth, as the adopted guidelines by the CCP in its VI Congress indicated, the 
institutional framework for the new relations between economic actors is not the plan but 




The implicit political silences are as important as what it is explicitly said by Raul 
Castro and the leaders of the “updating” process. The VI Congress of the CCP 
proclaimed as a goal the eventual ending of monetary duality and the integration of the 
different sectors of the economy. Nobody believes that this can happen as result of a 
policy reversal to the old command system. The political discourse of the reform includes 
multiple criticisms against egalitarianism, announcing the end the ration card and already 
allowing the sale of houses and automobiles. In this situation, all of the potential destinies 
are along the spectrum of a mixed economy (The question is how much competitive 
versus monopolistic the market driven coordination system will be). 
Change is not unidirectional and there are statements and actions that express the 
push-pull dynamic of the reform. For instance, the CCP guidelines declared that 
stigmatization of private property in socialism is a mistake but oppose property 
concentration, a natural trend of market reproduction. Legally, the issue is now how 
much property concentration is unacceptable but politically the question is who is going 
to decide that. The balance of forces is changing in favor of managers, military and party 
leaders associated to the economic opening. These are the same people who profits from 
the new partial reform structures and in some cases accumulated wealth unequally in 




The effects of the new strategy on the dual track system, originally of survival, 
now of a transition, are essential to understand the institutional transformation. Here it is 
important to notice how policy frontiers are changed by the new politics, not charismatic 
but institutional, and the demands of economic factors that are in power. Many of these 
actors as the Commission for Implementation and Development and the ministry of 
Economy are nominally in charge of preserving the communist system but their 
measurable responsibility is to achieve economic growth as a cushion of domestic 
political stability and international legitimacy. Accordingly, the political discussion shifts 
from whether the economy would be more market oriented to the technical questions 
about speed, sequence, timing and cohesiveness to do it. 
The political dilemmas of the economic transformation have to do less with CCP 
ideological rigidities or cycles- as it has been wrongly argued by Carmelo Mesa-
Lago(Mesa-Lago, Cuba en la Era De Raul Castro, 2012)- or the opposition of the losers 
(workers and managers from inefficient state owned firms, party and central government 
bureaucrats). The new political choice is defined by the alternatives of partial reform 
equilibrium defended by the early winners of the reform versus the advocates of a 
comprehensive transformation. The dangers of entrapping the economic transformation in 
partial reform equilibrium are associated to the political leverage and collective action 
capacity developed by the winners of arbitrage and monopoly rents in the course of the 




A central arena of confrontation between the advocates of comprehensive 
transformation and the winners of partial reform is the question of the rule of law in the 
new economic situation. This is a discussion to distinguish from the demand by 
opposition forces about a political transition to a multiparty system. Here the actors are 
competing for the character of the one-party system not for its abandonment. The 
dilemma is not about whether the Cuban state would be democratic or not, but whether 
the transition to a market economic society produces a predatory or a developmental 
state
61
. Issues such as corruption, competition policy, consumers’ protection and other 
good governance related themes are at center.  
Supporters of comprehensive reform share the preference for gradualism but they 
understand the complementarities and interdependence of reform measures. Since they 
perceive economic reform from a developmental perspective, their view about political 
control is instrumental: it serves to preserve social stability and might help to mobilize 
the population for development. But political control should not become a straitjacket 
                                                          
61Supporters of comprehensive reform desire a developmental state, not necessary liberal 
or democratic, but with important level of rule by law or consultative rule of law. This 
concept developed by Chinese scholar Pam Wei (Pam, 2003) is defined by the existence 
of zones in which the law is the central mechanism to solve conflict of interests. There 
are differences between rule of law and rule by law. Rule by law serves to constrain 
corruption and the prevalence of partial interests within the elites over the general 
interests of the CCP. Rule of law includes the adherence to written or common laws but 
also implies competitive political participation in writing and deciding the legal norms. 
Although rule by law represents progress in terms of predictability and might be 
emulated in areas outside the economy, there is no evidence to guarantee that its is a step 




against productivity gains associated to entrepreneurial initiative and access to 
information (internet for instance).  
In contrast, partial reform equilibriums have empowered a set of different 
supporters. First, it created a class of winners with a predatory behavior that pursue not 
the general interests of the system and the CCP but their own. Some believe that the CCP 
is in its way out and therefore they should take advantage of their power position to 
accumulate wealth and influence. If the comprehensive reformers look at China and East 
Asia as their central reference to emulate, the partial reform winners have their eyes in 
after communism Russia. Second, there are defenders of the partial reform because of 
their preference for the totalitarian system and the type of social control it brings. This 
segment of the CCP has a conservative agenda based on nostalgia for the “good old days” 
when capitalism was shut out of the system.  
In addition, there are segments of the military establishment that look at the 
economic reform as a security challenge because of its vulnerability to foreign influences 
and the centrifugal effects markets cause in terms of inequality.  Although not profiting 
from partial reform equilibrium they are politically sympathetic to suspicious arguments 
about market structures. Internationally, the preferences of these groups are to keep 




Russia and China are the suppliers of Cuba’s armament and the closer allies of its 
military.  
Upon consolidating presidential power, President Raul Castro, has assembled a 
coalition of military leaders, technocrats from the emerging corporations, and party 
bureaucrats to form the political stronghold of his rule. As important as those who 
gathered around Raul Castro and his Vice-president Jose R. Machado Ventura it was 
those who were excluded or expressed dissatisfaction with it.  
The pro-market reforms gained momentum after the purge of formerly high-
ranking officials, Carlos Lage and Felipe Perez Roque and subsequent consolidation of a 
new Cabinet of Ministers
62
. Lage and Perez-Roque were not known for opposing reform 
but they had their own turf within the Cuban elites, never part of the inner circle around 
Raul. As later was revealed they both had the political aspiration to place Lage in the 
succession line after Raul (Frank, Cuban Revelations: Behind the Scenes in Havana), and 
tried to achieve so by cultivating Fidel’s favor.   
                                                          
62Given Carlos Lage’s role in the 1990’s reforms as the economy czar and his younger 
age than Raul’s, many observers saw his demise as the closing of chances of market 
oriented changes. Life proved them wrong. The consolidation of power around the high 
command of the FAR and a group of party bureaucrats provided the winners with 
confidence for launching unprecedented market oriented changes in Cuba’s post 1959 
history. Of course any normative evaluation of these events cannot ignore that the new 
wave of economic reforms were launched by leaders with hard-line ideological 




 The removal of these two young politicians who had been instrumental in the 
promotion of the two-track system under Fidel unlocked the debate about reforms 
because it strengthened the unity and political confidence of the dominant block. The 
CCP and the FAR consolidated their union and feel assured that their political rule was 
not at risk. As result the coalition adopted a pragmatic approach to economic policy, 
openly stealing (obviously without acknowledging it) ideas proclaimed by past reformers, 
and even opponents to the regime, such as opening spaces for private property and 
releasing the state from the burden of managing small businesses.   
These intra-party politics gradually defined a new course in which ideological 
discussion is downplayed while economic modernization becomes central to all 
government functions. In contrast to its response to the limited reforms of the 1990’s, the 
party press is echoing these talking points and doing so largely with unanimity. The CCP 
propaganda machine from the provincial newspapers to publications such as “Juventud 
Rebelde” of the Young Communist League or “Trabajadores”, from the Trade Union 
Central, even the Cuban Communist Party’s main newspaper, “Granma” are now 
endorsing the reforms
63
. Self-employment as “a tool to increase efficiency and 
                                                          
63Even Fidel Castro has come out of his retirement to say in several of his columns that  
the old concepts of socialism need to be reassessed. In Cuban intellectual discourse, 
found in publications like the Ministry of Culture’s journal, Temas, or even in letters to 
the editor in Granma, the emerging consensus is much the same- that the main problem 




productivity”, and repudiating “those views that condemned self-employment almost to 
extinction and stigmatized those who participated legally in this activity” (Granma, 
2010)
64
. A central part of the discussion is the need to decentralize economic decisions 
and enable managers to make the most important decisions with respect to production 
plans and hiring and firing of workers.  
The policy frontiers changed as result of a coordinated ideological shift and a 
wider space for technocratic discussion. The Center for the Study of the Cuban Economy, 
Cuba’s primary economic research institute, produced several books about the potential 
role of cooperatives and private contracts for small and medium-size companies. Several 
of his researchers are part of different task forces of the Commission for the development 
and implementation of the Economic Updating. Every paper produced by the Center 




                                                                                                                                                                             
 
64The direct quotes in Spanish are: “una alternativa para incrementar niveles de 
productividad y eficiencia” and Granma repudiationgoesagainst: “aquellas concepciones 
que condenaron el trabajo por cuenta propia casi a la extinción y estigmatizaron a quienes 
decidieron sumarse legalmente a él en la década de los noventa”. Granma, Sept 24, 2010.  
 
65For examples of these papers see “Cambios Estructurales para Desarrollar la economía 
de Cuba” de Miguel A. Figueras (Figueras, 2014), and “Relanzamiento de la inversión 




Market oriented practices such as hiring workers part-time or temporarily and 
ownership and rent of means of production are now defined as politically correct.  
Marino Murillo, Minister of Economy and Planning, now a Vice-President of a Council 
of State and the member of the Cabinet in charge of the economic reform, told the 
National Assembly that the country must prepare its institutions to absorb at least 
250,000 new workers into the private sector, and another 215,000 in cooperatives during 
the first half of 2011. For the first time since 1968, the party endorsed the private sector 
as a legitimate employment and development alternative.  
Raul Castro and the members of his economic team have also begun criticizing 
traditional political rhetoric of the not-so-distant past, such as blaming the American 
embargo for most of the country’s problems, and discussing social policy separated from 
economic sustainability. The “Guidelines”
66
 made clear the government was planning to 
end many of the so-called “paternalistic” policies. The document announces the end of 
“unnecessary subsidies and gratuities” and anticipates “the orderly elimination of the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(Perez, Relanzamiento de la inversion extranjera en Cuba: necesidad para el desarrollo 
economico, 2014) 
 
66The Guidelines or “Lineamientos” are the program of economic and social reform 







 By the end of 2014 about 600 000 state employees were dismissed or 
relocated to non-state jobs (cooperatives and small private business). Although these 
plans to fire workers were later paused, the issue of ending the high level of sub-
employment in the state sector typical of the command economy has been reiterated by 
Raul Castro, Marino Murillo, and others.  
One of the proposals contained in the Lineamientos document is “a review of 
current prohibitions that limit internal trade”. This referred mainly to the restrictions on 
the purchase and sale of computers, hotel services, cell phones, cars and houses. More 
flexible rules governing areas such as these were openly welcome by ordinary Cubans.  
Reformists also believe such measures could help a collateral market for loans, easing the 
road to a much-needed bankruptcy law. These measures are seen as minor by some 
foreign observers but they fit in the logic of developing early support for more 
complicated reforms.  
At the core of the emerging system is the use of contracts and the end of wage 
ceiling limitations. One instance that demonstrates the government’s changing response 
to criticism from the population is its reaction to the frequently expressed need for 
wholesale markets and credit to development private-sector activities. As opposed to 
what happened in the 1990’s, the authorities declared the idea worthy of implementation.  
                                                          
67Point 44 and Point 162 of the “Social and Economic Guidelines of the VI Congress of 




Economic priorities have been reordered, with agriculture at the top. Before the 
revolution, although with great inequality and some malnutrition, Cuba produced 80 % of 
its food consumption. Today, only 25 % of the Cuban population lives in the countryside 
and the country imports 80 % of its food according to the World Food Program (Program, 
2015). Agricultural inefficiency costs the government $ 2 Billion every year. Agricultural 
reform is an area in which the security establishment warned the leadership since the 
1990’s that this is a neuralgic issue that can create governance problems if it is not 
properly addressed. Many international observers also look at reform in agriculture and 
the sugar industry as the ultimate test for the capacity of the Cuban government to put in 
place a sustainable alternative.  
One decision that seems to have already been made regarding agricultural 
production is to decentralize authority to the provinces, municipalities and to the units of 
production.  The government is also encouraging greater agricultural production by 
raising procurement prices, and distributing private plots (through ten years leases-
Decree 259 -2008) and cropping contracts.  In terms of use of the land, Cuba’s 
agriculture is not anymore statist. At the management level, there is a push to provide 
cooperatives and private peasants greater autonomy. In some cases, collective 
mechanisms are abandoned without an official statement and the land is divided among 
the workers who manage it.  In some of the UBPC (Basic Units of Cooperative 




2.4 Uncertainties and Political Challenges of the Economic Reform 
The economic adjustment is an inextricable part of the redesign of the political 
model. The political determination of the economic reform is expressed in the documents 
of the VI Congress of the Communist Party in which the priority of preserving party 
leadership is explicitly declared. The party presented the economic changes as essential 
to accomplish political goals such as: the preservation of domestic stability, the 
nationalist aspirations to defeat the U.S. embargo and the need to play a role in the Latin 
American region.   
The changes are taking place in the context of a partial reform equilibrium 
inherited from the previous reform wave of the 1990’s. The partial reform equilibrium is 
clustered around three fundamental conditions: the dual track monetary situation with 
multiple exchange regimes, the creation of strong monopolies associated to a few state 
owned corporations and the centralized ministries, and the foreign investment regime in 
which the state exert a discretional authority limiting access to the national market. The 
legacy of these three set of policies is aggravated by a political culture of the Cuban elites 
that positively opposed shock therapy strategies but it is insensitive to the costs of 
excessive gradualism.  
These characteristics are reinforced by powerful actors that profits from the 




economic nature of the challenges the government faces; the decision-making process, 
and the prism under which reform policy choices are analyzed and decided, follows 
essentially a political logic. Economic efficiency considerations and the timing and 
sequencing of the changes are always filtered by the CCP’s political convenience and 
national security calculations. This feature explain consistently not only the slowness of 
the reform process in certain areas but also how some complementary steps of reforms 
that are already in place are delayed.  
Another way in which political orientation shapes the content of the economic 
reform is by framing the political debate about the changes. The new discourse of reform 
emerged from the CCP’s necessity of restoring confidence on its capacity to lead the 
country after the disastrous years of the “special period”.  The post-revolutionary Cuban 
elites admit that the heroic narrative of past struggles or the nationalist narrative alone 
cannot keep the Communist Party in power without addressing the issue of economic 
sustainability and food security.   
The 1990’s reforms proved the importance of taking more market oriented 
changes, not less. The gap between this social consensus and the anti-market rhetoric of 
the official discourse was undermining the CCP’s political base little by little. But this 
popular enthusiasm for market liberalization runs counterintuitive to important long 




heavy state interventionism in the economy. Sugar, the main Cuban product then, was a 
commodity heavily managed by U.S government quotas and international agreements. In 
response to that situation, the Cuban government intervened frequently to promote 
corporatist pact between the different producers and between them and the labor 
movement.  
The pro-state intervention bias was strengthened during the years of communist 
rule in which official stigmatization of market mechanisms became an act of faith. The 
adoption of market oriented reforms by the leaders of the most radical pro-state 
intervention political party in Cuban history has path breaking dimensions but it includes 
also elements of continuity. The path continuity is determined by the dominance of a 
state centered approach to development, the path departure happened in reference to a 
trend to reinforce state interventionism since the mid-thirties. For the first time since 
then, there is a general a consensus that sees market and integration to the world economy 
as a central engine not an obstacle for development.  
A major flaw in comparison with the experiences of China and Vietnam is the 
failure of the reforms in agriculture to produce a food production recovery. Despite all of 
the priority assigned to the sector, and the measures taken to expand the flexibility of the 
law-Decrees 259 and 300, the production of grain, milk, vegetables and meat was 




particularly delicate because of the world market trends to higher food prices and the 
heavy dependence on the ration cards by the poorest sectors of the population. 
The reforms are obviously generating winners and losers and it is difficult to 
determine what kinds of policies the government will use to compensate the latter. 
Workers in Cuba’s social services such as education and health have already been 
disadvantaged by the development of Cuban tourism and other industries with access to 
hard currency or CUC. There is no evidence that in the coming years, even if the 
economy prospers, health and education professionals will share in rising wages or 
improvements to living standards in the same proportion of those in the favored sectors of 
tourism and foreign investment  
Fears that market changes could lead to high levels of poverty and unemployment 
runs especially high among Cuba’s most vulnerable groups. Unemployment in the 
absence of a cushion structure of assistance can have dramatic consequences if an 
economic recovery doesn’t happen and poverty overlaps with racial and regional 
identities. Civil society groups, particularly within Cuba’s black population, have 
mobilized quickly to warn about the risk of forcing blacks and the poor to bear the burden 





The creation of a more business friendly environment as part of the transition 
from the two track system to a mixed one has increased the structural inequality that the 
revolution mitigated for decades. In the absence of a deep financial system most capital 
to start up new businesses come from remittances sent by the Cuban American 
community that is overwhelmingly white and connected to relatives in Havana and the 
urban centers. Here, as it was the case in the former communist countries in Eastern 
Europe, partial reform equilibrium had paralyzed institutional changes that might 
empower the state with resources to counter the negative impact of the reform in the 
inequality gap (Hellman, 1998).  
The absence of certain concepts from the “Guidelines” as a reform plan is 
particularly worrisome because there are problems associated with gradual transitions to 
mixed economies that the CCP could alert its base about and didn’t. Together, a delayed 
reform and a hybrid system create ample opportunities for corruption and monopolist 
practices, in which officials exploit rent seeking opportunities due to the disjuncture 
between the different economic tracks and currencies. In its original version, the 






. For a Communist Congress, it is also curious that the 
word “trade unions” was blatantly absent from the document
69
.  
Some of the discussion of the reforms is based primarily on criticizing the current 
system, but there is little reflection about challenges that the implementation of new 
policies will bring. The experiences of gradualism in East Asia emphasize the role of 
proper timing and sequence. Cuba’s process of decentralization might cause the central 
government to reduce its capacity to manage reforms or worse, decentralize corruption.  
Finally there is the issue of certain categories of human capital that are vital for 
the reforms but Cuba has a serious deficit of them. In the discussion of the economic 
transition from plan to market, the issue of a good assignation of property rights is 
particularly important. It is cardinal also not to underestimate the significance of market 
institutions, particularly those associated with the creation of a competitive framework 
and a commitment to let bad firms fail.  
 
                                                          
68The concepts were vaguely incorporated after the document was discussed by the 
population and the membership.  
 
69In May 2013 the Congress of the CCP controlled CTC (Confederation of Cuban 
workers) was postponed because of lack of definition about some of the reforms and the 




Transition economics found important to underline the different relevance of 
property rights in the context of small and medium firms in which there is no principal-
agent problem because owner and manager are the same person and the situations in 
which they are different actors, making more important the nature of contracts and how 
complete they are.  Cuba will need some time and international assistance to develop 
lawyers, auditors, accountants and managers aware of how these institutions and norms 
work. It will have to do it without any significant support of the major international 
economic organizations because of the U.S. embargo, at least in the short term. 
Although the current phase of intra-party debate is focused on the economic and 
social dimensions of reform, and while the CCP attempts to insulate the economic 
changes from producing pressure for a transition to multi-party democracy, these 
economic changes will have profound political implications. It is true that the Cuban 
opposition is today exiguous but the economic reform could foster political resentment on 
which even disorganized and divided actors could capitalize. Workers in state sectors, 
particularly health and education, would not remain passive if their salaries remain 







Chapter Three:  Cuba’s Political liberalization 
3.1 Introduction 
The Cuban Communist Party (CCP) has demonstrated a noteworthy capacity of 
survival to important external and internal shocks.  After the demise of communism in 
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Cuba adapted to a post-Cold War world. After 
Fidel Castro’s retirement, the organization embarked on the route of economic reform but 
without any interest in adopting liberal democracy.  Even those in the dominant elite who 
recognized the possibility of a potential path to a multi-party system- such as Mariela 
Castro
70
- pointed out that such change will only be conceivable after the end of the U.S. 
embargo.  
The discussion in this chapter is guided by the literature about political 
development and democratization theory. In terms of typology it follows the view 
presented by Alfred Stepan and Juan Linz about four different types of non-democratic 
regimes (totalitarian, post-totalitarian, sultanistic and authoritarian.)(Linz, Juan & Stepan, 
                                                          
70Mariela Castro is the second daughter of Raul Castro and VilmaEspin. She is a 
prominent advocate of LGBTQ rights in Cuba and the Director of the CENESEX, the 
Center for Sexual Education, a government institution associated with the Cuban Women 
Federation.  CENESEX is considered an amphibious institution (a concept to discuss 
later) because it is a state institution but it has played an important role in the articulation 
of societal demands against gender and sexual orientation based discrimination. Mariela 
Castro’s declarations about the pertinence of multiparty democracy in Cuba once the 
embargo ends were made in interview for CNN with ChristianneAmampour. CNN, June 




Alfred 1996).  Regimes change along four central dimensions: leadership, pluralism, 
ideology and mobilization associated to five arenas of democratization: institutionalized 
economic society, autonomous political society, rule of law, development of a capable 
state and free civil society (Linz, Juan & Stepan, Alfred 1996).  
The fact that the Cuban party-state doesn’t intent to adopt a multi-party system in 
the short term does not diminish the relevance of significant political changes taken just 
to avoid such scenario. There are political intra-regime changes associated to personnel, 
generations, interpretations of central ideology, etc. There are also changes from one 
regime to a different one. 
In this chapter, I discuss the political liberalization process that has taken place in 
Cuba and its effects on two variables, domestic stability and international legitimacy. The 
Cuban political system is distinct in its origins, experiences and institutional structure 
from any other case in Latin America. It is the result of a nationalist revolution but also of 
a consolidated totalitarian party-state rooted in class mobilization with the ultimate goal 
of communism rather than market development. Political liberalization in the Cuban 
context implies an attempt to preserve the political order created by this regime by 





A key concept to understand political liberalization is post-totalitarian resilience 
because it defines political change within continuity.  Post-totalitarianism has its origins 
in the dynamic pressures for liberalization and adaptation faced by the party-state in 
terms of economic, social, and cultural pluralism as result of the exhaustion of its massive 
mobilization mechanism of legitimacy. ”In a post-totalitarian society, the historical 
reference, both for the power holders of the regime and the opposition is the previous 
totalitarian regime”- explained Linz and Stepan(Linz, Juan & Stepan, Alfred 1996, 43). 
“By definition,- these authors added- the existence of a previous totalitarian regime 
means that most of the pre-existing sources of responsible and organized pluralism have 
been eliminated or repressed and a totalitarian order has been established” (Linz, Juan & 
Stepan, Alfred 1996, 43).  
Political liberalization in the Cuban context is signed by the concept of 
“detotalitarianization”
71
.  The prevailing detotalitarianization under Fidel Castro followed 
the path of “post-totalitarianism by decay”. The Cuban party-state reluctantly acquiesced 
to dismantle part of its social and economic control as result of the degeneration of mass 
mobilization and the bankruptcy of the command economy model.  Trends of 
“detotalitarianization by societal conquest” took place when different organizations from 
                                                          
71Linz and Stepan described a cycle that encompasses forms of post-totalitarianism based 
on varying degrees of distance from the totalitarian paradigm: early post-totalitarianism, 
frozen post-totalitarianism and mature post-totalitarianism. Detotalitarianization is the 
process by which the regimes becomes more pluralistic, less ideology driven, less 




civil society develop areas of autonomy taking advantage of the vacuum left behind by 
the economic and political withdrawal of the party-state after the 1990’s. .  
There were also important dynamics of “detotalitarianization by choice”. Cuba’s 
post-revolutionary elites realized after the collapse of the Soviet Union that success 
against American regime change design would require a less vertical relation with some 
non-governmental actors. Raul Castro’s presidency has completed a political transition 
from totalitarianism to post-totalitarianism. This political liberalization is an essential part 
of the CCP adaptation to the new globalized, more market oriented, post-Fidel context. 
The adoption of a mixed economy structure made political reform unavoidable as a way 
to cope with the softening of the state-party complex’s control over the population and 
the release of tensions associated to disparities of economic growth, income and wealth 
distribution by the abandonment of the command economy model.  
Liberalization does not entail a transition to democracy but it is significantly 
consequential in terms of improvement of some human rights, changes in the state-civil 
society relations and the character of the post-revolutionary state. As Charles Tilly 
demonstrated in his book “Democracy”, democratization and de-democratization are long 






. Even if Cuba were shifting towards a more democratic polity in institutional 
or ideological terms, this does not mean the end of the socialist or nationalist cultural 
hegemony or a transition to liberal democracy. 
The lines that separate change and reconfiguration of post-revolutionary regimes 
are more diffuse than what those who emphasize rupture claim. There is a lot of 
arbitrariness in defining when a political regime is born or collapses. It is debatable to 
claim that the elites who dominated the Soviet Union are out of power in today Russia. 
Most of the Russian leaders, in the government and the main opposition were connected 
with the communist party and the state before 1989. Yet whoever claim that the Soviet 
System survived in Putin’s Russia ignore the significant transformation that took place.  
Another example of this ambivalent transformation, now from Latin America, happened 
in 1990 with the end of Sandinista rule in Nicaragua.  Was the 1990-2006 period a 
reconfiguration with new institutional bases of Sandinista hegemony? 
The three crises described in the introduction (economic crisis, end of charismatic 
rule, and distrust in the Marxist ideology as capable to propose viable solutions to the 
current problems) expressed the exhaustion of the development possibilities of the 
                                                          
72Tilly proposed the concepts of democratization as a long term process based on three 
major components, first, the integration of trust networks to public politics, second, the 
insulation of politics from categorical inequalities, and  third, the end of autonomous 
centers of coercion and control outside the control of democratic public politics. In 
contrast to democratization, there is de-democratization a process that operates in the 




command economy and  the incapacity to reproduce a charismatic leadership without 
Fidel Castro. Ideologically the reform represents a rebalancing of the central ideas of the 
Cuban revolution, a search for new sources of legitimacy beyond the mantle of a 
revolutionary history, highlighting the role of nationalism and opening a flexible 
discussion about the role of markets in production and distribution of goods and services. 
Politically it implies the transition to a type of mobilization that does not demand 
participation from everyone, but procures to neutralize potential opponents with 
mechanisms of selective repression.  
 
3.1.1 The political and institutional balance of power behind Raul Castro’s rise to 
the presidency 
By the time when Raul Castro became the president of the country, the transition 
to a post-totalitarian regime was well advanced. Some important remnants of totalitarian 
mobilization and charismatic leadership remained but the new wave of 
institutionalization of the CCP rule leaded by Raul Castro after 2006 was not totally new 
in post-Cold War Cuba. The move is better understood as a change within significant 
cycles of institutionalization progress and retrenchment that took place between 1959 and 




rules that the post 1992 special period brought on the hand of Fidel’s charismatic 
projection until 2006.  
When Fidel Castro left power as result of a gastrointestinal disease, he was at the 
apex of a pyramidal system but Cuba was not under a sultanistic regime (Linz, Juan & 
Stepan, Alfred 1996). Cuba was not governed by a family but by a communist party with 
strong ideological allegiance to socialism and nationalism. Fidel was a charismatic leader 
and a minimum winning coalition at the top of the system but below, the regime was in 
an advanced phase of the transition from totalitarianism to post-totalitarianism.  In fact 
with the exception of the role of Fidel’s charismatic leadership, the system was already 
post-totalitarian.  
Since the constitution of the Central Committee of the CCP in 1965, and 
particularly since the approval of the communist constitution in 1976, Cuba developed a 
vast network of state and party institutions according to the Leninist paradigm but with 
Cuban characteristics. Just below Fidel’s authority there were two important institutions 
with their respective leadership under Raul Castro: The Cuban Armed Forces (FAR) and 






This figure of a clear second in command was not typical of communist countries 
in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In China, it was always difficult and even 
dangerous to be Mao’s second
73
. In Eastern Europe, communist leaders feared to name a 
second in command afraid that he could be promoted by the soviets in case of a 
disagreement. But in Cuba’s guerrilla style politics, the second in command position 
seemed natural. Given his charisma, Fidel’s life was the target of many attempts against 
the revolutionary process. Since early in the revolution, after 1959, Fidel declared his 
brother Raul his successor (Leonov 2015).  
Raul not only was the main organizer of the Armed Forces but Fidel’s right hand 
in the institutionalization of the CCP and other state institutions. Fidel frequently tapped 
on Raul’s military subordinates and assigned military commander as ministers or other 
responsibilities. It is not inaccurate to say that Cuba was governed by a duo because the 
party-state was more than the two brothers, but the Castros were essentially a team. They 
complemented each other’s main skills. While Fidel at times opted for charismatic rule 
                                                          
73In China, Zhou Enlai was a kind of manager or assistant leader to Mao and he survived 
many of the intra-party disputes but his case can be contrasted with those of Liu Shaoqi, 
president of the PRC between the Great leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, and 
Lin Biao, Mao’s anointed successor who died in an air accident in Mongolia, after a 




and totalitarian mobilization, Raul Castro emphasized a more institutionalized Leninist 
party type of domination
74
.  
Raul Castro’s role as second in command also shaped the balance between the 
different institutions in Cuba’s power structure. This situation partially explains his 
speedy consolidation at the helm of the Cuban state once Fidel retired. As Minister of the 
Cuban Armed Forces, Raul developed the officer corps as his permanent political base.  
The officers were promoted in the ranks according to political loyalty but also following 
professional institutional well written rules, educational routines, and constantly under 
the surveillance of the military counterintelligence, a powerful security service 
subordinated directly to his command.  
Raul Castro’s central role in Cuba’s institutionalization was heavily influential in 
shaping another Cuba’s difference from the typical Communist state: The FAR was not 
the junior partner in the association with the CCP, particularly at the level of its top 
echelons. Fidel and Raul’s military identities created a political unbalance in civil-
military relations. 
 
                                                          
74There are many wrong facts and arguments in former CIA Cuba chief analyst Brian 
Latell account about Cuba’s political system but his explanation about Fidel and Raul 
Castro distribution of functions with charismatic and institutional roles as a major 




From the times of the struggle against Batista’s dictatorship, political balance 
within the Fidelista camp tilted toward the Rebel Army under Fidel, Raul and Che 
Guevara. The political directorate and the bases of support for the guerrillas in the 
underground movement suffered heavier leadership losses and had to operate in a less 
centralized manner. After the triumph of the revolution, a narrative was developed inside 
Cuba and outside that promoted the idea that the revolution was decided almost entirely 
by the role of the rebel army, the skeleton of the FAR, reducing the underground 
movement to a mere auxiliary role
75
.  
Fidel Castro’s highest political position was his military title: “Commander in 
Chief of the Revolution”. There were even two presidents between 1959 and 1976, the 
first one even dared to challenge Fidel in 1959. President Manuel Urrutia was forced to 
resign by massive demonstrations in support of Fidel Castro when the latter resigned in 
protest for Urrutia’s position against communist presence in Cuba’s government. The 
revolution was where the weapons were, and the weapons were with Fidel. No coalition 
within the revolutionary camp could defeat Fidel Castro’s charismatic authority.  
 
                                                          
75This narrative has been disproved by several memoirs of clandestine fighters in the 
underground movement published in Cuba in the last twenty years (Oltuski 2002). In 
English, the role of the underground movement was vindicated by Julia Sweig in her 




But charisma was not enough to govern the country. In Nelson Valdes’ words: 
“charisma needs organization” (Valdes 2008, 37) While the supreme leader engaged in 
massive revolutionary campaigns and deployed an international agenda that placed Cuba 
in the world stage, fighting apartheid or sending doctors to the most remote regions of the 
world, his younger brother managed the institutional base for guaranteeing a minimal 
plateau of order and stability. By 1974-1975, the CCP developed some political 
institutions (People’s power) as an additional source of domestic legitimacy. Raul Castro 
explained then: 
 The establishment of the representative institutions of our state is an extremely 
important step forward in our revolutionary process. It completes the elements of 
our proletarian government. During the first few years of the struggle for survival, 
this was neither indispensable nor vital-and might even have proved a hindrance 
to the speed with which the government had to act at that time. Now in the new 
conditions, this has become a pressing need, a basic element of our government 
through which the people’s participation will be given regular, real and systematic 
institutional form (R. Castro, Improving our democracy 2008) 
 
At times, such as the First Congress of the CCP, Fidel Castro acknowledged 
distortions associated with transferring military methods to civilian institutions (F. 
Castro, Informe del Comite Central del PCC, Primer Congreso del Partido Comunista de 
Cuba 1978). In the political scheme, the CCP, not the Armed Forces, supposed to be the 
main organ of power, first of all, because its role was to produce political hegemony. 




military command in the Politburo and many members of the FAR upper echelon in the 
Central Committee of the CCP.  
But this was a seudo-solution in the long term.  The primordial function of Armed 
Forces is not persuading and governing, but national defense. Military leaders don’t train 
every day to persuade but to command. The overrepresentation of the military expresses a 
correlated underrepresentation of the CCP politicians in the Politburo, those who are in 
charge of persuading and do the political work. This situation creates a particular 
“cognitive dissonance” because under the Leninist design, promoted by Raul Castro 
himself, the Communist Party’s supremacy is a constitutional principle and all 
institutions supposed to be subordinated to it
76
. 
Military overrepresentation in intraparty politics got aggravated during the 
Special period. If an important role of the military in the Cuban State was already a 
feature before 1992, after, the balance of institutional power shifted even more in favor of 
                                                          
76This position has been reiterated by Raul Castro himself all along his political life 
including his second major speech after Fidel got sick. In December 2, 2006, the day the 
Armed Forces celebrated their military parade for their fiftieth anniversary, Raul quoted 
Fidel Castro’s speech at the I Congress of the CCP and reiterated the subordination of the 
Armed Forces as the “most modest, best disciplined and most loyal servant” to the party 
since the founding of it in 1965. See Castro, Raul (2006), Speech at the Political 
Ceremony, Military Review and March in Commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of 
the Landing of the Granma Yacht, the Day of the Armed Forces and in Celebration of the 
80th Birthday of the Commander in Chief Fidel Castro, given on December 2nd, 2006. 
Homepage: http://www.cubaminrex.cu/English/50TH%Aniversary/50anivi.htm (access: 




the Armed Forces. The end of the African Wars in 1989 brought about the victorious 
return of the Cuban troops from Angola. In these circumstances, the Armed Forced 
acquired new functions beyond its military corporatist mission. The FAR stepped up to a 
considerable role in the economy (Casas 1990). The GAE (Grupo de Administracion 
Empresarial- Management Group of the Armed Forces, a holding of companies) leaded 
by now deceased Army Corp General Julio Casas, and General Luis Alberto Rodriguez, 




The 1989 summer was also a critical institutional juncture because of the “Ochoa 
Affair”
78
. On June 14 of this year, the ministry of Armed Forces announced the arrest of 
major general Arnaldo Ochoa, one of the revolutionary heroes of the war missions in 
Africa. In a Granma editorial attributed to Fidel Castro, the CCP newspaper declared: 
“The international traffic in drugs has dealt us a terrible blow. We can’t even say that the 
                                                          
77For a discussion of this role of the FAR in the economy see my book “Raul Castro and 
the New Cuba: A Close-Up View of Change” (Abrahams and Lopez-Levy 2011) 
 
78 The Ochoa Affair refers to the arrest, trial and execution by firing squads of General 
Arnaldo Ochoa, a hero of the African Wars who got allegedly connected to drugs traffic 
in coordination with some officers of the Ministry of the Interior associated with Cuban 
operations to circumvent the U.S. embargo regulations. The Affair included two judicial 
causes. Under Cause 2, the Cuban authorities arrested and condemned most of the high 
command of the Ministry of Interior. Many officers were retired or transferred to other 




big traffickers in drugs are mainly to blame. Our own people sought them out and easily 
accepted their first offers. However we will put this evil out by the roots” (Granma 1989) 
General Ochoa and his closest associates were shot by firing squad after they 
were declared guilty by several military courts. The Council of State presided by Fidel 
and Raul Castro ratified the sentence and decided not to pardon or commute the death 
penalty. The affair brought a purge of the Ministry of Interior, particularly the security 
services.  Fidel and Raul Castro sent to retirement or prison most of the high command of 
the main institution in charge of preserving public order, police, firefighters, political 
espionage and counterespionage. The new minister Abelardo Colome Ibarra, ‘Furry” was 
then the second man in command of the Armed Forces under Raul. “Furry” appointed 
generals and colonels from the FAR in all major positions of the police, the firefighters, 
the Coast Guard and the intelligence and counterintelligence services.  
In contrast to the ascent trajectory of the Armed Forces during the Special Period, 
the relative institutional power of the party went into a free fall at the national level in the 
1990’s. The permanent apparatus of the Central Committee of the CCP lost part of its 
luster because of Fidel Castro’s political ad hoc mobilization of a group of young cadres 
in the ideological campaign known as “The battle of Ideas”
79
. This political crusade 
                                                          
79The “battle of ideas” campaign originated in the successful massive mobilization for the 
return to Cuba of Elian Gonzalez, a little child whose mother died attempting to reach the 




invested massive resources in political propaganda and out budget economic projects that 
supposed to improve the lives of the population.  
In 2006 after he replaced his brother Fidel, Raul Castro expressed
80
 that he 
doesn’t plan to rule Cuba as his elder brother did. Part of the success of this intra-
generational transition can be explained by Raul’s understanding of its limitation to fit in 
his charismatic brother’s shoes. He needs a government of the CCP and declared as his 
main task to strengthen the Cuban Communist Party’s institutional basis to rule.  “The 
Commander in Chief of the Cuban Revolution”- Raul Castro declared – “ is solely and 
uniquely the Communist Party, as an institution that brings together the revolutionary 
vanguard and is a sure guarantee of Cuban unity in all times, can be the worthy inheritor 
of the confidence deposited by the people in its leader” (R. Castro 2006) 
Some authors has presented Raul Castro’s prevalence as Fidel Castro’s 
presidential successor as predetermined because of their family ties. Jose Azel, from the 
University of Miami has been a persistent defender of this hypothesis “General Raul 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Castro for solidarity in bringing back his son from the United States. A simple legal 
custody case became a political battle because of the importance assigned to the kid by 
the Cuban right in Florida.  In Cuba, the campaign inspired the most fervent young red 
guards to weakly rotate a high level political campaign (the “tribuna antimperialista” 
(anti-imperialist tribune) included artistic events, festivals, etc) to reach eventually every 
municipality of the country.  
80Just one month before his ascendancy to the presidency, Raul Castro told the 5th 
Plenary of the Central Committee of the CCP: “the Commander in-Chief of the Cuban 
Revolution is one and only one, and only the Communist Party, (…) can be the dignified 




Castro leads Cuba not because he is president of the Council of State, but because he is 
first secretary of the Communist Party, head of the armed forces, and Fidel’s brother” 
(Azel 2013). In the same issue of “World Affairs” magazine, one of the few Cuba based 
pro-embargo activist Antonio Rodiles (Rodiles 2013) even called Cuban elites as “Castro 
dynasty” while liberal journalist Ana Louise Bardach speculated about whether Raul 
Castro’s son, Alejandro, former Raul Castro’s son in law, Luis Alberto Rodriguez or even 
his grandson Raul Rodriguez Castro will succeed the general-president, presenting a well 
documented Castro family tree (Bardach 2009, XIV) as if she was writing about the 
descendants of Ibn Saud in Saudi Arabia or the Kim family in North Korea 
This is wrong. Undoubtedly family ties played an important role between Fidel 
and Raul Castro but Cuban politics does not follow a sultanistic pattern.  The focus on the 
family ties in the transfer of power hides more important dimension of factional and 
institutional political pluralism within Cuba’s political elites. These changes are better 
explained as the outcome of Cuba’s guerrilla style factional politics in which Raul Castro 
outmaneuvered others, even those who were most loyalists to Fidel’s vision as the 
optimal choice to preserve the unity of the leadership.  
Raul Castro demonstrated with his cabinet changes between 2006 and 2012 that 
more important than been Fidel’s brother, he was the leader of the complex FAR-




replace the ad hoc promotion of leaders “by helicopter”, Fidel’s style. By 2012, only 
three ministers of Fidel’s cabinet remained, two of them, the minister of the Armed 
Forces and the minister of Interior.  The new appointees were personnel vetted by the 
Armed Forces Direction of Cadres, or the Organization Department of the Central 
Committee of the CCP. In contrast to those promoted by Fidel Castro from Young 
Communist League orators, Raul’s appointees were characterized by long step by step 
promotion along the ladders of the armed institutions or the party.  
What balance of forces produced this outcome? There is a number of analyses
81
 
that have tried to explain the different divisions within Cuba’s power structure. Here the 
criteria that I present is based on a functional differentiation that look at the factional 
cleavages based on bounding ties associated to the type of work and career developed by 




                                                          
81Some of these analysis are “Back from the Future” by Susan Eckstein (Eckstein 2003, 
257-258), “Island in the Storm” by Gail Reed (Reed 1992) and “Cuba: Clearing Perilous 
Waters” by Edward Gonzalez (Gonzalez 1996).  
 
82Two accounts about the debate of alternatives within the revolution in the 1990’s are 
Maurizio Giuliano’s “El Caso CEA: Intelectuales e Inquisidores en Cuba” (Giuliano 
1998) and Aurelio Alonso’s “La EconomiaCubana: los desafios de unajuste sin 




The complete integration of the two main armed bodies (FAR and MININT) 
occurred in 1989. After the trials known as Causa 1 and Causa 2 the FAR high command 
controlled all the major position of the Ministry of interior including the minister itself. 
Because of its military, economic and history-based power, these two institutions were 
already the most powerful factions within the Cuban elites. This development was 
important because it nipped in the bud any possibility of a clash between military 
factions.  
The military establishment found a natural ally in the provincial party czars. This 
group frequently ignored by foreign media and academia is tremendously powerful and 
functional to the one party system. Provincial party czars are in favor of a type of regime 
more predictable and institutionalized than the one under Fidel. These leaders have 
suffered from their intermediate position between the highest level of the party and the 
local authorities. Their role was not to make revolutionary harangues but to implement 
policies. In addition they have seen perplexed how Fidel promoted leaders from the 
Young Communist League or the Students Federation to his closer entourage ignoring the 
party leadership and the laborious work of those who climbed the party ladder step by 
step from the base to the provincial or central departments’ levels of the organization.  
During the 1990’s, the FAR-MININT complex cultivated relations with the 




secretary of State Alexander Haig threatened about launching war against Cuba, FAR 
developed the doctrine of the all people’s war inspired and advised by the Vietnamese 
experience. As part of this strategy, the FAR created the provincial and regional army 
popular defense councils of which the CCP provincial czars were presidents. Cuba’s 
internationalist military missions in Angola, Ethiopia and Nicaragua were also a training 
ground for party cadres who were sent them to prove their disposition to sacrifice.  
The military had also the advantages of the historical transference of commanders 
to civilian government and party functions since the triumph of the revolution. One of 
these military officers who worked for Raul Castro and was transferred to the party 
apparatus was Jose R. Machado. Machado served before the revolution as the chief of 
medical services in Raul’s Second Oriental Guerrilla Front in Sierra Cristal. After the 
triumph, Machado served aschief of the medical services of the Armed Forces
83
, Minister 
of Health until 1967 and from there he was transferred to lead the CCP in Matanzas 
Province. Since the first Congress of the Communist Party Machado became a member of 
the Politburo and chair of the Organization Department in charge of party promotions. 
                                                          
83Machado Ventura served after the triumph of the revolution as military aide of president 
Manuel Urrutia. Since he was a man of Fidel and Raul Castro, he reported every 
Urrutia’s movement and meetings to the revolutionary leaders. When president Urrutia 
clashed with Fidel Castro, then premier, he was forced to resign by the mobilization of 






Between 2009 and 2014, Machado who came from the province of Villa Clara, in the 
center of the country was appointed as the first vice-president and second secretary of the 
CCP.   
Equally important, these party leaders’ political education
84
 coincided with the 
military high command on the importance of domestic stability in the design of the 
reform. In the political reading promoted by the CCP about the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, Gorbachev has been naïve at best and a traitor to socialism at worst
85
. They 
learned a bitter lesson from the collapse of the Soviet Union and particularly communism 
in Eastern Europe. The experience of China and Vietnam in which communist leaders 
reconfigured rather than destroying the system attracted their sympathy.  
                                                          
84For an insider’s look at the importance and orientation of political education for the 
CCP, see Jose R. Machado Ventura’s “La politica de cuadros: Unatareapriorizada” 
(Machado-Ventura Jul-Ago 1988) Bruno Hurtado’s article “Escuelasprovinciales del 
Partido: Preparar a los Cuadros para EnfrentarlasTareas” (Hurtado November 1988),  For 
a view about the role of ideology in framing the economic reform, see Dario Machado’s 
“El AspectoIdeologico del PerfeccionamientoEmpresarial” (Machado 2000) 
 
85Two illustrative Cuban readings of critical approaches that emphasized the 
abandonment of the communist paradigm as the cause of the collapse, not the paradigm 
itself are Enrique Ubieta’s “Las CienciasSociales, la Politica y la Crisis de los 
Paradigmas” (Ubieta 1996) and Ruben Zardoya’s “Ideologia y Revolucion: Notassobre el 






The third main group in Cuba’s power bloc was composed by civilian technocrats 
of economic administration (government) or political agitation (CCP). These government 
officials, managers of state owned companies and corporations, and propagandists 
associated to the so called “Battle of ideas” during the Special period have been less 
important in the Cuban context than in Eastern Europe or the former Soviet Union. These 
leaders have two main characteristics in common: 1) they were in the interval between 
30-50 years old, younger than the two first generations of the revolutionary leaders. 2) 
They have been promoted by Fidel Castro from the Young Communist League (UJC) 





                                                          
86Most of these leaders came from the National Executive Committee of the University 
Student Federation, an organization under the tutelage of the Young Communist League 
(UJC). The most prominent leaders were Otto Rivero, Carlos Valenciaga and Hassan 
Perez, who were presidents of the Students Federation. These three were good orators, 
and sharpened their skills during the mobilizations for Elian’s return. Rivero and 
Valenciaga, as it was the case of also later purged Felipe Perez Roque, were promoted 
from the Young Communist League and the Students Federation to the Group of Support 
of the Commander in Chief, and from there to a vice-presidency of the Council of 
Ministry and Fidel’s head of assistants respectively. About the third, Hassan popular joke 
among young people played with the slogan “Bring Elian” repeated incessantly in radio, 
TV and demonstrations. The people added a second part to the slogan and declared 
“Bring Elian and take Hassan”. The rapid rise in the political ladder of these young 
leaders raised a lot of hackle within the military ranks and the party apparatchiks more 




Fidel Castro identified them as political talents of new generations and used them 
to break the group thinking of the historical leaders of the revolution. Their political and 
ideological composition was much divided according to their functions in the system’s 
adaptation to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Some of them were more reform oriented 
as result of their experience in the market sector of the two tracks system. Others who 
had worked with Fidel Castro in the political campaigns to preserve revolutionary spirit 
and control were more reticent about such course.  
The head of the group of managers of the civilian industry and state bureaucrats 
was Vice president Carlos Lage, who had developed some support among leaders of the 
young communist league and was promoted by Fidel.   They were “Fidelistas” but not 
“Raulistas” (Every Raul’s loyalist is a Fidel’s follower, but the reverse was not true. 
There were cadres loyal to Fidel who developed a preference for younger leaders than 
Raul as Fidel’s replacement).  Raul Castro had cultivated relations of friendship with 
some of these young leaders as part of his relationship with his brother Fidel of whom 
Carlos Lage, Felipe Perez Roque and Carlos Valenciaga, all of them former leaders of the 








Structurally this third group was never a match for the coalition of the other 
previously described two factions leaded by Raul Castro. The “Battle of Ideas” group was 
never a rival to the institutional power of the Armed Forces or the provincial party czars. 
It circumvented the routines and procedures of the CCP by creating a parallel channel but 
it was never as cohesive or well organized as the FAR and party czars groups. Its leaders 
were radical careerist members of the Young Communist League (UJC) subordinated 
directly to Fidel as the commander in chief of the revolution, not inside the party 
structure.  
The civilian managers of the economy were more institutionalized than the battle 
of ideas groups but only as part of the state. They were at disadvantage to mount their 
own political alternative because the whole state machinery is subordinated and under 
surveillance of the other two groups, the Party and the FAR-MININT Complex.  
Fidel’s affinity with the civilian managers-battle of ideas “group” resulted from 
his focus on the economy and ideology but his historic allegiance was with the 
revolutionary old guard and the military who were always his closest comrades. Neither 
                                                          
87This difference of style promoting state and party officials between Fidel and Raul 
Castro had been explained by veteran Cuba observer and journalist Marc Frank in his 




the economic nor the propaganda skills of the third “group” were indispensable for 
Raul’s control of power. In propaganda, the party had its own department of 
revolutionary orientation that controlled all the newspapers, radio and TV stations. At the 
helm of the department was Colonel Rolando Alfonso Borges who was until 1992 the 
chief of FAR’s political propaganda apparatus. Raul Castro had also developed his own 
set of cadres in the economic realm around the Grupo de Administracion Empresarial 
(GAE-Enterprise Management Group) affiliated to the military high command.  
Three important factors served as stabilizers of this power shift. These factors are:  
1) The previous partial institutionalization of the political system, 
expressed in the anticipation of the intra-generational succession in 
article 94 of the Cuban Constitution
88
. The long transition to a post-
totalitarian rule began with the institutionalization of CCP rule the 1976 
constitutional process. This institutionalization was never completed 
because of the charismatic role played by Fidel Castro. Yet the party 
developed a experience celebrating five congresses (since 1975 to 
1997), elections every five years and electing its central committee 
                                                          
88Article 94 establishes a regular procedure for presidential succession. The constitution 
establishes the position of first Vice-president of the Councils of States and Ministers 
who replaces the president in case of death or sickness. Raul Castro was in this position 




(since 1965). In all these events, Raul Castro appeared as Fidel’s right 
hand and the head of the institutionalization drive. 
2) Circumstances also favored Raul Castro’s consolidation as Fidel’s 
successor. Although the Cuban one-party system reproduced many 
elements from the soviet style communist system, its character is 
essentially Cuban even in its flaws.  The succession politics of the party 
was also shaped by the experience of the anti-Batista struggle in which 
there was always an appointed second in command to take the 
leadership in case the guerrilla chief dies. Raul Castro was since 1959 
in such position.  
3) The new role Fidel Castro adopted as “elder statesman” and political 
commentator of international and national affairs after his retirement. 
Fidel Castro retired but he remained an arbiter’s presence. As soon as 
he recovered from his most critical illness, he endorsed Raul Castro as 
his successor. This support helped Raul Castro to neutralize potential 
opposition to reform steps. Politically it is difficult to appear in Cuba 
and Latin America more revolutionary than Fidel Castro.  
These stabilizing factors created a predictable path for the more complex coming 
inter-generational power transition in 2018 in which charisma would not play a major 




Raul Castro cannot merely replace Fidel Castro. The “successor” will not be able 
to replicate the founder. Raul cannot become the charismatic leader Fidel Castro 
was, for reasons beyond the obvious differences in their personalities. Charismatic 
leaders require a charismatic moment, when order has broken down, and 
followers who hunger for such leadership and willingly participate in the process 
of legitimating charismatic authority. Another reason, generally overlooked, is 
that there is no “equivalent Raul” for Raul Castro, someone who could do for him 
what he did for his brother. That means Raul will need to find others to perform 
numerous roles. The interlocking network of power in the hands of just two 
persons will become ever more dispersed (Valdes 2008, 38)  
 
Today there is not a substitute for Fidel or for Raul Castro or for the conditions in 
which the two Castros operated as a team to govern Cuba for five decades. Yet, the CCP 
elites are not lacking institutional capabilities and routines to manage the election or 
designation of the new leader and problems associated to him/her such as civilian-
military relations, the economic reform and decentralization.  
 
3.1.2 The starting point of the political reform in 2006 
The political challenges inherited by Raul Castro were the result of the flaws of 
the command economy and the totalitarian period of the one party system but also of the 
partial reform policies adopted by the Communist party after the collapse of European 
communism. The rise of unemployment and sub-employment as result of the economic 




The communist discourse about development with equality sounded hollow for 
segments that remained stagnant or fell in poverty condition despite the government 
efforts to mitigate their disgrace. The expansion of the inequality gap affected harshly 
social areas where the revolutionary discourse penetrated deep such as the blacks and the 
people from the Eastern provinces who were less connected to foreign investment and 
remittances from Cubans living abroad.  
Alejandro de la Fuente described how even before the crisis of the 1990’s, “the 
achievement of racial equality was largely dependent on government performance”, to 
conclude later that “capacity to perform is precisely what the Cuban government has 
lacked under the special period”. In this context, racial inequality expanded not as an 
intentional policy but as result of “measures like the legalization of dollars, self-
employment, foreign investment, and “free” agricultural markets carry with them”. These 
measures carry with them “a heavy social cost: They unavoidably provoke increasing 
inequality and resentment in a population which is used to living in a highly egalitarian 
social setting”. De la Fuente concluded that “Afro Cubans should not be automatically 
seen as uncritical supporters of the government”  (de la Fuente Spring 2001) not only as 
result of the lack of state action in areas such as housing, employment in the best sectors, 
etc., but also because “the erosion and deepening crisis of legitimacy of the current 
political system thus created new spaces for racist ideas and practices to operate and 




The process of institutionalization of collective leadership had major reversals 
after he V Congress of the CCP took place in 1997 in conditions that diminished the 
relevance of the conclave as the most important political event.  The Secretariat, the 
central body to govern and coordinate the party internal life, was dissolved and it was not 
restored until June 2006 in the V plenum of the Central Committee this year. The practice 
of having a Central Report to the Congress of the CCP was replaced by improvised 
speeches by Fidel Castro in the IV and the V Congresses. 
This decline of the CCP role was a U-turn in a trend of institutionalization since 
1975. Indeed the changes in the party rules and statutes in 1991 anticipated the beginning 
of an institutional adaptation to the post-Cold War world. The IV Congress of the CCP in 
1991 introduced several political changes that ease some of the reforms that later 
happened during the 1990’s such as the creation of self-employment segments and the 
openings to foreign investment and tourism. Politically, the IV Congress was particularly 
important because it opened party ranks to religious people renouncing to the previously 
proclaimed principle of “scientific atheism”.  
The post-1992 party discourses emphasized nationalist goals of sovereignty and 
independence, areas in which the CCP had some reservoir of legitimacy in the presence 
of the communist failures all over the world.  Socialism was presented as a necessary tool 




sovereignty. In terms of political education and propaganda, after 1992, the CCP 
concentrated in patriotic themes, relegating Leninism to a second plane.  This political 
move created a space for maneuver and plurality that later was enhanced with the rise of 
leftist movements in Latin America and the conception of the so-called “socialism of the 
XXI century”.  
Ideologically, the IV CCP Congress raised nationalist ideals and Jose Marti’s 
thought to the same level of Leninism as its guiding ideologies.  
The party statutes were amended to redefine the PCC as the party of the “Cuban 
nation” rather than the party of the working class, and the new statutes 
emphasized its ideological roots in the ideas of Jose Marti as well as Marx and 
Lenin. The prohibition on party membership for religious believers was lifted, and 
the process for choosing new party members was simplified so that more 
members could be drawn from work centers based on a vote of their coworkers 
(rather than requiring sponsorship by existing members or prior membership in 
the Youth Communist Union). Over the next five years, these changes produced a 
flood of new members as the PCC’s ranks grew from 611, 627 at the Fourth 
Congress to 780 000 in 1997 on the eve of the fifth Congress. By 1997, 232 000 
people, one third of the PCC’s total membership had joined the party since the 







The 1992 constitutional changes amounted to a new constitution since they 
redefined the character of the post-revolutionary state and its legitimacy
89
. The Cuban 
state stopped its atheistic practice to proclaim a lay separation between state and religion. 
Discrimination for religious beliefs was prohibited. New forms of property, including 
private one were explicitly added redefining the character of the economy and its 
rejection of foreign investment. It was a clear move from totalitarian to post-totalitarian 
features (Linz, Juan & Stepan, Alfred 1996). Margaret E. Crahan explained the new type 
of state-civil society relations that emerged:  
In 1992, a constitutional amendment transformed Cuba from officially an atheistic 
state to a lay state. There has been a concurrent ceding of public space by the 
government, the assumption of greater autonomy by some official organizations, 
and the mild revitalization of of some historical organizations, including religious 
ones. The result is obviously increased ferment as such groups very tentatively 
attempt to exert more influence over politics and society. Few are questioning the 
socialist nature of the government, although a fair number are challenging the 
government to deliver more enjoyment not only of socioeconomic, but also of 
civil/political rights (Crahan 2008, 333).  
 
During the nineties, three major processes served as the springboard for the 
political reform after 2006. Theoretically, it is not difficult to use the concept of 
detotalitarianism by societal conquest, used by Linz and Stepan(Linz, Juan & Stepan, 
                                                          
89Hugo Azcuy discussed the magnitude of the constitutional changes from a revolutionary 
perspective (Azcuy 1995). Julio Cesar Guanche and Julio A. Fernandez presented a 
critical view about deviation and lack of implementation of the constitution in recent 





Alfred 1996) as part of their description of the political liberalization leading from 
totalitarianism to post-totalitarian systems.  
The first process was the expansion of pluralism by the acceptance of new 
complementary and competitive identities. The country experienced a process of 
religious revival with massive increases in the number of baptism, creation of new 
churches, and expansion of the catholic and evangelical communities. There was a 
revival of some legal associations that survived outside the control of the CCP after 
1959with reduced organic life such as the masonic lodges. Groups such as associations of 
immigrants from specific regions of Spain, Afro-Cuban societies, and masonry were re-
activated. The government allowed them contacts with their international homologues 
that provided relief and support for Cubans of the same affiliation.  
A second process happened within some of the organizations under the control of 
the CCP that played earlier the typical role of transmission belts of the party policy for 
specific social sector. As in many post-totalitarian situations, some of these groups began 
acting as “amphibious” associations(Ding 1994), as surrogates of the state but also as 
representatives of specific sectors, defending the CCP’s hegemony but negotiating 
liberties and spaces for the social sectors represented by them within it
90
.  
                                                          
90One important case that set an example that other groups would try to emulate later 
was the Union of Writers and Artists (UNEAC) and its defense of the right and need of 




A third trend in civil society that also changed the balance of its relations with the 
state was the expansion of the social networks of religious groups after the changes in the 
constitution and the CCP statutes prohibiting discrimination for religious reasons. The 
rise of religious communities has mitigation effects on political polarization because 
people of different positions converge in the same communities in faith. In terms of 
values, and discussion of social issues such as abortion, education, public security, 
inequality, corruption, poverty and social solidarity, churches and groups such as 
masonry promote alternative values, different, not necessarily in conflict with the CCP.  
Rather than engaging in a total confrontation with the communist state, most 
religious organizations, particularly the Roman Catholic Church, opted for recognizing 
achievements of the Cuban revolution in terms of national sovereignty, elimination of 
extreme poverty, access to health and education while at the same time questioning the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
series of privileges to ease the conditions under which the members of the Union travel 
abroad. As long as they didn’t get involved in anti-government politics, they were 
allowed to travel and remain outside the country for long terms. Another example 
discussed in chapter III was the case of the National Union of Small Peasants which 
became very vocal defending the claims of its members to some government’s debt for 
previous deliveries of food. The case also set an example for another major practice of 
the amphibious association a demand for the respect of the law by the authorities. In this 
way, the CCP get some feedback from the implementation of its policies, finding reasons 
and information that flows from below to upgrade and monitor the state bureaucracy. In 
the cases in which central policies conflict with interests of local authorities, some of 
these amphibious groups provide the CCP with a wide array of mechanisms such as 
petitions, media coverage, hotlines, and even protests to increase the efficiency and 




totalitarian features of the regime.  As methods of political advocacy, religious groups 
have promoted non heroic forms of resistance, dialogue with the authorities and gradual 
reforms. In a context of international confrontation in which Cubans from the opposition 
are immediately welcome in the United States, the Churches have called Cubans to 
remain in the island and fight for a different future in their country of origin. Just by its 
example defeating “scientific atheism”, a previously declared central pillar of the 
totalitarian system, religious groups show a path to change.  
From a narrow vision of freedom of religion limited to the liberty to practice their 
creed in the temple, communities of faith stretched out their role in society, first as a 
practice, then as a right. Religious groups began to organize sports championships, 
cultural activities, fraternal groups, educational programs, poverty alleviation initiatives 
and charities. As in the previous two trends, the expansion of the social networks and 
roles of religious groups did provide a support net for dissidents and opponents to the 
regime who advocated compromise and dialogue. Yet its main function was not partisan. 
In the context of totalitarianism, the demand for respect of difference was a not so subtle 
political claim. In the post-totalitarian phase, the emphasis on respect for non-political 
difference provides the sprouts for improving governance and a more responsive non-




By 2006, the openly discussed ideas and aspirations of new generations of 
Cubans, inside and outside the party, were different from those that prevail within the 
historic revolutionary generation. By 2006-2009, the revolution of January 1959 and the 
struggle against dictator Bastista were not more than a distant reference. Cuban civil 
society was better connected to the outside world, more plural and more unequal than at 
any previous moment of the post-revolution period.  
The Cuban case is a call to take serious the phases of the revolutionary cycle as 
described by Crane Brinton in chapters VII and VIII of “Anatomy of 
Revolution”(Brinton 1965). By 2006 the Cuban political process was already in a well-
entrenched Thermidor phase. Communism is for the post-revolutionary elite more a 
justification for remaining in power than an ideology. Without formally denying their old 
credo, many former revolutionaries do not behave like revolutionaries anymore but 
follow the logic of the market whether openly as new businessmen (former ministries, 
party cadres, government officials, and sport glories have opened private restaurants or 
bed and breakfasts) or silently by using their contacts in the government to promote their 
relatives, friends or their own economic position.   
Here it is identifiable a trend towards what Linz and Stepan describe as de-
totalitarianism by decay. The gap between daily life, where official Marxist ideology is 




growing. This gap is particularly expressed in terms of the privileges enjoyed by the 
leaders and the conditions in which the majority of the population increasingly lives.  
Similar to what happened in other communist experiences, the creed of the 
nomenclature is that “The business of revolution is business”. The party and the 
communist ideology is a tool to keep their material and political privileges rather than a 
mechanism to advance a real revolutionary agenda. One indicator of the new orientation 
of the elites is the fact that the princes and princesses of the system, the sons and 
daughters of the first revolutionaries, had moved to business oriented jobs. If in the past 
many of these young members of the elites would prefer to work for the military or the 
ministry of interior, under the new circumstances, most of them seek jobs in the emerging 
business sectors of tourism and hard currency related activities. There, they can use the 
state for capitalist accumulation through rent seeking activities or traffic of influences.  
Emigration is another source of this attitudinal change. Well-connected children 
of members of the government found ways to live outside the country during the worst 
years of the crisis. Some of them did it as part of educational programs in Mexico and 
Spain and others simply took advantages of the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act to move to 
the U.S. in some cases using the cover justification of been artists and writers. The 




confrontation between those who remains in the island and the ones living in capitalists, 
market oriented countries.  
A third form of political liberalization is de-totalitarianism by choice. Facing the 
deterioration of socialist ideology, and anticipating the passing of the revolutionary 
generation, responsible bureaucrats emphasize the role of patriotic values, aspirations for 
economic integration with Latin America and a soft landing transition from revolutionary 
or charismatic forms of legitimating to procedural commitment and regime performance. 
A big impulse for institutionalization comes from the nationalist desire for a 
developmental state, capable to guarantee a better position for the country in the 
international system. Those who are more patriotic aspire to develop an efficient civil 
service and preserve autonomy of the state from economically dominant groups and 
international actors but national interests; neither democracy nor revolutionary ideology 
is their main concern.   
The new post-revolutionary elites appears more urbanized, educated and 
sophisticated than their parents who took power as part of the revolutionary generation, 
coming from the provinces or even from the rural areas in which the guerrilla struggle 
took place. They are also more cynical and hedonist. Educationally and professionally, 
many of them had developed some possibilities for autonomous professional careers 




began to develop. Part of the bureaucracy or Cubans in business positions associated to 
foreign investors began to have their own agendas about economic reform with interests 
that might or might not coincide with those in favor of preserving the heavy presence and 
regulation of the communist state. These “capitalist roaders” are not members of the old 
classes displaced by the revolution but the sons of daughters of the post-revolutionary 
elites.  
These shifts in the behavior and convictions of the elite are also present in the 
society at large. After two decades of limitations and scarcity, the new generations are 
particularly prone to more market experimentation than their predecessors. The Cuban 
society has also become more plural in terms of citizens affiliated to different non-
political groups, contacts with the outside world and the level of education of a 
significant number of its citizens. There have been also attitudinal changes in issues such 
as gender equality, respect for sexual orientation and a more respectful attitude by the 
government and the population towards the choice of emigration or remaining in the 
country.  
One development of the nineties was the consolidation of a segment of permanent 
political opposition to the government. The most dramatic event that happened in this 
regard was the 2003 Black Spring. In a sudden stroke the communist state arrested 75 




by engineer Oswaldo Paya collected more than twenty thousand signatures to petition a 
constitutional change ending one party rule and the restitution of some human rights such 
as the right to travel, the right to own private property and the right to free expression and 
association.  
Paya was originally a prominent lay leader in the Catholic Church who 
radicalized his projection in conflict with government repression. For a while until later 
in the 2000’s, Paya avoided the endorsement of the radical exiles and was repudiated by 
them enhancing temporarily his international and domestic status. But by 2006, the 
opposition in the island was disarticulated and heavily dependent on the exiles and the 
support of the U.S. government. Yet, it has achieved some important presence in the 
international media and survived.  
The arrest of the 75 led to the creation of the movement of the ladies in White, the 
most prominent opposition group in the island
91
.  The group originally gathered wives 
and mothers of those arrested in the 2003 Black Spring. After the indult and exile of most 
of the prisonners in 2010, and the death of their founder Laura Pollan, the group became 
a typical opposition party with her most prominent leader Berta Soler involved in 
multiple scandals related to U.S. financing of them. Soler became a vocal defender of the 
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embargo and even spoke gratefully about the Batista dictatorship in line with the 
dominant discourse of the most right wing exiles.   
 
3.2 Defining political liberalization in the Cuban context 
3.2.1 Challenges of Cuba’s political liberalization 
The 1992 Constitutional reform created the institutional framework in which most 
of political liberalization took place after 2006 once Raul Castro took the presidency and 
launched the economic reforms plan.  The crisis that followed the end of the communist 
world increased the autonomy of non-confrontational actors within the one party system. 
Social, cultural and economic pluralism represented different identities with political 
preferences that were reflected by expression or omission
92
.  
This growing social pluralism pushed demands for political change that forced the 
CCP to adapt and respond with the VI Congress of the CCP in 2011. Conceptually, 
                                                          
92Cubans who have differences with the state could join civil society groups that have 
different agendas from the CCP-state but do not confront it directly. These ways of 
mobilizing collective action may have political consequences in the long term but none of 
these groups expressed a partisan agenda. That said the social networks developed 
autonomously are fungible to political organizations. It will not be surprising if in a 
different context; leaders and members of civil society organizations begin to use 
theirskills and social capital with a more open political purpose. For a discussion of the 
process of “pluralizacion social”. One of the best analysis about the expansion of civil 





liberalization represents not a design for a transition to a new political system but the 
adaptation of the one that dominated Cuba since 1976 that once resembled 
totalitarianism. As Linz and Stepan explained: “Post-totalitarianism (unlike democracy, 
totalitarianism, authoritarianism or sultanism) is not a genetic type but an evolutionary 
type”(Linz, Juan & Stepan, Alfred 1996, 293). 
Fidel’s retirement ended a long transition from totalitarianism to post-
totalitarianism
93
. At the center of this transition in Cuba, it is a process of political 
liberalization. Alfred Stepan and Juan Linz distinguish this type of political change from 
democratization  
Liberalization may entail a mix of policy and social changes, such as less 
censorship of the media, somewhat greater space for the organization of 
autonomous working class activities, the introduction of some legal safeguards for 
individuals such as habeas corpus, the releasing of most political prisoners, the 
return of exiles, perhaps measures for improving the distribution of income, and 
most important the toleration of opposition (Linz, Juan & Stepan, Alfred 1996, 3).  
 
 
                                                          
93This classification of regime type follows the seminal work of Juan Linz and Alfred 
Stepan (1996), Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, Baltimore:  John 
Hopkins University Press. According to Linz and Stepan, totalitarian and post-totalitarian 
regimes differentiate in terms of pluralism, leadership, mobilization and ideology. In 
opposition to classical totalitarianism, the post-totalitarian regime includes more 
economic and social pluralism, a non-charismatic leadership based on bureaucratic 
politics, a reduction of political mobilization and more pragmatic, welfare oriented less 




The reader should underline the phrase “liberalization may entail”. It is not a 
package but a list of political measures that liberalization might or might not include. In 
contrast, democratization includes most of the above mentioned liberalization measures 
as a whole plus the celebration of free and fair elections in which the right to win control 
of the government is openly contested.  Using this conceptual framework, one can deduce 
that political liberalization carries a possibility of democratization but the probability of 
such outcome is not guaranteed. This distinction is a central theme of this chapter. 
The challenges that Raul Castro encountered in 2009 after consolidating the unity 
of the Cuban elites around his presidency were of four types. CCP responses to those 
challenges increasingly reinforce each other from the economy to culture to social and 
political life: 
1) The social and cultural consequences of the economic reform. 
A lot of the resilience of the one-party regime depends on its capacity to produce 
economic growth and manage the consequences in terms of inequality, corruption, 
regional disequilibrium, and rise of autonomy and pluralism of some economic 
actors. The transition to a mixed economy is empowering new actors such as the 
cooperatives workers and the new private property owners while reducing the 
party controls over significant segments of the population. Decentralization of 




transferences of responsibilities and prerogatives from the center to the lower 
echelons of the political system. Marketization implies also a challenge to 
traditional egalitarian values associated to the communist official ideology. The 
widening of the market role in the economy had brought to the surface regional, 
gender and racial inequalities and discriminations.  
2) The opening of the country to foreign influences as part of the 
economic reform and the role of globalization in general.  The new context is 
associated to the development of tourism and foreign investment, a more active 
relationship with the Cuban Diasporas, and a new migratory law that ended the 
odious exit visa in October 2012. As result of the combination of these elements, 
the possibilities of education and working abroad multiplied together with a 
circular migration that travel abroad and return.  The number of Cubans exposed 
to foreign influences since 2013 has exponentially increased, creating a 
multidirectional influence between Cuba, its diaspora and the world.  
3) The anticipated inter-generational presidential transition in 
2018. , Fidel Castro once told Sandinista Commander Tomas Borge that: “eighty 
years old is too much an age to be a head of state”(Borge 1992). In February 
2018, when the current National Assembly legislature ends, Raul Castro will be 
86 years old (He will be 87 years old in June 3) and Fidel Castro 91. The 




leadership and Raul Castro’s aura of historic leader of the revolution and its 
armed forces couldn’t be postponed.  
4) Political disaffection and apathy for the CCP official ideology 
(Marxism-Leninism) is open and blatant. Cuba’s political system enjoyed for 
decades high levels of revolutionary enthusiasm. After the end of the communist 
bloc allies, the CCP tapped its political narrative into the importance of preserving 
achievements of the revolution of education and health. The population would 
like to see some post-revolutionary normalcy. The official ideology has been 
incapable to offer a coherent alternative beyond the merits of the previous 
command economy system. After twenty years of meager economic growththe 
CCP needs to show capacity to manage economic growth and international 
insertion.  
5) The political burden of a nationalist victory in the struggle to 
preserve independence and sovereignty versus American imperial policy. As 
defenestrated politician Carlos Lage told the congress of Cuban writers and artists 
in 2008 “the double ethics, the prohibitions, the undesired inequality, and our 
deteriorated infrastructure are the wounds of the war we have fought, of a war we 
have won” (Lage 2008). The revolutionary-state has the dilemma of claiming the 
credit for the nationalist victory against the embargo while mitigating 




In response to these challenges, Political liberalization in Cuba has developed 
along six principal dimensions:  
1) A less vertical state-society relation focused in more tolerance, 
acknowledgement of social diversity and dialogue with the nonpolitical elements of 
civil society
94
, particularly the religious communities, and amphibious associations
95
. 
This new state-society relation includes a substantial expansion of civil liberties such as 
right to travel and freedom of religion as well as the economic right to own private 
property.   
2) The institutionalization of collective leadership within the party-state, 
including the regulation of intra-party politics and the transition to a more meritocratic 
collective system of ruling based on term limits and age limits for all party and 
government positions. Institutionalization also implied a preference to rule by law 
regardless if the law is democratically adopted or not. Reformists emphasized the role of 
                                                          
94This element emphasizes the methodological importance of the separation in our 
theoretical framework of civil society and political society as different arenas of 
democratization that are interdependent but not equivalent. For a discussion about the 
interdependence and complementarities of civil society and political society, see Linz and 
Stepan (1996) (Linz, Juan & Stepan, Alfred 1996).  
 
95For a discussion of the concept of amphibious institutions in the context of a transition 
from communism, see Ding, Xuelian, “Institutional Amphibiousness and the transition 




order in opposition to revolutionaries that place justice achieved in any possible way at 
the top of their scale.  
3) A phased political decentralization with emphasis in separation of functions 
between the central government, the provinces and the municipalities, the CCP and the 
government and the CCP and the economic managers,  
4) the co-optation of the new emerging sectors through the expansion of some 
rights: religious liberties, right to own private property and right to travel, and the 
creation of a system of rule by law. 
 5) A process of rapprochement between the Cuban state and society in the 
island and moderate groups within the Cuban Diaspora,  
6) A new policy towards the political opposition less focused on long detention 
of its members and more oriented to separate its active components from the rest of the 
population, particularly the middle segments of passive supporters and opponents of the 
regime.  
These six dimensions complement each other and interconnect. The process of 
political liberalization can be divided in pro-active actions to improve the governance 
capacity of the state and the adoption of new patterns of relationships between the party-




more flexible and pragmatic approach to government, bringing more technocratic 
oriented bureaucrats to the state apparatus and institutionalizing the one party rule. Here I 
called this process, institutionalization. In the second area, the CCP engaged in a 
process of social decompression in which some civil liberties such as freedom of 
religion and travel were expanded. The multiplying effects of these rights produce a less 
vertical state-society relation. This new situation combines tolerance to pluralism in the 




Part of the challenges of political reform for the CCP is to synchronize the 
complementarities and interdependence of the reform of state capacity and the new 
relation state-society.  Political liberalization is not an event but a dynamic process. 
Implemented reforms become catalysts for new changes of more consequential character. 
A transition to a market economy matters not only at the material level but also at the 
contestation of narratives.  Rejection of market mechanisms as “the dull instruments left 
by capitalism” (Guevara 1965) has been a central ideological pillar of the Cuban 
revolution. Furthermore, Che Guevara developed in the 1960’s a whole theory about how 
the use of the law of Value, private property and individual incentives take the 
revolutionaries to a “blind alley” from which it will be impossible to march towards 
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socialism.  It is impossible that people educated on the validity of such paradigm would 
remain unchanged by the adoption of another that it is so different if not diametrically 
opposed.  
Cuba’s revolution developed also a conception of the economic and political 
system averse to decentralization and centered on the merits of a permanent mobilization 
for development and to promote revolution in Latin America.  It is not coincidence that 
Che Guevara’s image for the party is a guerrilla column:  
Thus we march on. At the head of the immense column — we are neither 
ashamed nor afraid to say it — is Fidel. After him come the best cadres of the 
party, and immediately behind them, so close that we feel its tremendous force, 
comes the people in its entirety, a solid structure of individual beings moving 
toward a common goal, men and women who have attained consciousness of 
what must be done, people who fight to escape from the realm of necessity and to 




In “Political Order and Changing Societies” Samuel P. Huntington proposed a 
positive relation between institutionalization and legitimate government.  “Institutions are 
stable, valued, recurring patterns of behavior” and “Institutionalization is the process by 
which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability” (Huntington, 1968, p. 
12). Throughout institutionalization, a political system develops four important 




When these features were acquired successfully by a political system, one can speak of a 
“political community” (Huntington, 1968, p. 2), a necessary condition to achieve a 
government “effective, authoritative, (and) legitimate” (Huntington, 1968, p. 12).  
Huntington addressed a primary level of normative coherence from which the 
effectiveness of government to rule depends; an understanding among the regime insiders 
of the moral purpose of the state from the perspective of a political community. Given the 
scope of penetration of the Cuban state in society, it is hard to dispute that the system 
under Fidel Castro achieved -by consent and coercion- a high level of political 
community, at least among the followers of the regime. These followers of the regime 
were in 1959 a majority of the Cuban society
97
.  
                                                          
97After this original political honeymoon, Cuba went throughout a civil war in 
which the Armed forces loyal to the CCP defeated the anti-Castro forces that opted for 
violent resistance. Victory in the civil conflict and nationalist resistance against U.S. 
embargo policy provides the communist regime with zones of legitimacy enhanced by 
some important progress in health, education. The adoption of communist ideology by 
the revolutionary government provoked the disappointment of the upper classes and a 
significant segment of the middle strata. That said, the party got the support of many who 
received the benefits mentioned above. In 1969, the members of the CCP were around 
0.6 % (55 000) of the Cuban population at the time (less than 8 million). By 1975, the 
CCP had 202 807 members when it celebrated its first Congress. By the moment of the II 
Congress in 1980 and the III Congress in 1986, the number of militants had jumped to 
434,143 and 523, 639. By 1992 when the CCP had its fourth congress, the collapse of 
communist regimes in Eastern Europe was interpreted by Fidel Castro as the result of the 
over-burocratization of the communist party and its cadres. As part of the adjustment to 
the new situation, the CCP reduced the number of its departments from 19 to 9, and its 




 Some of Raul Castro’s political liberalization steps respond to the discontent in 
the society at large, but most of his institutionalization of CCP rule is targeted to enhance 
and ease the “adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence” of the institutions that 
coordinate and serve the action and interests of the regime insiders.  Raul Castro is not 
beginning from zero. CCP rule is modern and institutionalized. The party and the 
concentric circles of organizations under its control represent a regulated political 
community within the Cuban polity, self identified as “the revolution” (“la revolution”).  
But to speak about a rule of law in a country in which Fidel Castro acted as the minimal 
winning coalition and to a certain extend the party as a whole operate ultimately above 
the constitution is to overstretch the concept.  
By comparison to the Fidel Castro’s era, Raul Castro’s project with the Economic 
and Social Guidelines of the VI CCP Congress is to leave a significantly more 
institutionalized state to his successor in 2018. As Cuban sociologist Juan Valdes points 
out:   
after Cuba was hit by the crisis of the nineties, Fidel showed himself more 
conservative, less in favor of changes, accepting these grudgingly. He was 
looking or hoping for a more favorable international situation. Raul is more 
rational, he aims for order and organization, for the creation of functional 
institutions. He believes such an order will provide the needed answers. Fidel 






Just after taking the interim presidency, while waiting for a decision about Fidel’s 
fate, Raul Castro called a discussion within the party and the trade unions to vent not only 
the frustrations of the population but also to grasp urgency of the problems the people 
faced
98
.  It was the first tool in a new repertoire of mechanisms to allow for more open 
social space. Part of the goal in the debate was to activate a discussion about the role of 
the CCP and the best way to organize the reform.  
Raul Castro insisted that the party was not only a subject in the process of change 
but also an object of the discussion about how to improve the country. With the purpose 
of making the one party rule more accepted, the CCP and its associated social 
organization opened discussion against non-ideological types of discrimination of race, 
gender, provincial origin, sexual orientation, etc.  Particularly in the area of racial 
relations, the new leadership became open to criticism against the increase of poverty, 
inequality and the relative deterioration of the social conditions of the black Cubans in 
comparison with their lighter skin compatriots.   
 
                                                          
98Several scholars and journalists denounced the maneuver as merely gaining time to 
preserve power until Fidel and Raul die. Among the few analysts in the United States 
who rejected such interpretation were Phil Peters from the Lexington Institute and I. In a 
discussion at the Inter-American Dialogue in early 2009, we both were criticized harshly 
when we said that calling for the expression of this discontent didn’t gain time to the 




A new venue for this within the system criticism repertoire is the opening of the 
political system for those advocating against gender and sexual orientation 
discrimination. In Villa Clara province, Mr. Diaz-Canel built a positive relationship and 
co-opted the leaders of the LGBT community by engaging in a regular dialogue with 
them and acquiescing to many of their anti-discrimination claims. Another channel for 
this agenda is the CENESEX (Center for Sexual Education), an “amphibious” 
organization under the leadership of Mariela Castro Espin, Raul Castro’s daughter, 
advocating for legislation and policies to guarantee citizen equality for the LGBT 
community.  Although CENESEX’s public demonstrations do not qualify as protests, it 
creates an atmosphere in which complaints of discrimination are brought to the eyes of 
the authorities and the political space for friendly legislation to their demands might be 
adopted.  
One of the earliest indicators of the new approach was the creation of the 
Contraloria General to deal with the rise of corruption. Raul Castro initially designated 
Gladys Bejarano, a woman with a reputation of fierce defense of the laws. When Mrs. 
Bejarano clashed with some officials, ministers in some areas of the government, Castro 
elevated her to the condition of Vice-president of the Council of Ministers and later of the 
Council of States. With this solution he put her above her potential contenders although 




This institution oriented approach was used also to deal with some of the internal 
party problems. In his speech at the end of the VI Congress of the CCP, Raul Castro 
proposed the creation of a commission of the Secretariat under Jose Ramon Machado and 
Abelardo Alvarez Gil, the new chief the Organization Department with the goal of 
establishing predictable and stable mechanism to find and speedily promote cadres 
around the age of 40-50 based on party loyalty but also on administrative skills, 
educational background, race, gender and technical knowledge (R. Castro, Discurso de 
Clausura del VI Congreso del PCC 2011). The implementation of this policy led to 
significant turnover of provincial CCP secretaries and the rejuvenation of the Politburo 
and the Secretariat throughout the gradual addition of new members.  A period of two-
three months transition was established as a routine to manage the succession of CCP 
leaders in the provinces (Hernandez 2/2014).   
The VI Congress’ adoption of term limits for all the top positions in the party and 
the government is a historical shift in Cuban post-revolutionary politics. It opens a 
significant space for institutional pluralism within the party in ways that: 1) create a 
predictable path for political succession from one generation to another, 2) promote 
negotiation between the factions of the PCC (among region, generation, section of the 
government), removing the most extreme leaders from the list of potential successors
99
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and 3) increase the upward mobility chances for the lower ranks, ushering a new 
generation of leaders to key positions in the next years. 
It is recognizable also a pattern of professionalization of the party leadership in 
the intermediate and upper intermediate CCP levels. This is a sudden but important 
transformation. Historically, Cubans would associate rising cadres to personal loyalty or 
direct work with Fidel, Raul or some senior member of the Politburo. While to be good at 
guessing the leadership view is a necessary skill in communist cadres, their rise is now 
less identifiable with been part of a faction or a repeater of slogans than with work results 
in the economy or policy implementation.  Work for the party, rather than for a particular 
leader or department  seems to be more important in a leader’s promotion.  
One curious demonstration of the promotion of this institutional rather than 
personal loyalty to the CCP logic happened in connection to the removal of most 
ministers from their positions. Different from the old practices, in which the removal of a 
minister led frequently to the rooting out of personnel associated to him/her, the new 
nominations or removals did not bring a massive change of personnel at the CCP 
                                                                                                                                                                             
new first secretary but also his second-in-command and future successor. Since the 
designated first secretary will have to obey the term limit rule, he would probably 
promote a leader whom he trusts to be second secretary once he is retired. The idea is to 
create some “teamwork” to continue defending the power of the party as a tool of the 
current government. Promotion based on merits and education would also provide the 
PCC with a minimal common base from which leaders might engage in reason-based 




departments or State offices. Rather than encouraging the taking of factional sides, the 
new system of regularized promotion based in  results, encourages loyalty to the CCP 
(not to specific leaders) and staff neutrality.   
The VI Congress of the CCP proclaimed the goal of separation of functions 
between the Party, the government and management of state owned companies (R. 
Castro, Informe Central al VI Congreso del PCC 2011). Raul Catro, and the economic 
reforms czar Marino Murillo are insisting in the separation of responsibilities in ways that 
allow to reward or punish company managers, government officials and party leaders 
according to performance.  The CCP is entering into this political reform at large with 
some previous experience from the 1990’s at a much smaller scale. The separation 
between political and managerial functions is already in place in the case of joint ventures 
with foreign investors. The CCP is inserted in the new foreign partially owned hotels but 
the enterprise managers are selected and act according to a fundamentally economic 
logic, not ideology. 
It is not clear how successful Raul Castro would be implementing a sharper 
institutional differentiation within the regime but it helps the analysis to recognize the 
intention to do it.  In the case of the economic reforms, the institution controlling decision 
making is the Commission for Implementation and Development created in 2009. The 




specialists, economists, managers, government officials and academics from different 
areas and regions. 
In parallel, the Secretariat of the CCP has its own commissions with specialists in 
propaganda, ideology, and mobilization. The remnants of the Battle of Ideas groups work 
under the control of the Revolutionary Orientation Department (DOR). The last two years 
after the VI Congress of the CCP have shown how the party kept a heavy hand in the 
government strategic decisions but within an atmosphere in which excessive interference 
is repudiated. Economic policy makers take their own decisions and recommend them to 
the leadership. Ideology and mobilization specialists are forced to plan their job without 
the authority to interfere in advance.  This separation between party and economic 
management seems to be one of the most important adaptations to the transition towards 
a mixed economy.   
The CCP leadership is dominant in Cuba’s economy and politics. But the system 
is growingly ceding space for managerial discretion, institutional predictability and 
personal freedom. In practice most decisions of large state corporations, particularly 
those associated with the FAR economic emporium, are guided by economic urgency and 
criteria, not communist ideology or the battle of ideas political discourse.  The 
institutionalization of separation of economic functions and party apparatus has a positive 




growing unemployment, to the managers and local officials. After some experimentation 
and failures, the party has the chance to intervene correcting abuses and collecting 
sympathies.  
 
3.2.3 A less vertical State-Society relationship: Social decompression and 
expansion of civil rights 
Accompanying the institutionalization of the state and the CCP, the other side of 
political liberalization is a social decompression that softens the control of civil society 
by the state.  Linz and Stepan have described this process as detotalitarianism by societal 
conquest (Linz, Juan & Stepan, Alfred, 1996). The social decompression has two major 
components: 1) the opening of regular and institutionalized consultations between the 
state and civil society groups and 2) An expansion of civil, social and economic rights.   
 
3.2.3.1 Regular and institutionalized consultation between the state and civil 
society organizations 
The formalization of a dialogue between the CCP party-state and organizations of 
Cuban civil society allows the leaders of these civil society organizations to expand their 




these periodic dialogues has several advantages. First, it recognizes a change in the 
balance of power within society. From the time of religious inhibition in the 1960’s to the 
time of the constitutional reform of 1992 ending official atheistic practices, the religious 
communities have rolled back the state hostile attitudes against their communities. 
Communist propaganda used to say that “religion was a remnant of the old society” but 
the “remnant” not only survived but expanded.  
Second; the conversations between the CCP and leaders of religious, fraternal and 
other non-political associations serve as a give-and-take informal negotiation space that 
provide feedback to the authorities and help to measure the appeal of some demands 
within the society. The talks are in themselves sources of information and a powerful 
training for a different politics. The conversations are a feedback tool and a channel of 
information between the government and some actors (political opposition, for instance) 
with which the government doesn’t want to talk officially. This give-and-take negotiation 
prepares the party for contradictions with social groups that accumulate mobilization 
power even if they could not sustain a clash with the state. At best, it allows political 
leaders to co-opt reformist impulses from society and connect with them. By talking to 




provides them with stakes on the system. Dialogue with the civil society is also a tool to 
dry the pool in which the political opposition swims
100
.  
Third, the government’s dialogue with well recognized social groups, such as the 
religious communities, is a mechanism to reinforce the CCP’s and these groups’ 
nationalist credentials.  It provides common values to appeal. Since 1992, the CCP had 
emphasized its nationalist identity, lowering although not abandoning the relevance of the 
communist one (it is in the name). In the last two decades, Religious communities have 
been particularly active developing a second patriotic culture space. Nationalism is 
allowed by the authorities but the different versions of other actors diverge from 
proclaimed communist orientation.  
There are areas in which nationalism clashes with Marxism but there others, such 
as the opposition to the U.S embargo, in which coincidences prevail. Nationalist 
dialogues create a more fluid discussion in which communists to persuade use nationalist 
themes such as economic development and preservation of sovereignty lowering the 
importance of political control. One symbolic case has been the issue of internet 
connectivity. While the political opposition has criticized the government from a civil 
rights perspective, the most important internal critique has come with nationalist tones: it 
                                                          
100As I said before, I follow Linz and Stepan on their idea of the convenience of a 








The constitutional reforms of 1992 fostered a significant expansion of freedom of 
religion. Using a policy of negotiation, dialogue, and non-heroic resistance against former 
PCC atheistic policies, communities of faith have carved out significant space in Cuban 
society.
102
 When it comes to regular publications, education networks, assistance to the 
poor, and entertainment and youth activities, Cuban religious communities provide a 
space in which discussions about models of reform for the Cuban economy, politics and 
society can take place (Crahan 2008).  
The relations between the CCP and the Catholic Church improved significantly 
after the constitutional reform of 1992 but there was a fundamental disagreement between 
the government and the Church about the proper content of the dialogue. For years, 
particularly in response to the pastoral “El amortodo lo espera” (“Love expects 
                                                          
101See for instance the debates about internet access in publications such as Espacio 
Laical of the Catholic Church or the films “Off line” by Yaima Pardo (Yaima 2015) and 
“Blog Bang Cuba” by Claudio PelaezSordo (Pelaez Sordo 2014). 
 
102Despite official atheistic policies, Cubans of religious faith began to return to churches, 
temples and synagogues by the late 1970s and early 80s. Neither the clergy nor 
community leaders encourage their followers to engage in confrontational acts to 
challenge Communist atheistic policies. Followers were generally satisfied with having 
invoked their constitutional right to convene and worship. Doing so was a small step 




everything”)  in 1993 (Cuba's Conference of Catholic Bishops, 1993), the CCP insisted 
on a narrow definition of freedom of religion limited to a liberty of credo. The Church, on 
its side expressed a wider view in which freedom of religion was a right, not a 
government concession. The right to freedom of religion included the liberties of the 
believer and his/her organization to act socially in the promotion of their beliefs.  
The most recent important round of these dialogues began with the Roman 
Catholic Church in May 19 2010 (Equipo editorial Espacio Laical 2010). The dialogue 
with the Bishops was partially a continuation of a conversation that began between the 
CCP and the Church during Fidel’s era, particularly in the period of John Paul II’s visit to 
Cuba in 1998. But the 2010 Dialogue of Raul Castro with the Bishops departed from the 
government’s previous narrow vision. Cardinal Jaime Ortega became a facilitator in the 
process of the release of 116 prisoners for political activities, violent and non violent 
(including the 54 from the 2003 Black Spring, who remained in jail by 2010).   
For the first time, the government accepted to discuss with the Bishops issues that 
were not strictly related to the religious practices but to the presence of the religious 
communities in areas such as education, social values, economic changes, political 
stability and international affairs (Espacio Laical 2010). The dialogue with the Catholic 
Cardinal Jaime Ortega recognized the increasing role of the Church in areas such as 




activities. During the dialogue about the prisoners’ release, Ortega was recognized as a 
valid interlocutor by the Spanish government that received the released who want to 
emigrate. Ortega also traveled several times to Washington to explain the importance of 
accompanying Cuba’s process to the U.S. governments and moderate sectors of the 
Cuban exile  Ortega played also a facilitator role in promoting the facilitating role of the 
Vatican in Cuba-U.S. contacts (W. &. Leogrande 2014).  
In most of Cuba’s religious communities there are leaders committed to a 
gradualist strategy, of fomenting change in the state by creating pressure from the bottom 
up. The legal status enjoyed by religious groups also allows them to serve as a point of 
convergence for various non-confrontational agendas of reform. Religious publications 
such as Espacio Laical, Caminos, Cuba Posible and Palabra Nueva air the views of pro-
reform government economists and scholars such as Omar Everleny Villanueva, Carlos 
Alzugaray, Rafael Hernandez and Aurelio Alonso together with the opinions of moderate 
exiles and intellectuals from the Church.   
Religious groups also serve as contacts with international actors such as 
universities or non-government assistance groups with interests on preparing the Cuban 
population for a mixed economy in terms of managerial techniques, consumer protection, 
environmental monitoring, etc. The liberalization of public debate under the umbrella of 




the intangible gain is on the acceptance of differences rather than on a confrontational 
approach. Particularly the more radical elements of the Cuban exile community see 
confrontation (rather than dialogue) between Cuban civil society and the state as 
necessary, desirable and inevitable. But conflict and anti-government mobilization per se 
are clearly not a goal shared by most non-partisan actors in Cuba.  
 
3.2.4 The expansion of some civil, economic, social and cultural rights 
Earlier in his mandate, Raul Castro recognized that the CCP needs new zones of 
legitimacy to compensate for the losses associated with the transition from charismatic 
authority and the passing of the historical generation. The party launched a process of 
limited detotalitarianism by choice in which the transition to a post-totalitarian system 
happened more by design of the elites in power. In addition of giving voice to the new 
generation of Cuban leaders within the CCP, these policy choices are associated to 
provide a escape valve for some of the inherent tensions of a serious economic 
adjustment.  
One source of these policy decisions is the need to create synergies and 
complementarities to the economic reform.  Almost immediately after he took power, 
Raul Castro eliminated some of the government’s most restrictive policies such as 




addition to providing a source of hard currency for the Cuban government, the end of the 
prohibition on Cubans staying in hotels normalized interactions between nationals and 
foreigners, broadening the possibilities for reciprocal influence, opportunities for 
migration, education, business, communications, etc.  
The legalization of activities that were previously in the black market reduced the 
population subjected to criminal prosecution, including the most draconian cases, such as 
those classified under the subjective labels of “dangerousness” and “vagrancy”. The new 
sphere of private and cooperative property expands the right to own private property and 
reduces the degree of dependence and exposure to the arbitrariness of state power.  
Facing a more plural society, the government has being compelled to respond to 
the emergence of citizen advocacy groups rather than simply rely on confrontation. There 
is undoubtedly a totalitarian policy of confrontation employed against openly political 
opposition; however, in the last few years, a gray area has emerged where intellectuals, 
independent bloggers and groups that promote citizen interests without directly 
challenging the state’s survival are tolerated.  
These efforts include movements in favor of women rights, in opposition to racial 
discrimination, consumers’ rights advocates, gay rights activists,  environmentalists, anti-
abortion groups, death penalty abolitionists, the right to freedom of movement, among 




the PCC but demand policies that address their concerns. In December 2010, a group of 
Cuban gay rights activists leaded by Francisco Rodriguez, an AIDS and gay rights 
advocate who is also a member of the CCP protested against the Cuban government’s 
vote against a United Nations resolution repudiating acts of violence associated with an 
individual’s sexual orientation. As a result, Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez 
recognized that in this instance, Cuban foreign policy could not ignore the concerns and 
opinions of its citizens (Diaz, 2011).  
 
3.2.4.1 The Migration Reform: A short case study 
In addition the advancement on the right to own private property and the freedom 
of religion, the most important progress in human rights terms was the migration reform. 
On October 16 2013, Raul Castro's government repealed law 989, which was instated in 
December 1961 and allowed Cuban authorities to confiscate the "property, rights and 
shares" of those who "are definitively absent from the national territory," and made 
substantial changes to the migration law of September 1976. The unpopular exit permits, 
which had saddled any Cuban travelers with burdensome fees (more than 300 dollars tax 
to travel) and prevented many Cubans, including dissidents from traveling in the past, 




The changes are positive steps that bring Cuba closer to compliance with 
international standards of freedom of movement. The dynamics that have driven changes 
in Cuba's migratory policy are related to internal legitimacy, the economic reforms, and 
the politics of emigration within the Cuban context where nationalists prioritizes 
development while communists’ priorities is the control of the population. The greatest 
empowerment of Cuban civil society is associated mainly with the religious communities, 
independent intellectuals and amphibious groups that operate independently but within 
legal organizations such as the Union of Writers and Artists (UNEAC). These 
organizations and non-liberal modernizers within the regime were the main forces 
pushing for a migration reform in the last twenty years.  
The political logic of Cuba's new migration policy is evident: 1) it opens doors to 
the definitive emigration of those most irritated by official policies; 2) it increases the 
possibility of circular migration by reducing the costs of and barriers to travel in both 
directions; 3) it synchronizes Cuba's migration policy with economic reforms elaborated 
in the guidelines of the VI Congress of the Communist Party.  
The expansion of the right to travel has a multiplier effect in terms on other rights 
such as the right to education, right to work, right to seek information and others. People 
who can own some small or medium size business can save money and travel abroad. 




money and send remittances to their country of origin. They can also save money and 
eventually return to Cuba and open new business there. The opportunity to travel abroad 
also gave the travelers chances to connect globally with international trends and acquire 
opportunities for the Cuban development in arts, business, education, etc. 
 
3.3 Liberalization and Democratization: Is one the road to the other? 
The CCP leadership does not see economic reform and political strategic 
adaptation as early steps of a transition to a multiparty democracy
103
. On the opposite, 
liberalization is an effort to reshape the relations between state and society in ways that 
sharpen a responsive CCP monopoly of the political franchise.   
The documents of the VI Congress of the CCP illustrate how Raul Castro’s CCP 
recognized the existence of structural governance problems within the one party rule 
blocking information from flowing up to the political hierarchies.  One reiterated goal 
                                                          
103In Cuba, economy czar Marino Murillo and minister of Foreign Trade Rodrigo 
Malmierca had said several times that there is no interest on changing Cuba’s political 
system but only on updating the economy. Paradoxically, the same position is promoted 
from the Institute of Cuban and Cuban American Studies of the University of Miami. 
Most of its affiliates repeat frequently a diagnostics that takes such separation between 
economy and politics as valid. The view in this dissertation is just the opposite. Given the 
indivisibility of communist politics and economics, changes in the latter have 
transformational effects in the former. For a discussion about System effects in political 
and social life from a non-Marxist perspective, see Robert Jervis’ “System Effects. 




across all the assemblies and resolutions was the need to separate “definitively” the 
management functions of government and state from the monitoring and leading 
responsibilities of the CCP (Cuban Communist Party 2012). Corruption, indiscipline, and 
illegalities are identified by the CCP as scourges that “put the revolution in peril” (Cuban 
Communist Party 2012) 
The I National Conference of the CCP in 2012 centered on the importance of 
opening the system to upward information flows to check and improve governance and 
“one-party democracy”. The discussion about political and ideological work emphasized 
how Information is a central part of a government’s capacity to implement its policies 
and to manage efficiently the adjustment to a new context. Raul Castro condemned the 
proliferation of “formalism”, false unanimity” and “useless secrecy” (R. Castro, El rumbo 
ya ha sido trazado 2012). A less evident dimension includes the reinvigoration of the 
Poder Popular Assemblies.  At the national level, the CCP is activating the National 
Assembly, particularly its commissions, as the cardinal points for the discussion of new 
legislation to adapt the country to the new context of economic reform and openness.  
The National Conference of the CCP in 2012 adopted the practice of  term limits 
(two terms of five years for all the main positions in the government and the party) (R. 
Castro, El rumbo ya ha sido trazado 2012). In February 24, 2014, Raul Castro announced 




term in 2018. Castro spoke about the need for a constitutional reform to catch up with the 
changes that had already taken place and others to implement as part of the 2011 VI 
Congress program.  
At the local level, the CCP new policy guidelines call for a higher participation of 
people unaffiliated to it, anticipating more tolerance for competition and the 
encouragement of participation not directly controlled by the cadres
104
. The strengthening 
of feedback mechanisms and post-totalitarian responsiveness to population’s demands 
goes to the core of the governance dilemmas associated to the liberalization process. 
Liberalization differs from democratization but both processes frequently overlap. 
Democratization includes the celebration of competitive free and fair elections as the 
supreme vertical accountability mechanism of a political system. It is the most drastic 
feedback for an incumbent: reelection or defeat. 
The search for efficient feedback mechanisms short of multiparty elections shows 
the tensions between liberalization and democratization. The Cuban government hopes to 
decompress the social discontent and appease and co-opt the reformist elements within it. 
                                                          
104An example of this case happened in the city of Caibarien where a transgender male, 
Adela Hernandez, who was imprisoned two years for his “improper conduct” run in the 
local elections to city council against the vice-president of the municipal assembly. Since 
the nomination of candidates for the local assemblies(not for the provincial or national 






The liberalization’s irony is expressed in the fact that the expansion of some rights and 
the rationalization of the state can produce a more adaptable post-totalitarian regime, in 
part out of effective responses to the economic and political demands of the population.  
Under some less probable scenarios, the implementation of the political reform 
might speed up processes of democratization. The most likely scenario is that, the state, 
society and the ruling elites would be transformed by liberalization into a more flexible 
type of non democratic rule.  If under these conditions, the opposition remains as 
disconnected from the day to day problems of the population as it is today, the 
democratic impulse might dissipate at least in the short term.  
 Yet the absence of plans for multiparty elections doesn’t justify dismissing the 
liberalization steps taken by the CCP as cosmetic.  The experiences of Mexico, Taiwan, 
Hungary, Poland, Spain and other transitions show how important some institutions 
created during the liberalization process were later for the consolidation of democracy. 
Even if democratization doesn’t occur, the consolidation of feedback institutions might 
encourage the CCP to allow more openings if the leaders are confident that they will be 
able to control it.  As CatharinDalpino concludes: “History has shown (..)that the end 
result of liberalization may take many forms, often unforeseen by the reformers 




The nature of the challenges and the characteristics of the CCP response set 
another major difference between the frequently studied processes of democratization and 
political liberalization in the Cuban context: the relevance of the different actors. If in the 
case of the democratization many analysis of agency focused on the relationship between 
the government and the political opposition, in liberalization the more important 
developments happen within the more opaque ranks of the non-democratic reformers in 
the government and their relations with less prone to reform bureaucrats.  
Particularly important is the role of those actors who operate within the grayer 
areas of the amphibious associations and the nonpolitical organizations of civil society. 
Here it is important to recognize the double direction of the state-society penetration in 
totalitarian systems and how its balance is contingent to specific historical moments. The 
CCP has penetrated the society with its control and ideological mechanisms but the 
pluralism within society penetrates also to the party structure fomenting pluralism within 
the regime.  
Once reform starts, new actors and logics began to play. The expansion of private 
and cooperative sectors since Raul launched the reforms undermine the classic vision of 
communist utopia in terms of the state distributing and deciding all type of legal upward 
social mobility. The 1990’s opened the door to processes that gained momentum after 




end of the prohibition to buy cellphones and computers in 2008 had increased massively  
access to information by millions. The low connectivity to internet has not stopped 
Cubans to inform themselves through something called “El Paquete (The Package)”, a 
black market service of distribution of movies, tv programs and news in floppies and 
flash drives.  
The new social networks and elite connections to foreign investment, the 
remittances and the growing private sector provide a cushion and opportunities for the 
nomenclature. Those better connected and in higher position have been the first to take 
advantage of the situation of partial reform in which they are able to capture rents 
associated to lack of competition, minimal consumer protection, and asymmetries of 
information. The open launching of the economic reform in the VI Party Congress in 
2011 was a turning point because it has not been sufficient to stabilize the economy but 
strengthened the vision that the way out of the crisis is on the adoption of more market 
oriented policy. The property rights granted to new entrepreneurs, houses owners and 
land leasers have acted as a platform for pressures to broaden market structures. Private 
restaurants began with a limit of only twelve chairs in 1994 but the regulation was 





One important element of liberalization is the Cuban population’s’ growing 
access to the internet. Although the government will regulate the flow of information, 
curbing potential use by opposition forces, greater access to the internet will increase the 
general population’s exposure to alternative sources of information. Cubans with greater 
access to the internet won’t necessarily rush to read the internationally acclaimed Yoani 
Sanchez’ vignettes so much as they will be eager to use the web for educational, social, 
and business pursuits.  Cubans already know how wide the web is - the government will 
ignore the pent-up demand for it at his own peril.   
The discussion about state-society relations would be incomplete without some 
reference to the changes in state’s policy towards the political opposition. Raul Castro’s 
CCP is as hostile towards opposition group as Fidel was. Still there are some changes due 
to the difference of circumstances: 
 First, the government has adopted some of the most attractive issues in the 
agenda of the opposition (right to own private property, and right to travel) and 
implement its own version of them.  
Second, the opposition is still very fragmented and divided without a positive 
program about how to deal with the central problems of the country. Worse, it has not 




appear disoriented criticizing the Cuban government and the Obama administration for 
opening diplomatic relations with Cuba.  
Third; in order to guarantee a friendly international environment for the reforms 
in the relation with the European Union and Canada, and recently with the United States, 
the government is not arresting or punishing dissidents to long time jail sentences. 
Instead, the new tactic is not to bother prominent dissidents, concentrating in short term 
arrests of less known ones. Many times, members of the political opposition are arrested 
and released hours later or after a week or two without charges.  That “catch and release” 
combination explains why there was in 2014 a record number of arrests but at the same 
time the number of prisoners of conscience was the lowest in twenty years
105
.  
Fourth, massive mobilization in support for the party has been replaced by a 
demand of neutrality or acquiescence to the CCP rule. Repression is targeted to active 
members of the opposition, particularly those who enter into political cooperation with 
foreign powers, the United States in the first place. Law 88-1999
106
 (Cuba’s antidote to 
the Helms-Burton law ) penalized dissident behavior that would be legal in most 
countries such as sending articles or public information to radio or TV stations connected 
                                                          
105This is according to Amnesty International. (Amnesty International, 2015) 
 
106Cuba’s National Assembly (1999) Law 88 of Defense of the Sovereignty and 




to the U.S. policy towards Cuba (Radio and TV Marti). At the same time, it is obvious 
that the United States’ embargo policy states goals is rejected by the majority of the 
Cuban population and considered intrusive and antithetical to democracy promotion by 
most human rights organizations.   
 
3.4 International models and promoters of political liberalization 
Post-totalitarian liberalization is also favored by the influence of important 
international factors
107
. The actors of Cuba’s political reform are not passive recipients of 
foreign influences but active actors adapting international trends, selecting information, 
and applying their respective lessons. There are experiences from the collapse of 
communism in Europe and some relatively successful foreign models attractive to Cuban 
post-revolutionary elites in which marketization combined with political liberalization 
have modernized the one-party rule.  
                                                          
107The topic of foreign relations is discussed in the second part of the dissertation. This 
mention is necessary because international precedents shape and condition the thoughts 
of those who already are set on a course of marketization and political liberalization 





Cuban elites, particularly the dominant segment of non-democratic reformers, 
look with interest to the experiences of Communist parties in East Asia
108
. In China and 
Vietnam, the institutionalization of collective leadership has produced far better 
economic growth and more political stability than the charismatic rule of the founders of 
the regimes. The readings of Cuban political leaders is not a vision of rupture between the 
radical period (Maoism or Ho Chi Minh’s rule) and the later adoption of reforms under 
their successors.  Although Cuban leaders criticize abuses in the performance of the 
Chinese communist party under Mao, for instance, the Cuban official narrative about East 
Asian communism believes in continuity (Castro 2009) between “Mao’s invisible 
hand”
109
 and later market reforms, not a radical political rupture.  
                                                          
108The references to the experiences of reforms in East Asian Communism in Vietnam 
and China are frequent in the discussions about the reforms in Cuba. In addition, the 
frequency of CCP leaders’ visits to China, Vietnam and Japan, a model of capitalist 
development under the guidance of the state have increased in the last five years. See 
reports about the visit of Miguel Diaz-Canel, Cuban first Vicepresident to China, 
Vietnam and Laos. Luckily, this interest in East Asian communism does not include the 
NorthKorean dynastic model despite the excellent relations between Havana and 
Pyongyang. http://www.oncubamagazine.com/economy-business/looking-to-asia/ 
 
109This is a reference to the book edited by Sebastian Heilmann and Elizabeth Perry about 
the particular contribution of the specific style of governing of the Chinese Communist 
Party and its contribution to the transition to the market economy through traditions such 
as local experimentation, national campaigns, and other adaptive revolutionary methods 
(Perry and Heilmann 2011). Cuban reading of the continuity between radical politics and 
reform under the revolutionary state has significant similarities with the view of the 
author in the sense that it looks at the reform in its own merits, within the continuity of 




It is not a surprise that the East Asian market transitions under communist rule 
provoke desires of emulation within members of the Cuban elites and also in the base of 
the CCP. East Asia Communist party rulers have successfully managed more than one 
power inter-generational transition preserving political order and the continuity of the 
Communist party rule. Last but not least, the princess and princesses of the dominant 
factions have found a way to renew their dominance by participating actively in the 














Chapter Four: Cuba’s change of leadership: Sources, Actors and challenges 
of a transition from hybrid domination (Charismatic-institutional) to an 
institutionalized Leninist rule. 
4.1 Introduction 
One of the three important challenges for the Cuban Communist party is the 
intergenerational transition of leadership. The Cuban post-revolutionary regime faced 
between 2006 and 2009 the first intra-generational succession and managed it 
successfully. By 2015, a decade later, Raul Castro had established a chronogram to leave 
the presidency in 2018 to a new generation educated and trained within the system.  
Samuel Huntington distinguished between chronological age and generational age 
of social institutions.  
The more often the organization has surmounted the problem of peaceful 
succession and replaced one set of leaders by another, the more highly 
institutionalized it is. In considerable measure, of course, generational age is a 
function of chronological age. But political parties and government may continue 
for decades under the leadership of one generation. The founders of 
organizations-whether parties, governments, or business corporations-are often 
young. Hence the gap between chronological age and generational age is apt to be 
greater in the early history of an organization than later in its career. This gap 
produces tensions between the first leaders of the organization and the next 
generation immediately behind them, which can look forward to a lifetime in the 







A change of leadership and the way it happens tend to affect the stability, political 
legitimacy and character of any regime. Leadership in Cuba has a broader scope than 
Fidel and Raul Castro or even the whole octogenarian group who sit at the top position in 
the executive commission of the Politburo. Cuba is not a sultanistic system; it is ruled by 
a party with well-defined institutional features and a human capital system managed by 
the Organization Department of the CCP.  
Fidel Castro’s charismatic rule has played a significant role in Cuban politics. His 
retirement is a consequential factor but not the dominant one in the redesign of the 
system.  The professionalization and plural composition of the elites has broadened in the 
last five decades. Change in leadership in this chapter means not only the end of the 
charismatic presidency but the effect of institutionalization of cadres’ policies across the 
system. The biggest challenge for Cuba’s one-party system is how to rule a more 
pluralized society and bureaucracy with a less cohesive leadership than the one gathered 
around Fidel Castro’s charisma.   
The survival of the regime has disproved many analyses that predicted the end of 
the post-revolution regime in the absence of its supreme revolutionary leader. The 
evidence is a clarion call to seek alternative characterization and explanations about the 




the flaws of personalization of great powers’ policies towards smaller neighbors in the 
context of asymmetric relations
110
.  
There are many opinion articles about the question of how post-Fidel succession 
is taking place but few of academic character
111
. The explanation that I present here is 
based on the combination of two types of leadership incubated within the system in the 
last five decades, one of charismatic domination around Fidel Castro, and the second one, 
of a Leninist-institutional character around the Cuban Armed Forces and the Department 
of Organization of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party. The existence 
of the second system of leadership selection was key to the post-totalitarian adaptation 
that allowed the regime to survive and recover. Supported by resources, ideological and 
training schools and monitoring skills, the Leninist branch of the Cuban leadership is 
designed to nip any trend to open political contestation outside the party in the bud.  
                                                          
110This last topic is discussed in the chapter about U.S.-Cuba relations as part of what it is 
called the politics of inattention of Great Power politics. Inattention is frequently replaced 
by alarmism and personalization of the policy towards a country as a policy towards its 
specific leader, two tools in the repertoire of special interests groups.   
 
111One exception is the article by Bert Hoffman’s “Charismatic Authority and Leadership 
Change: Lessons from Cuba’s Post-Fidel Succession (Hoffmann, 2009). Hoffman’s 
narrative is compelling but lacks an important explanatory variable, factional politics. 
Factional politics within Cuba’s political regime is very opaque but this fact should not 
restrain scholars from advancing hypothesis as well informed as possible about their 
dynamics. Here I propose a view that looks at Cuba’s factional politics in its interaction 




That is why it is important to look at the factional politics that exist within the 
system structures. The factional politics presented here emphasize three differentiating 
criteria: a) functional affinities (what functions groups have in the party-state apparatus), 
b) generational formative experiences, and c) relation to the two legitimacy tracks. The 
type of pluralist competition that emerges from this dynamics is non-democratic and 
lacks transparence but there are important data that inform the educated reader about the 
potential for cooperation/conflict relations between the leaders of the political system. To 
begin, there is important public information in the speeches and practices of the Cuban 
leaders showing on civil military relations, the interactions between economics and 
politics, and the adequate way to promote cadres within the system structure. In addition, 
it is possible to trace the biographies of party, military and state leaders in ways that 
make reasonable to assume affinities with those who has risen in similar trajectories. 
Finally, it is possible to observe and compare the robustness and cohesiveness of the 
different institutions and the capacity of command and mobilization associated to the 
elites that rule them.  
Although the partial adoption of a market orientation and the implementation of a 
political liberalization undermine the initial totalitarian character of the Cuban regime, it 
is important to notice how the institutionalization and routines of the CCP remains 
committed to a Leninist centralized structure. The work of the organization department of 




of members of the FAR-MININT complex in the politburo show a reform process 
controlled by the communist party. In a continuation with a political tradition of secrecy, 
the Cuban leadership keeps an important part of the management of the leadership 
selection hidden from the public eye. This is Fidel’s legacy to the reform, the guerrilla 
methods and the Leninist playbook for designing and implementing any policy, 
conservative or reformist, focusing in the asymmetry of the relations with the United 
States.  
The chapter is divided in the following parts: first, I discuss the two types of 
leadership that preceded the presidential succession between 2006 and 2009, adding 
elements that explain the factional politics within the upper echelons of the Cuban elites. 
Second, I present a short description of the importance of the Department of organization 
of the central Committee of the Communist Party in shaping leaders selection in the 
provinces and the state machinery. There I notice how an intergenerational transition did 
already take place at every level of the CCP except the Politburo. Third, I list briefly a set 
of strategic decision that arises from the winning coalition associated to the presidency of 







4.1.1 A hybrid regime with two types of leadership. 
Since the consolidation of the Cuban revolution, decision making, and cadres’ 
promotion occurred within two different tracks along a continuum from charisma to 
institutionalization. The first track, the charismatic
112
 one was centralized around Fidel 
Castro. The second track, named Leninist for its emphasis on the “vanguard party”, was 
promoted by Raul Castro from his position as second secretary of the Cuban Communist 
Party and minister of the Armed Forces. These two tracks had separate trajectories; at 
times they were at odds but fundamentally complemented each other.  
The charismatic track around Fidel was innovative and non-formalized.  It was 
flexible because Fidel’s authority allows the system to experiment and circumvent 
institutional bottlenecks of the command economy and avoid the group thinking traps 
associated to rigid institutional routines. Important tools of this type of leadership were 
social compulsion, invocation of revolutionary ideals, and mass mobilization campaigns. 
Such practices were not the result of collective or institutional processing of information 
                                                          
112The term charismatic refers to an unusual type of legitimate authority. Max Weber 
defined charisma as “a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he 
is considered extraordinary and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at 
least specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These are such as are not accessible to 
the ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary” (Weber, 1978, 
p. 241). Weber said that “in a revolutionary and sovereign manner,charismatic 
domination transform all values and breaks all traditional and rational norms” (Weber, 





and decision making but centered on Fidel Castro’s use of revolutionary impulses. In this 
sense, the track could become rigid once Fidel Castro locked himself in a position
113
.  
The second track operated under Raul’s command of the Armed Forces and 
the Organization Department of the CCP
114
.  This Leninist track was grounded on 
institutional mechanisms developed in a long process of communist institutionalization 
between 1962 when the Secretariat of the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (ORI) 
was created, and 1997, when the V Congress of the CCP took place. Different from the 
charismatic track in which Fidel promoted its leadership staff “by helicopter” according 
                                                          
113There is a lot of partisan literature about the successes and failures of Fidel Castro’s 
leadership. His followers would point out his early warnings about the potential 
destruction of the Soviet Union in 1988 and his emphasis on the development of Cuba’s 
advanced bio-technological industries and health sector. His opponents will look at the 
failure of the 1970 Ten Millions Harvest, the Food Plan in the early 1990’s and the waste 
of the Battle of Ideas. For my  discussion of Fidel Castro’s role in Cuban history before 
and after his retirement, see Lopez-Levy, Arturo (2012) Cuba and Fidel Castro: Beyond 
his 86th Birthday.   
http://thehavananote.com/2012/08/cuba_and_fidel_castro_beyond_his_86th_birthday and 




114The member of the Politburo Jose Ramon Machado Ventura was the most important 
supervisor of the Organization Department. Machado Ventura is the only member of the 
Politburo who had been in it from the first Congress of the CCP in 1975 together with 
Fidel and Raul Castro. After Raul Castro took the presidency, he became the first Vice-
president of the Council of State and the Council of Ministers. In February 2013 when he 
was already 82 years old, he was replaced by Miguel Diaz-Canel, 51, who was anointed 
as the second in command and the person in line to replace Raul Castro in 2018 at the 
helm of the Cuban State. Machado Ventura kept the important post of Second Secretary 




to the demands of his political campaigns, military and party officials were promoted step 
by step and systematically. 
Control and surveillance were part of the second track. The counterintelligence 
apparatus submitted military and party leaders to periodic evaluation and surveillance. 
These reports implied recommendations from bottom-up that played a role in their 
promotion. In principle, the Leninist track had biases in favor of institutional stability and 
against sudden changes of policies and leaders. It cultivates the replacement of military 
officers, party bosses and state managers by their second in command.  
These practices were not followed in the charismatic track where Fidel Castro 
incited to think constantly with a revolutionary impulse although within the margins of 
the communist policy frontier. In relation to his staff, Fidel superseded any security or 
ideological concern about a cadre with his authority. He will promote or remove a 
manager, a party leader or a ministry if this person failed or opposed to his own plans, not 
those of any party document. Several times, he reacted against the institutional 
bottlenecks of the Leninist track successfully mitigating their slowdown of revolutionary 
plans with the expediency of the command-and-obey up-down guerrilla approach. The 
charismatic track also unleashed processes of revision and extraordinary feedback 




Conflict between institutional structures and charisma-propelled campaigns only 
happened at specific critical junctures. Different from Mao or Stalin, Fidel never 
embarked in a full war of attrition against the party or the Armed Forces. He generally 
acted as a individualist charismatic leader but of a Leninist kind not a Stalinist. At 
occasions when his charisma could make a difference to bolster the appeal of the system 
he didn’t hesitate to jump over regular routines and institutions. One area where Fidel 
Castro used his charisma and history as a revolutionary leader was foreign policy and the 




Fidel Castro was the minimum winning coalition in Cuban politics in virtue of his 
charisma, and historical role. Every “raulista” was by default a “fidelista” since 
institutional organization was predicated on the premise of providing the revolution and 
its supreme leader with an effective tool to implement his program. Fidel’s personal 
power and ideological prism prevailed over institutional norms.   
One difference between the two tracks was their view about the autonomy of 
lower structures in the communist system. In the charismatic track, Fidel and the leaders 
                                                          
115Jorge Castaneda’s “Utopia Unarmed” discusses the role of the Americas Department of 
the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party in Cuba’s relations with the Latin 
American radical left. Although some of the facts and evidences presented by Castaneda 
are in question, he made a good case about the existence of this parallel apparatus 
subordinated directly to Fidel Castro through one of his most charismatic subalterns 




favored a direct communication with the masses without the intermediation of the cadres. 
Fidel was suspicious and skeptical about bureaucratic routines because of its negative 
impact on revolutionary enthusiasm. Intermediate structures were also a convenient 
scapegoat for policy failures. At times he would develop his own assessment of social or 
economic situation exposing bureaucratic neglect and corruption as the main reason for 
the flaws of communism.  
Economic and political institutionalization was- in Fidel’s vision- a double edge 
sword. In several speeches he strengthened the importance of organization but in many 
others, he alerted about how bureaucratic rule and institutionalization created distance of 
the leadership from the masses.  According to Fidel Castro’s view, intermediate 
structures and division of labor among the cadres in specialized functions of the 
economy, representation might led to capitalist tendencies
116
, technocratic expertise 
without a revolutionary soul, accommodation to power structures and privileges 
(“acomodamiento”) as well as traffic of influences. He insisted in the importance of 
revolutionary guidance in the economy planning system to prevent a move to capitalism  
                                                          
116For examples of Fidel Castro’s explanation about the bureaucratic deviations in 
socialism and the abandonment of the revolutionary methods see his speeches during the 
so-called “rectification period” (Castro, 1986). This is totally compatible with Max 
Weber’s theory about charisma and its relations with bureaucratic appointments or 
dismissals: “In radical contrast to bureaucratic organization, charisma knows no formal 
and regulated appointment or dismissal, no career, advancement or salary, no supervisory 
or appeals body, no local or purely technical jurisdiction, and no permanent institutions in 




(Castro F. , Hay que rectificar los errores que cometamos en la rectificacion de los 
errores, 1987). This vision was frequently reinforced by campaigns to purify and renew 
the revolutionary spirit. This campaigns such as Che Guevara’s speeches in the 1960’s or 
the rectification process in the late 1980’s when Fidel Castro frequently blamed the 
bureaucrats for falling prisoners of routines without listening to the people’s voice in 
revolutionary ways (Castro F. , Un Encuentro con Fidel (Interview by Gianni Mina, 
1988).   
 In the Leninist track, decentralization and professionalization of the cadres was 
part of the party-state building task. Division of labor, specialization, delegation of 
decision and policy implementation was a way to release upper echelons from the heat of 
daily minutiae allowing the party to concentrate in strategic leadership, control and 
supervision. Rather than a space for sectarian tendencies conducive to a deterioration of 
communist values, decentralization could provide flexibility to party rule and national 
dictated policies. In this view, economic and political decentralization also encourage 
some competition between leaders of the party and the economy in representation of 
different regions. This competition rather than create sectarian tendencies might 





On balance, these two tracks survived in parallel for five decades since the 
establishment of the revolutionary party-state apparatus. Each track of leadership evolved 
into an accommodation between the two styles. The general trend was to the stabilization 
of institutional rule with sporadic moments in which Fidel reaffirmed his charismatic and 
veto power. Fidel did use his personal appeal and charisma to build ad hoc groups or 
institutions tailored for his command and massive mobilization and propaganda 
campaigns. The two most important ones were the Group of Coordination and Support of 
the Commander in chief
117
 and in the nineties the Battle of Ideas group with Otto Rivero 
as the Vice-president of the Council of Ministers in charge of this front.  
Fidel’s charisma was a reservoir of legitimacy for the revolutionary regime. In 
front of the evidence of bureaucratic accommodation and neglect, Fidel could always 
launch a mobilization campaign and appeal to revolutionary ethics and sacrifices. In 
terms of personnel Fidel Castro rightly or wrongly unceremoniously removed specific 
leaders and excluded them from the National Assembly, the Central Committee and even 
the Politburo. But nothing in Cuba has the characteristics of the Chinese Cultural 
                                                          
117In Spanish, Grupo de Coordinación y Apoyo al Comandante en Jefe. This was the 
platform for the projection of Luis Orlando Dominguez, Carlos Lage, Felipe Perez 
Roque, Otto Rivero, and Carlos Valenciaga. All of them were defenestrated in the 
Official Note of the Council of State on March 2, 2009 (Consejo de Estado de la 




Revolution or Stalin’s purges
118
. The most seasoned leaders of the CCP learnt earlier to 
get out of the way whenever Fidel launched a major campaign.  For some time they will 
tune to the mobilization campaign of the moment, for instance military troops were used 
in agricultural, construction or propaganda efforts for a while, but in the long-term, 
institutions would guarantee the continuity of the post-revolutionary order.  
The Leninist track also acted as stabilizer when Fidel’s charismatic campaigns put 
the country in disarray. When Fidel Castro’ was deeply committed to a failed policy, 
Raul Castro used the power of the institutions to shape a political adjustment. A typical 
case was the reopening of farmers’ market in 1993 announced by Raul Castro in a 
meeting with regional commanders of the Armed Forces and provincial party secretaries. 
This happened almost a year and a half after Fidel Castro had explained to the IV 
Congress of the Communist Party in 1991 why he opposed any marketization associated 
to Agriculture. Fidel did not support the farmers’ market opening but he kept silent when 
Raul provided space not only for the private farmers but also for agricultural 
cooperatives.  
                                                          
118Most victims of Fidel’s campaign and revolutionary abuses of human rights were 
opponents of the regime and people defined as of “deviant behavior” such as religious 
believers, homosexuals, hippies, etc. Fidel never destroyed the party as Mao did during 
the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution”, nor he ever conducted a military purge of the 




In the model of “Fidel-in-command” that prevailed until 2006, denunciation of 
market flaws was central. Fidel was a man of his anti-market principles. He and Che 
Guevara presented themselves as champions for the downtrodden of the world against the 
growing inequality created by capitalist market, particularly in its neoliberal version. 
Fidel Castro endorsed Che‘s dream about a “new man” “liberated” from the slavery of 
material incentives. This mantra was reiterated speech after speech in different cycles in 
which Fidel Castro launched sporadic campaigns against any endorsement of capitalism.  
Fidel also was above all the factions in the party since he is the founder and 
historic leader of the Cuban revolution. Because his leadership was undisputable, he 
historically provided space and assign functions to loyalists from all venues: veterans of 
different pre-1959 revolutionary organizations, civilians and military, young and old, 
raulistas and the rest. Fidel seemed to straddle the line between the pragmatic and anti-
market factions within the PCC, but at decisive moments he supported anti-market 
ideologues. He believed- as Che Guevara- that socialism cannot be built with the “tools” 
of capitalism.  
Fidel’s vision was structurally biased to the revolutionary left. A subordinate who 
supported a radical policy was considered by Fidel Castro with the proper principles, 
even if life didn’t allow him or her to implement its grand vision. Those who advocated 




“supporters of capitalism”. In November 1997, just after Raul Castro embarked on a 
major trip to the PRC and expressed positive views about the strength of socialism in the 
Asian giant, Cuban communist party’s newspaper Gramma published an article by then 
director of its National School, Raul Valdes Vivo. In what seemed to be an allusion to 
Fidel Castro’s anti-market legacy, Valdes Vivo warned that private investors could 
eventually grow into capitalists, a danger to socialism like “piranhas capable in a 
minimum time of devouring a horse down to the bones”
119
.   
Good chances for a better phased reform of Cuban political and economic system 
were lost in 1997 by the V Congress of the CCP. In the face of suggestions that Cuba 
could emulate the successful economic experiences of the Communist party-ruled 
countries in East Asia, Fidel emphasized that Cuba’s conditions, including its 
geographical location, were significantly different from those of Vietnam and the PRC. It 
was not a matter of political cost benefit-analysis, Fidel Castro’s rejection of the pro-
market models of East Asian communism was a matter of his identity
120
 as an 
                                                          
119For a discussion about the beginning of Raul Castro’s consolidation as Fidel’s 
successor in the V Congress of the Communist Party and the pressures from ideological 
zealots against economic reform, see Larry Rother’s “As Heir to Fidel, Raul Castro 
assumes bigger role in Cuba” (Rother, 1998). The reference to a horse was interpreted as 
placing private investors against Fidel Castro’s socialism because Cubans called Fidel 
with the nickname “El Caballo” (The Horse).  
 
120Fidel’s charismatic inspiration grows from his followers’ belief that he won’t 




intransigent revolutionary. If he were a less protagonist figure, perhaps the system could 
have moved earlier in the path of reform.   
The historical exhaustion of Fidel Castro’s charismatic authority explains not only 
a cause that pushed Raul Castro to adopt a new course of reforms but also the stagnation 
of the economic transformation in the 1990’s (Gonzalez & McCarthy, 2004). With his 
charisma, Fidel Castro locked Cuban political system adaptation into an aversion to 
market typical of partial reform equilibrium. Cuba reluctantly accepted some market 
segments in its economy but refused to adopt complementary steps that could have 
helped the country to deal comprehensively with issues of poverty, inequality and 
transitional adjustment.  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cuba had to concede a space to market 
mechanisms but Fidel Castro did not accommodate more than what was strictly 
necessary(Eckstein, 1994). His stand against market was a necessary condition for the 
partial reform equilibrium that emerged. Fidel provided Cuban radicals with a barricade 
against market transformation they would have never afforded without his altruistic 
revolutionary credentials. In favor of gradualism and partial reform equilibrium was also 
                                                                                                                                                                             
For them, Fidel remained always thelandowner’ son, who left aside privilege to take side 
with the market losers. Charisma is a relational category. People follow the charismatic 
leader for expressing some beliefs, not simply for a personal characteristic. Fidel made 
his reputation as someone who doesn’t compromise, an intransigent, a word with positive 




a Cuba’s national security rationality based on the difficulties of endorsing deep market 
oriented reforms in the middle of U.S pressures for regime change.  
In contrast, the institutional track was less adverse to the introduction of market 
mechanisms. The Armed Forces have their own economic branch. As the longest serving 
minister of defense in the history of the world (47 years), Raul understood Napoleon’s 
dictum about military expertise “amateurs speak strategy, generals speak logistics”.  
After 1970 when Fidel Castro mobilized the army for the Ten million sugar ton 
campaign, Raul began to develop an economic apparatus at the service of the Armed 
Forces (FAR). In 1973, FAR created the Working Youth Army (Ejercito Juvenil del 
Trabajo) in which young recruits from the military service worked as agricultural and 
construction labor.  The Armed Forces developed their own conglomerate of military 
industries and a chain of hotels, originally for their own officers but later for international 
tourism.   
The military introduced some market-oriented management practices during 
Fidel’s reign.   To prevent an excessive dependence on Soviet military support, in the 
1980’s the FAR high command created the Military Industries Union (Union de 
industrias militares), a holding of companies that after 1990 became the launching pad for 
the GAE (Grupo de Administracion Empresarial (Entrepreneurial Management Group, 




companies in Cuba today. Hotel chain “Gaviota” is one of the major tourism companies 
in Latin Another company of the GAE “Almacenes Universales” is in charge of the 
development of the Special Economic zone of the port of Mariel.  
Cuba’s security hawks endorsed institutionally the gradual approach to reform 
and the partial equilibrium for their own reasons. They found useful allies in the early 
winners of the partial reform among the bureaucrats, investors and entrepreneurs. These 
well placed actors profited from the monopoly and arbitrage rents associated to prices 
liberalization without competition. Politically this equilibrium favored the discretion of 
beneficiaries of the partial reform since they had to behave without ostentation because 
no position was safe enough in front of Fidel’s anti-corruption revolutionary attitude.  
Then, it is not surprising how once this type of relationship between leader and 
followers diminish due to Fidel’s sickness, the political system shifted rapidly to a 
thermidorean (Brinton, Anatomy of Revolution, 1965) stage in which common people are 
essentially motivated by well grounded desires for a better daily life in terms of 
transportation, housing, food, etc. Elites focused on preserving their interests and 
privileges. The upper echelons also became less afraid of expressing preferences for 
normalcy than they would in the presence of Fidel charismatic revolutionary fervor. 
Since the approval of the Social and Economic Guidelines at the VI Congress of the CCP, 




reform for surviving and serving to the dominant interests of the nomenclature. There 
was an interdependent synergy between the processes of reform and political succession.  
 
4.2 Change of leadership, intra-generational and intergenerational transition 
4.2.1 A unique intra-generational power transition
121
 
In July 31 2006, the Fidel-in-command model ended with the retirement of the 
charismatic leader. As Max Weber (Weber, 1978, pp. 243-247)has explained the 
charismatic track is unsustainable in the long run and “becomes either traditionalized or 
rationalized, or a combination of both”. It depends on the “extraordinary” circumstances 
not only of personality but also of a charismatic moment. Without Fidel Castro’s 
charisma at the helm of the state,  Cuba completed a transition to a bureaucratic-rational 
type of authority, from totalitarianism to post-totalitarianism(Linz, Juan & Stepan, 
Alfred, 1996). 
The July 31 2006 power transition condensed the charismatic-institutional double 
track described above into one.  A succession institutional channel was already 
established in the article 94 of the 1976 Cuban constitution: “In case of the absence, 
                                                          
121Here I use indistinctively the concepts of power transition and succession but I 
understand that presidential succession is just a central element of a more comprehensive 
process of power transition. Power transition invokes transference of power from a 




illness or death of the President of the Council of State, his duties will be assumed by the 
First Vice President”
122
.  This institutional channel was reinforced by Fidel’s charismatic 
anointment of Raul as his second in command since May 1959.  
Raul was Fidel’s successor in virtue of a combination of law, historical role as 
second in command in the revolution, and charismatic anointment.  In July 31 2006, 
Cubans not only received the news about Fidel’s inability to rule but also a “proclama” 
(proclammation), in fact a handwritten proclama(Castro F. , Proclama del Comandante en 
Jefe al Pueblo de Cuba, 2006), in which the commander in chief Fidel announced the 
temporary transference of power as president of the Council of State, Ministers and First 
Secretary of the CCP to his first Vice-president (No reference to brother relationship 
since Fidel has always insisted in the non-dynastical character of the regime).  
The “proclama” served two purposes: 1) Fidel reconfirmed the validity of the 
institutional channel with clear references to the Central Committee of the CCP and the 
distribution of functions in the post-revolutionary state. 2) At the same time, Fidel chose 
a team
123
 to rule as a collective commission accompanying Raul Castro in his leadership. 
                                                          
122Article 94, Constitución de la Republica de Cuba (Republic of Cuba, 2002). See 
Chapter IX Principles and Organization of State Organs. 
 
123In the July 31 2006 Proclama, Fidel Castro appointed Raul as his “provisional” 
successor in the leadership of the Armed Forces, the Council of State, the Council of 








Following Fidel’s sickness on July 31, 2006, there was a two year period in which 
power was shared by six leaders according to the area of their command: the economy, 
health, foreign policy and defense, the battle of ideas, etc with Raul Castro at the top. The 
years between 2006 and 2009 served to adjust the tensions contained in the “Proclama”. 
After a hard convalescence, Fidel Castro reappeared in public but it was evident he didn’t 
have the physical capacity to rule the country. In the new scenario, the older Castro used 
his presence to back his younger brother. Fidel began to write some press commentaries 
mainly about international events such as nuclear proliferation, climate change, the use of 
ethanol, Marx’s birthday, and other topics. Slowly he began to receive distinguished 
foreign visitors including some head of state but his relevance for daily policymaking 
waned.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Energy that Fidel placed in the hands of other leaders: Esteban Lazo, Jose R. Balaguer, 
Jose R. Machado, Felipe Perez, and Carlos Lage. See Proclama del Comandante en Jefe 
Fidel Castro, 2006, Juventud Rebelde, July 31. Accesible at 
http://cubajournal.blogspot.com/2006/07/proclama-del-comandante-en-jefe-fidel.html 
 
124In Fidel Castro’s temporary distribution of functions, Raul Castro got the most 
powerful responsibilities followed by Carlos Lage who was placed as responsible of the 
appropriation of funds and the supervision of two of the three main programs of health, 




An area in which Fidel Castro used his charismatic authority was Cuba’s relations 
with the Latin American left. Fidel anointed Hugo Chavez as his political heir in Latin 
America.   Chavez reciprocated Fidel’s gesture and claimed to be Fidel’s political son. He 
frequently travelled to Havana helping Fidel’s return (as if he ever left) the international 
stage as a kind of patriarch of the Latin American radical left.  
By February 2008 when the economic and political situation was stabilized and 
after new elections to the National Assembly, Fidel Castro formally resigned to be 
nominated for a new term. Raul Castro was elected as the president of the Council of 
State and the Council of Minister as it is established in article 74 of Cuban constitution. 
Raul’s ascendance to the presidency vacated two positions to fill up indicating the route 
the regime would take. The Council of State elected Jose Ramon Machado, a veteran of 
the FAR and the main leader in charge of the organization department of the CCP
125
. For 
                                                          
125Machado Ventura has not always been the formal leader of the Organization and 
Cadres Department of the Central Committee but he has been in charge of this CCP 
portfolio since the First Congress of the party in 1975.  The Department has been a 
critical piece in the management of the leadership in the party and the government. 
Machado Ventura represented the institutionalization and consolidation of its work. 
Historically, the secretary of organization had a strategic importance in the political 
contestation of factions within the CCP. It was the base of Anibal Escalante, the former 
leader of the old Communist party (PSP) in the formation of the Integrated Revolutionary 
Organizations (ORI). Later the responsibility was managed by two fidelistas without 
faction, loyal mainly to Fidel, Armando Hart (1965-1970) and Jesus Montane Oropesa 
(1970-75). After the first Congress, Machado Ventura became the Organization 
Department chief and the “raulistas” consolidated its control over the human resources 




the position of minister of the Armed Forces, the system followed the established rule. 
Julio Casas Regueiro, the first vice-minister replaced Raul Castro in the position.  
According to his own account, Fidel Castro played a substantive role in selecting 
the composition of the candidates for the State Council (Castro F. , I hope I Never Have a 
Reason to be Ashamed. Reflections., 2008), that in the Cuban system is equivalent to 
choose them:  
In the world of nebulous speculation and protocol, what counts is the State 
leadership and the party organization is considered a meddlesome intruder, an 
internal principle. In the specific case of Cuba, thus, it should suffice to know that 
Raul has all of the legal and constitutional faculties and prerogatives he needs to 
govern our country. As he himself explained-wrote Fidel referring to his Brother 
Raul’s speech in the National Assembly-, I was consulted during the process of 
putting together a list of candidates for the position of First Vice-president that he 
held, and of which no one was stripped. I did not demand to be consulted. It was 
Raul and the country’s top leaders who decided to consult me. Similarly, it was 
my decision to ask the Candidacy Commission to include Leopoldo Cintra Frias 
and Alvaro Lopez Miera, who joined the Rebel Army combatants when they were 
only 15, on the list of Council of State candidates.  
 
There were several implicit arguments in Fidel Castro’s statement that showed his 
support for a softlanding. First, there was an agreement on keeping the CCP and state 
leadership position together. Raul Castro concentrated all the powers, First Secretary of 
the CCP, President of the Council of State, and President of the Council of Ministers. 
Second, Fidel Castro stamped with this piece the actions and appointments made by his 
                                                                                                                                                                             
chief of the organization department is Abelardo Alvarez Gil who worked under 




brother, emphasizing the power of the party apparatchiks and the military high command. 
Third, he personally asked the addition of two military leaders among the youngest of the 
1959 revolution generation to the candidacy for the Council of State. Cintra Frias and 
Lopez Miera were both prominent generals of the revolution and the Angola war. Cintras 
Frias would become minister of Armed Forces after the decease of General Casas in 
2013.  
Seeing the factional composition of the Council of State with hindsight, it is 
evident that Raul proposed a continuity and loyalty coalition of the Armed Forces high 
command and the party apparatchiks as the custodian of the reforms he wanted to launch. 
Unity of the leadership and proven service to the CCP was more important than reformist 
conviction. The National Assembly session of February 24, 2008 represented the end of 
the plurality of the fidelista coalition left in charge by the commander in chief of the 
revolution in the proclamation of July 31, 2006. From then on, Raul installed his own 
power coalition.  
Marc Frank, a veteran observer of Cuba politics for Reuters wrote about the 
election of the Council of State in February 24, 2008:  
Cuba’s ‘new’ Council of State signaled to governments and Cubans that there 
would be no radical veering from the course Fidel Castro had set over the 
decades. The powers that be saw the next five years as critical and no time to test 
young cadre, whose time would presumably come with the new government. 
With Fidel fading, they had circled the wagons-12 of the 31 members had 




now members. The average age of the top eight positions was over seventy, with 
just three members under that age. At the same time the new government was 
though because the Communist Party planned to radically downsize the 
government and bureaucracy and lift some onerous restrictions on people’s lives. 
It was conservative and tough to manage the changes within the system that were 
coming. Thirteen of the members were on the party politburo, including all the 
top seven (Frank, 2013, pp. 108-109) 
 
The choice of Machado Ventura was not a surprise for those who knew the 
implications of Raul Castro’s consolidation of presidential power for the system. The 
experience of Mikhail Gorbachev’s Soviet Union marked the views of the military and 
communist party czars with suspicion towards leaders who had reform agendas incubated 
outside the party apparatus. For some of them the last soviet leader was a traitor
126
. 
Others agreed with Deng Xiaoping that Gorbachev “looked smart but was very stupid” 
(Pantsov, 2015) because he launched a reform that dislodged him and the Communist 
party from power. Based on this perception, Raul Castro and a cohort of leaders who 
fought the revolution with the Castros set on a course to choose their second man and 
successor without accepting the younger generation leaders promoted by Fidel Castro in a 
non institutional manner.  
                                                          
126The official support for the version that presents the fall of communism as rooted in a 
betrayal by the Soviet elites, has been evident in the CCP support for the printing and sale 
at cheap prices of books written by foreign scholars that agree with this view. Delegates 
to the VII Congress of the CCP in the province of Camaguey received the book 
“Betrayed Socialism” of American professors Roger Keeran and Thomas Kenny as a 




In addition to the election of Machado as first Vice-president and second 
secretary, new actions by the CCP structure showed that Raul Castro meant business 
when he declared that “Institutionalization is … one of the pillars of the Revolution’s 
invulnerability in the political field”(Castro R. , 2008). The leaders of the executive 
commission of the politburo appeared also as the vice-presidents of the Council of State. 
More conspicuous than his brother Fidel, Raul began to appear in the press surrounded by 
party leaders and military chiefs, calling for criticism of the government’s dismal 
economic performance and opening the door to “structural and conceptual changes”.  
Once established at the cusp of power, Raul Castro expressed his preference for 
cadres who climbed the bureaucratic and party ladder step by step. In 2007, the Young 
Communist League adopted the policy of requiring members of the National Committee 
to work in the profession they have studied for before assuming again a national 
responsibility. In the meeting that adopted this policy, Raul joked exactly about the career 
of the two leaders mentioned frequently as representatives of the new generations and 
promoted by his brother Fidel: Carlos Lage
127
 and Felipe Perez. He criticized that both of 
them have not good experience working in their professions as doctor and engineer 
                                                          
127Carlos Lage had a meteoric leadership career in Cuba until he fell on disgrace in March 
2008. He was in the early eighties the leader of the students’ federation and the young 
communist league. From there he went to work for Fidel Castro’s support group and 
eventually became the economic czar in charge of the economic opening of the 1990’s to 
foreign investment. Outside Cuba he was presented as a reformer but his political 
projection never went beyond his support for Fidel Castro’s command economy with 




respectively. He asked, “What do they know? How to give speeches? It is our duty to 
open up room for new generations…but not for test tube leaders… rather, for those 
brought up on their own efforts”(Garcia, 2007). 
In March 2009, Raul replaced nine ministers and fired Carlos Lage, Felipe Perez-
Roque
128
 and Carlos Valenciaga who had functioned as virtual prime minister, minister 
of foreign relations and Fidel’s chief of staff
129
. Fidel stamped the move by writing a 
column in Granma repudiating those who Raul expelled from the politburo because of 
their “ambition” and infatuation with the “nectar of power” (Castro F. , Healthy Changes 
in the Council of Ministers, 2009).  This soft purge of Fidel’s appointments era concluded 
the presidential succession and determined a new balance of forces in which Raul Castro 
and Second Secretary of the CCP, Jose Ramon Machado decided in 2013 the ascent of 
                                                          
128 Felipe Perez is a defenestrated Cuban politician. He was a leader of the students’ 
federation and later Fidel Castro’s chief of staff. When Fidel Castro appointed him as 
minister of foreign relations, Perez-Roque was only 34 years old and was presented as 
someone familiar as few with the thoughts and strategic views of Fidel Castro.  
 
129Valenciaga, Lage and Perez-Roque were part of a whole group of defenestrated leaders 
in their fifties, forties and thirties. In addition to them, there were the cases of Otto Rivero 
who was Vice-president of the Government for the Battle of Ideas, and Fernando 
Remirez de Estenoz, chairman of the Department of International Relations in the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party and former Chief of Cuba’s Interests Section in 
Washington. All of them were accused of illegal and immoral relations with Conrado 
Hernandez, a Cuban who was identified as agent of Spanish intelligence in secret videos 
only showed to members of the CCP. Marc Frank explained the whole episode in “Cuban 




Miguel Diaz-Canel to the condition of first Vice president and also are set to decide who 
will receive the first vice-presidential positions in 2018. 
Raul Castro proclaimed on several occasions that no one in the current leadership 
would be capable of reproducing Fidel’s leadership. Hence, the CCP began transitioning 
to a more collective and pragmatic approach to government with fewer speeches
130
. 
Under Raul’s presidency, the Council of Ministers changed most of its members, and 
adopted a new structure less centered in the presidency. The new ministers came from the 
ranks of the Armed Forces, the party leadership in the provinces and civilians in good 
term with the military establishment. By 2012 after the VI Congress of the CCP a reform 
program was approved, only three of Fidel’s appointed ministers remained in office, one 
of them, Abelardo Colome, appointed by Fidel as minister of interior after he was a loyal 
member of Raul’s high command.  
The reform program of the VI Congress in 2011 was born out of this new balance 
of factional politics. It was oriented and defined by members of its most conservative 
factions. The guidelines agenda was defined from above with the central goal of 
preserving the post-revolutionary system. Once the new policy frontiers were defined, the 
                                                          
130Raul Castro described this feature of his rule with an implicit distinction from Fidel’s 
style: “I am not used to making frequent appearances in public, except at times when it is 
required (..) Moreover, I have always been discreet, that is my way, and in passing I will 




CCP sought convenient feedback from the bottom, to pick and choose initiatives at the 
service of its Leninist agenda. 
The discussion of the 2011 Guidelines followed the script of “Llamamiento” of 
the IV Congress of the CCP in 1991. The base document called to debate the record of 
the revolution.  At the helm of the organizing commission for the IV and the VI 
congresses were Jose R. Machado Ventura and Jose R. Balaguer-Cabrera with clear 
loyalist credentials and ties to the organization department of the CCP. In their report to 
both Congresses, this leadership recognized the different opinions collected in the 
assemblies, from those in favor of adopting a market oriented economy to the demands 
for the rights to travel, own private businesses and freedom of religion including a 
minority who questioned the leadership role of the party. The CCP leadership behind 
these political maneuvers is very well trained in the use of its agenda setting powers 
avoiding divisive issues for the elite and advancing specific policy priorities. For 
instance, the party leaders rejected demands about ending one-party rule as simply non-







4.2.2 The inter-generational transition that already took place: The role of 
the Organization Department of the CCP 
In terms of leadership, the VI Congress of the CCP produced a systemic 
promotion of younger cadres to low and intermediate positions combined with the 
election of the oldest Politburo in history. This contrast gives a good picture of the 
transitional situation in Cuba: An inter-generational leadership transition well advanced 
at the municipal, provincial and Central Committee levels (cadres in the interval mid 
forties-mid fifties) supported an intra-generational transition at the national helm (leaders 
in their late seventies and eighties). The Politburo expressed a balance of forces clearly in 
favor of the old generation of “historicos” who reluctantly support a market oriented 
reform accompanied by the strictly necessary steps of political liberalization. Another 
aspect of the changes in the leadership composition is the synchronization of the CCP 
with global trends of improving gender, and race representation.  
The picture that I am going to present here shows a CCP with a serious challenge 
in terms of inter-generational leadership transition at the highest organ, the politburo, but 
well advanced in other level, even if it is not free of problems or criticism.  
The changes at the municipal, provincial and central committee level were not 
done in a rush. Evidences point out how the second half of the 2000’s witnessed the 




Armed Forces and the CCP intermediate and lower levels. Between 2007 and 2009, the 
FAR renewed all the chiefs of the major branches and the regional armies. Generals who 
were in their late forties and early fifties took the highest positions in the regional armies. 
All this was the expression of a well organized chain of command. In the three regional 
armies,the new supreme commanders served previously as chiefs of the Army’s head 
staff for several years
131
. Every one of these generals wasa career officer with several 
tours in Cuba’s African wars in Ethiopia and Angola.  
The strengthening of the institutionalization of THE CCP began in the 2006 VI 
Plenary of the CCP, when the Politburo decided to revive the Secretariat as the organ to 
coordinate party effort to implement its policies with the militants
132
. The 
                                                          
131The three generals who became leaders of the three regional armies in October 2008 
were 1) Division General Lucio Morales Abad who replaced Corps General 
LeopoldoCintra as Supreme Commander of the Western Army who became first vice-
minister of the Armed Forces. 2) Division General Raul Rodriguez replaced Division 
General Joaquin Quinta Solas, who became vice-minister of the Armed Forces, 3) 
Division General Onelio Aguilera Bermudez replaced Ramon Espinosa Martin who 
became also vice-minister of the Armed Forces.  
 
132The Party Secretariat has been strengthened in the phases of higher institutionalization 
and weakened when Fidel’s charismatic authority prevailed. In the early sixties, the 
Cuban leaders emphasized the organizational dimension of the integration of the different 
revolutionary groups that opposed the Batista dictatorship. The process ran into 
difficulties due to the sectarianism of old communists gathered around Anibal Escalante 
who functioned as Secretary of Organization of the Integrated Revolutionary 
Organizations (Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas (ORI). The difficulties were 
partially corrected with the creation of the Central Committee and the designation of 
Armando Hart, a veteran from the underground struggle as the Secretary of Organization 




institutionalization gained traction in the CCP during the preparation for the VI Congress 
of the party and the National Conference in 2011 and 2012. In the previous months, 
under the guidance of Jose R. Machado Ventura’s CCP organization department, most 
provincial top positions were renewed in ways that the posts fell in the hands of cadres in 
their forties, incorporating a new composition in terms of gender, race and education.  
In my work as a Cuba coder for the Global leadership project of Boston 
University (Gerring, Oncel, Morrison, & Keefer, The Global Leadership Project: A 
comprehensive Database of Political Elites, 2014), I information about the most 
prominent 712 members of Cuban elites in terms of their education, age, gender, race, 
profession and languages they speak. The organizations that I surveyed were from 
Communist Party: the Politburo, the Central Committee, the Secretariat and the 
provincial leaders in 2011, from the state, the Councils of State and Ministers, and the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Fidel Castro assigned leaders of the Politburo and the Secretariat to multiple functions in 
the provinces or as ministers.  
The politics of the 1970’s brought the first Congress of the CCP in which Fidel Castro 
declared: “The party is the soul of the Cuban revolution” (Castro F. , Report of the 
Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party to the I Congress, 1975, p. 236) . The 
Congress launched a long interval until 1992 in which Raul Castro and other 
functionaries such as Jesus Montane and Jose Ramon Machado Ventura bolstered the 
institutional structures of the party, such as the Politburo and its executive commission, 
the Secretariat and the Departments of the Central Committee. In 1997, the Secretariat 
was seen as doubling functions and was dissolved until June 2006. After the VI Party 





National Assembly. The available data at the website of the study
133
 shows important 
elements that align current Cuban elites with the general demographic trends of the 
Cuban population except in the case of the Politburo
134
. 
In 2012, the members of the CCP (769 318) and the UJC (405 830) were together 
(1 175 148) more than one fifth of the Cuban Labor Force (5.3 millions)(Hernandez, 
2/2014). Compare to the median age of the Cuban population (38.7 years in 2011), the 
median age of the Cuban elites was over 48.9 years old
135
. The Central Committee 
average age is 57 years. The Secretariat’s is 63.8. A similar situation exists in the 
Councils of Ministers (58 years old).  
 
                                                          
133See the database of the final report of the study: “The Global Leadership Project: A 
Comprehensive Database of Political Elites” (Gerring, Oncel, Morrison, & Keefer, 2014).  
 
134. Later I benefitted of consulting the data collected by Cuban scholar Rafael Hernandez 
in 2014 (Hernandez, 2/2014) that included also a survey of the Young Communist 
League (UJC and the provincial party secretaries). 
 
135I am using the data I collected as a coder for the Global Leadership project (Gerring, 
Oncel, Morrison, & Keefer, 2014) and the data collected by Rafael Hernandez 
(Hernandez, 2/2014). My sample included the leaders of the Politburo, the Central 
Committee, the first secretary of the party in the provinces, the CCP Secretariat, the 
Councils of State, and the Council of Ministers, the members of the National Assembly 




In terms of gender and race participation, the Cuban political elite’s structures had 
problems of underrepresentation.  The data of race is not alarming in the party 
membership, the Central Committee, and the National Assembly. In terms of gender, 
women are systematically underrepresented in all the institutions but compared with 
other nations, Cuba trends towards some important correction.  





















35% 35% 31.2% 35.67% 26% 
Women 49.9% 39% 42% 45.25% 7% 
 
 
The situation is different when one looks at the upper echelons of power: the 
Politburo.  In 2013 the average age of the Politburo was 68.7 with both the first and 
second secretary above 80. There were two blacks and two mulatos representing 26.66 % 




Acea was a woman (7%).  Only one of the eight members of the Secretariat was a woman 
(Olga Lidia Tapia).  
In terms of professional trajectory, there are a high number of primary and middle 
school teachers working as provincial cadres of the CCP and the social organizations 
under party control. At the highest level, the Politburo, and the Council of Ministers the 
dominant profession is engineers, some of them civilian and other from the military. The 
military presence is at its highest in the Politburo, seven of fourteen. Of the eight 
members of the secretariat, only Raul Castro is an active member of the military but other 
three (Jose Machado Ventura, Jose Balaguer and Victor Gaute are former members of the 
military).  
One important distinction is between new and old members because this could 
indicate trends in the higher structure of the party.  The four younger and newest 
members of the Secretariat were provincial party czars. Of the four members of the 
Politburo under 60 years old, two has been provincial party czars, each of them in two 
important provinces, Diaz-Canel in Villa Clara and Holguin, Lopez-Acea in Cienfuegos 
and Havana City. The other two are the economic czar Marino Murillo and the minister 
of foreign relations, Bruno Rodriguez.  
For the modernization of the CCP, the Politburo organized the I National 




provinces and the central apparatus of the party discussed topics such as the role of the 
Young Communist League and the ideological work in the new circumstances, and a new 
party officials promotion policy. The new CCP goals declared the necessity of having a 
systematic policy to promote young members of the party, women and blacks. As part of 
this effort, the Conference insisted in revitalizing the system of provincial party school 
adding the teaching of economics (including market economics) to the cadres. No 
provincial or municipal leader can assume its position without passing first the respective 
political and management courses
136
. 
By the time of the VI Congress of the CCP in 2011, Raul Castro proposed for the 
first time in more than fifty years the adoption of term limits for all the major positions in 
the state and the party. The timing was particularly convenient for the historical 
generation since most of those who fought in the struggle against Batista were becoming 
octogenarians and will not serve the two terms. The rule partially aligned the experience 
of the CCP with those of the East Asian Communist Parties that have carried on 
economic and political reforms.  
 
                                                          
136The conclusions of the CCP I National Conference discussed these topics and Granma, 





The institutionalization of the term limits rule for leadership renewal advanced an 
increasingly norm-bound style of succession politics. It takes some historical perspective 
to understand the importance of the adoption of terms limits as a practice of the CCP and 
the Cuban State. During Fidel Castro’s rule, only once the issue was openly discussed 
after the IV Congress and the mere idea of limits to the supreme leader seemed as 
laughable.  
The adoption proves the diffusion effect by which non-liberal democratic 
reformers with developmental purposes learn from the Chinese and Vietnamese systems. 
In Cuba, the rule has already been enforced at the provinces during the years 2012 and 
2013. The party line about leadership promotion has eliminated Fidel’s practice of 
“helicoptering” young leaders in their twenties and early thirties to prime positions.  
Machado Ventura and the Department of Organization of the CCP had implemented a 
policy of step by step promotion of cadres, under the tutelage and supervision of party 
elders.   
One major difference between the CCP and the Vietnamese and Chinese 
Communist Party is the absence of age limits in the Cuban case. The CCP have not 
adopted the 70 years-age limit already in place in Vietnam and China.  This difference 
explains the old average age of the Cuban Politburo with nine of fourteen members above 




levels of the Central Committee, the National Assembly, the provincial party leaders, and 
the regional high command of the military. Median age is not particularly old in the 
Secretariat in which all members are under 70 with the exception of Raul Castro, 
Machado Ventura and Jose R. Balaguer.  
Another important element of the leadership succession was the increase in the 
use of meritocratic criteria in opposition to previous factional considerations in the 
promotion of the elites. For decades, the Cuban Central committee included non-
explicitly stated quotas for historical leaders of the organizations that fought against 
Batista and later founded the new CCP in 1965. This practice is in decline. Furthermore, 
in July 2013, Raul Castro announced a new practice in party politics: the replacement of 
members of the Central Committee and the Politburo when they leave their position as 
leaders of other organizations or government institutions. “This door leads out without 
constituting any demerit”- Raul Castro affirmed, emphasizing that the political system 
must accustomed to the practice of leaders’ resignation and retirement ( Associated Press, 
2013).  To demonstrate in practice what he meant he announced the retirement of Ricardo 
Alarcon, the former president of the National Assembly, and Jose Millar Barruecos, who 





Institutionalization of the party rule represents the ultimate acceptance of the 
primordial role of the Secretary/Department of Organization and Cadres of the Central 
Committee of the CCP. The Department is the result of the CCP’s historical experience 
organizing a policy for the promotion of leadership. The Department that has been under 
the leadership or supervision of Machado Ventura (his current chief is Abelardo Alvarez 
Gil) is the right hand of the Politburo and the government for almost all the major 
appointments in the country. The absolute victory of the coalition of the Armed Forces 
High Command and provincial party czars in the factional dynamics that surrounded 
Fidel’s succession by Raul bolstered the influence of the Department as a decisive maker 
of Cuba’s political balance.  
Some international observers had described the organization department as the 
human resources section of the CCP but this description falls short of its real role. The 
Department either approves or submits to the consideration of the Politburo and 
provincial party structures the appointments of the leaders of the party and government 
from municipalities to the nation. It has also a primordial role in the selection of those 
who manage the economic life of the nation and the social organizations affiliated to the 
CCP such as the Union of Writers and Artists (UNEAC), the Association of Small 
Peasants (ANAP), the trade unions (CTC), the Women’s Federation (FMC) and the 




With the exception of the ministries of the Armed Forces and the ministry of 
interior in which any grade higher than Colonel was approved by Fidel and Raul, the 
CCP organization structure do the vetting for most of the positions at the levels of 
ministers, vice-ministers and directors of state owned enterprises and the private 
corporations in name, registered in other countries to avoid the U.S. embargo but owned 
by the Cuban state.  
Three areas in which the role of the organization department is critical are 
international relations, education and revolutionary orientation (propaganda). Inside the 
party, the organization department is in charge of the Higher School of the CCP “Nico 
Lopez” and its provincial subsidiaries
137
. In the general system of education, the 
organization department approves in addition to the ministries and vice-ministers in 
education and higher education ministries, the designation of all the presidents of 
universities (rectors) and technological and pedagogical institutes.  
 
                                                          
137In the early 1990’s, there was a rumor that Carlos Aldana, who appeared to be a 
powerful member of the Politburo after Fidel and Raul Castro, and was in charge of the 
Secretary of Ideology tried to peel off the Central Party School from the Organization 
Department. Machado Ventura rejected the attempt and made clear that education of 
cadres fell under his turf. Aldana was later removed from the Poltiburo under some 
accusations of bad judgment and corruption despite his trajectory of working under Raul 




The policy is also applicable to foreign affairs apparatus of the party and the state. 
The department approves the director of the research centers affiliated to the CCP such as 
the Center for the Study of the Americas (CEA), the Center for the Study of Asia and 
Oceania (CEAO), and the Center for the Study of Africa and the Middle East (CEAMO). 
All the cadres of the ministry of foreign relations from the level of director and 
ambassadors up are passed and monitored by the filters of the department. In terms of 
propaganda, the organization department vets and approves the appointment of all the 
directors-editors of the national and provincial newspapers, TV and radio stations.  
Indirectly, under the leadership of Machado Ventura, the organization department 
had a say in almost every area of Cuba’s political life. The organization department 
doesn’t appoint directly all intermediate new cadres in provinces, municipalities or state 
companies but it approves the committees and chief of human resources departments in 
charge of doing so. One of the successes of the team lead by Machado Ventura was the 
creation of a culture of norms and procedures to institutionalize appointments and 
information processings about the cadres of the party-state apparatus. By the time 
someone is a manager of a major state company or a member of the provincial committee 
of the Communist Party, the organization department has a thick file about their life, 
friends, family, personal biographies with moments of self-criticism about their past 




It is not that the Organization Department is in control of all decisions, it is not. 
The Department monitors and play a role in the appointment of cadres but ministers, 
party leaders in the Secretariat, the other departments of the Central Committee and the 
provinces have more influence over appointments in the area they rule. There is a system 
of patronage in which members of the politburo, ministers, members of the Secretariat, 
provincial party czars and others promote individuals affiliated to their areas or factions. 
But as a whole, the department is one of the best organized and institutionalized veto 
players of the system, with strong influence across functional sectors, and regions. At the 
end of the process, only Fidel and Raul Castro can bypass the organization department’s 
filters.  
The Department cadres have also important informational advantages about other 
leaders and policy feedback. They are present at critical junctures in the functioning of 
the CCP rule, such as every provincial assembly of the CCP, or the commissions for the 
organization of the congresses, the evaluation of ministries and other institutions. Equally 
important, all the vetting process for appointments operates behind closed doors. In most 
cases, when someone is appointed or rejected for a position, this is done without any 




qualifying criteria for the job
138
or the reasons the party took the decision to reject 
somebody. 
The rank of the former leaders of the Organization Secretary expressed its status 
in the hierarchy: Armando Hart in the sixties, Jesus Montane in the early seventies and 
Machado Ventura after the first Congress of the party, every one of them was members of 
the Politburo and the Secretariat during their tenure. Today, Abelardo Alvarez, the 
current chief of the Department is a member of the Secretariat. He is the first one to come 
from outside the historic veterans of the revolution but was a party cadre since 1969.  
The Organization department of the CCP is a major denial to those who 
hypothesize about the collapse of the system at the death of the Castros, conceiving 
Communist Cuba as a sultanistic or patrimonial system (Saxonberg, 2013). In terms of 
human resources management the department employs sophisticated techniques of 
administration as any of the major corporative institutions in the world. The Department 
rotates cadres of the party-state to different regions and functions, promotes loyalty to the 
CCP as a whole and not to the parts, has a system of cadres’ promotion and education to 
                                                          
138In the few cases in which after 1975,  some young leaders from outside the 
party system were appointed to important responsibilities either as ministers of foreign 
affairs or directors of scientific centers, Fidel Castro took himself the task of explaining 
the rationality behind the process. Raul Castro has only done so once when he explained 
Marino Murillo’s return to be minister of the Economy without abandoning the 
Commission on Development and Implementation of the “actualizacion” (updating of the 





guarantee knowledge and preparation of policy implementers.  It has written rules and 
statutes codifying appointments and promotions according to the length of service, 
education level and periodic performance evaluation. It has a system to assure a 
combination of training, education and loyalty to the CCP rule and its two main 
ideological sources: socialism and nationalism
139
.  
The system headhunters identify talented people to serve party rule and monitors 
their career from teaching jobs to party instructors to local and provincial leaders. The 
high levels of the Department collect information about the official in question from 
different venues: from homologues, from subordinates, from their passing throughout the 
educational system, from psychological tests, etc.  The Department has learned from the 
experiences of transition and non transition from communism in other countries. The 
department is immersed in most of the leadership experiment to improve the efficiency 
and efficacy of the party-state.  
The power of the department explains not only the successes of the CCP in 
conducting an intergenerational transition in the provincial, municipal and central 
committee levels but also in its limitations and incapacity up to the VI congress to 
                                                          
139For a good study of the CCP educational and cadres promotion system see Salomon 
Berman’s dissertation at Georgetown University (Berman, 2008). I benefited from my 
conversations with Salomon Berman in Washington, NYC and Mexico. He published the 
discussion about the education of the cadres in his article “Bound to outlast: Education 




institutionalize one at the level of the Politburo and its executive commission. The 
Politburo has been excluded from the rotation and renewal rules and procedures instituted 
by the department at the lower levels. Factional loyalty and trust by high offices holders 
still prevail over more institutional interest rationality.  Leaders with a dismal record in 
the management in their strategic portfolios such as Ulises Rosales del Toro, and Jose 
Ramon Balaguer have remained at the upper echelons of the party-state. Commanders of 
the Revolution such as Ramiro Valdes and octogenarians from the revolutionary veteran 
generation continue to play a decision making role far more important than the powers of 
the office they had.  
Above the Central Committee level, power is still very personalized and 
associated to the dominant revolutionary generation military group. Performance 
evaluation seems to have today even less meaning than at the times of Fidel’s charismatic 
authority. He could fire anyone, open a brainstorm about a new political path, and make a 
radical policy shift reducing or increasing the power of the functionaries in charge of his 
political priorities. He never put this power in favor of a reform course, but had he done 
so, it could have been a formidable bypass for many of the current system bottlenecks 






4.3 The preparation for an intergenerational transition at the top 
The Cuban political system under the CCP is 56 years old chronologically but it is 
very young in generational terms. At the top of system, in the Politburo, it is seated the 
same generation that took power in 1959. The renewal of the Cuban leadership has had 
different cycles. From the Politburo of the first Congress of the CCP in 1975 to the one in 
the VI Congress, only Raul Castro and Jose Machado Ventura have been members 
without interruption (Of the current members, Ramiro Valdes was a member of the 
Politburo elected in 1975 but was purged out from it at the third Congress, returning in 
the VI). The apex (meaning the # 1 and #2 positions) were the same for almost five 
decades.  
By April 2011 when the VI Congress of the CCP took place, the new government 
has showed a clear record of a stable intra-generational transition at the top and began to 
discuss the challenge of an intergenerational one from the so called “historicos” (the 
generation that overthrew Batista’s dictatorship with the revolution) to those who were 
born in the sixties
140
. The top echelon of the party and the state was integrated by people 
in their seventies and eighties (born in the interval from the late twenties to the mid 
forties of the XX century). As Rafael Hernandez demonstrated those who were born in 
                                                          
140In the distinction between intra-generational and intergenerational transitions and their 
respective challenges I follow the discussion presented by Samuel Huntington in his 




the late forties and the fifties, the second generation of the revolution, an intermediate 
group between those who made the revolution and those who were born under the new 
regime, had worked at the Council of Ministers and played important executive functions 
(Hernandez, 2/2014) in the central government and the provinces. These were the 
generations who- if one accept Crane Brinton’s theory of revolutionary cycles- had 
endorsed most enthusiastically the ideals of socialism and nationalism(Brinton, 1965).  
These generations however did never have the chance to exert Cuba’s supreme 
authority since by 2018 they would be in their seventies. They were trained by the 
historic revolutionary leadership and worked side by side with them in the most difficult 
missions and sacrifices in Cuba and overseas. But their promotion to the top was frozen 
by the absence of a retirement mechanism of the “historicos” generation either with age 
or term limits. That is why the political turnover implied a dose of strategic trust on the 
new generations because Fidel and Raul Castro had remained in their top positions for 
five decades. 
 There are some ideas that emerge from this brief discussion of the first power 
succession
141
 at the top of the state after 1959.  A list of them can bring some light about 
the challenges for the 2018 transition from Raul Castro to his eventual successor:  
                                                          
141Technically it is not the first presidential transition because in June 1959 there was a 
presidential transition from President Manuel Urrutia to President Osvaldo Dorticos who 




First, the transition was institutional but reinforced by a charismatic logic. Fidel 
Castro’s undeniable charisma played a part in appointing his brother Raul Castro as his 
successor. Yet the system did fundamentally follow its institutional route: Article 94 of 
the constitution, the dominance of the Council of State and the Politburo.  
Second, the transition stability benefitted from aligning charisma and institutional 
design but also from counting with a consolidated second in command as the head of the 
most powerful institutional and political faction: the Armed Forces. Raul’s unique 
condition as first Vice-president, second secretary of the CCP, ministry of the Armed 
Forces, and Fidel Castro’s anointed successor for almost fifty years eased the transition 
by bridging any gap between the institutional route and the charismatic anointment in one 
side and the political balance of forces on the other. Future transitions beyond 2018 will 
not have a Castro (Fidel or Raul) to serve as a final arbiter; therefore the elites would 
have to learn to solve their ideological differences at the risk of sparking an open and 
therefore more vigorous policy discussion among the society at large.  
Third, semi retired Fidel Castro played a stabilizing role at the succession. He 
confirmed his support for every decision of the new government and backed the removal 
of those who supposed to be next in line in the political succession: Carlos Lage and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
established. Politically, the transference of power was the first one Fidel Castro stop 




Felipe Perez. He stood by his brother at all times and never antagonized any of Raul’s 
decisions.  
Fourth, given his important international stature, Fidel Castro kept playing an 
important role in foreign relations, anointing Hugo Chavez as his international successor 
channeling through Chavez his radical projection while allowing his brother Raul to 
pursue a reformist, more moderate road at home.  
These observations are important to confirm the importance of Hungtington’s 
distinction between intra-generational and intergenerational successions. Future 
transitions are not expected to replicate most of the characteristics of this first intra-
generational succession. Some of the discussion about the Cuban political system has 
insisted on the issue that Fidel Castro’s charisma is not reproducible but only a few 
(Nelson Valdes is an exception (Valdes, 2004)) had called attention to the fact that there 
is “no another Raul” to play his historical role and enjoy the condition of undisputable 
Fidel’s potential successor.  
The institutional framework that smoothed the intra-generational succession is 
also incomplete for the consolidation of a stable one-party system.  As I demonstrated 
above, there was no transition from charismatic authority to institutional rule in 2006 but 
a staged succession from a dual track leadership system that combined charismatic and a 




Vietnamese experiences, Raul Castro had proposed the adoption of limits of two five 
years term for all top government and party jobs.  
The most salient event of the process of leadership succession was the designation 
of Miguel Diaz-Canel as Raul Castro’s succesor for 2018 as first Vice-president of the 
council of State and Ministers. Diaz-Canel is 53 years old electronic engineer from the 
central province of Villa Clara who served as provincial secretary there and later in 
Holguin province in the Eastern part of the country. Mr. Diaz-Canel was a professor at 
the Central University of Las Villas, where he became the leader of the young communist 
league (UJC) before becoming the Ideology Secretary of the league at the national level. 
He was an “internationalist collaborator” in Sandinistas’ Nicaragua. 
Mr. Diaz-Canel ascent has all the characteristics of an institutional arrangement 
managed by the Organization Department of the CCP. If one considers the CCP as a 
corporation- an analogy that should not be overstretched- Diaz-Canel has worked in the 
entire production ladder. His service as provincial party czar in Holguin and Villa Clara 
are no minor achievements.  These are two of the most strategic provinces in term of the 
economy and the implementation of the reforms of the 1990’s such as the opening to 
foreign investment and tourism. His short service since 2008 to 2011 as Minister of 
Higher Education placed him in contact with the conflicts and challenges of political life 




discussions the regime would face after the passing of the revolutionary veterans’ 
generation. 
In terms of factions within the CCP, Diaz-Canel is not only part of the group of 
provincial czars but he also has a significant political and social capital in the networks of 
the Cuban state.   First, during his successful work in the provinces he developed close 
connections to intermediate elites of increasing power due to the economic reform and 
the coming process of decentralization. In addition, his service in the central provinces 
and the east of the country helped him to develop a close connection with the military 
commands of the Central and the Eastern Army, the latter, the biggest one of all the 
regimen military regional organizations.  
Another important topic of Diaz-Canel’s rise to the first vice-presidency is the 
difference between Fidel’s and Raul’s military background and his civilian one.  If he 
becomes President in virtue of a rule in 2018, it will be the first time Cuba has a civilian 
at the helm of the state since 1952 when General Batista overthrew Carlos Prio in a coup. 
This possibility looms as two other factors influence the civil-military relations in post-
revolutionary Cuba. First, the completion of the retirement of Cuba’s most senior military 
officers since all the high command of FAR above the regional armies would be above 
seventy five or eighty years old by 2018. Second, the military has a widespread presence 




Since Raul Castro will remain the main decider in the CCP for the next five years, 
Diaz-Canel could be also the first post-revolutionary Cuban leader not able to appoint his 
successor. This new situation anticipates certain complexities in terms of the relations 
between the post-2018 leaders with three important groups: the generation that follows 
Diaz-Canel, the elders and the military.  
One major difference between the management of the inter-generational transition 
in China and Vietnam and in Cuba is that East Asian communism had adopted age limits 
together with term limits by the time of their second presidential succession. The absence 
of this adoption is the result of factional politics and the dominance of the military group 
with ages in the seventies and eighties, not of a rational decision with the interests of the 
CCP in mind as a whole. Age limits were suggested by Fidel Castro at several moments 
of his political life, ironically in the context of criticizing Mao Zedong’s alleged senility.  
One well kept secret is that liberalization is desired by Cuba’s elites. In the last 
twenty years, the dual economy has served the interests of the post-revolutionary elites in 
allowing them to acquire advantageous positions from which to promote their interests 
and privileges through eventual marketization. Without formally rejecting their old 
ideology, many revolutionaries of older generations, and particularly their children, the 
princes and princesses of the system, have engaged in conspicuous consumption. A new 




accumulating wealth in the hope that Fidel Castro’s death will also mark the end of anti-
rich sentiments within Cuban society.  The idea of expanding rights such as the right to 
own private property and the right to travel is part of a self-serving agenda of the 
emerging elites. To them, the business of revolution is business. 
One of the most important reasons for political liberalization is the need to 
institutionalize single-party rule.  Without the decisive authority provided by Fidel’s 
charisma and Raul’s concentration of power, the CCP will need rules to solve political 
conflicts in a de-personalized way.  Factions need to manage leadership promotion from 
one generation to another and policy disputes in ways that compromise of different 
interests is formalized and explicit
142
. To rule in an institutionalized way, the CCP will 
                                                          
142Evidences from the presidential succession of 2006-2009 suggest that there was a lot of 
personalization. In one of the secret videos about the demise of Carlos Lage and Felipe 
Perez Roque, the latter who was a member of the Politburo expressed resentment against 
the designation of Machado Ventura as first Vicepresident and stated that “Machado 
Ventura would ruin the country”. Raul Castro criticized Lage for informing Perez-Roque 
and others of decisions that were taken by a group smaller than the Politburo that it is not 
specified, presumably the executive commission of it. One member of Lage’s faction, his 
cousin medical doctor Raul Castellanos Lage regretted not to have killed Machado 
Ventura when the then seventy eight years old leader went into a heart surgery. Machado 
and others were called by the younger leaders “fossils” and “dinosaurs” (Frank, 2013, pp. 
150-151).  All references to the videos are based on Marc Frank’s “Cuban revelations” 
and the report by Dalia Acosta “Video Sheds light on Cuba’s sacking” (Acosta, 2009). 
While visiting Cuba I crossed information with several friends and relatives about the 
content of the secret videos and confirmed the accuracy of the events I quoted. The 
videos were showed only to members of the CCP. They were told to use the information 
for their persuasive tasks with the rest of the population. Therefore, I was not revealed a 




have to normalize its intra-party political discussion, creating formal spaces for pluralism 
within its ranks. Power must remain the office and exercised according to written rules, 
without personalization. It will also have to differentiate the roles of government 
organizations from those of the party and allow space for allowing the population to vent 
its frustrations with local authorities. It will also need to professionalize internal party 
governance though a collective division of labor in the Secretariat.  
The organization department of the CCP has proven to be a formidable machinery 
to modernize and institutionalize one party rule but its functioning has the stamp of 
guerrilla improvisation and personal ties of the revolutionary veterans’ generation. The 
system is partially institutionalized and does not depend on charisma but neither power 
nor policymaking at the upper hierarchies follows impersonal rules. Three areas of 
leadership in which partial institutionalization reform is hurtful are:  
1) The informality of ties and traffic of influences between political and economic 
leaders of the party-state and the market oriented corporations. Corruption opportunities 
are bigger together with its political damaging effect for the CCP rule
143
,  
                                                                                                                                                                             
included an open reference to the open presence of Spanish intelligence agents in the 
island. 
 
143In the secret videos of Raul Castro’s speeches about the removal from power of Carlos 
Lage, Felipe Perez Roque, and other leaders from the Battle of Ideas and Fidel’s 




2) Civil-military relations. The CCP has its origins in the Rebel Army and the 
military has intervened in Cuban politics as a major reservoir of loyal leaders for Fidel 
and Raul Castro in the last fifty years. Miguel Diaz-Canel or any other leader who 
succeeds Raul Castro would lack the military credentials and the power base that the 
Castros has had in the Armed Forces. Only the retirement of the high command and 
legislation of military subordination to the civilian authorities can confer the party 
leadership effective control over the huge economic and political apparatus of the Armed 
Forces. It is not logical that in the absence of war, the military holds so many seats in the 
Politburo and the Councils of State and Ministers. The military also might want to have a 
less partisan role and insulate its high command from the day by day political discussion 
and management of the country 
3) The indetermination of divisions of functions, checks and balances between 
local, provincial and national levels of government. Economic reform and political 
liberalization require some level of decentralization allowing more competition between 
local authorities and social decompression by contestation between different local elites.   
The solution to this political challenge goes beyond questions of policy implementation 
by the Organization Department of the CCP; it requires a new political design creating a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Italian businessman who operated in Cuba and Conrado Hernandez, the Cuban 
representative of Basque government’s business in Cuba. Foreign investment minister 
Martha Lomas explained how she allowed Lavarello significant space for operations 




viable distribution of functions between the local, the provincial and the national level. 
Such design can take the burden of managing every single local issue off the back of the 
party, allowing it to focus on control and national development tasks.  
The last four years have demonstrated how difficult it has been for Raul Castro, 
and those interested on gradual reforms, to move the party forward in the absence of the 
“order and obey” system typical of the past.  The party has began to do politics in the 
traditional sense of persuading and developing consensus at least within insiders but also 
in its relation with a wide network of civil society groups
144
.  
To implement the reforms and cope with their collateral consequences, the party 
will need to define policies regarding how the cadres’ performance would be measured. 
To generate political initiative in its cadres, some institutional guidelines would have to 
differentiate a fatal mistake from an excusable one, how much latitude local officials 
have to make policy adjustments, and the point at which such adjustments are rendered 
unacceptable political deviations from the party line. Up to now, Fidel Castro had defined 
the party line while the CCP and the Armed Forces organized under Raul’s guidance 
                                                          
144The CCP formulated guidelines in 1975, 1980 and after the III Party Congress in 1986. 
In all those cases, there was a written Central Report that defines policies for the five 
years after the conclave, and documents such as the PlataformaProgramatica or the PCC 
program to establish long term goals. In the IV and V congresses, Castro spoke without 
preparing a written balance of the party’s achievements and flaws. The theme of his 





have tried to implement it. But in the middle of so much economic and political change, 
the party line itself becomes an arena of contestation.  
Raul’s ascent also represented a transition to a new leadership style. Fidel’s 
typical approach would be to design a policy and then ask for advice on what was an 
already settled-upon course of action. Raul’s Castro’s style is different. Since taking 
power he has initiated not one, but two processes of popular participation (of course, 
constrained by the limits of the communist system) in which public input were solicited 
before a government proposal was offered. This new debate also allows officials, 
academics and intellectuals to have more influence on such processes as long as they 











Chapter Five:A world safe for reform: How domestic process of economic 
and political liberalization shapes Cuba’s insertion in the post-Cold War world and 
viceversa 
5.1 Introduction 
The second part of the dissertation discussed the foreign relations dynamics that 
accompanied the process of economic reform and political liberalization in Cuba. These 
last four chapters propose a framework in which change and continuity at the state-state 
foreign relations level is increasingly connected to openness in foreign actors’ access to 
Cuba’s economic and civil society. 
Other transitions from command economy and communist party political 
monopoly show how foreign influences tended to bolster market oriented and liberalizing 
forces. Explaining the positive influence of international factors in economic reform and 
political liberalization in China, Minxin Pei listed:  
1) the diversity of external actors over whom the old regime has little control. 2) 
Their capacity to mobilize externally available resources, 3) the speed with which 
these resources can be introduced into the transition process, and 4) the 
multiplicity of means and channels through which external influences may be 







Cuba is a smaller actor than China in international society, it is not a great power 
and therefore its exposure and vulnerability to international factors tend to be greater. In 
addition, Cuba is a western society with significant synchrony with the cultural flows of 
the West, the springboard of the current liberal world order.  
Cuba’s economic and political transformations were initiated by a non-liberal 
reformist segment of the post-revolutionary Cuban elites interested on repositioning their 
interests in the post-Cold War world, not on dismantling the one party system. To 
advance the reforms these elites clash with other groups within the system with 
entrenched privileges, interests, conceptions and values about decisive issues such as the 
validity of the old command economy and traditional Marxist political ideology. Part of 
the discussion about the old and new structures in the context of the transition is about 
Cuban state capabilities to face the challenges and opportunities of the new international 
environment offer. This is particularly true in the case of the changing environment of 
Cuba-U.S. relations.   
This second part of the dissertation lay out the principal features of Cuba’s 
international interactions in the post-Cold War era. Its first purpose is to present how the 
domestic drivers of change within Cuba interact with the dominant trends in the 
international system. The inability to design a sustainable path for Cuba’s command 
economy became a fundamental motivation for the CCP reform agenda. International 




are at the causal core of Cuba’s economic reform and political reform.  At the same time, 
these domestic processes altered ultimately the nature and priorities of Cuba’s foreign 
policy.  
The promotion of a friendly world for the processes of economic reform and 
political liberalization is essential for the survival strategy of the CCP.  The confluence of 
domestic and foreign demands shapes Cuba’s identity in global society
145
. The task is 
particularly difficult because reform makes political regimes more vulnerable not only to 
domestic challengers but also to foreign pressures.  
New access to foreign sources of information, funds and markets provides 
structural chances for empowerment of non-state actors by raising their international 
contacts and profile. Not all of these actors pursue a confrontational agenda towards the 
communist-nationalist state but some of them do. Marketization and the expansion of the 
right to travel make economic resources, organizational knowledge and social networks 
                                                          
145This dissertation theoretical approach is based on a pluralist conception of international 
and global societies, generally associated with the English School of International 
Relations and supported by the contribution of constructivism to the discipline. The 
normative structure of these approaches is built around the mutual recognition of 
sovereignty and legal equality by the states. International society is conceived as an 
“anarchic society” of states. These states rely on self-help logic but this logic is 
constrained by norms, rules and set of institutions at the core of their society: 
International law, the balance of power, Great Powers, diplomacy and war. Global 
society includes not only the international society (states) but also other important factors 
such as international organizations, international civil society groups, transnational 




available to civil and political societies groups. They can add new tools to their repertoire 
increasing their leverage versus other factors. These reforms, legitimated by official 
stamp, do not present an easy target to control as the minuscule political opposition does. 
The political cost of policy reversions in areas such as travel rights and market reform 
affects millions of travelers, private entrepreneurs and consumers. Any potential 
reversion of these structural changes has important foreign policy consequences since it 
direct signals to foreign actors.   
The second goal is to highlight how the conflict between United States’ 
hegemonic presumption towards the Western hemisphere and Cuban radical nationalist 
narrative shapes Cuba’s foreign policy grand strategy in the age of reform. The clash with 
the United States intertwined decisively with Cuba’s internal dynamics imposing a 
foreign policy and security rationale on Cuba’s strategic calculation. Cuba’s conflict with 
the closest and most developed market of the world decreases the possibilities of 
integration in economic liberal international regimes, raising the appeal of a pre-existent 
revolutionary identity to the strategic calculation and the construction of Cuban national 
interest.  
Disconnection and economic conflict with the United States makes difficult for 
Cuba to develop a market economy. The premise that U.S-Cuba relations after 1992 are a 




clarified the primordially anti-nationalist, not anti-communist, content of U.S. policy 
towards the Cuban revolution. Both legislations of the U.S. congress do not target 
communism but accommodation between a U.S led world market economy and CCP 
rule. Both legislations pursued to limit the expansion of foreign capitalist investment in 
Cuba by punishing transactions not with communist countries but with liberal allies of 
the United States in Canada and Europe. The goal is to block a transition to market 
economy under any leadership different from Miami right wing exile or their allies in the 
island.   
The end of the Castros’ era brought also foreign policy imperatives for the Cuban 
establishment. In the absence of Fidel Castro’s international profile, the symbolism of 
Cuba’s challenging position to the United States decreases. The gratitude and 
commitment of Angola, South Africa, China, Russia, Vietnam, Algeria and others to the 
CCP ameliorates with the arrival of a less prominent leadership to the global 
revolutionary scene. Leadership in those countries is also going through their own inter-
generational transition. Cuba’s integration to the world market is essential to safeguard 
the revolution because luring foreign investment, trade and aid is the expedite way to 





A post-Fidel Castro’s world allows a Cuban foreign policy less personality 
centered.  Economic reform procures to enroll important segments of American society in 
the anti-embargo coalition and undermine American regime change policy. Cuban needs 
to find reliable economic partners in other countries of the world, and the hemisphere.  
Although Fidel Castro enjoys the sympathy of some important segments of Western 
society, he is perceived negatively by many in the business world and the Cuban 
diasporas in the United States and Europe. His retirement lowers the antipathy levels 
towards the CCP of governments and societies at large in North America and the west.   
Cuba’s economic foreign policy seeks to open the entrepreneurial appetites of 
critical business groups in the world economy. American business community is one of 
its most important targets. Since the partial reforms of the 1990’s the embargo began to 
experiment some cracks in the case of the cash only agricultural American sales. The 
discussion about the pertinence of the embargo has been also increased by the interests of 
American oil companies on risk exploration at the Cuban waters of the Gulf of Mexico 
and the challenges of cooperation against an oil spill in the Gulf. The increase in the 
tourists’ flows and the profits made in the island by European and Canadian companies 
have a demonstration effect for some American travel and hotel companies. The opening 
to small and medium private business and the changes in Cuba’s migration policies are 
having a direct impact in the Cuban American community, its composition, perception 




These trends reflect in the political balance in which U.S. policy towards Cuba is 
decided. “The business of America is business”- President Calvin Coolidge used to say. 
Agricultural trade with Cuba even expanded during the republican highly ideological 
George W. Bush’s administration. As it is the question of a growing contact between 
Miami and Havana in terms of remittances, travel and now support for the opening of 
family private businesses.  
The third goal is to show how Cuba’s identity in the world system has changed- 
and so has the perception of the island held by most international actors, particularly 
those at the top of the international hierarchy: the great powers. Cuba’s economic reform 
and political liberalization soften strategic and ideological differences with great powers 
and regional actors in the Western Hemisphere. The combination of a market oriented 
reform with Communist party rule receives support of Russia and China, non-democratic 
powers with historic ties with Cuba since the Cold War era. The reforms also attract a 
friendlier position from U.S. allies in Latin America, Canada and the European Union. 
These capitalist democratic countries have developed an incremental approach to the 
promotion of economic development and human rights in Cuba. Rapprochement between 
Cuba and these actors place the United States in a less favorable position towards Havana 





5.1.1 Cuba’s foreign relations and the dynamics of partial reform. 
A time of economic reform and political liberalization is a critical juncture in the 
definition of Cuba’s international identities for three main reasons: 1) because these 
reforms change the nature of the Cuban state, and State-society relations, 2) because 
economic reform and political liberalization might change the nature of the relations 
between Cuba and other states and specific expectations about each other, 3) because by 
interacting in manners associated to economic reform and political liberalization, Cuba 
and other states evaluate the expected utility of their ties and what proper behavior to 
follow in their interactions. 
An important distinction in the analysis of the international influences on the 
processes of reform and political liberalization is between causality and conditionality. 
Cuba’s response to the economic crisis, the leadership succession, and the crisis of trust is 
fundamentally driven by domestic politics. At the same time, Cuba’s international 
position bounds the policy making rationality within specific constraints. First among 
those constraints are the tense relations with the United States. These difficult relations 
create national security dynamics in the background of any major decision about Cuba’s 
economic and political model. For instance, one of the fundamental official arguments 




than one political party refers to the possible emergence of a fifth column at the service of 
U.S. regime change strategy
146
.  
Cuba’s foreign policy grand strategy, a set of policies to promote national 
interests and state values beyond its borders, is not merely a reaction to foreign stimuli 
but a design mediated by Cuban leaders’ perception, analysis and will. The formulation 
of the national interest is primarily determined by the demands of the ruling elites on the 
international arena. Cuba’s foreign policy supreme goal consists of promoting a friendly 
environment for the regime’s political stability and international legitimacy. This goal is 
conditioned by the determination of the CCP to manage economic and political 
transformation preserving regime continuity. Regime continuity is inextricably linked to 
the nature and origin of the regime itself: the Cuban revolution is inherently 
international
147
. It is almost impossible to separate the domestic and international spheres 
in Cuban revolution and counterrevolution.   
Marketization, state owned companies’ reform, and political liberalization were 
initiated by the ascendance of non-liberal modernizers within Cuba’s post-revolutionary 
elites. This ascendance is an event of domestic nature but in no way disconnected from 
                                                          
146See Fidel Castro’s discourse to the IV Congress of the CCP in 1991 (Castro 1991) 
 
147Fred Halliday claims that revolutions are “always in some degree international events 
and need to be seen in this context” (Halliday, Revolution and World Politics: The Rise 




international challenges. Raul Castro and its minions are modernizers as result of the 
opportunities and challenges imposed to them by the international balance of forces, 
including their alliances and those of their counterrevolutionary opponents. Cuba’s 
foreign policy is guided by a decision to provide the Cuban state with what Edmund 
Burke called “the means for some change as essential means for self-preservation” 
(Burke 1984, 106).  
As discussed in previous chapters, the Cuban process follows patterns of partial 
reform (Hellman 1998) in which winners insist on combining some degree of stability 
with changes that provide them with opportunities for rent seeking and capital 
accumulation. Relations with other countries provide post-revolutionary elites with 
advantageous opportunities for arbitrage and access to technology and capital 
(managerial, material, or social) in a manner that preserves the domestic balance of 
power. Simultaneously international relations give civil society organizations and 
opposition forces windows to interact with homologues or potential supporters from 
abroad.  
A Cuba in transition creates uncertainty for international actors. Not all of them 
understand the political game in place. For some of them the pursuit of stability by the 
CCP is just a masquerade for maintaining the status quo. Others look at the process of 




gain for political pluralism, protection of rights and economic sustainability of economic 
reform and political liberalization. Others look at reforms as an opportunity for using 
instability for regime change while others, including this author, prefer to look at 
economic reform and political liberalization as an increase on the power of civil society 
and economic society without necessarily leading to political democracy.  
Since Cuba’s transformation is happening after multiple transitions from plan to 
market and from one party system to democracy or other forms of non-democratic 
regimes, there is a temptation to look at Cuba through the lenses of other experiences. 
Knowing transition experiences from other countries can be positive because many 
problems in Cuba have significant similarities with other countries. Yet there is a further 
analytic issue related to the timing of Cuba’s reform: the learning by Cuban actors from 
past experiences of democratization, transition to the market and opening in other 
countries. This is easier to identify in abstract than to figure out what Cuban actors 
concretely learned and what they made of this knowledge.  
Fidel Castro’s predisposition against adopting market mechanisms stamped his 
approach to domestic transition but also to Cuba’s foreign policy projection. Partial 
reform is part of the desires and options of winners of early stages of the reform but also 
encouraged by the cautious approach of Fidel Castro to any dismantlement of the 




message to states and non-state actors in the international arena who adjust their 
expectations for the long haul.  
The different evaluation of the possibilities and limits of changes in Cuba 
conditions the attitude of international actors towards the Caribbean nation. Here it is 
important to differentiate the areas of the reform, the economy as the primary sphere of 
interest, and politics. The CCP has never expressed an interest on a transition to liberal 
democracy raising important suspicion and reservation among international actors 
committed to this agenda. The ambiguity of economic reform and liberalization without 
democratization raise doubts among international democrats and non-democrats. The 
former don’t want to contribute to the consolidation of a non-liberal democratic regime. 
The latter might fear investing in a political and economic alliance that might evaporate 
in a democratic transition. 
But this is not the main source of cautiousness towards Cuba by other 
international actors. The ambiguity of partial reform towards market economics creates 
anxiety among international business actors, who look at Cuba as a high risk market. This 
vision of Cuba as having a high risk business environment was based on the history of the 
island nation. Fidel Castro did never commit to a transition to a market economy.  This 




effects of U.S policy of isolation and punishment of third country actors explain Cuban 
government’s difficulties for boosting its opening to foreign investment.  
Foreign investment is particularly important for marketization. First, given the 
severity of the economic crisis, foreign investment and international aid provide critical 
funds for some minimal macroeconomic stabilization. This is essential because of the 
cushioning role a minimal economic stability provides for reform experimentation. This 
is consistent with the international experience. Without European, American and 
Japanese support to the former Soviet Union, Eastern European countries, and China and 
Vietnam in smaller measure, these nations could never embarked on some of the drastic 
adjustment programs of privatization and marketization they had (Pei 1994).  
In addition to offer capital, foreign economic relations represent the expansion of 
social linkages between Cuba and other nations. Those ties vary from country to country 
but play a positive role in pushing reforms ahead. Foreign economic associations with 
Cuban state owned companies prey on the closed nature of the command economy 
system but most of these joint ventures expose Cuban companies to the international 
markets. This is clearly the case in the tourism industry where intensive competition from 
other Caribbean destination forced Cuban hotels to introduce new technologies, and 




Foreign investment and technical assistance have helped the growth of the non-
state sector in Cuba despite the regulations and obstacles imposed to state-non-state 
sector ties. For instance, pressures from foreign actors in the touristic industry were 
critical in the demand for direct sales from the agricultural private sector to the hotels and 
other state companies. Foreign companies in Cuba helped also to train the personnel and 
adopting state of the art management standards. This experience is consistent with the 
discussion about the role of external actors in other transitions in Eastern Europe, former 
Soviet Union, China and Vietnam. In addition to the economic direct benefits, contact 
with foreign actors increased the flow of educational and cultural exchanges with the 
outside world. Internet, for instance, was introduced first on hotels as an essential need 
for clients. 
Despite the desirability of foreign participation to break up the logic of partial 
reform, other countries foreign policy towards Cuba is not exclusively based on 
perceptions about the transition process.  Other states weight multiple issues such as the 
history of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with Cuba and the triangular implications 
that relations with Cuba have for respective ties with the United States.  There is also the 
question of values of the international actors and the dynamics of their own domestic and 
bureaucratic politics. States are not unitary actors. The Cuban government has also its 
preferences amd priorities about whom to attract as foreign investors and how to engage 




Some difficulties arise from the design of policies towards Cuba’s economic 
reform and political liberalization by international actors.  There are tensions between 
human rights promoters and the democracy promotion community. In Brussels, 
Washington, Ottawa, and the rest of the capitals of democratic countries in Europe and 
the Americas; decisions about investing or connecting with a humanitarian project in the 
island are taken independently of the merits of the concrete project, and conditioned by 
the political debate there. Foreign influences in Cuba’s economic reform and political 
liberalization are divided according to their effects on those processes. While some 
international actors promote structural changes, others would retard or prevent them.  
Retarding factors are not equivalent to pro-government or opposition.  More 
foreign trade and investment can bolster economic reform but whether it helps or 
weakens political liberalization depends on the contexts. In some circumstances, it can 
strengthen the government’s control of society while in others it might unleash a societal 
takeover of state areas throughout marketization or new civil society organization.  
Human rights promoters such as Amnesty International tend to have a more 




Since they look at human rights in the context of international law, they reject heavy 
hand- democracy promotion activities because they raise nationalist hackles
148
. 
In addition, there are influential external forces centered on provoking a regime 
collapse. Although these forces talk the same language of democracy and human rights, 
they naturally oppose any soft landing on a market economy or even a multiparty 
democracy if current elites remain in power. Their conflict with Cuba is not about 
government behavior or observance of human rights standards; they want to get rid of 
any CCP government or even illegalize the CCP and lustrate Cuba from its historical 
legacy
149
. Such logic exacerbates the security arguments within the Cuban government 
against comprehensive reform.   
The nature of the changes (economic reform, political liberalization without 
democratization) combined with the challenges associated to U.S. regime change policy 
determined the preferences of Cuba’s elites’ foreign alliances. During the nineties, Cuba 
                                                          
148USAID programs under the Helms-Burton Act exemplify covert, illegal, unethical and 
ineffective interference in Cuba’s internal affairs (Armstrong, Damn Yanquis 2014).  For 
the contradictions and complementarities between the human rights and  the democracy 
promotion approaches see Jack Donnelly’s article “Human Rights, Democracy and 
Development” (Donnelly, Human Rights, Democracy and Development 1999) 
 
149Some exile groups in the United States have studied the experience of lustration in the 
Czech Republic, Iraq and other places. This experience was mentioned as relevant at the 
second report of the U.S. Commission of Assistance to a Free Cuba prepared by the Bush 
Administration in 2006 particularly in relation to the Armed Forces and Security 




had little alternatives but to deal with Canada and the European Union as its main trade 
and investment partners. Europe and Canada were the main origin of tourists traveling to 
Cuba. But the Cuban government is aware of the special ties that bound Europe and 
Canada with the United States. These two actors opposed the embargo but they are 
always reticent to get into a conflict with Washington because of Cuba. Europe and 
Canada have also important values conflict with the one-party system the CCP hope to 
keep in place in the island.  
These reasons explains why Cuba has prioritized strategic projects with rising 
powers from the developing world which tend to have a vision on sovereignty and non-
interference in domestic affairs closer to the one of the Cuban party-state. Brazil and 
Venezuela are the top two examples but Raul Castro and his diplomats have embarked on 
a significant effort to attract other countries in this category such as Malaysia, Iran, and 
India. Havana has particularly tried to lure big national state companies from these 
countries to its main development projects, particularly in its search for energy security. 
China and Russia are for historical reasons and the nature of their political 
systems, Cuba’s favorite strategic allies among great powers. Cuba’s military is 
completely armed and trained with Russian technology. This armament is compatible 




balance of power.  Neither China nor Russia accepts the validity of American secondary 
sanctions because of their trade or investment with Cuba.   
Russia, China, Vietnam, and other countries such as Angola and Algeria have 
together with Cuba a history of difficult relations with the United States. Although these 
countries vary on their degree of normalization of relations with Washington, their ties 
are not free of conflict. Although generational change moderates some of the anti-
American resentment after some level of contacts and engagement with Washington, 
there are patterns of suspicion that persist on those countries and are not confined to old 
guard revolutionaries. Memories and articles by Vietnamese, Russian, Chinese and 
Iranian third and fourth generation leaders show a connection with Cuba’s leaders that 
can be only understood from the perspective of revolutionary camaraderie and admiration 
for his resistance to U.S. hegemony.  
 
5.1.2 Ideas and policy frontiers of Cuba’s foreign policy elites 
Cuba’s foreign policy identities and definition of its national interest are 
endogenous to social interaction. They are not given and constant but variables dependent 
on Cuba’s domestic politics and the culture of the ties the country establishes with other 
nations. These international interactions are not predetermined by a rationalist calculation 




When Cuba and the United States interact as adversaries, the interaction reinforces this 
identity. When Cuba and the United States cooperate about an issue of shared interest or 
against a common threat, the possibility of friendship emerges. That is why it is so 
important to look at the images and ideas the actors have about each other and the nature 
of the international system and their relations.  
In Cuba’s post-totalitarian scenario, the most influential ideas in foreign policy 
are those of the military and CCP elites: The Politburo, the Council of the State and the 
Council of Ministers. But such ideas are influenced by the opinions of Cuba’s civil 
society or professional levels in diplomacy and national security such as the ministry of 
Foreign Relations or the directorate of intelligence. As result of economic reform and 
political liberalization, the plurality and importance of societal voices in the discussion of 
foreign policy are increasing. At the same time, the professionalization 
(institutionalization) of the state in the last twenty years has produced a well-educated, 
professional and influential diplomatic service.   
The professionalization of a specific foreign policy oriented epistemic community 
creates a fertile ground for a realistic processing of Cuba’s role in world affairs and the 
existence of important asymmetries in the international system. This is an under-studied 




national interest as driver of Cuba’s foreign policy in relation to the internationalist 
revolutionary impulse.   
The leaders who managed Cuba’s foreign policy until the mid 1990’s traced their 
origin to the radicalization of the Cuban nationalist and communist left in the 1950’s or 
even earlier
150
. The group is known as the centenario generation in reference to the 
centennial celebration of the birth of Cuban national hero Jose Marti in 1953. The 
centenario generation anticipated the emerging of the new left in the 1960’s and the 
project of third world socialism that found support in the theory of dependency 
(Valenzuela, Samuel & Valenzuela, Arturo 1978).The road to development- according to 
this view- needs a separation from the international structure of the world capitalist 
system promoting socialism in the periphery. This view represented a rupture with 
several tenets of the traditional Marxist vision and found some important support in what 
was then known as the new left.  Cuba became a pilgrimage place for anti-colonial 
                                                          
150All the ministers of foreign relations in the revolutionary government until 1992 were 
politicians before 1959: 1) Roberto Agramonte, a university professor of moderate 
positions who was sacked by Castro in mid 1959 and later abandoned Cuba for exile. 2) 
Raul Roa Garcia, a revolutionary of the 1930’s until 1976, IsidoroMalmierca, a member 
of the Communist Party  until 1992, and Ricardo Alarcon de Quesada, a member of the 
July 26 movement. After 1992, two of the ministers were former leaders of the Students 
Federation, Roberto Robaina and Felipe Perez. Both lost their position due to political 
conflicts with Raul Castro and the security establishment dominated by the generation 





revolutionaries in Asia and Africa, and radical participants in the movement for gender 
and racial equality in the capitalist developed world.  
The centenario generation’s project shook out the old left dogmas
151
 of the social-
democratic and communist movement by emphasizing the need to defeat imperialism in 
the Third World. At the highest point of the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, Castro 
boosted his revolutionary credentials by criticizing not only Washington but also 
Moscow. During the years of the Vietnam War, revolutionary Havana became a center of 
reunion, coordination and even military training for radicalized breakaways groups 
originated on nationalist and communist parties. Havana aspired at a time to create a 
revolutionary center with autonomy if not a rival to Moscow and Beijing.  
These elites believe that the national security state created by the revolution 
served them well during the Cold War. From a security perspective the command 
economy and the one-party system helped them to crash their internal rivals in spite of 
the massive military and political support received by them from the United States. From 
                                                          
151This radicalization of the revolutionary left can be interpreted as a return to radical 
roots. At Karl Marx’s tomb in London Highgate Cemetery it is written one of his theses 
on Feuerbarch: “Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; 
the point is to change it”. In Latin America, the Cuban revolution accused most pro-
Moscow communist parties of distorting the revolutionary legacy of Marxism. Fidel 
Castro proclaimed in the 2nd Declaration of Havana in 1962 “the duty of a revolutionary 
is to make a revolution” in response to the participation of most communist parties in the 





a development point of view, the alliance with the Soviet Union provided important 
resources for raising Cuba’s standards of living and human development index between 
the 1960’s and 1989. Their vision about the communist experience that ended in 1989-
1991 still is positive from a national interest point of view. Despite its many flaws, 
communism in Cuba allowed significant social progress in education, health, women and 
racial equality
152
 supported by Soviet aid.   
In terms of their role in the world, the current elites were not disappointed with 
the part they played in the Cold War. Under no other leader, Cuba’s international reach 
has gone as far as with Fidel Castro. Even after his retirement, he is revered as a world 
patriarch of the radical left. The alliance with the Communist bloc empowered Cuba to 
launch mid-power actions in Africa and become a leading country in the two main 
international institutions of the developing world: the non-aligned movement (Cuba has 
been the president of the movement in two different periods (1979-1984 under Fidel 
Castro, and 2006-2009 under Raul Castro) and the Group of 77.  The alliance with the 
Soviet Union was also cardinal in terms of energy and food security to survive U.S. 
policy of embargo and isolation for almost thirty years. From a nationalist perspective, it 
                                                          
152In certain sense this view is in line with some of the calibrated evaluations about third 
world socialism by Fred Halliday in “Third World Socialism: 1989 and After”. However 
Halliday concludes that Socialism “achieved a remarkable amount but was, in the end, 
doomed to failure” (Halliday, Third World Socialism: 1989 and After" 2010).  Camila 
Pineiro discussed the different visions of socialism behind the current reforms in Cuba 





created a history of cooperation with Russia and China that would be useful in the 
fundamental aspiration of diversifying Cuba’s external partners even if U.S. –Cuba 
relations improve.  
The flaws of Cuba’s communist model of development became visible with the 
transition from the Cold War world to globalization. The integration of the global 
economy together with the lessening of ideology driven relationships exposed the 
advantages of the developmental model applied by the countries of East Asia in which a 
market friendly government intervened to complement, never to substitute, the role of 
markets. Cuba’s fundamental investment in health and education produced important 
progresses but it has taken decades to put all this human capital in function of an 
economic takeoff in the absence of a solid economic base.  
The globalization world, not the Cold War has been the context in which Cuba’s 
foreign policy establishment new generation has its formative experience. This is not the 
place for an in-depth comparison between Cuba’s development in the last fifty years and 
East Asian countries or to explain why the record shows a better positive record in almost 
every single area for East Asia. As in the rest of the world, the most internationalized 
Cuban elites know how the adoption of the developmental state based on a balanced 
relation between state and market has been fruitful for those countries that have achieved 




cases of East Asian Communist countries’ adoption of market oriented strategies with the 
exception of North Korea
153
.   
One important component of this transformation is the promotion of economic 
interactions that ease up the access of underdeveloped countries to markets, technology 
and foreign capital flows. If the old generations of the CCP rejected the adoption of the 
developmental ideology that characterizes the economic policy focus in the Chinese and 
Vietnamese cases, the new ones tend to have a more open view to it.  It is an unsaid true 
in Cuba’s political circles a recognition that a world friend for economic reform in the 
island requires a foreign policy that it is necessary less adverse towards international 
capitalism. This doesn’t mean that Cuba will abandon its revolutionary identity but that 
new actors would be less drastic and unilateral in its promotion.   
Raul Castro didn’t break away from his older brother’s anti market rhetoric and 
practices but has marked important differences. He is not a mere Khrushchev but he also 
doesn’t compare positively with his fellow partial reformer, Deng Xiaoping (Nathan 
2012)who released China’s economy from the ideological barriers imposed by Chairman 
                                                          
153The clear outlier here is North Korea. There are multiple explanations about this 
exceptionality but the topic is outside the scope of this research. For a discussion of the 
possibilities of a developmental state in North Korea see the article “Can North Korea 
Develop? Developmental Dictatorship versus the China Reform Model” by Hilary Jan 




Mao. The question is of the highest relevance because the model of a command economy 
with some insulated market segments of the 1990’s is exhausted.  
Structurally, Cuba can twist an action here or there to preserve its revolutionary 
discourse but to make successful its economic reform, the CCP has to adopt a policy less 
in conflict with the capitalist international order. For instance, Cuba’s current strategy of 
development and survival has an important component based on remittances from the 
Cuban diaspora mainly settled in the United States, having important implications for the 
way the government relates to a segment of the nation that supports a capitalist road for 
the island.  Remittances and Diaspora travels were described in the past as potential 
sources of disunity within the revolutionary family and Trojan horses of U.S. controlled 
capitalist restoration.  They are today officially promoted.  
One element that shaped the foreign policy frontiers
154
 of Cuba’s policymakers is 
that of partial reform. The obstructionist role of winners who profit from the 
                                                          
154The concept of policy frontiers refers to social constructions that impose limits to 
foreign policy options. Policy frontiers explains why “some options are considered taboo 
or kept off the table as necessarily unthinkable or destructive”. Stephanie Golob explains 
how “Policy frontiers develop as certain elements of the ‘national interest’- sovereignty, 
security and identity-become equated with the legitimation of state elites. When these 
leaders defend the policy frontier (ostensibly to defend the nation), they are also 
defending their own political power. These barriers are constructed in a path-dependent 
fashion, through a critical juncture that first establishes the frontier, and then are 
maintained over time by institutional and ideological mechanisms of reproduction. For 




opportunities for profit and arbitrage in a non-completed market reform together with the 
logic of a national security driven state in which the main potential foreign market is 
controlled by hostile interests to the Cuban elites reduces the impact on Cuba’s foreign 
policymakers of the attraction of joining the capitalist order to take advantage of it for 
development purposes.  Assuming that economic development in Cuba is a desire of the 
post-revolutionary elites, it is impossible to ignore the realpolitik security mentality of the 
core command of the Cuban establishment, young or old, for whom a market logic of 





of interaction: The prevalence of Hobbesian Culture 
The cornerstone of the Cuban revolutionary state is a systemic military national 
security logic centered on the concept of winning the conflict with the United States by 
avoiding the worst case scenario of a U.S. military intervention.  This logic does not 
prioritize opportunities of economic or political potential if they exist in combination 
                                                                                                                                                                             
internal legitimacy crisis must undermine, and then reconfigure, both mechanisms of 
reproduction” (Golob 2003).  
 
155Here the discussion follows Alexander Wendt’s archetypical cultures of international 







 threats. The views of nationalists and communists about the 
conflict between U.S. hegemony and Cuban sovereignty are embedded in the political 
culture, norms and institutions from which Cuba’s foreign policy and its security strategy 
emerges
157
. These ideas creates a security driven mindset that prioritizes certain aspects 
(energy security, partners diversification, avoidance of dependence on U.S. political 
allies) while it is blinded to others (economic potential of investment by Cubans living 
overseas, mobilization of American business community against the embargo). 
National security has been at the driver’s seat of most of Cuba’s decisions of most 
of the foreign policy adjustment to the post-Cold War world, particularly after Raul 
ascended to the presidency. This military mindset that has its highest expression on the 
centrality of Raul Castro at the helm of the Cuban state and its reform is one of the 
central connections between the logics of partial reform at the domestic level and its 
foreign policy projection. Cuba’s national security culture is fundamentally Hobbesian 
about the U.S.-Cuba conflict. The post-revolutionary elite look at the nationalist conflict 
with the United States as one of existential nature.  
                                                          
156Here I used the term state security challenges because national security is a concept 
constructed in a less transparent ideological way. 
 
157For a theoretical discussion of the role of ideas, norms and institutions in the making of 
security policy, I have built on the framework proposed by Goldstein and 




The historical reference to a past of humiliation and American intervention in 
Cuban affairs is a permanent component of Cuba’s foreign policy discourse. There is a 
Cuban version of “remember the Maine” that is not about Spanish insult to the U.S. but 
centered on American self-serving intervention frustrating Cuban thirty years efforts for 
independence between 1868 and 1898. References to the imposition of the Platt 
amendment and Cuba’s exclusion from the Treaty of Paris that concluded the Spanish-
American War became part of the narrative taught in the public schools before 1959.  
Institutional arrangement of Cuba’s foreign policy expresses this security 
mentality
158
. The Armed Forces and the Ministry of Interior, particularly its Directorate 
of Intelligence are the main institutions for analysis and diplomacy with the United States 
and the Cuban community abroad. The priority of the conflict with the United States is 
expressed on the organizational chart of the ministry of Foreign Relations. Below the 
authority of the Minister and his vice-ministers, there are four general Directorates: 
United States, Latin America, Bilateral Relations with the rest of the world, and 
multilateral affairs. It is worth noticing that just relations with the United States are 
covered at the same hierarchical level as relations with whole Latin America (that it is 
                                                          
158This paragraph builds on my own experience as political analyst for the Cuban 
government since 1992 to 1994. The current organizational structure of the Ministry of 
Foreign Relations is not available in public materials but I got the information in 




separated in two specific directorates for Central and South America respectively) and 
bilateral relations with the rest of the world.  
Every Cuban diplomat in the world and every intelligence officer reports about 
the American embassy in the country as much as about the bilateral relations with the 
country in which it is located. In multilateral organizations, Cuban diplomats wonder 
permanently how every U.S. proposal can be used against Cuba. If reports from 
embassies discussed issues about U.S. policy or initiatives, they are addressed not only to 
the ministry of foreign relations but frequently to the intelligence section of analysis, the 
president and the ministers of the Armed Forces and interior (in charge of intelligence 
and counterintelligence).  
This Hobbesian mentality at the core command of Cuba’s foreign policy does not 
exhaust all the explanation of Cuba’s foreign policy but it is critical to understand not 
only Cuban elites suspicion towards the United States but also the importance of this 
conflict for Cuba’s projection towards the rest of the world. Once the analyst of Cuban 
foreign policy understand the centrality of the security logic in the relations with 
Washington one can add the Lockean prism through which Cuba perceived most of the 
rest of the international system. Cuba does not pursue autarkical goals and recognizes that 




NATO (Lockean culture). Cuba also recognized the importance of international law as a 
tool of international order and peace.  
The perception that Cuba needs to integrate itself into a globalized world explains 
the new priority to economic diplomacy. The specific training for Cuban diplomats at the 
Higher Institute for International Relations (ISRI) before their mission overseas had 
incorporated in the last three years more economic preparation. The role of the Ministry 
of Foreign Investment and Foreign Trade has grown in importance. In the farewell 
ceremony for new ambassadors presided by Raul Castro, Ambassador Juan Carlos 
Hernandez, who spoke in the name of the recently designated, said that the group began 
their mission at a critical juncture of national history, centered around the modernization 
of the economic model: “Economic diplomacy has to play a more active role if we want 
to achieve a prosperous and sustainable socialist society” (Ministerio de Relaciones 
Exteriores de Cuba 2014).  
Cuban disposition to entertain any Kantian culture project is projected 
fundamentally to Latin America. The preferences for economic and political integration 
of Cuba’s national security elites are in South and Central America.  Cuban diplomacy 
has prioritized the role of the regional organizations that either project a counter-





Cuba’s projection towards international integration tends to focus on state-to-state 
relations with a clear contrarian view towards markets oriented mechanisms that are 
generally rejected as product of neoliberalism. The same can be said about 
nongovernmental organizations that have gained in importance at the world level. The 
2014 Summit of CELAC in Havana was the first one in a long list of heads of states 
reunion that lacked any parallel meeting of civil society and private sector actors.  
Any Kantian initiative with the United States is beyond Cuban military and party 
elites’ nationalist policy frontiers. Their views and discourse comes from a Bolivarian 
and Jose Marti tradition that has only looked at Washington with suspicion: they 
rejecteda U.S. led hemispheric integration in principle. This can change as it happened 
with the Mexican elites at the end of the XX century but it will take a time or a crisis
159
 
beyond the scope of this dissertation’s horizons. It is symptomatic how in the discussion 
about Latin American integration in Cuban academy and political circles even the market 
of millions of latino immigrants in the United States is frequently ignored.  
No pragmatic desire of economic development supersedes the national security 
logic that look at the United States as the principal adversary. Although the drivers of 
Cuba’s strategic adaptation are fundamentally economic, the shapers of the policy 
                                                          
159That was the case with NAFTA. Stephanie Golob explained how the Mexican elites of 
the Institutional Revolutionary Party’s policy frontiers shifted during the government of 
Carlos Salinas de Gortari after the political and economic crisis of 1988 (a critical 




responses are essentially political framed within policy frontiers that resulted from 
ideological and historical trajectories. Cuba’s preference with the United States is not for 
integration as a solution to the sovereignty conflict but for stabilization and respectful 
separated coexistence. Engagement between Cuba and the United States is not conceived 
as a marriage but as a respectful coexistence.  
 
5.2 A social perspective of change in Cuba’s foreign relations 
Marketization, political liberalization and openness to the world capitalist 
economy change the social relations between the island nation and its main international 
interlocutors. Economic and political liberalization transform Cuba’s foreign policy 
priorities but also how other states perceive Cuba’s changing identity and how they adapt 
their foreign policy to the new Cuban realities. The perceptions of other actors about 
Cuba’s intentions, interests and roles led to responses filtered by their ideological 
conceptions and interests.  
Cuba’s social interaction with other states creates a dynamic in which actors 
learn, corroborate or discard perceptions about each other.  These actors are never passive 
receivers of information. On the contrary diplomats, strategists, and investors frequently 
take decisions in contexts of incomplete information. This incompleteness of information 




economics. Hence, other actors depend heavily on their perceptions, biases and 
expectations about where the process is going and its probabilities.  
In addition there is the issue of attention. Cuba is not a great power or an 
economic powerhouse in the international system. Revolutionaries tend to get a lot of 
attention but reform lacks drama. Reformers like Deng Xiaoping in China, Nguyen Van 
Linh in Vietnam, Chiang Ching-Kuo in Taiwan or Raul Castro in Cuba have the 
calibrated task of reshaping a rigid and centralized economy without breaking its power 
structure. A reformer’s ability to control change is as important as its skills to maintain 
support for it.  
One of the most difficult dilemmas for reformers is managing the signals they 
send to multiple foreign and domestic constituencies controlling the pace and timing of 
change. “For it is not always when things are going from bad to worse that revolution 
break out,”- Alexis de Tocqueville wrote- “generally speaking, the most perilous moment 
for a bad government is one when it seeks to mend its ways” (Tocqueville 1955, 176-
177). Reforms might easy become revolutions and destroy reform politicians. Cuban 
elites mention frequently the example of Mikhail Gorbachev, a leader who destroyed a 




Cuba is adopting market economy mechanisms but it insists on calling itself a 
communist country. This should not be attributed only to hypocrisy or cynicism
160
. There 
is an ideological struggle within the post-revolutionary camp to define the identity of the 
country, and its national interests. There is an expansion of the non-state sector but delays 
and partial reform retard changes and plant fears about crony capitalism. Corrupt assets 
stripping by elites, predatory taxation or even policy reversals scare investment spirits. 
The battle between different projects of a post-totalitarian developmental state versus a 
predatory one is far from concluded.  
This contradictory situation forces other countries to look at Cuba from a 
dynamic, not a static perspective, trying to identify dominant trends in ambiguous 
situations. One signal frequently misunderstood by not well informed international actors 
refers to the nature of the process of political liberalization. The “divide and reform” 
method in a post-totalitarian system works necessarily different from an authoritarian 
situation. Reformers in authoritarian system tend to dialogue and form coalition with 
loyal opposition segments of the political society. This choice is not available to 
reformers within the Cuban communist regime because the opposition is meager, divided 
and with a very low power of mobilization. It also tends to be radical and dependent on 
U.S. budget.  
                                                          
160Without abusing Tocqueville’s quotes, another one here might be appropriate: “In a 




Non-liberal reformers in Cuba as it happened in China and Vietnam negotiate 
factional alliances with society groups bolstering pluralism in social and economic 
society, not in the strictly political domain. Occasional observers who tend to look at 
Cuban politics with references from the Eastern European or Spanish experience neglect 
this reality. They adopt benchmark associated to the treatment of political dissidents or 
personalize politics too rigidly for post-totalitarian transitional situation. In political 
liberalization those who are playing the fundamental role in the changes are frequently 
members of the same elite who created the system and committed the same mistakes and 
abuses in the first stages of the process that they are rectifying
161
.  
Partial economic reform makes misperception
162
 probable for three reasons
163
: 1) 
the ambiguity of the data. The CCP elites pursue economic reform and political 
liberalization to remain in power not to adopt liberal democracy, but still they might 
                                                          
161That is why the generational divide is an important but not a decisive factor. This was 
the case in China where Deng Xiaoping rectified not only Mao’s anti-markets policies 
but many promoted by him while he was vice-premier (Vogel 2011) 
 
162Robert Jervis has documented the existence of patterns of misperception and distortion 
in policymakers and analysts’ work. “Policymakers tend to fit incoming information into 
existing theories and images. Indeed their theories and images playa large part in 
determining what they notice. In other worlds, actors tend to perceive what they 
expected” (Jervis 1968).  
 
163In this paragraph I applied some ideas presented by Robert Jervis in his book 
“Perception and misperception in International politics” (Jervis, Perception and 




improve significantly economic efficiency and human rights. This is a challenging 
context for those who think in zero sum games terms. 2) The more ambiguous the data, 
the more policymakers interpret them with their preconceived mindset (confirmation 
bias), just what an analyst needs to avoid at transition times. People who sympathize with 
the Cuban government would see major reforms in transformations that although 
significant they fall short of a complete reform. People who assume that CCP structures 
cannot be reformed react by ignoring the significant change the reforms represent with 
respect to the old model of Fidel in command. 3) Cuban reformers receive ambiguous or 
even negative feedback from outsiders who they expect would acknowledge and support 
reform despite their reservations. 
This negative feedback cycle might reinforce the upper hand of status quo forces 
on both sides of the Strait of Florida. It also serves partial reformers because it confirms 
the reasons and prophesies they argued in their caution and slowness in the 
implementation of decentralization or societal controls. It reinforces also the narrative 
and strategies of alliance against liberal democratic actors. In their narrative, Cuba cannot 
count on the European Union or Canada’s resistance to the United States in the 




Those countries- in Cuba’s official propaganda- are at best the good cop pursuing the 
same goals as Washington (bad cop) by softer means
164
.  
It is hard for foreign liberal democratic actors to accept a modernization logic in 
which reformers who they don’t like do the right thing for the wrong reasons.  Non-
liberal reformers are not ideological homologues of market oriented international 
institutions officials, human rights activists or liberal democracy promoters. When non-
liberal reformers promote actions that led to more rights and pluralism they do so to 
provide political stability and international legitimacy not to undermine the one party 
system.  Cuba’s partial reformers manage the political dimension of the opening precisely 
by sequencing and slicing the expansion of rights associated to economic reform. This 
causes irritation among some observers because from a normative perspective, there is 
also a relatively clear structure of universality, interdependency and indivisibility of 
international human rights (Daniel 2010).  
To win the political battles in the context of liberalization, reformers have to 
persuade conservatives within the regime that their modernizations projects expand the 
rights of the elites and the general population while isolating and draining the potential 
appeal of the opposition.  This type of evolution frequently left a bad taste in the mouth 
                                                          
164A sophisticated but vitriolic locus for propaganda of the official narrative is the blog 
“La PupilaInsomne” of former chairman of the Cuban Institute of Publications, Iroel 




of foreign actors who tend to fall in love with heroic narratives about democratization and 
resistance.  
Globalization, with the cheapening of transportation and communication costs, 
implies an expansion of the exposure of Cuban government and society to international 
trends. Slowly but surely internet and the new digital age gain ground within the political 
and intellectual elites helping to internationalize them. This exposure to pressures and 
incentives from other international actors generates interactions that are social in nature. 
Foreign actors began to understand better the nature of the game while domestic ones 
align with the codes of communication and language of global communities. Actors’ 
identities and roles are modified by the information they share. By actors in this case I 
mean mainly the states with a corporate identity
165
 but also other elements within the 
state-society relations such as bureaucrats, social organizations, families, intellectuals, 
artists, diaspora communities, etc.  
In the opaque circumstances of partial reform, state identities as rivals, friends, 
enemies, trade partners or trade rivals, aid recipient, aid receiver or aid giver are shaky 
but substantial change happens when some stability is achieved. Cuban actors at the state-
                                                          
165This issue is well discussed by Alexander Wendt in the V Chapter of his “Social 





society levels and their partners in global society
166
 might acquire new roles, and reduce 
or expand old ones. The spectrum of Cuban interlocutors in international interactions is 
widened when political liberalization expands the access of Cuban economic, civil and 
political society to the international arena. Since the travel reform of October 2013, 
religious communities
167
, prominent artists and intellectuals, LGBT activists, feminists, 
anti-racism advocates, environmentalists and even opponents of the regime gained easier 
access to the international arena.  
Liberal IR theory shows how economic interactions favor issue-linkage and 
solution of international conflicts. Opening to foreign tourism and investment, and 
integration of state and non-state sectors in the economy widen the diversity of actors 
participating in bilateral and multilateral international links. Constructivist IR theory goes 
further by suggesting how trade and investment across borders trigger social interactions 
                                                          
166The discussion follows the distinction developed by the English School between 
international society centered on the relations between states and global society that 
includes non-state actors.  
 
167One of the civil society actors that gained international prominence has been the Cuban 
Roman Catholic Church (Dominguez 1989). In 1994 Cuba got its second Cardinal in 
history, Jaime Lucas Ortega. Ortega hosted the visits of two Popes and became a leading 
figure of the Catholic Church in Latin America. His policy of constructive engagement 
with the Cuban government has been applauded by most Latin American and European 
governments including those on the right. Simultaneously his promotion of a soft 
transition from post-totalitarianism to a more open society has been fiercely attacked by 
the Cuban-American right (Kirk 1989) and at times by the U.S. government under 
George W. Bush or by agencies of the government under President Barack Obama 




of interdependence, homogeneity, the creation of communities of common fate when 
facing common enemies (international crime, environmental disaster), and self-restrain 
(Wendt 1999) that have a potential to transform the identities, roles and interests of the 
actors. 
These process-variables proposed by Wendt are not necessarily the only ones but 
they help to explain changes in the micro and macro culture of the international system 
through the creation of new collective identities. The following chapters discuss the 
application of these process-variables of social change on Cuba’s foreign relations. The 
creation of communities of common fate and self-restraint are better specified in the 
analysis of specific bilateral relations.  
In the rest of this chapter I concentrate in the role of interdependence and 
homogeneity as social pressures that emerge from the micro culture of bilateral relations 
and the macro-level of international society as a whole. This introduction would state 
issues of interdependence and homogeneity pressures that are specified in the following 
three chapters about Cuba’s foreign policy grand strategy, strategic triangular relations 







5.2.1 Asymmetric Interdependence 
Economic reform and political liberalization increase the density of interactions 
between Cuban actors and foreign actors. These processes coincided with a rise of 
interdependence
168
after the end of the Cold War. During the decade of the 1990’s, 
interactions between Cuba and the rest of the international system became more complex. 
In addition to the diversification of Cuba’s foreign trade
169
, new issues of cooperation and 
                                                          
168The concept of complex interdependence in International Relations theory is associated 
to the work of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (Nye, Joseph & Keohane, Robert 2001). 
The idea is that states and societies are becoming tied together in their economic and 
political destinies creating non zero sum dynamics. Balance of power politics and 
military affairs remain relevant but their importance is decreasing on the face of a rise of 
multiple channels of interactions between the political communities, economies and 
societies of different countries. Keohane and Nye explained how complex 
interdependence creates different goals and balances of power in different issues. Nye 
developed this idea with the notion of three main interrelated balances of power in 
today’s world: Strategic, economic and a non-state related field characterized by power 
diffussion (Nye 2011). Complex interdependence have three main effects according to 
Keohane and Nye: a) it alters the possibilities of linkages between issues and also the 
linkage strategies of weak and powerful countries, b) it reinforces the role of agenda 
setting powers because of the lack of a clear hierarchy among multiple areas and actors, 
c) multiple transnational and trans-governmental interactions between different actors 
blurt the separation between international anddomestic politics, reducing the role of 
traditional foreign policy mechanisms and creating political coalition and communities 
across borders (Nye, Joseph & Keohane, Robert 2001, 29-37).  
 
169In the 1990’s Cuba diversified its foreign trade as it has never done before. Since the 
colonial times, Cuba has been heavily dependent on one market. During the Spanish 




new transnational, interstate and trans- governmental ties emerged.  There were also new 
actors such as companies, international banks, churches and non-governmental groups 
interested on the island, its business opportunities and the fate of its people.  
As liberal IR theory predicts the rise of nonmilitary agendas relax the centrality of 
state-to-state relations and the hierarchy of military security themes in states’ foreign 
policy. The end of Cuba’s alliance with the Soviet Union and the rise of foreign 
investment, tourism, and the easing of contacts with the Cuban Diaspora diminished the 
centrality of political military alliances and replaced it with economic cooperation and 
political dialogue agendas with most countries.  
This development didn’t pass unnoticed by the CCP and FAR elites that gradually 
expanded its presence in the new economy. The Armed Forces economic apparatus 
expanded to areas such as hotels management, marinas, passengers and tourists 
transportation, agriculture and industries with broad contact with the outside world. In 
addition Raul Castro transferred to civilian life mid and high level officers who became 
ministers, vice-ministers and directors in multiple areas of the economy and political life 
connected to foreign actors.   
                                                                                                                                                                             
colonial times, Cuba had a concentration on sugar and the U.S. market. After 1959 Cuba 
fall into another concentration in sugar and the Soviet Market. The 1990’s crisis forced 





Relations with the United States were the obvious exception because security 
logic remained dominant there. But even in this case, there was a higher interdependence 
because non-state social and economic interactions broadened. Two important new 
developments are: 1) the significant Cuban-American family travels and remittances to 
Cuba that has reached more than 400 000 visitors a year after a fall due to Bush 
administration restrictions between 2004 and 2009. 2) The food sales to Cuba under the 
opportunities opened under the 2000 Trade Sanctions Reform Act (TSRA). I discuss the 
two issues with more details in the reference of this chapter to the creation of 
communities of common fate and in the chapter dedicated to U.S-Cuba relations.  
In security terms, the United States did not acknowledge the full sovereignty of 
the Cuban state and the futility of a regime change policy until December 17 of 2014. 
Even after, the logic of regime change still dominates U.S. legal projection towards Cuba. 
Yet a new security agenda emerged pulling the two countries to cooperate in issues such 
as anti-narcotics interdiction, migration, anti-international crime operations, coordinated 
response to natural disasters or oils spills in the Gulf of Mexico.   
The fact that interdependence between Cuba and major international actors is 
asymmetric (Nye, Joseph & Keohane, Robert) explains the national security rationale that 
influences Cuba’s partial reform. Different degrees of sensitivity and vulnerability are 




vulnerability in policymaking depends heavily on the subjective definition of interests 
and roles. This is relevant in Cuba’s conflict with the United States and also in Cuba’s 
assessment of Washington’s leverage over Europe and Canada.  
Following the logic presented by Keohane and Nye (Nye, Joseph & Keohane, 
Robert 12-16) it is safe to say that openness to foreign investment, trade, tourism and 
other interactions increases Cuba’s “sensitivity” and “vulnerability”
170
 to foreign 
influences. Equally important interdependence gives Cuba some leverage on other 
countries because entrepreneurs, business groups, humanitarian agencies, government 
entities partners and others can become sensitive and vulnerable to Cuban influence. 
Travel and trade are critical components of liberal IR logics of interdependence since the 
two activities create opportunities for tit for tat behavioral tactics and issue linkage 
strategies to ease military or political conflict.  
The role of this international praxis is even higher according to constructivist 
views that see possibilities of imitation and complex social learning by the actors. Trade 
is also a distinctive identity issue for international society according to the English 
School. Hedley Bull (Bull 1977) highlighted trade between states as the central activity of 
a “Groatian” dynamic in opposition to war in a Hobbesian world or ideological 
                                                          
170Sensitivity measures the degree to which changes in the other actor affects one’s 
behavior. Vulnerability measures the cost of ending the relation with the other actor. 




transnational conflict in Kantian perspectives. As much as it is important to identify the 
absence of trade and travel between the two countries as a hostility reproduction 
mechanism, it is relevant to recognize how licensed travel and food sales introduce 
rapprochement in the bilateral links.  
In the constructivist view, interdependence affects not only the behavior but also 
the identities of the states. Here it is important the distinction between causal and 
constitutive effects
171
.  Although interdependence is rarely a causal variable of state 
identities, it helps to change perceptions and make possible complex social learning and 
cultural selection by imitation. A higher exposure to market economies, liberal 
democratic practices, or market oriented authoritarianism do not change Cuban political 
system but increases the probability that Cuban actors identify and imitate successful 
behavior in these respective social models of Europe, Canada, Russia or China. It also 
exposes them to legitimacy criteria and practices that challenges some of the Cuban 
government policies while validate others. Epistemic and professional communities in 
Cuba can identify themselves with the agendas and ethics of actors in other countries. 
                                                          
171An important distinction of constructivist methodology is the one between causal logic 
and constitutive logic. Interdependence is a variable that answer more questions of what 
or how-possible than why in the reform. A higher density of trade, or investments, or 
security cooperation between Cuba and other countries do not cause the reform or even 
the deepening of the reform process. It generally makes possible processes that led to a 




This development can widen Cuban elites’ policy frontiers by providing new knowledge 
and helping to create professional and political interests
172
.  
Higher interdependence based on cultural, economic, educational and academic 
exchanges help Cuba and other actors avoid misperception mistakes. This is particularly 
important in times of partial reform when contradictory information is common. These 
practices in the post-reform context are essentially different from what was typical for 
several decades between Cuba and the Communist bloc or currently between Cuba and 
Chavez’s Venezuela. Identities are not independent from roles, since practices socialize 
elites and states by habituating them to certain behaviors and norms. Just in terms of 
quantity, after 2013 the overwhelming majority of Cubans who travelled abroad did so 
not as part of an official delegation or task but organized by themselves. The extension of 
the limit to stay abroad for personal motives from eleven months to two years has opened 
doors for a rising number of Cubans to have a transnational life of work and study abroad 
including in the United States.  
                                                          
172Interdependence-generated-knowledge is not only technological or managerial but also 
social. Constructivists highlight how complex learning has constitutive effects on 
interests and identities in virtue of sharing knowledge between different actors.  Together 
with trade, investments, tourism, or conflicts; interdependence means the sharing of 
“speech acts” (discourses and narratives) with the rest of the world. Structures and agents 
are codetermined by their concrete interaction. Agents and structures, their identities and 
interests are reproduced and changed by the practices of their interactions. They are 




More cultural, educational and social exchanges make possible for the states and 
other actors to see themselves from the perspective of their interlocutors (alter-casting
173
). 
This shared knowledge in terms of perspective-taking does not mean that parties in 
conflict would align their solution preferences but it opens the possibility of conflict 
stabilization (to be discussed on the chapter on U.S.-Cuba relations) and ease the chances 
for acknowledgement for deference (AFD)
174
 dynamics. Second track exchanges can 
                                                          
173The idea of alter-casting as a policy to change the collective identity in a relation is 
based on the constructivist view that identities and interests are learned and reinforced by 
the way actors respond to each other. The principle is known as reflected appraisals or 
“mirroring”. When leaders decide to practice the policy of alter-casting, their state treat 
the other or others with an identity role associated to a new type of relations, and can 
express clearly its intentions. The significant other has the opportunity to reciprocate by 
casting itself in a new role-identity in agreement or not to the proposed new relation. 
Since the practices of alter and ego frame the relations, a new collective identity might 
appear and sustained. A classic example of altercasting policy in IR was Gorbachev’s 
policy towards Reagan at the end of the Cold War.   
 
174Developing the paradigm of acknowledgement for deference (AFD) as probable 
solution between an strong power and weaker state in its neighborhood, Brantly Womack 
pointed out how realist premise that “relative power decides all” contradicts multiple 
practices of diplomacy. In Womack’ view, hierarchies are negotiated, “structured by 
interaction and power” (Womack, China Among Unequals Asymmetric Foreign 
Relations in Asia 2010, 29). Interdependence between states is a fundamental process to 
understand how situations in which “the strong is more resourceful but less committed to 
bringing about [a] specific outcome in the bilateral relationship, while the weak is more 
vulnerable and therefore more alert to threat and committed to survival” (Womack, China 
Among Unequals Asymmetric Foreign Relations in Asia 2010, 384), there is a possibility 
of stabilization around a solution in which the strong acknowledge the sovereignty of the 






provide policymakers and diplomats with inside information and themes that are decisive 
for diplomacy.  Alter-casting might help to break partial reform equilibria by announcing 
new roles with expectations to be reciprocated.  
Since the 1990’s Cuba and Latin American countries cooperated in a process of 
“de-roguing”
175
(Onderco 2014).  In nuclear nonproliferation, Havana accomplished its 
goals with clear Latin American support but in other areas, it faced U.S. intransigence 
and maximalist behaviors sustained by a mixture of American domestic politics and 
institutional foreign policy inertia. The classic case is Havana’s presence on the list of 
Terrorism Sponsoring Nations of the State Department. Havana engaged in significant 
speech acts and practices to transmit an interest on seeing itself removed from the list but 
Washington did not reciprocate until it decided to restore diplomatic relations.  
FAR high command and the CCP leadership are conscious of the challenges that 
interdependence means for the one party system they promote. That explains the 
expressed preferences for China, Russia, and Venezuela not only because of homogeneity 
but also due to cautious perceptions about Europe and Canada. The Cuban official 
                                                          
175Onderco defines “de-roguing” of states as the strategic and purposeful process to 
reverse the rogue status. Onderco proposed a model of two phases of reintegration of the 
rogue state to the international community. Based on criminology literature, he presents 
Gadhafi’s Libya case using the term of “parolee” after the North African country gave up 
its weapons of mass destruction program and cooperate with solution of some terrorist 
actions cases in which Tripoli was presumably involved. “De-roguing” could be 




coverage of Europe-United States relations for instance, frequently presents Europe 
subordinated to U.S. power in policies towards Russia and the Middle East. From this 
reading there is a natural deduction: if in the case of Russia, a great power and main 
supplier of energy, Europe reacts as a follower of U.S. leadership, in the case of Cuba, 
one must not expect anything less than subordination to U.S. mandates if a crisis were to 
happen.  
This view of the world led Cuban elites to assume a cautious policy towards 
Europe and Canada from the premise that these two actors would end kowtowing to the 
United States if conflict arisen. Here there elements of self-fulfilling prophecy because 
Cuba’s premises reinforce its caution and logic of partial reform.When Europe and 
Canada receive mixed signals of lack of commitment to marketization and liberalization, 
in turn, they adopt their own caution and do not embark on a course of support for Cuba’s 
marketization and political liberalization that might create undesired conflicts with 
Washington even if there is a critical view about the U.S. embargo. That way Cuba 
confirms the original premises it helped to reproduce.  
But this specific culture does not prevent the possibility that Cuba and its foreign 
interlocutors manage their differences and create a positive cycle altering their behavior 
in a tit for tat or in a conscious effort to insulate their relations from a downward spiral. 
Cooperation creates dynamics of absolute gains for all sides or even relative gains for 




In the case of Cuba, accommodation by great powers to its legitimate demands might 





As in all revolutionary states, post 1959 Cuba’s foreign policy combines the 
duality of support for revolution abroad and diplomatic relations with other states. In his 
study of revolution in world politics Fred Halliday warned against the simplicity of 
seeing the adoption of a diplomatic-nationalistic approach as an abandonment of the 
internationalist revolutionary impulse.  
The record is not one of movement from internationalist conflict to diplomatic 
and/or strategic accommodation: rather it is of the maintenance- with shifting 
emphases- of both, of a dual commitment that it is of the overriding antinomy of 
the foreign policy of revolutionary states (Halliday, Revolution and World 
Politics: The Rise of the Sixth Great Power 1999, 134).  
                                                          
176This discussion about homogeneity pressures and its constitutive impact on the Cuban 
state follows Fred Halliday’s analysis of “International Society as homogeneity” 
(Halliday, International society as homogeneity: Burke, Marx Fukuyama 1994). 
Presenting the concept, Halliday built on the works of three thinkers of different 
orientation, Edmund Burke, Karl Marx and Francis Fukuyama. Homogeneity in 
international society “denotes a set of norms shared by different societies and which are 
promoted by inter-state competition. This is based neither on inter-state nor on 
transnational models but on the assumption of inter-societal and inter-state homology”…. 
…Briefly, this approach investigates how, as a result of international pressures, states are 
compelled more and more to conform to each other in their internal arrangements. Unlike 
the realist concept, ‘homogeneity’ pays considerable attention to what happens within 
states and societies, and examines the interaction of international activity with domestic 
legitimacy and stability” (Halliday, International society as homogeneity: Burke, Marx 




Halliday explained, in a sharp interpretation of Edmund Burke’s insight about the 
French revolution, how the root cause of the conflict between revolutionary states and the 
international status quo is not their revolutionary foreign policy but its internal order. 
Based on several case studies (Russia, France, Cuba, Iran, China, etc), Halliday  
criticized the simplicity of some international relations literature that see foreign policy 
accommodation of revolutionary states as associated with the “socialization” or “taming” 
of revolutions and marking the end of revolutionary impact. In contrast, he showed 
substantive evidence that “irrespective of what the conscious diplomatic priorities of the 
revolutionary regime may be, the ideas it generated, and the example it sets, continue to 
encourage people in other states” (Halliday, Revolution and World Politics: The Rise of 
the Sixth Great Power 1999, 139).  
 The conflict between revolutionary states and status quo powers arises from the 
heterogeneity of political, social and economic systems brought by revolutionary. Foreign 
relations are not a mechanic replication of this heterogeneity but the contradiction 
between antagonistic systems of political organization causes a state of conflict.  “….the 
central question is not whether the revolutionary state is “socialized” in its external 
relations, but whether in the longer run the pressures of the external context lead not just 
to changes in foreign policy but also to an internal change, whereby the commitment to 
an alternative path of social development is abandoned” (Halliday, Revolution and World 




is not terminated domestically, there are going to be pressures for homogeneity regardless 
of the foreign policy accommodation that Cuba can make.  
The relations between Cuba’s foreign strategy and the policies of the status quo 
powers towards Cuba is better understood as a confrontation between the structural quest 
for homogeneity and the revolutionary identity as a vindication of an international 
heterogeneity. A leadership in Havana might have reasons to accommodate its actions to 
the dominance of market forces in the international system but this does not prevent Cuba 
from taking advantages of changes in the international system that served its 
internationalist revolutionary impulse. Broadening the opening to foreign investment in 
Cuba is an accommodation step that can occur together with an internationalist 
revolutionary support for the leftist processes in Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia. 
 The pressure for political and socioeconomic homogeneity is structural to the 
international system while the internationalist impulse of Cuba’s foreign policy is 
structural to its communist regime. The two forces interact and depending on junctures, 
strategies, asymmetries of power and attention, one or the other prevails. International 
order’s pressures for homogeneity of market economies and liberal democracy impact a 
Cuba interested on integration with the world economy. Cuba’s domestic politics and 
foreign policy feel this impact. In some areas, where the asymmetry of attention in its 




impulse expands the margins and capacity of revolutionary allies in the international 
balance of power.   
The period of economic reform and political liberalization has been accompanied 
by a reaffirmation of revolutionary internationalist projection in three particular areas
177
: 
1) the relationship with the Inter-American system in which president Raul Castro 
expressed interests in improving relations with Washington but reiterating that nothing 
about Cuba’s sovereignty is negotiable and Cuba doesn’t have any interests on returning 
to the OAS, an organization that Havana insists on describing as dominated by the United 
States, 2) the unrestricted support for Hugo Chavez’s internationalist revolutionary 
projection in the Americas and other areas of the world, 3) the priority of ALBA as an 
alternative form of integration to market driven mechanisms in the Americas under the 
leadership of the United States (NAFTA, CAFTA-DR), or Brazil (MERCOSUR).  
 
 
                                                          
177In addition to these three areas, in 2013 Cuba got involved in an incident with a North 
Korean Cargo ship that was carrying Cuban weapons in violation of the U.N. sanctions 
against the Pyongyang regime. This incident was highlighted in the United States by 
fierce opponents of any improvement of relations between the U.S. and Cuba. In the end 
a U.N report criticized Cuba but the U.N. Security Council did not impose any significant 





As a trend, Cuba’s economic reform and political liberalization increases 
homogeneity between Cuba and its regional context. Constructivist IR theory look at 
homogeneity as a cause of collective identity formation and reduction of conflicts
178
. 
Cuba’s transition to a market economy even with a heavy state intervention make the 
Cuban state and economic system more isomorphic with other states, in line with market 
economy principles and some aspects of the political order such as right to travel, 
freedom of religion, right to own private property, and some aspects of rule by law. 
Another important element of homogeneity refers to Cuban foreign policy itself. Cuba’s 
international projection is becoming also more “national” or nationalistic, framing its 
                                                          
178Fred Halliday explained “the counterposing of heterogeneity and homogeneity in 
international relations”. His work is quoted by Alexander Wendt. The realist argument 
for heterogeneity is that differences between states internally are not a source of conflict 
internationally. Homogeneity is a liberal argument enhanced by the English School and 
the structural constructivists. The idea is thatheterogeneity of domestic orders do not 
prevent cooperation but it makes it more difficult. Halliday quoted Raymond Aron’s 
work about the Cold War attributing to the different domestic systems’ attitudes to 
markets (capitalism and communism) the root of this international conflict (Halliday, 
International society as homogeneity: Burke, Marx Fukuyama 1994). Here I build on this 
premise to argue that Cuba’s transition to a market economy reduces conflict with other 
international actors with similar economic systems. Equally important, the partiality of 
Cuba’s economic reform and its decision to remain a one party system and preserve 
important elements of its revolutionary counter-hegemonic identity remain a source of an 
ideological conflict with countries more amicable to U.S. led liberal hegemony. This 
conflict motivates international relations to contribute as constitutive factors to domestic 
change. Daniel C. Thomas in “The Helsinki Effect” provided important evidences about 
the role of international norms of human rights as criteria of legitimacy as a constitutive 
factor of domestic change in the countries of the European Cold War system (Thomas 
2001). Thomas analyzed how the “Helsinki effect” highlighted incompatibilities between 




internationalist solidarity impulse in ways that are compatible with accepted views of 
sovereignty, statehood, national security and non-interference.  
There are three parallel process of homogenization at the international level to 
consider in the discussion about Cuba today: 1) the intellectual and political consensus 
about the importance of markets for achieving development and prosperity, 2) the 
growing support for liberal democracy and human rights as criteria of legitimacy in the 
international system. Although the endorsement of liberal democracy and human rights is 
less than the one of market economics, there is critical support for these criteria by states, 
international organizations and non-state actors. 3) At the Americas regional level, there 
is a convergence between Cuba’s move to a mixed market economy and Latin America’s 
rejection of its own neoliberal experience. Traditional friends of Socialist Cuba in Latin 
America, leftist parties won elections and promoted a social equality and anti-poverty 
agenda within the framework of capitalism and without been dislodged from power by 
non-democratic veto players mainly the military as it was the case in the past. For the 
first time in Cuban post-revolutionary history two of Cuba’s main external allies are in 
the Western hemisphere (Venezuela and Brazil) and its main political alliance, the Latin 




There is also a dynamic relationship between foreign policy and revolutionary 
cycle
179
 that pushed Cuba in the direction of higher homogeneity: The rise of nationalism 
vis-à-vis the internationalist impulse
180
 within the organizing hierarchy of Cuba’s foreign 
                                                          
179There are several studies that discussed revolutions in the framework of a historical 
cycle in which nationalism and internationalism are interconnected. The concept of 
internationalism refers to revolutionary cosmopolitanism, a vision of the world as 
becoming more transnational and unified by political and economic processes of 
internationalization. Revolutionary cosmopolitanism, internationalism, see ideological 
and political alliances among revolutionaries transcending national boundaries in the 
struggle for the realization of human progress. This progressivism places 
revolutionarycosmopolitanism as a creature of humanistic enlightenment. For a vision of 
the revolutionary cycle see “Anatomy of Revolution by Crane Briton (Brinton 1965). The 
internationalist vein of revolutionaries is easy to follow through their works, speeches 
and pamphlets from John Milton, to Robespierre, to Lenin, to Mao, Fidel Castro and Che 
Guevara, and Khomeini.  
 
180There is no space in this dissertation to discuss in depth the internationalist impulse in 
Revolution and particularly in Marxism. The double character of the Cuban revolution 
(nationalist and communist) poses important dilemmas to Cuban foreign policy from the 
beginning. In terms of ideology, communism as presented by Marx, Lenin, Rosa 
Luxembourg, Trotsky and others was essentially an internationalist movement. Marx 
even said that proletariats are a force for progress, among other reasons, because they 
don’t have country. The conflict between nationalism and internationalism is at the root 
of the rupture of the II International between parties that supported the budget for war in 
1914 at their national parliament and those who followed Lenin and declared their loyalty 
to the international proletariat as a whole. Later, Lenin explained communist support for 
nationalist revolution in China and the Orient because it would contribute to bring 
communist revolution to the capitalist centers of power and to eliminate national 
oppression. The revolutionary internationalist impulse had represented in almost every 
case (The United States, France, Russia, China, Vietnam, Cuba, Nicaragua, Angola, etc.) 
a challenge to established nationalist ideas of sovereignty, statehood, security and non-
interference. This is well explained by Fred Halliday (Halliday, Revolution and World 




policy. This is not an exceptional Cuban characteristic but part of the well identified 
pattern of revolutionary foreign policy trajectories. Fred Halliday has explained:  
…revolutions, when they come to power, put into practice their range of 
‘internationalist policies’, proclamation of peace to the world, support for kindred 
movements abroad, provisions of citizenship to foreign nationals, sympathetic to 
the revolution, announcement of the brotherhood and common interests of 
humanity. Going beyond this, revolutionary states see practical support for other 
revolutionaries as the appropriate implementation of their internationalist 
commitment. Over time, however, it becomes clear that this simple approach of 
internationalist solidarity does not produce the consequences anticipated, ant the 
policy of the revolutionary regime becomes more ‘national’ in character, as much 
in theory and practice (Halliday, Revolution and World Politics: The Rise of the 
Sixth Great Power 1999). 
 
          The resilience of Cuban internationalism has been remarkable but it cannot avoid 
the preponderance of structure over agency described above.  
There is a distance between homogeneity as an objective reality and the subjective 
categorization of it. This is particularly important in Cuba’s partial reform situation 
because government elites might present homogenization with international standard 
practices as a tactical move to weather periods of crisis. The logic of partial reform 
implies at time the reaffirmation by Cuban authorities of conflictual characteristics in 
clash with the homogenizing capitalist liberal order, the one party system is the more 
salient. Discourse here it is very relevant because it transmits signals about intentions to 
other actors but practices and unintended dynamics are the decisive factors because they 




Fidel Castro presented his revolution always as part of an international cause. On 
the one hand he emphasized the ordinal principle of sovereignty against U.S. interference 
on Cuban internal affairs. On the other hand he did not apologize for training and arming 
revolutionary groups that tried to overthrow U.S. allies in the Western hemisphere, 
Africa, and the Middle East. In this double attitude towards sovereignty the Cuban 
revolution expressed its counter-hegemonic posture in the international system.  
The central axis of conflict was ideological, national borders could not block the 
Cuban revolution. It was an international event, in both its causes and consequences and a 
challenge to the set of values about what was desirable in Latin America domestically 
and internationally. The revolutionary government, harassed by a policy of isolation from 
the hemisphere with the exception of Mexico and the Caribbean, did not hesitate to 
complement its alliance with the Communist bloc with support to radical groups that 
challenged the same governments that were cooperating with the hostile policy of the 
hegemon. But the conflict was not mainly of national security, it was about the role of 
markets and public sectors in the economy, foreign investment, rule of law, liberal 
democracy, sovereignty, individual liberty and economic equality, among other concepts.   
In the case of Cuba’s reform, homogeneity is promoted because: 1) Different 
from the old soviet model of command economy, the variant of market socialism that 






. 2) The synchronization of the norms to solve conflicts between a 
market oriented Cuba and market economies in other countries become easier than in the 
old command economy in which party arbitrariness and rejection of private property and 
market competition was the ideological norm. 3) Economic reform and political 
liberalization require a foreign policy based on peaceful dialogue and understanding with 
countries of the capitalist world. To attract foreign investment, development aid or find 
markets for its products Cuba needs to contemporize its discourse with other states, 
ameliorating conflicts. This reality forces Cuba to practice its principle of internationalist 
solidarity in ways compatible with the liberal international order.  
To paraphrase a title of Jorge Dominguez’s book, Cuba’s foreign policy 
transitioned from seeking “a world safe for revolution” to promote a world safe for the 
Cuban revolution”. The movement towards higher homogeneity is expressed in changes 
of institutional ties with other countries but mainly in values and ideology. The supreme 
moral value of Cuba’s revolutionary foreign policy in the 1960’s was solidarity. This 
principle was predicated as a question of identity, a response to the international character 
of what was presented as capitalist oppression. Cuba supplied and demanded solidarity. 
The highest moment of demanded solidarity was the Cuban missile Crisis. Fidel Castro 
                                                          
181This means creating a variant of Cuban nationalism and communism compatible, in 
conformity with attracting foreign investment, developing market institutions such as a 
minimum of rule of law, and ties of cooperative nature between the private sector, the 




asked the Soviet Union to sacrifice everything for the defense of Cuban revolution while 
offering the island as a base and first target in a nuclear war just to shift the arms balance 
in favor of the communist bloc.   
Solidarity with revolutionary and leftist movement was also the prevailing motive 
in Cuba’s regional strategy during the 1960’s. The Second Declaration of Havana read as 
a speech by Fidel Castro in February 4, 1962 synthesized his response to the expulsion of 
the Cuban revolutionary government from the OAS in a policy known as defense 
revolucionariaactiva (Active Revolutionary Defense). In fact it was a policy of active 
revolutionary offensive around two premises: a) Cuba’s destiny was connected to the 
destiny of Latin America because the revolution in the island was not secure as long as 
the United States has the support of almost every government in the region against Cuba, 
b) in consequence, Cuba’s goal was to make revolution in Latin America.  
The duty of every revolutionary is to make the revolution.-Fidel Castro said- It is 
known that the revolution will triumph in America and throughout the world, but 
it is not for revolutionaries to sit in the doorways of their houses waiting for the 
corpse of imperialism to pass by. The role of Job doesn’t fit a revolutionary…. 
No nation in Latin America is weak- because each forms part of a family of 200 
million brothers, who suffer the same miseries, who harbor the same sentiments, 
who have the same energy, who dream about the same better future and who 
count upon the solidarity of all honest men and women throughout the world.  
Great as was the epic of Latin American Independence, heroic as was that 
struggle, today’s generation of Latin Americans is called up to engage in an epic 
which is even greater and more decisive for humanity” (Castro, The Duty of a 
Revolutionary is To Make the Revolution: The Second Declaration of Havana 





These ideas of internationalist solidarity were inscribed on many Cuban official 
documents. In 1976, the first post-revolutionary constitution proclaimed “proletarian 
internationalism” and solidarity with peoples’ liberation as principles of Cuban foreign 
policy in Article 12. This foreign policy projection reflected on five institutions within 
the Cuban party-state created with the goal of abetting revolution in the continent: a) in 
the cultural arena, Casa de las Americas (House of the Americas), a cultural center to 
promote Latin American art and literature, including revolutionary ideological essays, 
poetry, music, etc; b) in the public diplomacy arena, Prensa Latina, a press agency with 
the intention to report and analyze news from a revolutionary perspective; c) in the direct 
promotion and support of revolutionary movements, the National Liberation 
Department of the Ministry of Interior
182
, later transferred to the Central Committee of 
                                                          
182The central figure in the National Liberation Department was Commander Manuel 
Pineiro, known as “Redbeard”. Pineiro had fought with Raul Castro in the Oriental 
Second Front. He was the leader of Liberation and later the Americas Department for 
almost twenty five years. His life expressed the institutional trajectory in Cuba’s support 
for revolution. The National Liberation Department was originally an intelligence agency 
in support of revolutionary movements within the Ministry of Interior. In 1974-75 Pineiro 
was transferred to the Central Committee of the CCP as chief of the then recently created 
Americas Department.  The department became more a CCP political liaison with 
homologues from the region to support revolutionary movement and solidarity with the 
Cuban revolution. It responded to the need to accommodate the reality of governments in 
Latin America that established diplomatic relations with the Cuban government. Cuba did 
not engage in activities to support guerrillas or armed groups against these authorities. In 
1993, the Department ceased to exist and became an “area” of a general department of 
international relations of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party. In 2010, 




the CCP as Americas Department, in charge of training revolutionaries from other 
countries or provide them safe haven, medical treatment or general education; d) two 
organizations of solidarity, agitation and propaganda and coordination of political support 
all over the world for revolutionary movement: OLAS (Latin American Solidarity 
Organization) and OSPAAAL (The organization for solidarity with the peoples of 
Africa, Asia and Latin America). Both OLAS and OSPAAL celebrated conferences in 
Havana to coordinate and mobilize revolutionary support.  
Fred Halliday accurately described Cuba’s internationalist commitment as 
“designed to augment Cuba’s independence vis-à-vis both the United States and the 
USSR”. Halliday explained that the Cuba’s record of more than thirty years of 
commitment, from 1962 to 1992, ranks as one of the most extraordinary and sustained 
engagements by any state to the export of revolution.  
Cuba not only inspired radicals in much of the world, well beyond Latin and 
North America but amidst pressure from Washington and Moscow alike, it 
exerted itself to match that verbal, ideological commitment with actions, in the 
form of assistance and, in some cases, troops. Yet not more than other states 
Cuba was unable, in asserting this engagement, to abstract itself from the 
constraints of the international system, and of the links between that system 
and its own internal development. In the first place, the internationalist 
commitment of Cuba was a product above all of the difficulties to which the 
Cuban state was subjected: the launching of armed struggles in Latin America in 
1962 was a response to the attempted U.S invasion of 1961. The sustained US 
blockade and political support for the Miami-based opposition provided a lasting 
motive for solidarity with those opposed to the USA elsewhere” (Halliday, 





The pressures for homogeneity at the end of the Cold War forced upon Fidel 
Castro and his followers an accommodation of Cuba’s revolutionary identity to forms 
more compatible with the liberal international order. For decades, Cuba’s most prominent 
missionary role in international affairs was played by soldiers in Africa or guerrillas in 
Latin America. After the 1990’s this role was fundamentally played by doctors, nurses 
and teachers. The new “army” still provides Cuba with significant influence and prestige 
in the third world but this “soft power” is perfectly compatible with a liberal world order, 
including a U.S. led regional or global order.  
The transition from the prevalence of the internationalist impulse to a more 
nationalist centered policy appeared more as forced upon Fidel Castro by the post-Cold 
War realities than a decision to moderate. In “Cuba: Back from the Future”, Susan 
Eckstein (Eckstein 2003)dedicated a well-documented chapter “Internationalism” to 
explain how Fidel Castro appealed to the importance  of Cuba’s survival for the 
international revolutionary movement to justify a change of focus to domestic issues and 
a reduction of its internationalist solidarity. As Eckstein demonstrated there was not more 
political or economic space to sustain the domestic costs of Cuba’s internationalism 
without risking political stability and survival at home or abroad (Eckstein 2003, 171-




The reduction on Cuban military involvement overseas was the result of a 
necessity. The tensions between the internationalist impulse and the nationalist drive to 
reform and liberalization persist. But necessities shape interests, interests shape roles, and 
roles make identities Capitalist international homogenization have generated a Cuba in 
which the ideas of a market economy are not anathema anymore. Cuban state’s interests 
in domestic stability generated a need for interdependence with a world in which 
capitalism is dominant with functions and roles that are incompatible with the classical 
command economy and revolutionary communist state.  
In a 1992 meeting with American, Russian and Cuban experts and veterans of the 
1962 Missile Crisis, Fidel Castro vindicated Cuba’s revolutionary character but 
emphasized that although wishing social change in Latin America, his government was 
not on the task of overthrowing governments anymore. In a direct message to the 
American political class in an electoral year, Castro said to American historian and 
President Kennedy’s advisor Arthur Schlesinger Jr.:  
If you ask me if we still support revolution in Latin America, if that is Cuba’s 
policy today, I tell you, ‘no’…. Have we changed? Yes, we are more mature, 
more realistic. We have learned from experience. We have changed. Latin 
America has changed. The world has changed. The calm in Latin America 
today…is deceptive. The relative stability will not last. Deep social problems 
remain. But “if those countries become destabilized, we are not going to promote 
the destabilization. We are not going to take advantage of the objective conditions 
to promote anything. That is a policy of a different era…We wanted revolutionary 
change. We still do. This doesn’t mean that we are going to help anybody to do it 





In August 24, 1993, while Latin America celebrated Simon Bolivar’s birthday, 
Fidel Castro addressed the Foro of Sao Paulo, an international coalition of socialist and 
revolutionary movements in Latin America that includes from the Workers Party of 
Brazil to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Castro reiterated his 
message about Cuba’s peaceful adaptation to the post-Cold War world. He said, “As 
someone who participated in, advocated and supported armed revolutionary movements 
something I would not repent, I must advice you clearly against it. It is not the most 
promising path in the current circumstances” (Arreola 2010). From been a supporter of 
the guerrillas, Castro changed to criticize the FARC for its kidnappings of politicians and 
civilians. Today, Cuba is playing together with Norway, a U.S. NATO ally the role of 
mediator in the Colombian civil war promoting the demobilization of the FARC and ELN 
guerrillas.  
Homogeneity as a trend also creates virtuous cycle by expanding positive 
responses to changes in Cuba by other states and vice versa. In most countries, the 
changes in Cuba have led to a review of Cuba’s image in their foreign policy 
establishment. Most diplomatic missions and foreign press correspondents in Havana 
began to report Cuba as a country in transition, not a threat to the international order. As 




the international order with the revolutionary state immersed in the process of 
accommodating at least to the economic principles of the liberal order.  
These visions of Cuba as a country in transition tend to update the debate about 
the scope and reach of Cuban changes. Rather than discussing whether Cuba is in a 
process of economic reform, the policy discussion becomes how to contribute to it. The 
new discussion assumes sympathies for Cuba’s marketization and adoption of policies 
and norms more compatible with the rest of Latin America. Rather than scoring 
ideological points about capitalism or communism, the governments of other countries 
and Cuba find a common ground and language about foreign investment, anti-narcotics 
interdiction, health and education programs, tourism and other potential areas of 
cooperation. All of this settled in a background of homogenization that clashed daily with 









Chapter Six: Cuba’s foreign policy strategic adaptation to the Post-Cold War 
world: Changes in identity and interests 
6.1 Introduction 
Cuba’s foreign policy strategic adaptation
183
 to the post-Cold War world included 
several processes associated to the structural changes
184
 in the international system but 
also the agency shown by the Cuban government in filtering, organizing, and prioritizing 
the perceived signals
185
 and responding to the new realities. From a constructivist 
perspective, the central question is to what extent changes in the international system and 
                                                          
183By foreign policy strategic adaptation I understand two main processes: 1) the 
constructivist one that implied the rebalance of old identities and the emergence of new 
ones as result of a change in the culture of the international system. 2) The rationalist one 
that implied a new calculation of benefits, costs and risks of actions according to the new 
realities.  
 
184In a constructivist approach, the analysis looks at the structures of international 
relations as primarily cultural. 
 
185Two central features of Fidel Castro’s perception about the collapse of state socialism 
in Europe were its temporal and geographically located characters. Fidel Castro and 
Cuban foreign policy makers such as Raul Castro, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and Carlos 
Aldana specified in their speeches the survival of China and Vietnam as authentic 
communist revolutions that remained vigorous. Fidel Castro also emphasized the 
“inevitable” of a new socialist revival as a necessity to save the world from capitalist 
excesses and contradictions. The respond to this diagnostics was one of survival and 
weathering the temporal storm while preserving Cuba’s socialist achievements and not 
less important, its communist revolutionary identity. Foreign policy would be a costly but 




Cuba’s foreign relations shape the island nation’s new roles, interests and identities. From 
a rationalist point of view, the puzzle is to identify strategies of adaptation that measure 
the agency of the new Cuban state, post economic reform and political liberalization for 
responding to a new balance in the costs, benefits, and risks of its actions.   
The discussion of these two dimensions of Cuba’s foreign policy adaptations 
intermingles in the following four topics: 
- The legacy of the Cold War as processed by Cuban foreign policy elite in the 
redesign of its new roles, interests and functions within the international system.  
- The transition of Cuban policy towards U.S. allies from the revolutionary 
formula of peaceful coexistence to the concept of respect for ideological pluralism among 
states, more in line with the needs of economic reform and integration to the world 
economy.  
- The reaffirmation of revolutionary identities and connections to leftist 
movements. 
- The strategies of adaptation to the new balance of power and normative 





It is a well known fact that the foreign policy of Cuba, a small country in size, 
population, economy and military power, allied to the loser side of the Cold War was 
heavily hit by the end of the Cold War. No area of Cuba’s foreign policy exists in 
disassociation with the challenge of management of the asymmetric relations Havana has 
with Washington. In its most direct consequence for Cuba, the collapse of the Soviet 
Union led to a structurally higher exposure and vulnerability in its conflict of sovereignty 
with the most powerful nation in the world, the United States. In another less tangible but 
not less important change, the culture of global society changed from bipolar conflict to 
globalization with generally new criteria of international legitimacy, including the 
prevalence of paradigms
186
 of liberal democracy and market economics that have existed 
in synchrony with a U.S. led liberal world order.   
These two different factors (1) the living legacy of conflict between Cuba and the 
United States increased by the Cold War, and 2) the ordinal legitimacy principles of the 
new post-Cold War order; market economics and representative democracy) are 
particularly relevant for Cuba because the survival of the current government was 
explained by many, including Cuban protagonists as Fidel and Raul Castro, as an 
outcome of the Cold War system of ideological alliances. In terms of Cuban foreign 
                                                          
186Here I am discussing the issue of conflict of paradigms. It is clear that United States 
foreign policy deviates from these paradigms in frequent cases of hegemonic paradoxes 
in which the hegemon undermines its own normative power by acting in an ad hoc erratic 




policy, the new perception of vulnerability and the emerging legitimacy paradigms of 
global society were filtered by the perceptions of Cuban leaders and their constituencies, 
in front of who Cuban political elites attempt to legitimate their policy. 
During the Cold War, the CCP regime defined itself as socialist and part of the 
third world, two concepts that were defined in relation to the Communist bloc created 
around the leadership of the Soviet Union and its dispute for global hegemony with the 
U.S. led Western camp. The identity as a non-aligned country (third world) is a reference 
to the importance of development in Cuba’s foreign policy towards the North-South 
agenda. Geographically, Cuba defined itself as a Latin American and Caribbean country, 
in opposition to the Inter-American system that emphasizes a pan-American identity that 
includes the United States and Canada. The command economy and the one-party-system 
were inextricably part of the agenda of asymmetric resistance versus the United States 
imperial policy of embargo/blockade.  
The central organizing principle of Cuba’s foreign policy is the promotion of the 
national interest, if for no other reason, because most policymakers formulate their 
options and programs appealing to this concept. This concept, as JuttaWeldes explained, 
is a social construction: 
Before state officials can act for the state, they need to engage in a process of 
interpretation in order to understand both what situation the state faces and how 
they should respond to it. This process of interpretation, in turn, presupposes a 
language shared, at least, by those state officials involved in determining state 
action and by the audience for whom state action must be legitimated. This shared 




produced in, or emerged out of, a process of representation, through which state 
officials (among others) make sense of their international context. The national 
interest, that is, is constructed, is created as a meaningful object, out of shared 
meanings through which the world, particularly the international system and the 
place of the state in it, is understood (Weldes 1996).  
 
Due to the preponderance of the asymmetric conflict with the United States, 
Cuba’s foreign policy organized around the centrality of this existential threat to the CCP 
regime. The asymmetry of U.S.-Cuba relations affects Cuba’s position in the world-
system for two reasons:  
1) The links with the U.S state-society complex
187
 is far more important for the 
majority of Cuban actors than for their interlocutors in the United States. This asymmetry 
gap is sharper in the key areas of security and economic exchanges but it extends to other 
dimensions such as persuasion capabilities (soft power).  
2) Given the centrality of the U.S. in the post-Cold War international system as 
the sole superpower, the relations with the United States are preeminent for the majority 
of the international actors and have a higher place in their foreign policy priorities than its 
relations with Cuba.  
                                                          
187In a seminal article, Robert Cox proposed to consider the state/society complex “as the 
basic entity of international relations” (Cox 1986). “Traditional international relations 
theory- Cox wrote- maintains the distinctiveness of the two spheres, with foreign policy 
appearing as the pure expression of state interests. Today however, state and civil society 
are so interpenetrated that the concepts have become almost purely analytical (referring 
to difficult to define aspects of a complex reality) and are only vaguely and imprecisely 




The importance of the United States in the international system  (Cuba-MINREX 
2014) and American maximalist habits  (Sestanovich Spring 2005), generate significant 
spillover effects from the U.S. conflict with Cuba on Havana’s relations with third 
countries. Generally speaking the primary focus of action of Cuba’s relations with third 
countries is bilateral. But at critical junctures in which the burden of a conflict with the 
United States foreign policy and judicial system (legal extraterritoriality of the embargo) 
not only shape but determine the policy of a third country
188
 towards Cuba.  
The calibration of Cuban diplomacy takes place in a post-Cold War world in 
which the principles of market economy and representative democracy become 
paradigmatically dominant
189
. These paradigms are promoted by a concert of great 
                                                          
188There is a dismissive attitude towards the role of Cuba’s asymmetric conflict with the 
United States in strategic triangles and multilateral diplomacy by assuming that the 
effects of American pressures were only effective in the case of small states but that is 
simply not true. The combination of American attitudes towards Cuba and power have 
proven to be an important dissuasive against a coherent foreign policy action by great 
powers such as France and Germany. Multibillion dollars fines have been imposed to 
banks such as the German Commerzbank and French BNP Paribas for violating not an 
international law, a European law or a French or German law, but only an American law, 
the Helms-Burton law, officially condemned by the diplomacy of the two countries. In 
front of such violation of their sovereignties, the French and German state opted for not 
entering into a clash with the United States because of Cuba. The banks entered into a 
bargain process and negotiated the payment of fines that they declared abusive and 
illegal.  
 
189The political systems of several countries were only liberal in name and their 
deterioration led to the emergence of populist and other alternatives by the end of the 




powers and were adopted by all the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean with 
the exception of Cuba in the 1990’s. In this line the changes in the balance of power 
operates not as a mere material distribution of capabilities but as transformation in the 
institutions and cultural structure of relations
190
. Five fundamental dimensions arise as 
result of these interactions between the Cuban state-society complex and other national 
contexts:  
1) The addition of new roles, identities and interests to the Cuban state, as result 
of the interaction between Cuba’s processes of economic reform and political 
liberalization and the hemispheric economic and political regimes,  
2) The participation of new actors in the social construction of Cuba’s national 
interest given the risen social, cultural and economic pluralism of Cuban society and 
state. Marketization and political liberalization creates a less vertical relation between the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
introduced reservations to the consensus about support for representative democracy, 
arguing that such system requires to be complemented by participatory and social-
economic dimensions. By the mid-2000’s, leaders of the left in the hemisphere took a 
“flexible” approach to the democratic governance norm and some like presidents Chavez 
of Venezuela, Ortega of Nicaragua, Correa of Ecuador, and Morales of Bolivia even 
talked about the Cuban “one party democracy” and elections as a legitimate variant of 
political legitimacy given the island-nation circumstances. 
190Stefano Guzzini has demonstrated the impossibility of reducing the analysis of power 
in international relations either to the agent or the structure levels. Guzzini proposed a 
dyadic structure in which power is associated to the agent level dimension as governance 
is to structure. The issue is condensed on figure 3 of Guzzini’s article “Structural Power: 




Cuban state and its civil society but don’t affect all local actors equally. Some civil 
society actors gained fast new prerogatives for freer contact with outside partners.  
 3) Cuba’s openness to tourism, foreign investment and diversification of 
international contacts create higher exposure to persuasive actions by other countries 
associated to Cuba’s adoption of new roles, identities and interests. 
4) The role of power asymmetries between countries beyond the security realm 
internationally and domestically
191
, and  
5) The Cuban state’s agency adopting strategies to maximize its power position 
internationally and domestically.  
But all these new dimensions operate in a context in which the central feature is 
the social construction of Cuba’s national interest as a projection of the revolutionary 
goals of the CCP to the international arena. PieroGleijeses(Gleijeses 2002) demonstrated 
how Fidel Castro meant what he said when he spoke as a revolutionary in international 
affairs. Although he was a fierce nationalist defending Cuban sovereignty, Castro’s 
                                                          
191The United States is not only the most powerful country in terms of security but also as 
an economic, educational and social magnet. In Cuba, even after economic reform took 
momentum, state capitalism remains more powerful given its many regulatory and other 
prerogatives than small and medium private enterprises. Within the Cuban state 
economy, state owned companies associated with the military are definitively in an 
advantageous position domestically although not necessarily internationally because of 





attitude towards the international system included a radical solidarity across state borders 
with little respect for the sacrosanct principle of sovereignty
192
.  
Cuba actively engaged in subverting norms and practices of the society of states, 
based on power asymmetries that were unfavorable for developing countries. Havana 
promoted a defensive multilateralism and attempted to redefine the institutional language 
of international relations. Aspiring to be the voice of the global south, instead of “free 
trade”, “aid”, “collective security based on great powers consensus”, “freedom of press”, 
it promoted “fair trade”, “a new international economic order”, the end of the privilege of 
the veto in the Security Council, and a “new informational order”. In terms of 
“international peace” and “collective security”, rather than nuclear non proliferation, 
Cuba preferred to talk about global disarmament.  The central idea was that the destiny of 
Cuba was inextricably linked to the rise of Latin America and the global south as 
independent blocs, to challenge the after Second World War distribution of power.  
 
                                                          
192Fidel’s speeches at the first and second declaration of Havana (Castro 1975) in the 
1960’s are archetypical of what Martin Wight defined as “revolutionism” (Wight 1999). 
This posture is not only about bargaining power among states. In Wight’s typology, the 
“revolutionist” tendency seeks to displace the state as the central actor in international 
relations. This perspective about sovereignty, state security and non-intervention conflicts 





Gleijeses’ study of Cuba’s missions in Africa does not fit the realist assumption of 
an egoist state always maximizing power in material terms. Cuba endured impressive 
economic and political sacrifices and risks to promote a world safe for revolution as the 
title of Jorge Dominguez’s book suggests. Under Fidel Castro’s leadership Cuba have 
engaged in economic, social and even military actions overseas that are not 
understandable outside an ideological commitment to support revolutionary causes and 
allies in the world.  
For decades, Cuba, with or without the support of the Soviet Union intervened in 
support of national liberation movements in Congo, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, and 
Angola, or leftist groups in Nicaragua, Chile, El Salvador not just as a defensive strategy 
versus the United States but as a expression of revolutionary convictions. This 
revolutionary convictions showed disregard for international conventions when the 
possibility of radical revolution was at stake.  
After 2009, the goal of creating a friendly world to Cuba’s economic reform and 
political liberalization demanded a change of priority from the almost fifty-year role of 
promoting world revolution and proselytizing communism using the classical charismatic 
model of Fidel in command. To reach zones of legitimacy by economic performance 
demanded some “aggiornamento” (accommodation) with the international order where 




Changes in the culture of the international and hemispheric order helped the 
transition of Cuba’s foreign policy from a primordially anti-systemic actor to a more 
balanced approach, part revolutionary but dominantly a stakeholder of the society of 
states. This melting was influenced not only by the end of Soviet aid, and the increase of 
American power but also by the change of policies developed from the seventies by Latin 
American and Caribbean countries. Openness by Latin American elites to include Cuba 
in the regional order and the rise of the left in the region made a policy of open promotion 
of revolutionary change non rational from Cuba’s nationalist perspective.  
The post-Cold War hemispheric context pushed an agenda of peace and national 
reconciliation in several countries of the continent where Cuban allies in government 
(Nicaragua) or the insurgency (Guatemala, El Salvador and Colombia) were protagonists. 
These process as well as the negotiation of peace in the Southern Cone of Africa in 1988 
offered to Cuba a change of roles. From been a promoter of revolution, Havana 
transformed itself in a supporter of peace processes in Africa, Colombia and Central 
America. Together with Norway, Cuba is today a mediator of conflicts in Colombia, 
promoting negotiated arrangements in the region as a way to guarantee a zone of peace. 
While in the first declaration of Havana in 1960 (Castro, First Declaration of Havana 
1960), Cuba denounced the OAS Declaration of San Jose, and announced a continental 
class struggle, the 2013 Cuba in reform hosted the second summit of CELAC to declare 




and “anti-imperialist solidarity” by non-intervention, a principle that rounds coherence 
around Cuba’s thirst for foreign investment and the rejection of the U.S. embargo.  
Yet it is still impressive the relative amount of resources spent by Cuba in 
solidarity with other countries despite the difficulties Cuba endured after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. That is why it is a mistake to look at Cuba’s foreign policy in a 
trajectory in which a reformist phase in the revolutionary cycle implies a progressive 
abandonment of the revolutionary internationalist drive and its replacement by more 
nationalist realist rationality. As Halliday demonstrated in the case of the foreign policies 
of other revolutionary actors, the strategic adaptation of Cuba’s foreign policy is a 
calibration of the balance between the internationalist revolutionary impulse and the more 
nationalist instrumentalist one.  
As John Kirk suggested- Cuba’s generosity in offering some of its human capital 
resources to internationalist causes has been revised under the Raul Castro’s 
Administration to make it more efficient and compatible with international order, and less 
indiscriminate. But there is no dismantlement of the principles, culture and institutional 
framework committed to the internationalist impulse. It might be the case that in the 
future, with a stronger economy or other domestic balance of force, some re- launch of 
the internationalist drive might occur. It must be pointed out that evaluations about 




remorse or regret but pride on the policies implemented and its results. As long as the 
CCP is in power, and frames its identity as the heir of the revolution, the tension between 
internationalism and nationalism would persist.  
In the following discussion about Cuba’s foreign policy in the post-Cold War 
world, I will highlight Cuba’s pluralization of its identities and roles in the international 
system as the central transformation of its foreign policy for the last twenty years. I will 
look at: 1) How Cuba as an agent has advanced its political position within the 
governance structure of the international system. As Cuban scholar Carlos Alzugaray 
wrote, after 1991 Cuba made its foreign ties more diversified, pluralistic and less 
vulnerable to unilateral U.S. pressures.  2) How the diversification of Cuba’s links had 
brought dynamics of identity transformation to the Cuban state-society complex 
associated to the balancing and integration of new and old foreign policy state and society 
roles. 3) How processes of interdependence, creation of communities of common fate, 
homogenization of social and economic practices and self-restraint policies between 
Cuba and its partners have  undermined the American narrative that paint Cuba as a 






The ideas presented here are complemented by the discussion of specific Cuba’s 
triangular relations with other powers and the United States in a following chapter. Here 
and there the task is to identify how the processes of adaptation took place and how 
changes in the structure of bilateral or triangular relations codetermined changes in the 
identity of the actors, primarily but not exclusively the Cuban state.  
 
6.1.1 The legacy of the Cold War as processed by Cuban foreign policy elite 
in the redesign of the national interest and roles: nationalism and internationalism. 
The Cold War was quintessentially an ideological competition between 
communism on one side and capitalism, in the other. Highlighting this element reduces 
the complexity of that history but helps noticing the legacy of ideational factors inherited 
by states’ identities in the post –Cold War international system. The most important 
consequence of the end of the Cold War for Cuba was the defeat of one of the two main 
pillars of its state ideology: communism.  
Cuba’s strategic adaptation has been so difficult not because of Havana’s foot-
dragging to accept the security consequences of the end of its alliance with the Soviet 
Union but due to Cuban leadership’s reluctance to accept the defeat of a central tenet of 
its radical identity: communism. At the darkest hour in 1993-94 when Cuban economy 




representative democracy. Different from the experiences in Vietnam and China, a 
market aversion mindset bounded the rationality of the CCP responses to the crisis and 
after. Cuba adopted a few important market-oriented changes such as opening the country 
to foreign investment but this was a crisis-driven decision. Fidel Castro explained them as 
a temporary concession to survive. Only after Raul Castro became president, the CCP 
began to express a commitment to a new model, and even in this case, all changes were 
presented as an updating of the old.    
The ideological defeat of communism in 1989-1991 was less tangible than the 
material effects of the fall of the Soviet empire but more consequential
193
. Cuban 
diplomats and foreign policy strategists had to change their foreign policy discourse at 
risk of appearing anachronistic with reference to the unity of the socialist bloc or the 
progress of socialism. In the 1990’s Cuban officials negotiated partnerships in which 
Cuba communist identity will count but not as a project for the future but a remnant of 
the past. For the first time, since 1959, Cuba presented itself as a country in transition, 
less communist, not more. The lowering of the importance of Cuba’s communist identity 
highlighted other identities such as the nationalist one, or regional ones: Caribbean, 
Ibero-American, and Latin-American.  
                                                          
193A bias problem not only in international relations politics but in modern social sciences 
in general is the preference for highlighting easier- to-quantify factors based on the fake 
premise that everything is quantifiable and quantifying things make them more 




At Caribbean and Ibero-American summits during the nineties, Fidel Castro 
defended the right of Cuba to have its “own democracy”. In his speeches and answers to 
recommendations of market driven reforms and multiparty elections, Castro reaffirmed 
his commitment to communist anti-market values but stop offering them as recipes for 
other countries.  
As Alexander Wendt (Wendt 1999) explained the fact that a structure is cultural, 
not material, doesn’t mean that it is easier to change it. According to Fidel Castro’s 
views, shared by many on the Cuban leadership, the Soviet Union collapsed not because 
of the flaws of communism but due to the abandonment of it by their leaders. Not only 
had the transitions in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, but also the market-oriented 
economic changes in China and Vietnam placed communism at peril. Episodes of the 
kind that happened in Tiananmen Square in June 1989 confirmed Castro that Cuba could 
not afford the drastic institutional, economic and ideological transformations taken place 
in the PRC
194
. In Castro’s perception an incident of this kind could unleash a U.S. 
military intervention under the pretext of a humanitarian crisis.  
                                                          
194It is worth noticing the difference between Deng Xiaoping’s discussion and Fidel 
Castro’s view about the Tiananmen episode. For Deng, the riots demonstrated the need 
for a more comprehensive authoritarian pro-market modernization agenda. Castro viewed 
the incident as a demonstration of the unbearable risks for a country like Communist 




Recognizing the importance of the mentioned ideational factor does not 
underestimate the material impact of the end of the alliance with the Soviet Union. It 
helps to frame material deficits in the context of ideas. This is not the space for an in-
depth counterfactual analysis but ceteris paribus there were several pro-market policy 
options, the Cuban government rejected in the days after the collapse of its commerce 
with the Soviet Union for ideological reasons. These options could have smoothed 
Cuba’s adaptation to a post-communist world and reduce the distance between Cuba and 
its capitalist neighbors but Fidel Castro rejected them. He insisted on a communist path, 
suspicious and skeptical about market and particularly political pluralism.  
Fidel Castro’s responsibility for Cuba’s delay in adopting elementary market 
oriented measures is beyond any doubt in his speeches at critical junctures such as the IV 
and V Congress of the CCP. But in terms of guaranteeing political stability, his personal 
charisma was decisive in the face of a sudden destruction of Cuba’s international 
alliances and the collapse of one of its most fundamental ideological tenets, communism. 
Under Fidel Castro’s leadership, the CCP survived without engaging on massive 
repression of the kind that could create a fracture within the elite, a popular uprising, or 
even an American intervention. Cuba’s projection abroad was an essential part of the 
“ritual of power” that provided stabilizers of international legitimacy to the regime. In the 




the Cold War guaranteeing some level of continuity between its international insertion 
before and after 1989.  
Cuba is not a passive receiver of international norms and institutions but an active 
participant in its challenge and/or reproduction. The ideology, institutions and norms 
from which Cuba responds to the challenges and opportunities of the international system 
impose institutional rigidities in the making of its foreign policy. The specific interactions 
of the Cuban state-society complex with other international actors affect the reproduction 
and change of Cuba’s multiple identities and interests. These specific interactions are 
framed by Cuban state officials in a language and concepts that were developed within a 
mixture of nationalism and Fidel Castro and Che Guevara’s radical Marxist-Leninist third 




                                                          
195Equally important is the fact that U.S. official perception about Cuba before December 
17 2014 was also frozen in the Cold War. Cuba is presented as an outcast in the 
hemispheric system while it is not so since the late 1980’s. Havana is presented as a 
threat to American security, in spite of Cuba’s adherence to non-nuclear proliferation 
treaties, and the end of its alliance with the Soviet Union. It is presented as a dangerous 
precedent promoting nationalization of American and foreign companies to establish a 
command economy despite Cuba’s reform and trends towards a market oriented 
economy.  The problem might be even worse. Lars Schoultz even wrote that U.S. image 
of Cuba is still inspired by old school self- serving paternalism from Washington towards 





Fidel Castro’s anti-U.S. hegemony vision serves as a central orientation from 
which Cuban state officials define Cuba’s national interest in decisive issues such as 
international security, human rights, alliances, trade and cooperation. Cuban diplomats 
frame their narratives with appeals to Fidel’s reading of Cuban history and international 
projection. Cuban embassies, official websites, foreign policy textbooks at the diplomatic 
academy are full of references to his postures at decisive moments of international 
politics such as the Bay of Pigs invasion aftermath, the Missile Crisis or his defiant 
attitude after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The language of Cuban foreign policy is, 
ten years after his retirement, Fidel Castro’s language.  
Castro’s conception is based on an unyielding defense of Cuba’s sovereignty and 
prioritizes coordination of initiatives with other Latin American countries, specifically 
those that have adopted a radical leftist agenda.  Fidel Castro’s nationalist vision drove 
him to manage relations with Washington with a long-term strategic perspective in which 
the supreme goal was that Cuba be treated as “sovereign” and “equal”. To reach this goal, 
Castro designed not only his alliance with the Soviets, the PRC and other U.S. rivals in 
the world but also the domestic design of the Cuban post-revolutionary state. In Castro’s 
view, United States are identified as Cuba’s main adversary for one clear reason: 
Washington’s commitment to remove Cuban revolutionaries from government by violent 




Fidel’s vision was generally pragmatic in its implementation but intransigent in its 
principles. Cuba measures carefully the effect of its actions on U.S. vision about Cuba’s 
own domestic economic or political opening. Yet, under no circumstances, Cuban 
diplomats accept officially to discuss their internal affairs in a negotiation with the United 
States
196
 or any other external actor. In foreign policy grand strategy Cuba engaged in a 
rebalancing of its revolutionary and nationalist identities in favor of the second one, but 
without an abandonment of the first.  
One important feature of Fidel Castro’s approach to foreign policy was 
reciprocity. United States allies and even rivals like the Soviet Union met an intransigent 
response whenever they tried to pre-condition the dialogue to unilateral concessions by 
Cuba. In contrast, these same countries have found a Cuban receptive attitude when their 
diplomats framed ideas based on mutual and reciprocal acknowledgments of each other 
interests and values. Countries such as Canada and Brazil have established with Cuba an 
institutionalized annual dialogue on human rights, accepting that Cuba can bring to the 
table criticism of their record on equal footing.  
 
                                                          
196This is clearly described in some of the cables dispatched from the U.S. Interests 
Section in Havana. American diplomats describe Cuban attitude towards any attempt to 
discuss issues of Cuba’s internal affairs. One example is the chief of the section 




One element of clear Cuban criticism to the collapsed communist regimes in 
Europe was their abandonment of so-called “socialist principles of foreign policy”. This 
category included ideas such as “solidarity with the peoples of the third world”, and 
“proletarian internationalism”. Fidel Castro was particularly critical of Gorbachev’s idea 
of “deideologization” of international relations. In Castro’s vision, socialist 
internationalism, participation and sacrifice for peoples in other countries was a way to 
cultivate communist virtues as it was the case with Cuban presence in Angola.  
The choice of rejecting and resisting not only the liberal democratic but also the 
pro-market economy impulse (this second criteria was endorsed by Communist party 
regimes in East Asia) became a dominant strategy
197
 also from a foreign policy 
perspective. Rather than accepting the end of the Cold War as a triumph of markets and 
democracy, the Cuban perspective vindicated its progressive role in regional scenarios of 
                                                          
197I am using here a term from game theory that explains a strategy an actor will follow as 
optimal regardless of what its opponents do. In this case, the defense of the one party 
system was clearly in the interest of the Cuban elites since the conditions were 
particularly adverse for them if competitive elections were called. The decision not to 
adopt a market economy- as China and Vietnam did- is less clear. The Cuban government 
adopted a strategy of partial market reforms. Later under Raul Castro the impact of the 
market in the reform would significantly increase. The working hypothesis here is that 
the Castros understood the convenience from a pure economic rationality of adopting 
some market oriented reforms but decided to do it only partially because, different from 
the context in East Asia communist countries the potential providers of foreign capital 
were committed to a change in the political regime and subject to Washington’s active 
pressures to use their position in Cuba’s economy as leverage for forcing the Cuban 









Rejecting the adoption of a market economy was as consequential as sticking to 
the one party system. It undoubtedly impacted Cuba’s foreign projection because it 
placed the island on its own set. There was a presumption in many capitals that 
communist Cuba was destined to collapse because Havana was simple following the road 
of its Soviet patron, without its previous economic aid. But the rejection of market 
fundamentalism provided Cuba with bona fide credentials against market fundamentalist 
neoliberal adjustments in Latin America, at a time when economic adjustments generated 
profound discontent across the region. Havana offered itself as a political space to 
articulate anti-neoliberal coalitions, a clear alternative to both neoliberal fundamentalist 
                                                          
198 From a Cuban perspective, it was easy to reject the end the Cold War as the triumph of 
democracy and markets. The embargo against Cuba was a denial of both American 
democracy rights and the persuasive power of markets. Facing communism in Cuba, 
different from its policy towards Eastern Europe, the United States used an embargo (An 
anti-market barrier to trade and travel) and supported groups in Miami where respect for 
different opinions about Cuba was conspicuously absent. In Latin America, the Cold War 
meant until the Carter Administration little priority for the promotion of democratic 
principles. The Cold War competition was presented in Manichean terms between 
democracy and communism but as long as repressive regimes took sides with the United 
States against communism, Washingtontolerated and promoted them. In the Southern 
Cone of Africa, Cubans saw themselves as fighting together with the democratic forces 
against the apartheid regime. Although the United States ended playing a positive 
mediator role, there were fresh memories of President Reagan and Senator Jesse Helms’ 




pro-market ideology and the defense of liberal democracy as the only modernizing 
alternative. 
At the IV Congress of the CCP in 1992 the party highlighted the importance of its 
nationalist roots, proclaiming itself as the political organization of the whole nation, not 
only the working class. This political transformation had an ideological corollary on the 
elevation of Jose Marti’s thought as the first source of CCP political ideology. This 
rebalancing of the revolution ideological matrix had an impact in the foreign policy 
apparatus creating effects of restraint. The leadership declared that internationalism 
begins at dealing with Cuba’s own problems. Solidarity actions beyond Cuban borders 
became essentially peaceful and in the case of anti-pandemics and natural disaster relief 
intervention compatible with the U.S. led liberal world order. 
As a small state in conflict with a superpower, and the carrier of a radical 
ideology, Cuba had to balance its emphasis on improving inter-state relations to defeat 
American hostility with its commitment to its ideological brethren around the world. 
Relations with Latin American governments, most of them right of the center, acquired a 
priority over leftist parties that were encouraged to be defenders of good relations 
between their own countries and Cuba rather than agents of an ideological solidarity that 




No matter how Fidel Castro reaffirmed his commitment to communist doctrine, 
the dramatic fall of the Cuban economy and the end of the Soviet Union brought upon 
Cuba a decline of the revolutionary fervor that animated most of the overseas military 
action after 1959. Cuban foreign revolutionary projection did not disappear but had to 
adjust to an adverse context in which communism was not even a competitor at the global 
stage. Proletarian internationalism remained principles at the core of Cuba’s identity but 
they were adapted to the new security and economic situation. Even China as a market 
economy was integrating to the liberal capitalist order that Fidel Castro despised.  
Havana remained a major articulator of third world coalitions but not as the 
revolutionary opponent of governments but in virtue of its state-state diplomacy’s long 
commitment to international development, “fair trade”, and democratization of the 
multilateral institutions of the U.N and the Bretton Woods system. In 2000 Cuba hosted 
the first Global South summit as part of its leadership of the 77 Group that began to be 
called the 77+China group.  The prevalent term was pragmatism, not generally a 
revolutionary one.  
Cuba did attempt to remain a prominent voice for the global south by remaining at 
the left of any South-South cooperation. Havana continued challenging the institution of 
Great Powers management (Bull 1977) in international governance. Cuba insisted in 




international institutions to the majorities in the South. What was new was how Castro’s 
government adjusted to the end of the Soviet protection. Havana denounced the double 
standards in nuclear proliferation but realistically avoided cornering itself in a conflict 
with the security agenda of great powers.  Cuba remained a zealous denunciator against 
the practices and opiniojuris that take unequal sovereignty (Simpson 2004) as granted. 
Simultaneously, Cuba did sign several treaties and conventions of non-nuclear 
proliferation that were written accepting the great powers management premise.  
The most drastic normative challenge brought upon Cuba by the end of the Cold 
War was a general demand in the governance structure of the international system for the 
adoption of liberal democratic standards. The structural challenge was compounded by 
the coincidence of the collapse of communism in Europe with democratization in Latin 
America. Samuel Huntington has called these series of political transformation a “third 
wave of democratization” (Huntington 1991). The clash between Cuba rowing against the 
stream as one-party state and a new world liberal order seemed insurmountable if the 
United States had rationally adapted its policy to a post-Cold War rationality.  
But it didn’t happen. The United States remained committed to an imperial policy 
while the world and Latin America remained loyal to a narrative in which the American 
embargo appeared as the main obstacle for Cuba’s development.  With such irrational 




Given the weakness of Cuba’s opposition, the historical trajectory of the discussion about 
Cuba’s democratization in human rights international organizations as a clash between 
Cuba and the unilateral imposition of the United States, this ideational challenge was 
easily managed. 
The Cold War left also a legacy for the institutional configuration of the Cuban 
foreign policy apparatus. Given Cuba’s activism in several hot confrontations, Fidel 
Castro heavily relied on his brother Raul Castro and the Armed Forces for coping with 
several foreign policy problems.  Military organizations were key factors in the 
relationships with Moscow, Angola, South Africa, Nicaragua and several countries where 
Cuba had military advisors. 
Castro’s trust in the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Interior created an 
institutional overrepresentation of these military organizations in Cuba’s foreign policy 
decision making and implementation
199
. This military and security overrepresentation is 
reflected on the persistency of foreign policy parcels that still are under the main 
supervision of the Armed Forces and the ministry of interior, not under the supervision of 
the ministry of foreign relations. These power parcels obviously represent a challenge to 
                                                          
199Hal Klepak has discussed the role of the Cuban Armed Forces not only in Cuba’s 
traditional international security projection but also in foreign economic policy and even 
the building of favorable opinion among key U.S. security sectors given Cuba’s 




the construction of a legal-rational institutional structure as it is the goal of the political 
liberalization process.  
 
6.2 Two different discourses about Cuba’s relations with U.S. allies during 
the Cold War: From Peaceful coexistence to ideological pluralism. 
From very early on after the declaration of the U.S. embargo, Cuba cultivated 
relations and trade with allies of the United States such as Canada, Mexico and countries 
of Western Europe, to diversify its foreign affairs, and create workable relations that 
contrast with the level of hostility in the Havana-Washington Axis.   
The mutual insulation of those relations from U.S. pressures for Cuba’s isolation 
was presented as a sign of independence from the United States and a preference for 
policies that promote change by rapprochement not by coercion.  By the beginning of the 
1990’s relations with Cuba were increasingly presented as an economic opportunity for 
European businesses to fill the vacuum created by the end of Cuba’s integration to the 






The nature of the engagement was itself a contested ground of ideas trying to 
define what the relationship between Communist Cuba and these countries should be. 
The Cuban narrative emphasized the principle of peaceful coexistence by which 
communist countries seek peaceful and cordial relationships with capitalist countries in 
the international arena. The idea behind the concept was to avoid unnecessary conflict 
with ideologically different governments while favoring contacts with ideological 
partners within their societies.  
From the European, Canadian and Mexican side the narrative defended the 
principle of ideological pluralism in international relations
200
. The idea emphasized 
                                                          
200The principle of respect for ideological pluralism in international relations implies that 
countries of different ideological orientation can work together in the promotion of 
common interests respecting the principle of equal sovereignty and peaceful solution of 
conflicts. In its most sophisticated version include a synergy between international peace 
and democracy. The idea is that the acceptance of pluralism as a foreign policy value 
creates opportunities for economic, cultural and educational exchanges. These activities 
supposed to incentivize an emulation of ideological pluralism at the domestic arena. 
Democratization at the domestic level creates different liberal checks and balances that 
reduce the possibility of war between nations following the classical democratic peace 
proposition. The principle ofideological pluralism was invoked frequently in the 
seventies in OAS resolutions and Foreign policy communiqués of Canada, France, 
Mexico, and others to explain their policies towards the People’s Republic of China, 
Cuba and other countries. In the United States, this position permeated President John F. 
Kennedy’s discourse at American University before his assassination and later was 
invoked in the Nixon-Kissinger approach to China. The causal chain about ideological 
pluralism-democratization-peace was argued by Western powers involved in the Helsinki 
process of the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe. For a discussion about 
the persuasive logic of ideological pluralism in international affairs see “Ideological 
Pluralism in the Caribbean: Challenges and Prospects  (Grant 1984) and Daniel Thomas’ 




the convenience of highlighting common interests, engagement and dialogue to solve 
differences. Engaging with Cuba supposed also to have a mitigating effect on Cuba’s 
support for radical political movement within their countries and in the international and 
regional theaters.  
The two narratives were expressed in parallel to explain a convergence of 
interests and even reconciliation in the case of Latin American countries which broke up 
relations with Cuba in the 1960’s but restored them in the 1970’s and 80’s. The narratives 
were simultaneously competitive and complementary since they help each other to face 
hostile narratives within their respective foreign policy establishment but try to explain 
the same process with different perspectives and concepts. In Canada, Mexico or Spain 
there were groups that proposed the image of Cuba as a Red menace and a source of 
regional instability. Simultaneously what for Cuba was a way to advance communism at 
the world stage without unnecessary conflicts was for its partners/rivals a way to use 
rapprochement as a rational policy to defeat it.   
The content of the peaceful coexistence concept was contested in the form of 
answers to two formulations of the search for national security: 1) how “to make a world 
safe for revolution”
201
(internationalist version) and 2) how to make a world safe for the 
                                                          
201This is an obvious reference to the title of Jorge Dominguez’s book “To make A World 
Safe for Revolution” (Dominguez 1989). Dominguez explains Cuban foreign policy as a 




Cuban revolution (nationalist version). Sometimes, at the head of the radicals was no 
other than Fidel Castro himself
202
who saw himself- at times rightly- as having a major 
role at the world scene.   
By the end of the 1990’s, the ideological pluralism narrative became dominant 
when Cuba co-opted the same discourse of its rivals/partners. The ideological pluralism 
discourse became a platform for Cuba’s buffering strategy isolating the U.S policy 
embargo from American allies. At multiple international forums, Cuba defended its right 
to decide its own internal political order by invoking democracy in international relations 
and respect for ideological pluralism with the same terms used by Canada, Western 
Europe and Latin America until then.  
What follows in this section is a discussion of the trajectory of the replacement of 
peaceful coexistence for respect for ideological pluralism and how this strategic 
adaptation of Cuba’s relations with U.S. allies contributed to Castro’s Cuba survival in a 
post-Cold War world. The transition from one concept to the other expresses also the 
rebalancing of roles in Cuba’s foreign policy in ways that favor the nationalist over the 
internationalist revolutionary one. I will exemplify the cases of Cuba’s relations with 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
202PieroGleijeses had described how Henry Kissinger who at the time couldn’t grasp Fidel 
Castro’s revolutionary spirit behind Cuba’s foreign policy in the seventies would 





Canada, Europe and Mexico to demonstrate the features of continuity and rupture that 
helped a Cuba in partial reform to survive within a U.S. led world order.  
In the sixties, Cuba’s diplomacy pragmatically engaged in an active relation with 
De Gaulle’s France and Franco’s Spain despite CCP and Castro’s ideological differences 
with those governments. The preferential relations with these Western Europe got even 




A similar situation characterized revolutionary Cuba’s ties with Canada. As it is 
described by John M. Kirk and Peter McKenna (Kirk, John M and McKenna, Peter 
2007), Canadian relationships with Cuba were configured during the government of 
Conservative Prime Minister John George Diefenbaker (1957-1963). Diefenbaker made 
clear that Canadian policy towards the “Cuban problem” would be decided in Ottawa, not 
Washington DC. The fact that a position in favor of active engagement with Cuba in 
opposition to Washington’s embargo was defended by a fervent anticommunist 
conservative as Diefenbaker created a precedent for the dramatic improvement achieved 
under the successive liberal administration of Lester Pearson and Pierre Elliot Trudeau 
                                                          
203This is not the space for an in-depth discussion of the relations between Cuba and the 
European countries. Some of the readings that inspire these interpretations are the works 
by Joaquin Roy (Roy 2002), Susanne Gratius(Gratius 2012), and Eduardo Perera Gomez 




that came after him
204
. The Canadian consensus about an engagement policy towards 
Cuba was never abandoned during Brian Mulroney’s conservative premiership.  
After 1959, Mexico and Cuba built a “modus vivendi” based on a mutual 
acceptance narrative about relations between two revolutions, the Cuban and the 
Mexican
205
. Mexico was the only Latin American country that never broke up 
relationships with Cuba. Since the proclamation of the Estrada Doctrine
206
 in 1924, 
Mexico insulated its diplomacy from U.S. pressures to pull its southern neighbor into 
                                                          
204During Trudeau’s premiership a personal friendship between him and Fidel Castro 
elevated the Cuba-Canadian bilateral relationship to the most revered one of Havana with 
the Western world. Fidel Castro gave Canada the highest possible priority in its foreign 
policy and development agenda. Cuban tourist industry targeted early the Canadian 
market even when Cuba avoided tourism from Western countries as a policy. Canadian 
development aid was also well received by Cuba in areas such as farming and fishing. 
Although Trudeau’s government cut development aid as response to Cuba’s intervention 
in Ethiopia in 1977, trade and tourism remained a constant component of the bilateral 
links. 
 
205For a discussion about the triangle U.S.-Cuba –Mexico after 1959 see Renata Keller’s 
book “Mexico’s Cold War: Cuba, the United States and the legacy of the Mexican 
Revolution” (Keller 2015). For Cuba-Mexican relations after the end of the Cold War, 
see the articles by Ana Covarrubias (Covarrubias 1996, Vol. 26) , and my own article 
(Lopez-Levy, La visita de Felipe Calderon: Cuatro ejes de la relacion Mexico-Cuba 
2012) 
 
206Genaro Estrada, Secretary of Foreign Affairs proclaimed Mexico’s guiding doctrine 
about changes in the political regime in other states. Mexico conceived relations with 
states, not governments. In the absence of a contrarian declaration, countries should 
assume that Mexico recognizes as legitimate any government in other state unless 
explicitly rejected otherwise, regardless of the way the government took power or the 




conflicts with other countries in the region or even in the world. Cuba did not support 
opposition groups in Mexico and Mexico did not adopt any international sanctions 
against Cuba or support for Cuba’s opposition (Covarrubias 1996, Vol. 26).  
By the mid-sixties the United States found ways to build a partnership with 
Mexican authorities that provide Washington with good reliable intelligence information 
about Cuba from Mexican sources, including the Mexican embassy in Havana. Until 
1989, Cuba found on Mexican state-civil society complex an amicable partner for many 
of its foreign policy positions in Latin America. There were strong pockets of sympathy 
for Cuba’s revolution in Mexico while industrial and educational sectors provide the 
island with partners to connect with the capitalist neighborhood.  
Between 1959 and 1991, Cuba’s special relations with Canada, Spain and Mexico 
were ties developed- according to the Cuban perspective- under the principle of peaceful 
coexistence between states with different socioeconomic systems. One after the other, 
Canadian, Mexican and most Western European governments have promoted a course of 
neutrality as a model for Western democracies role with respect to the U.S.-Cuba 
conflict. In terms of values and security, Canada and Western Europe were on the 
capitalist side of the Cold War, but these actors have taken clear distance from American 




These workable relationships with Canada, Spain and Mexico served as a model 
for the type of relationship, buffered from the clashes of the Cold War, Cuba built during 
the 1970’s and 1980’s with other Latin American and Caribbean countries. 
Decolonization in the Caribbean was accompanied by opening of relations with Cuba. 
Havana’s Latin America diplomatic relations were gradually restored mainly after the 
democratization in the Southern Cone with the end of right wing military dictatorships. 
Cuba maintained a privileged political relationship with the leftist parties but 
simultaneously build new links with state institutions and business sectors. These ties 
created constituencies of contacts and a zone for management of conflicts and 
coincidences that buffered Cuba’s global connections from U.S. attempts to 
internationalize American sanctions against the CCP regime. 
The Cuban government identified these bilateral relations as a potential balance 
for the loss of the Soviet partnership in 1991. One of the advantages for the weaker side 
in an asymmetrical conflict is the disparity of attention over the bilateral ties on its favor. 
By the early 1990’s when the United States was concentrated on the strategic issues of 
German unification, Soviet Union’s collapse and the Tiananmen crisis, Cuba’s 
government was focused in building a net for survival. Havana’s emphasis on 
nationalism as the last reservoir of ideological legitimacy was also more compatible than 
the previous internationalist communist identity with the ideological pluralism narrative 




The defense of sovereignty and self-determination enhanced the coincidence of Cuban 
foreign policy discourse with international norms.  
By the early 1990’s Cuba’s identity as a revolutionary state faced the reality of 
much reduced capabilities for international activism and a dominant anti-interventionist 
vision that emphasized des-ideologization of international relations and respect for 
ideological pluralism. In Central America, an area of concentrated attention by the United 
States, Mexico, and the European social democracy and Christian democrats, the 
Esquipulas Plan brought about the withdrawal of Cuban military advisors from Nicaragua 
as a Sandinista goodwill gesture. By the time of the peace agreements in El Salvador and 
Guatemala, plus the Sandinista defeat in 1990, Cuba’s military support for local actors 
was nonexistent. 
Cuba’s adoption of the language of respect for ideological pluralism was evident 
in its diplomatic treatment of the summits of the Ibero-American community, a forum 
celebrated annually under the leadership of Spain, including Portugal, Brazil and all the 
Latin American countries. Fidel Castro but particularly the new generation of Cuban 
ministers (Roberto Robaina and Felipe Perez) and diplomats dropped the language of 
“peaceful coexistence” that assume a trajectory to the solution of the ideological conflicts 
in favor of socialism, and adopted the more neutral term of respect for ideological 




This synchronization of terms favored Cuba’s regional integration into the 
Association of Caribbean States. The language of respect for ideological pluralism serves 
well Cuba’s relations with other countries and its demand for non interference in Cuba’s 
domestic affairs by the United States. This narrative helped to drop Cuban support for 
insurrectional groups such as the FARC and the ELN in Colombia, and the Tupac Amaru 
Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) in Peru. It was presented as a normative change in 
international society, not a concession to American unilateralism. Cuba remained critical 
of multiparty systems but Havana argued that political rule in those countries was 
constitutional. Cuba channeled its international activism towards a social dimension 
(health, education, sports and disaster relief assistance) and political contacts with leftist 
parties well inserted in their political systems.  
 
6.3 Balancing revolutionary identity in Foreign Policy 
The processes of economic reform and political liberalization challenged the ways 
and content in which Cuba’s different identities expressed in the international arena. 
Several theories about the revolutionary cycle and leadership take as given that Cuba is 
replacing its revolutionary identity for another identified with the current international 




1) Rather than a replacement of the revolutionary identity, there is a re-balancing 
of the revolutionary projection together with other important dimensions of economic, 
political and security character. This might cause the lowering of the revolutionary roles 
in foreign policy but this is a dynamic dimension, in which the radical projection is tuned, 
not irreversibly abandoned.  
2) The new post-Cold War world offers opportunities of expressing the 
revolutionary identity in less risky ways for Cuba’s national security, such as the 
international health diplomacy. It shouldn’t be a surprise if Cuba prefers to use a less 
costly projection that still bring allies and reputation to its anti-status quo cause.  
3) Cuba’s institutional ties with parties and movements are not a burden but an 
asset for Cuba’s diplomacy. Rather than abandoning its privileged relationship with 
radical and communist movements, the Cuban Communist Party had transformed these 
relations in function of its new priorities.  
A radical third world version of Marxist-Leninist ideology was at the core of 
Cuba’s foreign policy during the Cold War. In this view, class struggle at the world level 
connects nationalist resistance against imperial relations and support for political and 
economic self-determination against global capitalism. Cuba’s grand strategy articulated 
around this ideological core. It emphasized a zealous view of its own sovereignty, a 




promotion of South-South cooperation as a way to highlight Cuba’s importance in the 
Cold War context.  
It also included an active political relationship with ideological homologues, 
movements and parties all over the world that shared leftist ideological affinities. Since 
1959 to 1990, Cuba’s foreign policy counted on a special relationship with the 
communist movement and other leftist oriented organizations all over the world. Cuba’s 
adherence to the international communist movement was multidimensional. It included a 
tight alliance at the highest level with communist bloc states, an economic integration in 
the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) and a non-formalized military 
alliance between Cuba and Moscow.  
Cuba’s Affiliation to the communist world provided its diplomacy with important 
political connections and social networks all over the world. These political tentacles 
included a system of academic, cultural, economic, sports, youth, women, social 
publications and even religious exchanges within the socialist bloc. State-state relations 
between communist states were complemented with a vast web of communist parties and 
affiliated organizations in the capitalist developed world. The importance of these ties 
varied from country to country but in some places like Italy, Spain or France, there were 




another to communist affiliates. Scientists, and intellectuals affiliated to leftist parties 
were also a source Cuba counted on as political allies.  
On its own and with the support of the Soviet Union, The PRC and Vietnam; 
Cuba attracted contacts within national liberation and progressive movements in the 
developing world. During the 1960’s, Cuba didn’t take a definitive course in favor of 
Moscow in the Soviet-Chinese dispute allowing the CCP to build relations with pro-
China and Trotskyite groups resented from Soviet tutelage. Cuba opened a positive 
relation with these actors, independent not only from the United States but also from 
Moscow. At times, these ties created conflicts with traditional pro-Soviet groups but 
eventually Cuba learned to manage parallel relations with groups in dispute for a 
hegemonic position within the left.  
Facing the hostility of the mighty U.S power in every capital, these communities 
of links represented a social defense to the permanent attempt by American embassies 
and anti-Castro groups to isolate Cuba. Some of these groups acted as intelligence 
networks; in other cases they provided leverage, influence and solidarity with Havana. 
Cuba benefitted from these ideological affinities by collecting important political 
information from groups and individuals with a close affinity with the Cuban revolution. 
In some cases, it also provided business contacts with members of the private sector and 




One of Cuba’s foreign policy more delicate task has been to balance the state-
state contacts with its connections with radical non state actors. After the collapse of the 
Communist Eastern European bloc, Fidel Castro did gladly inherited a leadership role in 
many mechanisms of international political coordination within the radical left. In Latin 
America, the CCP created together with the Workers Party from Brazil, the Sandinista 
Front from Nicaragua, and other leftist movements and parties of the region, the Sao 
Paulo Forum. Cuba’s position eventually improved with the rise of Chavismo and the 
turn to the left in several countries of the region. It also helped Havana the fact that most 
of the radical left in the region, with the exception of the FARC in Colombia opted for 
pursuing power by electoral means, rejecting armed struggle as their method to control 
the state.  
Globally, the Cuban communist party sponsored events such as a Youth Festivals 
and publications of books about socialist and nationalist resistance. Cuba also became 
one of the main provider of educational opportunities and health care attention to leftist 
leaders and militants from all over the world, particularly from Latin America. Cuba’s 
Communist reaffirmation imposed dynamics of mutual influence and intangible 
persuasion with leftist movements all over the world. One important example of this two 
ways cooperation was the creation of Telesur, an alternative television network owned by 





Cuba used the thirty years of special ties with the international communist 
movement and a circle of organizations and individuals with socialist leanings to raise the 
profile of its anti-U.S. resistance. The solidarity network was particularly effective 
denouncing the tightening of the embargo after 1992 and pushing governments to 
condemn the policy in question at the United Nations. Even though in most countries 
these leftist groups were not in the government or a parliamentarian majority they served 
well to raise the profile of the Cuban cause in the foreign policy agenda of countries as 
diverse as those in Western Europe, Latin America or Asia.  
After the Soviet Union ended, solidarity groups with special relations with Cuba 
were important points of leverage in intraparty factions or at subnational levels in 
regions, provinces, and municipalities. The card of good relations with Cuba was used by 
politicians of different ideological persuasion to show independence from the U.S. and 
also as a bargaining chip with the left.  In countries such as Spain, France, Italy or the 
Nordic countries, the solidarity groups provided spaces for Cuba’s diplomacy beyond 
Havana’s material resources. Cuba’s political friends were not limited to traditional 
radical parties but included politicians and personalities within center-left and social 
Christian groups in parties of Latin America and Europe, such as the SDP in Germany, 




Any minimal review of the report of activities of Cuban embassies at the Cuban 
Ministry of foreign relations website (Cuba-MINREX 2014) or in the Cuban embassies 
websites illustrates a series of visits, presentations and political activities showing a vast 
network of political contacts in countries where there is not a large community of Cubans 
or any important bilateral trade.  These networks are coordinated institutionally by the 
Cuban Institute of Friendship with other peoples (ICAP) to promote Cuba’s allies by 
connecting them with Havana but also among themselves. When needed, these ties also 
help to mobilize segments of public opinion around topics of Cuban interests, for instance 
the theme of the Cuban Five
207
.  
Fidel Castro also didn’t give up on Cuba’s links with the state-society complexes 
of the former Soviet Union. There, Cuba was selective in investing political capital with 
countries Havana thought it was worth to keep a fluent relationship in place. Even in a 
context of economic austerity, Cuba offered Belarus, Ukraine and Russia programs to 
provide post-traumatic recovery to victims of the Chernobyl accident and the Afghanistan 
war veterans. These gestures identified Fidel Castro’s insistence on inheriting the 
                                                          
207The Cuban Five were five intelligence agents who were caught in Miami mainly spying 
inside anti-Castro groups. The trial reaches notoriety because of the argument against 
prosecuting them in Miami given the strong anti-Cuban government sentiment in the city. 
By decision of the Judge the trial remained in Miami and the U.N Group on Arbitrary 
detentions qualified in 2006 as arbitrary the punishment of the Five due to the absence of 




leadership mantle of communism. By 1994, the Russian Duma created a Cuba friendship 
group with Communists and nationalists from the Liberal Democratic Party as members.  
Two important regions in the world with which Cuba developed strong 
revolutionary alliances are Africa and the Middle East. The central scenario for these 
relations is the non-aligned movement. There, Cuba developed a close alliance with post 
Apartheid South Africa and the radical Arab countries but not limited to them. These 
states became bridges to the business sectors, university and cultural world in these two 
regions.  
 
6.4 Strategies of adaptation to changes in the balance of power and 
normative structures of the international system. 
6.4.1 Challenges to Cuba’s identity in the Hemispheric System: 
By the end of the Cold War in 1989, the Western Hemisphere had experienced a 
major transformation in the normative structure of its international system. Three changes 
were fundamental: 1) The adoption across the whole hemisphere with the exception of 
Cuba of a consensus around the rationality of market economies as the best form of 
responding to the challenges of economic development, 2) By 1990 the region as adopted 




American countries had declared the region as fully committed to avoid a nuclear 
weapons race.  
In 1991, Cuba was an outlier of these three regional trends. It was a typical 
command economy ruled by a one-party system with characteristics of an early post-
totalitarian phase including severe limitations to the rights to travel, freedom of religion 
and to own private property. In terms of human rights, Cuba was and still is outside the 
inter-American system as result of its forced separation from the OAS.  Havana had 
signed neither of the two 1966 covenants of Civil and Political rights and Economic, 
Social and Cultural rights.  In the nuclear issue, Cuba was at the time a persistent objector 
of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco
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 that 
established Latin America as the first heavily populated zone free of nuclear weapons.  
I have already discussed in other publication the long history of conflicts between 
Cuba and the OAS (Lopez-Levy 2009. Vol. 52). By the 1990’s, Cuba’s exclusion from 
the inter-American system was the combined result of the separation of Havana from the 
Inter-American system in 1962 with an expressed rejection by the Cuban authorities of 
                                                          
208The 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco was promoted by the Mexican ministry of Foreign 
Relations since 1963. The Mexican government under the PRI insisted on preserving a 
space in Latin America outside the Cold War competition and arms race. Tlatelolco is an 
Aztec name of the neighborhood of Mexico city where the Mexican Ministry of Foreign 




the principles and norms of the continental organization. Cuban official narrative 
describes the OAS as a “ministry of Yankee colonies”.  
By 1991 most Latin American countries were governed by elites that converged 
around the Washington consensus and attempted to implement a neoliberal adjustment 
package under the tutelage and recommendations of the IMF and the World Bank. 
Although not all process of economic liberalization or transition to market economies 
were equivalent to the acceptance of neoliberal reforms, it was clear that intellectually 
and politically the ideas of a strong state regulating the economy were in retreat at best 
and already defeated at worst. 
The neoliberal economic consensus has a correlate on the acceptance of 
representative democracy as hemispheric criteria of legitimacy. Regardless their 
ideological origins, most political forces of the region converged on the importance of 
preserving democratic guarantees and competitive elections. Within the Latin American 
left, the experience of the military dictatorships in the 1960’s and 1970’s motivated a re-
evaluation of liberal democratic institutions that were previously described as mere bases 
for capitalist domination. The revolutionary narratives about other types of democracy 
went on retreat when the Mexican system began to open after the contested elections of 
1988 and the Sandinista defeat in 1990. The Cuban Revolution was seen by many as a 




Cuba’s insertion in Latin America was favored by a change in the hemispheric 
structure of international relations and Cuba’s own process of reform and openness. 
Beginning in 1998, Latin American experienced a turn to the left with Hugo Chavez’s 
election in Venezuela. The trend intensified with the rise to power of the Workers’ Party 
in Brazil. In a matter of a decade, most South American countries elected leftist 
candidates to presidential offices and parliament. These governments have towards Cuba 
a welcoming attitude and for decades have enjoyed the support by the CCP described 
earlier in this chapter.  
The change in the structure of hemispheric relations was a constitutive factor, not 
a causal one of Cuba’s re-insertion in Latin America. One reason that undermines the 
narrative presenting Cuba as a remnant of the Cold War was the early acknowledgement 
by most Latin American elites of the relevance of the economic reform and political 
liberalization processes taking place in the island. The perceptions about these processes 
among the governments of other states have important foreign policy and international 
dimensions because Latin American elites identify not only from where the Cuban 
changes were departing from (command economy and vertical one party system state-





There were changes in Cuba’s foreign policy that also explain the new attitudes of 
all the governments in the hemisphere, including those from the right, towards Havana. 
Cuba developed several strategies of adaptation that placed the island-nation in line with 
minimal membership criteria for the regional institutional-normative structure.  
 
6.4.2 Cuba’s Post-Cold War foreign policy adaptation strategies 
The international adaptation of the Cuban state-society complex (Cox 1986)is 
better explained with a constructivist approach because it is primarily cultural(Wendt 
1999), and fundamentally different from the formulae prescribed by the realist school
209
 
in which small powers has two fundamental choices: balancing or bandwagoning. Cuba’s 
strategies show a prolific repertoire well beyond these two choices and others with more 
sophistication such as buck-passing and chain ganging included in the realist arsenal of 
prediction of state behavior once the specificities of the security dilemma are added 
(Christensen, Thomas, & Snyder, Jack 1990).  
                                                          
209This is hardly a surprise since Kenneth Waltz announced in his Theory of International 
Politics that such subject should concentrate in explaining the actions and motivations of 
Great Powers as the central units of the system (Waltz 1979). This is also the case of John 
Mearsheimer’s book that from its title “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics” assumes 





The explanation that follows it is a call to take seriously historical context in the 
study of international relations. Trends that might be secondary in a particular context 
(such as Cuba’s peaceful coexistence policy towards Spain or its policy of non-alignment 
during the Cold War) might become crucial to a survival strategy some years later. The 
available strategies and self-assigned roles of a state such as risk taking revolutionary 
Cuba changed dramatically in the absence of the backing of a great power as the Soviet 
Union was during the Cold War.  
Strategies of adaptation are difficult to understand outside the agent that applies 
them. In this area, it is important to look not only at the distribution of capabilities- 
generally Cuba is a rule taker in the international system- but also at some functional 
differentiation and the legacy of multiple identities that explain the choices that a state 
takes to adapt or survive. Perception and misperception of the state’s leadership are not 
randomly distributed but contains important biases developed through historical 
experiences and ideology.  
In the case of Cuba’s foreign policy strategy, I will highlight three elements: 
 1) Differences of power capacities create qualitative variations in the identity and 
function of states. A great power, a middle power or a small one are not three similar 
actors in a scale. Their differences of opportunity and vulnerability make them design 




period, Cuba designed its foreign policy adaptation strategies from a position of high 
security vulnerability and limited opportunity to integrate to a U.S. led global order.  
2) A revolutionary (revisionist) state designs its policy differently from a status 
quo one because its projection implies a disposition to challenge the consequences of the 
asymmetry of power. Cuba has problems with the United States and other actors more 
powerful than Havana not only because these great powers have engaged in practices that 
interfere in Cuba’s sovereign affairs but also because Cuban leadership in principle does 
not acknowledge any legitimacy to differences of international status based on different 
capabilities of power.  
3) Asymmetric relations are not the expression of abnormal, transitional 
imbalance. There are dynamics of asymmetry that trend to instability and conflict while 
there are others that results in stability and normalcy. Adaptation strategies are not 
produced by similar states that happen to have different power capabilities but by agents 
whose strategic calculation, perception of vulnerabilities and images differ significantly. 
The relationship between Cuba and the United States is an archetypical case of 
asymmetry and it has characterized by conflict since 1959. The disparity in Cuba’s 
disadvantage entails a significant risk to the island’s national security. During the Cold 
War, Cuba counterbalanced the disparity by using ideological affinities with the Soviet 




geographically distant. After the Cold War, there was not any alternative great power 
available to replace the supporting role the Soviet Union played before.  
As result, Cuba’s adaptation strategies focused in the short run on avoiding 
isolation from its regional context and denying pretexts for a security clash with 
Washington. In the long run, Cuba overwhelmed the United States with international 
demands against its imperial coercive embargo policy and forced Washington to rethink 
it.  
6.4.2.1 Buffering 
The first Cuba’s major adaptation strategy can be described as buffering. 
Buffering is  
“the lessening of exposure to, and influence by, the more powerful by 
creating alternative spheres of influence or carving out neutral areas in terms of 
geography or function that can remove or at least significantly limit the immediate 
and active impact of the dominant power”
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210In the definition of the strategy of “buffering” I am basing my explanation on the 
concept provided by Chong Ja Ian in his paper “Revisiting Responses to Power 
Preponderance: Going Beyond the Balancing-Bandwagoning Dichotomy (Chong 2003) 
but applying the concept to a particular situation. In his paper Chong only presents 
buffering as a strategy and promotes the hypothesis that buffering would be generally 
preferred by states that are stronger and integrated to the international system to other 
options that include balancing, bandwagoning, beleaguering, bonding and binding. 
Although I find useful the concepts of the strategies, I don’t share his views about 




Cuba’s buffering strategy consisted in an active defensive multilateralism 
preventing the creation of conditions that favored its international isolation or 
acquiescence to a U.S. military action against Havana. Until he got sick in 2006, Fidel 
Castro exercised his leadership in the global radical left in most heads of state summits 
and presidential inauguration he was invited. Castro took advantage of his opportunities 
at the podium to be a voice for the global south. In every one of these organizations, 
Cuba achieved early on a resolution condemning the U.S. embargo. Every new meeting 
the resolution gathered new adherents and the language against U.S. policy got stronger.  
The rejection of U.S coercive imperial policy towards Cuba by international 
organizations and American allies came in the form of a compromise. Joining the 
organization of Iberian-American states as a founding member in 1992 brought to Cuba 
the inconvenience of facing constant calls to sign presidential commitments to 
representative democracy and international human rights. The Presidential Summits 
brought sporadic attacks to the non-democratic character of the Cuban regime by 
presidents of Uruguay, Jorge Battle, Argentina Carlos Saul Menem, Spain, Jose Maria 
Aznar, Salvador, Francisco Rodriguez and Mexico Ernesto Zedillo. At times, Castro 
engaged in diplomatic rifts with some of those countries (Uruguay broke up diplomatic 
relations with Cuba). But in most cases, he built up the symbolism of Havana as a 




of democracy while pocketing diplomatic declarations that clearly condemned the U.S. 
embargo against Cuba.  
The priority of the buffering strategy was carving out buffer regional or functional 
spheres of influence in which, even if there were actions and declarations against the 
government in Havana, the treatment received by the Castro’s government was in clear 
opposition to any U.S. drastic military action against it. Cuba also received the benefits of 
participating in the programs of the Iberian American Secretary of Cooperation based in 
Spain and the regional dialogues between Latin America and the European Union. The 
Summits became forums in which Cuba also sought new opportunities for its opening to 
foreign investment in the 1990’s.  
Cuba’s buffering strategy raised the profile of the Caribbean as its geographic 
region based on the strong commitment of the countries of the zone to traditional notions 
of sovereignty and non interference in the internal affairs of states. Cuba played a 
contributing leadership role using sensitively the asymmetry that makes it a regional 
power in the Caribbean context, joining the Association of Caribbean States (ACS) 
created in 1994.  
Cuba is a Caribbean country but historically was more integrated to Latin 
America for cultural reasons and the fact that until the 1970’s many islands remained 




Guyana, Trinidad-Tobago and Barbados decided at unison to establish diplomatic links 
with Havana in 1972, challenging American pressures. Cuba’s disposition to engage 
pragmatically with the Caribbean nations benefitted from its use of the principle of 
peaceful coexistence later transformed in respect for ideological pluralism. During the 
1970’s, Cuba’s diplomacy presented its growing ties with the Caribbean as parts of the 
rise of the third world. Fidel Castro insisted on bridging differences between the third 
world and the Communist bloc.  
This type of policy raised suspicion among the Caribbean elites deeply connected 
to the United States and European former colonial powers. By the 1980’s Michael 
Manley’s defeat in Jamaica, the collapse of the New Jewel Movement’s Revolution in 
Grenada with the U.S. invasion in 1983 and Reagan’s initiative for the Caribbean Basin 
polarized the region. Although integration was an urgent regional goal for most of the 
small economies of the region, Cuba was perceived by many Caribbean governments as a 
Soviet ally, too insistent on pushing its radical agenda in the region and a source of 
troubles with the United States.  
The post-Cold War context opened possibilities of rapprochement between Cuba 
and its Caribbean neighbors. Caribbean nations couldn’t ignore the free fall of the Cuban 
economy and the collapse of the Cuban-Soviet alliance shifted Caribbean perceptions 




problem of regional instability if the Cuban government collapses. Caribbean countries 
preferred also to deal systematically with Cuba’s attempt to develop a competitive tourist 
industry, an economic activity in which the Caribbean business community had plenty of 
experience.  
Cuba began to collaborate with other Caribbean countries in the new security 
agenda, highlighting the Caribbean as its region, and implementing a pro-active buffering 
approach against U.S. attempts to present Havana as a regional pariah. Of great impact 
were Cuban disaster relief programs to deal with humanitarian crises in Haiti, Belize and 
several Central American countries after the devastation of several hurricanes. Cuba’s 
diplomacy also lend itself to voice regional concerns at international organizations and 
forums about central problems for small insular states such as drugs interdiction, control 
of illegal immigration, international crime, global climate change, etc. Havana, given its 
radical posturing and lack of relations with Washington was fitted better to specialize in 
such denunciatory role.  
Although the political will to re-engage Cuba existed in the Caribbean in the 
1970s, it is now perceived for the first time as the expression of a regional 
consensus- Gerardo Gonzalez wrote- that Cuba has an important role to play in 
future Caribbean integration. With a population exceeding 11 million and its 
strategic geographical location, Cuba is a geo-political and geo-economic reality 
that cannot be ignored. Accordingly, the appraisal made by business and political 
leaders of its importance for regional development stems from strategic 





In addition to its political value, the relations with the Caribbean played not minor 
role in helping Cuba’s opening to foreign investment in tourism during the 1990’s. 
Cuba’s trade with the Caribbean jumped from USD 8.6 million in 1990 to 200 million in 
1999 (Cuba y el Caribe. 2000). Joint ventures in tourism and multi-destination 
agreements were signed with several companies of the region. The region provided 
products for services associated to the tourist industry that were not available in Cuba due 
to the inefficiencies of the command economy. It also show examples of good corporate 
management and practices to emulate.  
Another advantage of Cuba’s entrance into the ACS (Association of Caribbean 
States) was its participation in the Caribbean group of the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific 
nations (ACP) that negotiated the Cottonou preferential agreements with the European 
Union. Cuba’s inclusion among the Caribbean partners of the Cottonou agreement didn’t 
provide the Cuban government with a preferential treatment by the European Union but 
expressed a regional endorsement to such aspiration. By entering into the ACP group of 
the Cottonou agreement, Havana attempted to find a venue for venting its own 
controversies with Europe in a framework that includes many developing countries. Cuba 
perceived a friendly forum for its reservations against democratic conditionality of aid, or 
what Havana describes as the imposition of western standards in issues of human rights 




The European countries however, did not fall for Cuba’s game. The European 
Union insisted on a separate agreement of Cooperation and Political dialogue. Still, 
Cuba’s participation in the ACP group buffered Cuba from U.S. most aggressive policies.  
It cannot be denied that the changes in the international arena influenced the 
formation of this regional consensus,-Gerardo Gonzalez explained- strengthening 
friendly perceptions of Cuba while moderating hostile ones. In that sense, 
economic imperatives have outranked shared political concerns arising from 
previous experience in the 1970s with regards to Cuban objectives in its relations 
with its Caribbean neighbors. In the current circumstances, a post-Cold War 
approach to Cuba is possible because it is not perceived anymore as the carrier of 
extra-regional interests (Gonzalez 2002). 
The greatest buffer political space found by the Cuban government against U.S. 
policy is the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). Created in 
2011, this political consultation mechanism gathers all the countries of the Western 
Hemisphere except Canada and the United States. It was created by a confluence of 
interests across the political Latin American spectrum and by the active initiative of 
presidents Hugo Chavez from Venezuela, Luiz Ignacio Lula de Silva from Brazil and 
Felipe Calderon from Mexico.  
By regional consensus Cuba was invited to the foundational meeting of the 
Community in Cancun, Mexico and after the first summit in Chile in 2012, Havana 
became part of the leading troika of the organization. In January 2014, Raul Castro 
welcomed in Havana all the presidents of Latin America and the Caribbean with the 




opportunity to show a country in reform. Havana got an overwhelming regional support 
against the U.S. embargo, including a commitment to include Cuba in the 2015 summit 
of the Americas in Panama. 
The dominant narrative of Cuba’s inclusion in CELAC was the formula of 
“political pluralism in international relations” and “respect for ideological differences”. 
Another evidence of how Cuba has successfully adopted an idea rejected by its diplomats 
in the 1970’s. The correlate of this formula is the permanent condemnation against U.S. 
embargo policy as illegal, immoral and counterproductive to the promotion of democracy 
and human rights.  In this way, Castro’s government has mitigated calls by different 
groups of states and organizations to liberalize and democratize its domestic 
institutions
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. Cuba has played off the democracy promotion persuasive logic of 
European and Latin American countries against the coercive actions by the United States 
on the other.  
 
                                                          
211There have been strong declarations of support for democracy and human rights in 
member countries at the Organization of Ibero-American States, the Association of 
Caribbean States, the Cuba-CARICOM cooperation agreement, and CELAC. The 
Cottonou agreement between the European Union and the developing countries of Africa, 
Asia and the Pacific includes a democratic conditionality clause by which all recipients of 
European aid have to show periodic improvements in their respective human rights 




Within this buffering framework in which the U.S embargo, not the Communist 
government, is perceived as the major obstacle for Cuba’s integration into the 
hemisphere, Cuba has been able to live with pledges to adopt democratic standards and 
human rights principles as understood by a majority of Latin American or Ibero-
American countries. The central argument of the Cuban government rests diplomatically 
on the premise that Cuba lives under conditions of emergency due to a U.S. policy that it 
is already rejected by all these organizations and the United Nations General Assembly.  
 
 
6.4.2.2 Beleaguering and transcending conflict 
Cuba’s government’s success at producing a stalemate in an unfavorable 
asymmetric conflict with the United States was the result also of two other important 
strategies: beleaguering and transcending conflict with other countries of the region.  
“Beleaguering- Chong Jo Ian wrote-  is a strategy where states aim to undermine 
the influence and authority of the more powerful as well as their ability to exercise power 
through disruption for the purposes of gaining concessions” (Chong 2003, 12). 
Beleaguering is a strategy that has always been in Cuba’s arsenal versus the U.S. led 




Raul Castro frequently said about a conflict with the United States: “The best way 
Cuba wins a war against the United States is by avoiding it”. The end of Soviet support 
forced Fidel Castro to be selective on differentiating the areas in which Cuba could resist 
U.S. global hegemony and those of high risk for Cuban national security in which he 
opted for hiding or transcending conflict to avoid a clash that could have disastrous 
consequences for the CCP rule.  
Beleaguering with states in conflict with the United States and transcending 
security issues that entailed a high security risk of a military conflict with the dominant 
superpower were part of a combined strategy. I will discuss them separately but both 
strategies act in unison. They coincide in time and one could not succeed without the 
other. Beleaguering provides political allies for pro-active initiatives to prevent U.S. 
encirclement. Transcending security conflicts by endorsing international norms and 
agreements mitigated the one-party-system’s conflict with democratic principles of 
international legitimacy.  
Dealing with issues associated to anti-narcotics interdiction, nuclear proliferation 
and terrorism, Cuba had constantly offered guarantees to the successive U.S. 
Administrations of a non hostile attitude and restraint.  Havana decided to transcend 
conflict with the United States and its allies in these high risk topics. Cuba’s foreign 




offered help to the U.S. Southern Command and Coast Guard in anti-narcotics 
interdiction and operations against international criminals trying to infiltrate the United 
Sates at its southern coasts.Cuba’s positive attitude toward international security regimes 
lowered its place in the U.S. and international security agenda. Hence it provides a 
normative shield against any drastic military action by the United States
212
. 
One area in which Cuba developed sustained efforts to transcend conflict with 
anti-terrorism. The purpose was to undermine any legitimacy of Cuba’s presence in the 
U.S. State Department list of terrorism sponsoring nations. Cuba was added to the list on 
1982. At that time the argument was that Cuba was deeply involved in providing 
weapons through Nicaragua to the Marxist insurgencies in Guatemala and Nicaragua. 
Later other elements would be added by American diplomats such as the refuge provided 
                                                          
212The shutdown of the two civilian small planes belonging to the Cuban anti-Castro 
group Brothers to the Rescue (BTR) was the historical exception that confirmed the rule. 
BTR had entered several times into Cuban national airspace to throw anti-government 
leaflets in Havana. The government warned the United States against these actions in 
violation of Cuban sovereignty and international civil aviation norms. In February 24, 
1996 in coincidence with a large meeting of Cuban opposition groups BTR entered 
Cuban airspace and in its way out two Cuban military planes Migs shoot them down in 
what was reported as international space. The case was taken into the United Nations 
Security Council and the Clinton Administration discussed the possibility of airstrikes 
against Cuba in the National Security Council. The Clinton Administration opted for 
accepting the call by the Security Council to an investigation of the International Agency 
for Civil Aviation and the president signed the Helms-Burton law in the heat of American 
condemnation to the excessive use of force by the Cuban government. Castro later sent a 
message to Bill Clinton saying that the shutdown of the planes was the result of “a 
mistake”. According to Clinton the incident cancelled the possibility of a major move by 




by Cuba as part of an agreement with Spain to members of the Basque separatist group 
Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) and the presence in Cuba of guerrillas associated to the 
FARC (Colombia’s Revolutionary Armed Forces).  
Since 1992, the United States has not presented any substantive evidence to 
justify Cuba’s inclusion on the list. Most observers attribute the inclusion to reasons of 
American domestic politics related to Florida and Cold War inertia. In fact, most State 
Department reports about terrorism seem to present arguments not to keep Cuba on the 
list but to take it off (State 2014). When finally the State Department took Cuba off the 
list in 2015, the majority of the states, allies and rivals of the United States, and also 
American officials were referring to the issue as an anachronism.  
Cuba followed a similar strategy towards the international regime of non nuclear 
proliferation, another security priority for the United States. U.S. labeled Cuba with the 
ideological construction of a “rogue state”, a category that supposed to focus on three 
areas (weapons of mass destruction proliferation, gross human rights violations and 
terrorism), placed the island in a collective identity that Havana rejects. By collaborating 
with the hemispheric regime against nuclear proliferation and joining the Tlatelolco 
agreement, and cooperating with anti-terrorism efforts, Cuba outmaneuvered U.S. 




By the 1990’s Cuba transformed most of its military cooperation and intervention 
in security conflicts into a civil effort to cope with issues of the new security agenda, 
such as pandemics and natural disasters. This transition to civilian assistance brought 
Cuba important acclaim from American allies in Europe (Norway sponsors part of Cuba’ 
medical brigade in Haiti) and eventually as in the case of the Ebola pandemics in West 
Africa in 2014 some recognition by American officials (Secretary John Kerry and 
Ambassador Samantha Power). During the years of the Bush Administration, the United 
States tried to undermine Cuba’s influence in the world throughout the medical missions 
by promoting a program of defection
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 among the Cuban doctors and nurses. Although 
the program achieved the defection of less than five percent of the Cuban health 
personnel, it essentially put Washington at odds with Cuban aid recipient countries. 
If in the high security areas of nuclear non proliferation and terrorism Cuba has 
pursued a strategy of transcending conflicts, in areas of democratization and human 
rights, Havana has preferred one of beleaguering with opponents to the U.S. led liberal 
world order. Cuba’s main coordination of strategies with these countries was at the 
diplomatic level, particularly in the human rights agenda and denouncing the double 
standards applied to them in several topics from human rights and anti-terrorism to 
nuclear proliferation. Early at the commission of Human Rights and later in the Council, 
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Cuba coordinated a favorable coalition that prevented a condemnation of the Cuban 
regime.  
Combining diplomatic skills and an active effort in Global health in dozens of 
underdeveloped countries, Cuba managed to be elected member of the Human Rights 
Commission and later of the Council.  By the early 2000’s, Cuba was playing a leading 
role in attracting some third world countries to an alliance with Russia and China with the 
purpose of limiting the the scope for international supervision of human rights at the 
domestic level. By beleaguering with Russia, China, Iran and other states with an illiberal 
agenda, Cuba and those states disrupted the consolidation of a reading of human rights 
norms that tried to redefine sovereignty adding international supervision without the 
consent of the supervised state.  
In Latin America, the creation of CELAC and a new discussion within it of the 
human rights issues, Cuba contributed to disrupt the hegemonic liberal consensus 
sponsored by the United States throughout the OAS. The greatest success of Cuban 
diplomacy in beleaguering was the creation of the Bolivarian Alternative for the 
Americas (ALBA). This organization emanated from the alliance between Cuba and 
Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela. The two countries used this organization to profit politically 




The ALBA project was originally understood by its opposition to the Free Trade 
Area of the Americas (FTAA), a project associated to U.S. hegemony and the OAS. 
ALBA and other institutions serve the purpose of undermining American leadership in 
the region and increasing the bargaining power of the radical left bloc. Two of these other 
institutions are Telesur and PetroCaribe. Telesur, an international channel owned by 
some of the countries of the bloc, mainly Cuba, Argentina and Venezuela, imitates the 
successes of Al Jazeera in the Middle East. PetroCaribe is an energy based agreement for 
the countries of the Caribbean basin with oil rich Venezuela as its spine.  
ALBA represented a launching platform for an agenda against U.S. hegemony in 
the hemisphere. It was proposed first by Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez at the 
Summit of the Association of Caribbean States in 2001 in Margarita. It was finally signed 
in Havana in December 2004 by Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez who called it also the 
Trade treaty of the peoples of Our America (A title that comes from an essay by Cuban 
nationalist founding father Jose Marti).  Between its creation and 2013, the organization 
grew from two to eight members (Bolivia, 2006, Nicaragua, 2007, Dominica, 2008, 
Antigua y Barbuda, 2009, Ecuador, 2009, and St. Vincent and Granadines, 2009). There 




than a year under Manuel Zelaya’s government (2005-2009) who was overthrown by a 
military coup in July 2009
214
.  
Cuba’s leadership in ALBA increased its role in the hemispheric agenda because 
the ALBA placed the rejection of the U.S. embargo and Cuba’s exclusion from the 
hemispheric organization at the center of the inter-American discussion of the Summits 
of Americas. The group coordinated opposition against the FTAA and pushed for the 
creation of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. In CELAC and the 
OAS, the ALBA countries acted as a bloc increasing the impact of their diplomatic 
positions. Simultaneously Cuba has used ALBA to institutionalize its medical, 
educational and sports cooperation with the region obtaining significant cash for the 
services provided to other countries. Cuba also has used ALBA as a hinge to connect 
some Latin American states with powers and countries outside the region with historical 
connections with Havana since the Cold War such as the PRC, Russia, Vietnam, Angola, 
South Africa, Algeria, Syria, Iran and others.  
One of Cuba’s new most active engagements was with the Holy See. In parallel to 
a dialogue with the Cuban Roman Catholic Church, the Cuban government engaged in a 
permanent conversation with Popes John Paul II, Benedict XVI, and Francis I about 
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(Americas. 2006)A more critical view can be found at Hirst, Joel, “What is the Bolivarian 




humanitarian issues related to the conditions of political prisoners, family reunifications, 
travel to Cuba by Cubans living in South Florida and limited to do so after the 1994 
rafters’ crisis.  
Pope Francis I was instrumental on promoting the negotiations between Cuba and 
the United States that ended in the re-establishment of diplomatic relations. As it has 
been revealed by Madeleine Albright at her memoirs, John Paul II, and Vatican 
diplomacy actively played a communication role between the higher echelons of the 
Cuban and American government (Albright 2003). The Vatican welcomes this new role 
that highlighted its moral stature. Using two Papal trips to the island in 1998, 2010, and 
2015; Cuba rebutted the image of a country frozen in the Cold War, highlighting the 
space available to freedom of religion, diplomatic engagement and moral dialogue. 
Vatican engagement with Cuba also served to spark actions and declarations against the 
embargo by the influential American Roman Catholic Church.  
Transcending Conflicts: 
A less visible strategy but far more consequential for Cuba’s national security was 
one targeted to transcend potential areas of high risk conflict with the United States such 
as nuclear proliferation, or lack of cooperation in anti- terrorism, and drug interdiction. 




discussed in his work about the contradictions between historical reality and neo realist 
theory. Schroeder defined the transcending strategy as: 
attempting to surmount international anarchy and go beyond the normal limits of 
conflictual politics to solve the problem, end the threat and prevent its recurrence 
through some institutional arrangement involving an international consensus or 
formal agreement on norms, rules and procedures for these purposes (Schroeder 
1994, 117) 
 
One of the most important actions in the strategy of transcending conflicts was 
Cuba’s decision to fully cooperate with the non-nuclear proliferation international 
regime. Beginning in the 1990’s with its new attitude towards the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty and the Denuclearization in Latin America treaty of Tlatelolco, Cuba 
subscribed actively several international non-nuclear proliferation, anti-terrorism, and 
human rights agreements.  
This was a significant change in Cuban diplomacy. Since the beginning of the 
discussion of regional initiatives against nuclear weapons, Cuba declared its sympathy for 
the non-proliferation agenda but rejected how it was promoted. Havana argued lack of 
reciprocity and sovereign equality. During the sixties, seventies and eighties, Cuba 
clashed with Mexico’s efforts to promote regional denuclearization in Latin America 





From a hard defense of the principle of equal sovereignty, Havana insisted that 
the NPT contained unacceptable hierarchical privileges for great powers allowing them a 
right to preserve their nuclear military arsenal. Castro also criticized that the Latin 
America denuclearized zone allows the great powers, specifically the United States, to 
transport Nuclear weapons throughout the region. As a condition to sign the treaty in the 
name of Cuba, Fidel Castro demanded a commitment by nuclear powers to never use 
nuclear weapons against any member country of the Tlatelolco Treaty.   
Jorge Dominguez (J. I. Dominguez 1989)had identified Cuba’s attitude towards 
the Tlatelolco Treaty as one of the most important differences between Havana and 
Moscow in their policies towards Latin America in the sixties, seventies and eighties. 
While the Soviet Union considered the treaty and its protocols I and II positive steps for 
international peace, Cuba rejected to sign up them at least unless the United States 
committed itself not to deploy nuclear weapons in the Panama Canal Zone, Puerto Rico, 
the Virgin Islands, Guantanamo and any U.S. military base in Latin America and the 
Caribbean.  
But by 1992 during the first Ibero-American Summit of Heads of State and 
Government, Cuba announced its intention to sign the Tlatelolco treaty. One year later, 
Cuba stop the construction of its first nuclear power plant and never went back to build it 




president Vladimir Putin offered in 2001 to finish it as part of a renewed Russia-Cuba 
cooperation.  
In 1995, Cuba signed the Tlatelolco treaty as the last Latin American country to 
do so.  In October 23, 2002 Cuba submitted its ratification in Mexico. The diplomatic 
move included the ratification in November of the same year of the non-proliferation 
treaty in Moscow. Cuban Ambassador Carlos Palmarola ratified Havana’s denunciation 
against Washington’s lack of commitment to not attack Cuba under any circumstances 
(Arms Control Association 2002). Cuba’s actions were part of a well timed diplomatic 
act. 2002 was the fortieth anniversary of the Missile Crisis when the world was at the 
verge of total nuclear destruction.  
The transcending conflict strategy also included some unilateral confidence 
building measures. Since 1993, Cuba began to invite delegations of retired American 
military to visit Havana and exchange views with members of the upper echelon of the 
Cuban Armed Forces. The FAR created the Center for Security Studies (CES), a think 
tank leaded by retired generals including the former chief of the military intelligence, 
Division General Jesus Bermudez.  In addition to its role preserving Cuba’s military 
memories about the conflict with the United States, CES hosted former military visitors 
from the U.S. and other countries with which the U.S has good relationships such as 




international security and confidence building measures to transmit the United States and 
others in the region a message of trust about Cuban Armed Forces military capabilities 
and lack of interest on getting weapons of mass destruction.   
Havana approved conversations with the U.S. military about avoiding accidents 
and unwanted confrontation around the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo. By the end of the 
Clinton Administration, Cuban and American Coast Guard began to cooperate in their 
patrol missions in the Strait of Florida. When the United States sent prisoners from the 
war on terrorism to Guantanamo, Raul Castro, then minister of the Armed Forces made 
clear on a speech that although Cuba rejected the presence of a U.S naval base in its 
territory, it will return to the United States any escapee from the prisoners’ camp.  
Raul Castro also reiterated Cuba’s disposition to raise the level of the dialogue 
and cooperation in the security realm, against terrorism. By opening informal and formal 
channels of communications with the U.S military, Havana send clear signals to the 
American security establishment about its acknowledgement of a security hierarchy in 
the hemisphere. Retired U.S. military personnel got access to military and biological 
centers denounced by Cuban exile groups as capable of developing biological weapons to 
confirm that Cuba was not involved in a any effort of this kind.  
The creation of these informal communications channels created a pro-




including former Chiefs of the Southern Command, Charles Wilhelm and Barry 
McCaffrey, who also served as Clinton anti-drugs czar had been outspoken in favor of 
not treating Cuba as a military threat and even to take Cuba out of the list of nations 
sponsoring nations of the State Department. Some of the military who participated in 
these exchanges such as Lawrence Wilkerson (Lopez-Levy and Wilkerson, the Havana 
Note 2011), former chief of staff of General Colin Powell, and retired Army General 
David Adams (Jones 2012) became advocates of a new engagement policy towards Cuba. 
Cuba’s acceptance of the Non-nuclear proliferation regime responded to the 
priority the issue has in Washington’s security policy but the government presented it as a 
goodwill gesture to Latin America. Havana was insistent on avoiding conflict with the 
United States related to weapons of mass destruction. The move proved to be a clever 
understanding of American foreign policy making after the end of the Cold War. During 
the George W. Bush Administration neoconservative foreign policy hawks such as Roger 
Noriega, Elliot Abrams and John Bolton tried to present Cuba together with Syria and 
Libya as part of a second tier of the so called “Axis of evil”
215
.  
John Bolton was particularly active in pushing an anti-Cuba position into the 
nonproliferation agenda. Just the day before the beginning of President James Carter’s 
visit to Cuba in 2002, Mr. Bolton, then Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and 
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International Security accused Cuba of developing a biological weapons capability in a 
speech at the Heritage Foundation. Bolton claimed that most previous analysis about 
Cuba’s offensive biological weapons capabilities underestimated the threat Cuba posed to 
the United States.  
Bolton’s accusations were dismissed by the global and hemispheric arms control 
global epistemic community. The accusation fails flat when former President James 
Carter said in Havana that his State Department preparation briefing contains no mention 
about biological weapons. Even Bolton’s chief, Secretary of State Colin Powell did not 
endorse the ambassador’s accusations. Powell just said that Cuba has a research capacity 
that can be potentially used to produce biological weapons, something that many 
countries in the world possessed.   
Mr. Bolton’s manipulation eventually backfired when Senator Christopher Dodd 
(D-Conn) called him to testify under oath at the hemispheric affairs subcommittee of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Secretary Powell decided to send Assistant 
Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Carl Ford (Sub-Committee on Western 
Hemisphere, Peace Corps and Narcotics. 2002) because he claimed that Mr. Bolton was 
not the proper official to testify on the matter of Cuba’s biological weapons capabilities. 




consensus(The Nuclear Threat Initiative 2013) :  Cuba obeyed its ratification of the 
Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention in 1976
216
.   
Another area in which Cuba moved to transcend conflict was anti-terrorist 
cooperation. Together with Great Britain at the time presiding the U.N. Security Council, 
Cuba ratified all the twelve U.N major conventions on terrorism less than one month after 
September 11, 2001. This is another area in which Cuba’s narrative of acceptance of 
ideological pluralism in international affairs bear fruits. After 1991, Cuba began a long 
cooperation with the government of Colombia to mediate agreements with the insurgent 
groups. In the case of Spain, Cuba cooperated with the Spanish government’s monitoring 
of members of ETA.  
 
6.5 Conclusions 
All these adaptation strategies undermined U.S. discourse about Cuba as a threat 
to the international system and a remnant of the Cold War. Most countries identified 
American effort to isolate Cuba as driven not by U.S. national security interests but by 
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Mr. Bolton’s nomination for U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Mr. Ford accused Mr. Bolton 
of bullying an analyst in the State Department in pursuit of information to confirm his 
accusations. Mr. Bolton served as U.S. ambassador to the U.N as a recess appointee but 





Florida politics. This reality made any coordination of collective sanctions against Cuba 
almost impossible and lowered U.S. conflict with Cuba in the American hierarchy of 
security issues to discuss in the U.N and other international forums. These differences 
placed Cuba in its own category, apart from other countries labeled as rogue by 
Washington’s security establishment. Cuba is/was as a United States’ rival but inserted 
positively in its own geostrategic region: Latin America.  
Cuba’s adaptation strategies had a constitutive effect on its foreign policy identity. 
By adopting the language of ideological pluralism in the global arena, Cuba acquired new 
identities and drops some previous ones. Accepting great powers hierarchy in the nuclear 
proliferation issue affected Cuba’s policymaking and narrative since it created a 
precedent useful for a potential acknowledgement for deference arrangement to the 
asymmetric conflict.  
Using strategies such as buffering and beleaguering with countries of the region 
with different political systems and transcending conflict, Cuba began to act more as a 
stakeholder of the international system than as a revisionist revolutionary state. Its 
discourse about the nonproliferation regime, human rights, and terrorism became less 






Chapter Seven:  U.S-Cuba Asymmetric Relations: Breaking the Stalemate 
7.1 Introduction 
The history of the last fifty years of conflict between Cuba and the United States 
has been written many times. This is not the space to discuss the origins of the U.S. 
embargo against Cuba or Cuban response from 1959 to 1991. The emphasis of this 
chapter is on the changes in the conflict after the end of the Cold War and after the 
presidential succession from Fidel Castro to Raul Castro.  Which new features of the 
bilateral relationship emerged in the last decade in parallel to the processes of economic 
reform and political liberalization in Cuba? Which dynamics led to the establishment of 
diplomatic relations in December 17, 2014?   
The chapter analyzes how the asymmetric relations structure between Cuba and 
the United States matured for a minimal compromise in which Presidents Raul Castro 
and Barack Obama agreed to restore diplomatic relations. For the last five decades Cuba 
and the United States engaged in an asymmetrical conflict (Womack 2006) in which 
Cuba as the smaller side demonstrated its capabilities to survive. By achieving this 
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The stalemate altered U.S foreign policy makers’ cost-benefit strategic calculation 
about their policy towards Cuba in the context of American global grand strategy. This 
new calculation took into account the irrational cost of the U.S. embargo in hegemonic 
prestige and soft power. It made possible a change from an imperial/coercive approach to 
a persuasive/hegemonic one. The stalemate also altered the strategic calculation of Cuban 
policy makers in Havana because they understood that the options of a partial 
dismantlement of the embargo from the executive branch could generate more positive 
dynamics for the bilateral relations than a maximalist position of pursuing only a total 
dismantlement of the illegal embargo/blockade before the restoration of relations.  
During the last two decades, Cuba and its ties with the United States were not 
frozen in the Cold War.  On the contrary, relations between the two countries became 
                                                                                                                                                                             
is incapable of destroying the larger capacity of the opponent, and A (the great power) 
cannot force a conclusion because the limited resources it can commit cannot sustain 
submission by B, then a situation of asymmetric stalemate exists. Like asymmetric 
hostility itself, stalemate can be either “hot” or “cold.” Hot stalemate involvescontinuous 
military confrontation, but with the gradual realization that a military breakthrough is 
highly unlikely. If the relationship between A and B is hostile but they are not at war, 
then cold stalemate would imply that neither side expects that their posture of hostility 
will change the opposition of the other side…. 
From the subjective perspective of the antagonists, stalemate seems to last forever 
because there is no prospect for a unilateral resolution of the conflict. But not all 
stalemates are hopeless. Stalemate creates two conditions necessary for an eventual 
negotiated settlement. First, the situation of stalemate is lose-lose, although the nature 
and scale of the losses are different on each side in an asymmetric stalemate. Secondly, 
the illusions of winning have withered. If neither side can compel the other and time is on 
no one’s side, then negotiation is a reasonable step, even with an enemy”. (Womack, 




more dynamic, plural and fluid despite the reinforcement of the embargo policy. A series 
of social interactions between the two states and societies were influential in shaping 
their construction of a new bilateral dyad and the images about each other. As Womack 
defines in cases of asymmetric stalemate; “illusions of winning have withered” 
(Womack, Asymmetry and International Relationships 2016).  
In Cuba there was a conviction that as long as the United States do not 
acknowledge Cuban sovereignty, there was no alternative but to resist.  Resistance to 
American hubris brings intangible benefits to the Cuban government such as international 
revolutionary solidarity, symbolic respect and opportunities to crash opposition forces as 
long as they don’t take distance from the embargo/blockade policy. On the other hand, 
the burden of resistance against American hostility in terms of economic and democratic 
development is high, including the permanent uncertainty that a policy mistake might be 
fatal. Domestic political conflicts are always aggravated by the role of United States’ 
hostility. Leaders of the communist party were convinced of the convenience of 
accelerating a potential agreement at the moment of economic reform and inter-
generational leadership transition.  
Stalemate was not an urgent situation for the United States. According to U.S. 
documents, American policy makers recognized since 1968 in a very explicit document 




by sanctions were very remote. But a combination of the international consequences, in 
terms of Great Power prestige, of ending hostility while Cuba had a major role in Africa 
and Central America with the diminishing role after the Cold War of Cuba in American 
security strategy together with the increasing role of Florida in national elections allowed 
the illusions of victory to persist in the margin. These “illusions” were severely hit by the 
tranquility of the intra-generational succession from Fidel Castro to Raul Castro at the 
presidency and the launching of the processes of economic reform and political 
liberalization after 2009. It was clear that the stalemate and its costs for American grand 
strategy could rise easily for at least the next decade, in the presence of a new regional 
scenario more favorable to Cuba and the rise of American strategic rivals in China and 
Russia with vigorous diplomatic efforts towards the Western hemisphere.  
This chapter highlights the starting point of hostile impasse (stalemate) from 
which U.S.-Cuba relations began the post-Cold War period. American Cold War policy 
constructed an official response to a radical variant of Cuban nationalism in what U.S. 
policymakers saw as their backyard. The pro-embargo forces in the United States 
transformed into laws in 1992, 1996, and 2000 the executive and presidential regulations 
that codified an imperial coercive policy towards Cuba during the Cold War. This historic 
reality granted the continuity of premises and the constraints for change in the culture and 




institutionalization of structures for resistance on the Cuban side. Cuba approved laws for 
the explicit purpose of defeating U.S. designs.  
After the Cold War, the United States Congress passed laws not just to impose a 
regime change policy against the Cuban government but to proof such strategy against an 
American president with a different approach to Cuba
218
. The new phase of the conflict 
(1992-2014) carried on the legacy of the Cold War, but it was not a continuation of such 
previous era. Before 1992, American policy was hostile to the Cuban government but the 
president had all discretion for compromise without the end of the Cuban government.   
The current framework of the conflict was shaped in the nineties when the United 
States foreign policy establishment lost attention on the Cuban issue allowing domestic 
groups with a hostility agenda prevail over national strategy concerns
219
. In response, the 
Cuban government set an institutional-political course punishing harshly any 
collaboration with the Helms law. The most important of this legislation is the law 88 
(1999) of the protection of National Independence and Cuban economy. The law was 
                                                          
218William Leogrande and Peter Kornbluh have discussed this issue in her article “The 
Real Reason it is nearly impossible to end the Cuban Embargo” (Leogrande and 
Kornbluh 2014) 
 
219Patrick Haney, Walt Vanderbush and Phillip Brenner explained this transformation 
through the concept of “intermestic interests”. This definition refers to the emergence of 
foreign policy lobbies that construct American national interest” based on their power 




invoked as an emergency measure by Fidel Castro who warned about the proliferation of 
opposition groups financially supported by the U.S. government directly or indirectly.  
Law 88 doesn’t exist in separation but connected to a system of national security 
legislation at the core of Cuba’s constitutional structure as a national security state. It 
regulated a system of political vigilance against any American plan targeted to subvert 
the current political system or any attempt to organize the political opposition to the CCP. 
The harsher measures are reserved for those who favor the U.S embargo but served to 
harass any Cubans who disagree with the CCP even if opposed to the U.S. embargo.  
Continuity in American disrespect towards Cuban sovereignty since 1898 and 
Cuba’s responses to the United States qualifies the presumption that the conflict persists 
due to the strength of the Cuban American anti-normalization lobby in South Florida. 
This lobby didn’t consolidate as an autonomous domestic force in American politics until 
the end of the Reagan Administration. The hostility between the U.S. and Cuba existed 
before the creation of the Cuban American pro-embargo lobby and at times, it was 
strengthened when the influence of the lobby declined, as it was the case during the 
Clinton Administration.   
The Cuban American pro-embargo lobby had a considerable influence but its 
reach would be far less in other foreign policy and national security culture. Structural 




of U.S. policy towards Cuba. Among these features a short list will include: United 
States’ foreign policy culture of maximalism (Sestanovich 2014), particularly in the 
Caribbean, in which anything short of absolute victory was always difficult to sell 
domestically, the wide definition of security and American mission in the world, and the 
pluralistic opening to the influence and leverage of ethnic lobbies in the post-Cold War 
context. These factors amplified the pro-embargo voices that articulated its demands with 
other interests and discourses. 
It is important to look not only at causal questions (why) but also to constitutive 
mechanisms (how possible) (Hopf 1998) to explain how the pro-embargo lobby built its 
control over institutions and ideas that empowered its leverage in the process of 
“producing and reproducing the identity of American foreign policy” (Campbell 1992). 
Due to the interests of this lobby on an uncompromising total defeat of Cuba’s 
revolutionary process, not on launching a democratic process, American policy has been 
a persistent contributor to Cuba’s partial reform equilibrium. Until December 17, 2014, 
American foreign policy did not pursue the deepening of Cuba’s economic reform and 
political liberalization but the failure of these two processes and the collapse of the CCP 
regime. The persistence of the imperial policy versus nationalist resistance dispute at the 




The second part of the chapter emphasized that the sovereignty conflict between 
United States and Cuba can be stabilized with an Acknowledgment for Deference 
solution
220
  but will not be likely solved without a change on the identity of at least one of 
the actors and this is unlikely in the short or medium term.   
Economic reform and political liberalization does not amount to an end of the 
nationalist identity or the internationalist revolutionary impulse. Washington’s 
hierarchical paradigm for its relations with Cuba and Cuba’s revolutionary identity 
collide structurally. The rise of a less doctrinaire generation of Cuban leaders does not 
represent the end of a revolutionary post-totalitarian nationalist definition of Cuban 
interests domestically or in the international arena. As long as the United States has a 
policy of regime change with or without the embargo, Cuba will seek to counter-balance 
                                                          
220I focused on the analysis of different variants of acknowledgment for deference (AFD) 
solutions because these ones don’t predict a drastic change in the nature of the actors, 
American hegemonic presumption in the Caribbean and Cuba’s nationalist aspiration to a 
full sovereign status. There are others less likely scenarios given the “Lockean” culture 
(Wendt 1999) of the international system but still plausible such as the use by the U.S. of 
military force or the success of sanctions and coercion to submitCuba to U.S. mandates. 
Another possible scenario although not probable is that an increasingly tired and 
isolationist U.S. abandon any hope of shaping Cuba’s policies and judge Cuba is not 
worthy of all the attention dedicated to change its regime. This scenario of neglect is 
plausible although not probable in a Donald Trump’s administration. For an exceptional 
defense of the isolationism argument see Eric Nordlinger’s book Isolationism 





American preponderance with alliances with Russia, China, Brazil, possibly India and 
even other regional alternative powers such as Iran, Venezuela or Algeria.  
An American shift from an imperial coercive policy towards one of a persuasive 
hegemonic character can stabilize the asymmetric conflict within a peaceful structure but 
in Cuban revolutionary view, anything less than equal sovereignty
221
 does not amount to 
“normal” relations. More business, travel, market homogeneity and interdependence do 
not solve the incompatibility between U.S strategic great power aspiration to lead a 
liberal world order and Cuba’s revolutionary views about an international system without 
hierarchies. In virtue of its identity as a revolutionary state, Cuba is at times a cause, not a 
country. In response, American foreign policy dominant mindset
222
 had conceived regime 
change not only as convenient and proper policy, either by hostility or rapprochement. 
                                                          
221Equal sovereignty is not the same as equal status. Fidel Castro expressed conscience of 
the asymmetry of power and acknowledged the special status of Great Powers in the 
international system when subscribing the non-nuclear proliferation treaties and other 
international instruments that reserved some privileges for the permanent five members 
of the Security Council.    
 
222There are several cases in which the United States as a country has adopted by law a 
policy of regime change in ways that are in violation of  international law: Cuba (Helms-
Burton law), Iraq under Saddam Hussein (1998 Iraqi Freedom Act), the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, Syria, and Libya. Notice that these are examples of countries in which Congress 
without declaring war against another country established a set of regulations by which 
every U.S. foreign policy action must include a direct component of regime change. This 
is obviously different from executive covert operation of the kind conducted against 




But this structural continuity should not let us to forget important changes. Cuba’s 
economic reform and political liberalization activated important anti-embargo forces in 
the U.S. foreign policy making process: a) the business community, b) humanitarian, pro-
business and trade groups within the Cuban American community, c) segments of the 
human rights and pro-democracy community who see political liberalization and 
economic reform as steps to democratization in the logic of modernization theory, d) 
trends towards market homogeneity and interdependence that exacerbate the 
contradictions of the hegemonic paradox and costs for U.S. foreign policy grand strategy. 
On the other hand, a Cuba attempting to build a friendly international environment to its 
economic reform needs stability in its state-state bilateral relations and a general attitude 
favorable to global markets stability, precisely the opposite of what a revolutionary actor 
would desire.   
The appearance of these factors at both shores of the strait of Florida provides 
opportunities for shifts on the American debate about U.S. policy towards Cuba and 
Cuba’s views about opportunities in its relations with the United States. It also makes 
possible the appearances of logics of understanding, alter-casting and empathy between 
Cuban and American elites.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
during the Cold War in which there was a policy to cultivate a change of government or 
system in the countries behind the Iron Curtain by interacting with their elites and 




Under those circumstances, a definitive AFD arrangement is more elusive than 
conflict stabilization in asymmetrical contexts. There is a culture of conflict in which 
structures of hostility and separation are solidly in place.  Diplomacy understood as a key 
institution in the sense described by the English School was constrained until the recent 
opening of embassies in their capitals (July 20, 2015). American statecraft is still placed 
by law and design at the service of removing from power the current Cuban elite. Cuba’s 
statecraft was designed by Fidel Castro’s historic generation to resist and fight American 
imperial designs.  
Stabilization, as a different stage from AFD solution is still an improvement from 
the current situation of conflicted asymmetrical impasse. It has important unlocking 
consequences for the partial reform dynamics and Cuba’s foreign policy behavior due to 
its empowerment of development oriented politicians within the Cuban elites. At the end 
of the chapter, I will summarize the centrality of the ties and conflict with the U.S in the 
design of Cuban foreign relations. 
 
7.2 Brief historical review: From the beginnings of the Cuban Revolution to 
the fall of the Communist Bloc 
The history of the last two centuries of Cuba-United States relations played a 




countries. It is important to look not only at the content of the conflict but also at the level 
of attention dedicated to it by each side.  
Cuba was a security priority for American Foreign Policy and an issue in 
American domestic politics
223
during the whole XIX century. The Monroe Doctrine 
expressed American security worries about Cuba changing hands from Spain to a more 
powerful European power (France, Germany, or the U.K).  American elites solved the 
issue with the Spanish-Cuban-American war of 1898, considered by Secretary of State 
John Hay a “splendid little war”. After the war, the United States discussed Cuba in the 
context of Washington’s policy towards the Western Hemisphere and the relevance given 
to the region in U.S. global strategy.  
The United States has been a central actor in Cuba’s politics since their formation. 
In the second half of the XIX century, the United States was an alternative republican 
model to the failed Latin American republics and Spanish colonial order.  The 
neighborliness of the American society influenced the formation and development of 
Cuban nationhood (Perez, On Becoming Cuban 2000). The Cuban Republic was born in 
1902 marked by the subordination to Washington’s tutelage but, the birth of the Cuban 
                                                          
223American history is generally taught from a perspective that based the origins of the 
nation in the North Atlantic coast but cities like St. Augustine and New Orleans existed 
before several of those that later constituted the Confederation and later the Union. 
Cuba’s colonial history and Spanish policy of alliances and conflicts in Europe and the 
Caribbean played an important role in the destinies of Florida and Louisiana as Spanish 




republic represented the defeat not only of Spanish colonialism but also of a strong pro-
U.S. annexationist movement.  
The 1902 independence left three problems that fed Cuban nationalism along the 
first third of the XX century: The Platt Amendment as an affront to Cuban sovereignty, 
the naval base in Guantanamo, and the occupation for two decades of the Island of Pines. 
From the perspective of its foreign relations, republican Cuba’s history before 1959 is 
divided in 1933-1934 when the Platt Amendment was derogated after a revolution 
overthrew Dictator Gerardo Machado. Before 1933 the political system consisted of a 
traditional two party system with a Conservative and a liberal party. The possibility of an 
American intervention authorized by the Platt Amendment was an intrinsic challenge 
embedded into the political calculation of all factors.  
The transition to the second republic began with the government of the one 
hundred days in September 1933. President Ramon Grau declared the Platt Amendment 
abolished. The Roosevelt Administration did not recognize the revolutionary 
government. In 1934 after president Grau’s revolutionary government was removed by 
Colonel Batista’s coup, the United States reached an agreement with the successor 
government to abolish the Platt Amendment. The post-revolutionary order expanded 
Cuba’s sovereignty reinforced institutionally by the adoption of a new constitution in 




overthrew President Carlos Prio ending the short, meaningful but troublesome twelve 
years democratic experience.   
In all these events, the United States played a major role, either by action, reaction 
or indifference. The abolition of the Platt Amendment placed the asymmetrical relation 
on new bases because it ended the 1902 imposed legality of U.S. interference in Cuba’s 
internal affairs. Yet American diplomats and government continued to have major 
influence in Cuba’s domestic politics.  
The post 1934 order strengthened nationalism by creating educational, political 
and economic institutions destined to promote Cuban culture and interests not necessarily 
in conflict but independent from the United States. The birth of the second republic in 
1940 represented a more modern and less controlling asymmetry between Cuba and the 
United States, but still one of subordination. The period 1940-1947 represented a 
balancing juncture for U.S.-Cuba relations since the United States as a great power 
focused in the global theater of the Second World War but gave positive attention to 
Cuba as a reliable sugar supplying partner for the anti-Fascism effort (Pettina 2011).  
This situation changed with the beginning of the Cold War. The United States 
concentrated its efforts in Europe and East Asia, lowering Latin America priority in its 
grand strategy. George Kennan designed a policy based on a strict anti-communist 




anticommunist military dictatorship (Pettina 2011). Washington’s lesser attention to Cuba 
and effective global power status translated into tensions for U.S.-Cuba asymmetrical 
relations during the Carlos Prio’s government (1948-1952). The conflict was one of the 
factors that favored the emergence of the Batista Dictatorship (1952-1958) pretending to 
solve the contradiction by aligning and subordinating Cuba’s foreign policy to U.S. 
global anticommunist grand strategy.  
After Fidel Castro’s revolution triumph in 1959 the clashes between American 
hegemonic presumption in the Western Hemisphere and Cuba’s aspiration to full 
sovereignty led to an asymmetric conflict that still persists. Earl Smith, the last U.S. 
Ambassador to Cuba during the Fulgencio Batista’s dictatorship described his role by 
saying that the American Ambassador before Castro “was the second man in importance 
in Cuba, sometimes even more important than the president” (U.S Senate Committee on 
the Judiciary. n.d., 700). American policymakers began from the premise of an 
unbounded hierarchical order with the United States as the superpower in the Western 
Hemisphere and Cuba constrained to be a subordinated follower.  
Cuban revolutionaries proposed an alternative narrative: Cuba was an 
independent country; Havana should agree with the United States only when it promoted 
Cuban national interests. The revolutionaries felt frustrated with Cuba’s dependence from 




nationalists had insisted on the importance of diversification of foreign ties and trade as 
the wisest policy. The international system provided them with some significant 
opportunities after 1959. The Cuban revolution was part of a Latin American awakening 
rejecting anti-communist dictatorships favored by the Eisenhower administration. The 
post-Second World War order brought about decolonization and the birth of new African 
and Asian states. Cuban revolutionaries identified their cause with these trends. There 
was also the communist countries bloc eager to engage with the post-colonial world.   
During his first visit as prime minister in 1959 to the United States Fidel Castro 
ordered every member of its delegation not to ask for aid even after he received news  
from his minister of Treasure “Rufo” Lopez Fresquet that there was a U.S disposition to 
provide 25 million dollars in aid. Castro explicitly stated that he wanted to change the 
dynamics of the relations. He was cordial with Vice-president Nixon and talked 
receptively with Secretary of State Christian Herter and the officer of the CIA in charge 
of combatting communism in the Western Hemisphere Frank Bender, but he made clear 
that his agenda didn’t have these priorities but his own
224
: Cuban sovereignty and 
development.    
                                                          
224For a discussion of U.S.-Cuba relations after the revolution in 1959 and during the 
Eisenhower Era see the coverage of this issue by William Leogrande and Peter Kornbluh 
in “Back Channel to Cuba” (Leogrande, William & Kornbluh, Peter 2014). For an 




Just showing independence from the United States scored points for the 
revolutionaries with their Cuban and third word constituencies. American policymakers 
didn’t have the patience to let Cuba pass its revolutionary fever. Superpower’s interests 
took precedence over any acknowledgement of past mistakes or support for the previous 
dictatorship in their relations with Cuba. Cuban leaders’ vision of their country as equal 
seems to American policymakers completely out of place. For Cuban revolutionaries the 
central task was to put Washington on notice: times of Cuba’s limited sovereignty were 
over. For an American Cold War warrior, any disagreement between Havana and 
Washington might be solved only after Cuba aligns without any reservation under 
Washington’s hegemony in the Western Hemisphere (Pettina 2011). 
The clash of foreign policy strategies was the decisive factor at the conflict 
between the Cuban state and American companies, not economic interests. U.S. security 
hawks tied to red scare hysteria were generally more radicals in their anti-Castro views 
than the business owners, lobbyists or managers
225
 whose companies were affected by 
Cuban nationalism. In the the Dulles brothers’ foreign policy establishment, any 
neutralism or small countries playing superpowers against each other was harmful for 
                                                                                                                                                                             
“Algunosantecedentshistoricos. El Conflicto Cuba-Estados Unidos desde el umbral del 
siglo XXI”(Morales 2009) 
 
225See Leogrande and Kornbluh(Leogrande, William & Kornbluh, Peter 2014)for details 
about the clash of the Cuban government with the most important U.S. companies in 




anti-communist solidarity (Pettina 2011). The insulation of the Western hemisphere from 
the red threat was not a matter of persuasion but of “democratic” discipline. 
The post-revolutionary period 1959- 1989 vindicated a successful Cuban 
resistance, a necessary although not sufficient condition for an Acknowledgement for 
deference compromise with the United States. Cuban post-revolutionary elites proved 
their resilience against United States’ ceaseless policy of regime change against them. 
Soviet support for Cuban revolutionaries was decisive in the early years. With Soviet 
political, economic and military support, Castro broke regional isolation in the Western 
hemisphere. Survival with Soviet support allowed Cuba to build powerful Armed forces 
and form new alliances of the utmost importance with the emerging developing world as 
well as workable relations with Western Europe and Canada. Last but not least those 
were the years in which American sanctions had the higher impact because of Cuba’s 
technological and trade previous connections to the United States. The Soviets provided 
suboptimal technology, energy and food security but their help was vital to keep the 
country running.  
But communist involvement in the U.S.-Cuba conflict added serious triangular 
complications to the asymmetrical conflict and bolstered the view of Castro’s Cuba as a 
national security threat in the American imagination. The dispute between communism 




presumption and Cuban nationalism. Communism as an expansionist ideology is 
antithetical to the American paradigm of liberal democracy and market economy. 
Logically the central attention for the United States as a superpower was on the 
communism-capitalism controversy while Cuba’s attention was on the promotion of its 
sovereignty. There were chances of accommodation of a Tito
226
 like Cuban nationalist 
communism but most American administrations did not explore them. Fidel Castro also 
sent during the Carter administrations several explicit signals about his refusal to play a 
Tito-like role. The intervention in Ethiopia in 1978 was the most clear example.  
The Cold War logic puts Cuba back as a priority in the American political radar. 
From January 1959 to March 1960, the prevailing image of Cuba in American foreign 
policy circles went from revolutionary country and Latin American troubled modernizer 
to communist threat
227
. Cuba became an important piece in the Great Powers puzzle: 
Khrushchev, Kennedy, Fidel Castro, De Gaulle, Mao and others would discuss Cuba with 
                                                          
226This a reference to the non-alignment foreign policy adopted by Yugoslav Communist 
nationalist leader Josip-Broz Tito during the Cold War. Supporters of a détente course 
with Cuba during the Johnson, Ford, and Carter administration used several times this  
 
227There were important debates within the State Department about the proper diagnosis 
and policy to apply to the Cuban revolution since its insurrectional phase. These debates 
are documented in several books including Thomas Patterson’s “Contesting Castro” 
(Patterson 1995), Mark Falcoff’s “The Cuban Revolution and the United States: A 
history in documents 1958-1960” (Falcoff 2001) and more recently William LeoGrande 





references to Munich, Pearl Harbor and even the Guns of August of 1914. The White 
House Tapes of the Kennedy Administration about decisions during the Missile Crisis 
(Naftali 1997)shows how American moves on Cuba were generally analyzed in the 
context of potential retaliation by the Soviets in Berlin or other parts of the old Continent. 
The danger of nuclear annihilation during the 1962 Missiles Crisis produced an 
understanding between Washington and Moscow by which each country committed to 
exercise restraint in their military conflict about Cuba. Cuba’s locking of Soviet support 
was the result of a historical moment in the ideological power play between the USSR 
and China, the two communist superpowers. Soviet rush to support Cuba was 
unintelligible outside Moscow’s competition with Beijing for the leadership of the 
communist movement. United States’ insistence on expelling Cuba from the Inter-
American system because of Havana’s alliance with “the Soviet-Chinese Axis” made 
support for Castro’s government a matter of revolutionary prestige for the Soviets and the 
Chinese who were not allies by 1961. 
The consolidation of Cuba’s revolutionary state was also favored by the 
compromises and strategic restraint by the superpowers within the context of the 
international order that emerged in the world after the Second World War (Ikemberry 
2001). Part of the U.S.-Cuba conflict was negotiated through the great powers 




Missile Crisis in the Security Council to the overwhelming votes against the embargo in 
the General Assembly since 1992, there is a normative structure imposing restraints on 
power.  
The non-intervention norm, the principle of peoples’ self-determination and 
human rights; and the promotion of development throughout an open economic order 
were proclaimed and defended by the international society as civilization norms of the 
post-second world war order. These international norms helped the definition of 
normalization and normality in U.S.-Cuba bilateral relations. Cuba developed an 
attrition strategy that placed the United States in the dilemma of trashing the general 
order and destroy its Cuban adversary or respecting its general liberal design trying to 
deal with the Cuban issue with covert operations and even temporarily accept the 
existence of a restrained (non-nuclear) Soviet ally in its vicinity.  
The Cold War played an important role in the construction of new visions in 
conflict. The United States constructed an image of Cuba’s subordination to the Soviet 
Union that was not real but functional to the containment strategy. Superpower’s struggle 
about Cuba reached its climax in October 1962 with the missile crisis. This episode left 
important scars at both sides of the Strait of Florida. Any American responsible 
policymaker could not ignore Fidel Castro’s petition to Khrushchev to launch a first 




Cuban responsible policymaker couldn’t ignore how close the American national 
Security Council was to adopt General Curtis LeMay suggestion of a Pearl Harbor style 
massive bombardment of Cuba.  These existential threats were learnt in both countries’ 
schools of international relations about a disposition to escalate causing the other side the 
most unbearable consequences.  
For the United States, the Cuban threat was significant because of the island’s 
place in the ideological struggle between superpowers and their respective socioeconomic 
models. Cuba amounted to a communist beachhead in the Western hemisphere for thirty 
years. Cuba’s official narrative was essentially different. The defeat of the American 
organized Bay of Pigs invasion and survival at the “sad and luminous” days of the 
Missile Crisis (Brenner, James Blight and Philip 2002), when the entire country could 
have disappeared from the earth, fed a nationalist pride on revolutionary unity.  
There are also differences in the role of historical memory in the discussion about 
U.S.-Cuba relations. The asymmetry of power between Cuba and the United States has a 
correlate in an asymmetry of attention. Cuban nationalists discuss their history in 
connection with events that have the United States as a protagonist (The Spanish-Cuban-
American War, the Bay of Pigs Invasion, the Missile Crisis, etc.) while American 




importance associated to its connection to a European power (Spain, or the Soviet 
Union).  
The asymmetry of attention created important pathologies of misunderstanding 
when the two countries negotiate. Americans misperceived Cuban insistence on 
reminding historical grievances as expression of disinterest to address current issues. 
Meanwhile Cubans misperceived American disinterest on acknowledging past grievances 
as a desire to reinstate the imperial type of ties that caused Cuban humiliation. Their 
respective visions might have been true at certain times but at others what happened was 
a mismatch of cultural attitudes.  
 
7.3 American hegemonic presumption and Cuban nationalism in the context 
of post 1991 Cold War inertia 
A central debate in international relations theory addresses questions of whether 
and how low politics cooperation (people-to-people exchanges, travel and trade) mitigate 
or exacerbate conflict in high politics (security and grand strategy images). In U.S.-Cuba 
relations, American policy- defined by Cold War strategic desire to create a sanitary 
cordon around Cuba- blocked most of society-society ties. In contrast to explanations that 
emphasize the role of the pro-embargo Cuban American lobby in American politics; I 




relevance for American grand strategy as the main block to an AFD compromise. This 
factor empowered the Cuban American lobby but it is not one and the same.  
Rather than why absence of comprehensive social exchanges remained the 
dominant pattern of U.S.-Cuba relations, the question here is why it took more than 
twenty years for the two countries to seriously explore a variant of an Acknowledgement 
of sovereignty for deference to great power status (AFD) compromise. Diplomacy as a 
central institution of the society of states mitigates conflict and helps to manage relations 
of trade, cultural exchanges, low security measures and other non-ideological areas 
between countries. The differences between grand visions of Cuba’s post-revolutionary 
nationalist state and American oriented liberal hegemony in the Western hemisphere are 
incompatible but manageable
228
 precisely because of the huge asymmetry between Cuba 
and the United States. 
AFD solutions to asymmetric conflicts are favored by the existence of a liberal 
international order in which sovereignty, international law and hierarchy in international 
society (Great Powers Management) are recognized institutions. Such normative structure 
contributes to anticipate states’ behavior, facilitate world order and lower the cost of joint 
                                                          
228As Alexander Wendt (Wendt 1999) demonstrated intersubjective knowledge is not 
necessarily of cooperative nature. Communications and diplomacy help to solve 
problems of misunderstanding between states but don’t solve antagonistic contradictions 





pursuit of valued goals. Interactions of cooperation or conflict are facilitated or 
obstructed by respective visions about the other state, their capacity for empathy and the 
accuracy of the information they possess. AFD solutions become difficult when the 
absence of communication reinforces foreign policy visions of the other state as a rogue.  
Explanations of dynamics of U.S.-Cuba relations begin by specifying the 
characteristics of the two states, and their roles in international society. The United States 
sees itself as the leader of the Western Hemisphere due to its history, “manifest destiny” 
narrative and capabilities
229
. Cuban nationalists- since the time of Jose Marti- look at 
their movement as a platform to achieve Latin American integration creating a different 
balance of power in the hemisphere.   
No logic of conflict of values and interests between Cuba and the United States 
justify the extreme hostility that prevailed between Havana and Washington since the end 
of the Cold War. Neither in security nor in ideological terms, had Cuba represented a 
threat to the U.S.-led liberal world order after 1989. It can even be argued that Cuba’s 
international status as a rival to the United States has gained prominence precisely for the 
world’s rejection of the outdated American embargo.  
                                                          
229For a discussion of American hegemonic presumption in the Western hemisphere and 
its role in the policy towards Cuba, see David Bernell’s “Constructing US Foreign Policy. 




The U.S.-Cuba case shows how a change in the objective circumstances did not 
reflect automatically in a foreign policy rationally adjusted to the new conditions. When 
Congress discussed the two main laws to strengthen the embargo in the 1990’s (1992 
Cuban Democracy Act  and 1996 Helms-Burton Act), the State department officials 
objected such moves as counterproductive to their global and regional goals of economic 
liberalization, democracy promotion and international security.  
Foreign policy visions convey a synthesis of ideas, beliefs, and political ideology. 
These Foreign policy visions are generally presented as “common sense” but things 
“evident” in one side are not so in the other
230
. American expectation of a sudden 
collapse of Cuba after the fall of the Soviet Union based on the inertia of logical 
centrality of Moscow in U.S. containment strategy bolstered visions that appropriating 
new foreign discourses (democracy promotion, nonproliferation, anti-terrorism) 
advocated for continuing old policies that defined Cuba as an enemy and threat under the 
new situation. As a consequence, despite president Clinton’s realistic assessment in his 
private judgment that the embargo was a failure since the early days of his 
administration, during his terms, American foreign policy establishment took the illusion 
                                                          
230I recognize that I might be drawing inferences from my experience of working as 
political analyst for two years for the Cuban government (1992-1994) and dealing also 
with U.S.-Cuba relations from a civil society perspective on the Cuban side as a leader in 
the Cuban Jewish Community (1999-2001) and later discussing and interacting with U.S. 
policy towards Cuba as a columnist and political advocate in Washington. The normative 
frameworks, themes, priorities and discussions of the elites in the two countries are 




that “one further escalating step” will produce the end of the CCP regime to its utmost 
extremes with the Helms-Burton law. 
Asymmetric conflicts are the result not only of disparity of power and 
disagreement in terms of interests and values but also they have to do with status 
consciousness and self fulfilling prophecies of hostility
231
. One of the main obstacles to 
an AFD solution after the end of the Cold War was American official discourse about 
revolutionary Cuba as a remnant of the communist cause destined to disappear, not as a 
nationalist project
232
. This diagnosis created a self-fulfilling prophecy that blocked 
opportunities of interaction by confirming a U.S. policy of isolation and harassment 
against Cuba. By holding the post-1991 circumstances hostage of the Cold War culture of 
                                                          
231Robert Jervis has defined the concept of self-fulfilling prophecies of hostility in inter-
state conflicts: “For our purposes the crucial question is the degree to which a state’s 
actions that are based on an initial false image have transformed the other state’s 
intentions. If the prophecy of hostility is thoroughly self-fulfilling, the belief that there is 
a high degree of conflict will create a conflict that is no longer illusionary. Overtures that 
earlier would have decreased tensions and cleared up misunderstandings will now be 
taken as signs of weakness” (Jervis 1976, 77). 
 
232Here the question is one of degrees. Cuba is at the same time a country with a 
nationalist project of sovereignty and a revolutionary cause identified with communist 
challenges to the liberal world order. Given the asymmetry of power after the defeat of 
the Soviet Union in the Cold War, American insistence on highlighting the communist 
threat, not the nationalist project, in Cuba’s role reinforced precisely Cuba’s most 
troublesome identity (revolutionary internationalist) for a U.S. led liberal world order. 




communism-capitalism enmity, the American diagnosis made Cuban behavior more 
predictable but also more hostile at the international scene.  
Foreign policy discourses are not explanatory variables but major conditionals 
that help to reproduce or mitigate the animosity between states. Changes on discourses or 
the emergence of new narratives might also help to consolidate areas of cooperation and 
de-escalation. In 1991-1992, the IV Congress of the CCP in Havana and the passing of 
the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act by the United States congress expressed domestic 
victories of intransigent positions in both countries. The logic of partial reform 
proclaimed in Cuba’s discourse as using segments of market economy to save 
communism found a correlate in American discourse about the absence of real change in 
the political and economic nature of the Cuban regime. 
The low density of the interactions between foreign policy discourses of Cuba and 
the United States played a central role in the obstruction to the creation of a common 
knowledge about their international status.  States -histories lead to conceptions about 
their “rightful place” in the international system. These conceptions generate an 
expectation of a certain interaction and level of respect among enemies, rivals or friends 
(Wendt 1999). Social interactions between states, policy makers, academics, 




real possibilities of compromise. These interactions were not the norm of relations 
between Cuba and the United States between 1992 and 2014.  
While Washington looked at Cuba as a defeated communist foe in 1992, 
revolutionary Cuba saw itself as a victorious nationalist revolution still standing. Cuba’s 
successful resistance against a far stronger power generates an expectation of greater 
respect. Castro’s Cuba was in the vortex of the 1962 Missile Crisis and didn’t blink. Just 
before the end of the Cold War, the Reagan Administration and Cuba negotiated together 
with Angola and South Africa a series of agreement to bring peace and political opening 
to Africa’s southern cone. Post-revolutionary Cuba looks at itself as a sovereign state 
with the right to be taken serious in its sovereignty in the international system. 
At the transition from the XX to the XXI Centuries, a Cuban nationalist hostile 
reaction to U.S sponsored neoliberal wave in Latin America was as logical as U.S. 
superpower assertiveness for proving a market oriented and democratic system superior 
to the communist alternative. Given the hostility of the United States towards the post-
revolutionary government, a Cuban government’s deference to American superpower 
status represented a political and ideological suicide. In the absence of regular venues for 
interactions and diplomacy, any proposal of an AFD solution to the US.-Cuba 
asymmetric conflict was at a tremendous disadvantage in Washington and Havana versus 




The election of Barack Obama as the first post-Cold War generation president in 
the United States, and Cuba’s processes of economic reform and political liberalization 
ignited changes in the discourses about Cuba and the United States in the two countries. 
However those changes were not the end of the U.S. regime change narratives or Cuba’s 
nationalist resistance and revolutionary internationalism. There is an adjustment of these 
discourses in a direction to stabilization and prevention of the escalation of conflicts but 
such change is:  1) constrained by the limits to United States executive action settled by 
the rigidity of the Helms-Burton law, 2) enabled by changes in the demographic and 
sociopolitical conditions in the two societies (Milliken 1999), and 3) limited by the 
“social construction of the respective foreign policy of each country understood as the 
image of the other in connection to an image about themselves”, the implicit paradigms 
for U.S.-Cuba relations, and the policy options that flow from them (Weldes, Jutta & 
Saco, Diana 1996). 
Even if a discourse is not dominant anymore in one side of the strait, it might 
remain a historical reference in the vision on the other shore. That is the case for instance 
of the annexationist idea in the United States that is not dominant anymore in the 
American political imagination but it is frequently invoked and instrumented in Havana 
to rally the Cuban population around the nationalist flag. It happens also with the image 
of Cuba as a “red menace”. This image was inextricably associated to the Soviet Union 




agitated in conservative circles every time Cuba develops ties with an adversary of the 
U.S. such as Russia, Iran or the PRC.  
Each state’s foreign policy discourse is not the result of how a unitary rational 
actor understands the other country but the polyphonic result of contestation between 
different narratives. Discourses about sovereignty and international hierarchy, and about 
the other and the Self condense processes of perception and interpretation by state-society 
actors
233
 in which the domestic balance of power play major roles. The Cold War has 
been over for quite a long time but important groups in the anti-normalization lobby used 
its legacy to solidify in laws resentment and hostility towards the island nation. Today, 
May, 2016, Cuba is the only country in the world considered “enemy” of the United 
States under the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 and every U.S. president since 
1977 has renewed its presidential authority for the embargo under a clause that 
grandfathered this status. Rarely the question is asked about what options Cuba has in the 
international arena in the presence of such American hostility.  
 
                                                          
233Some constructivists define the reality from which visions and discourses emerge as 
“intersubjective” (Wendt 1999) indicating a context of material and ideational factors in 
which ideas and actors change themselves in the process of reproducing identity, roles 





This situation resembles what Emmanuel Adler (Adler 1997) described as 
“mutually constitutive” effect between image and context: the particular images about the 
international context affect the context itself within which officials apprehend the events 
taking place and frame their foreign policy options. This is particularly important for 
understanding the nature of the reproduction and change of foreign policies in conflict. 
Discourses of hostility or cooperation in U.S.-Cuba relations do not replace or displace 
each other. They tend to accumulate and build upon each other even if at times they seem 
to be contradictory or anachronistic
234
.   
In the period 2009-2012, Cuba and the United States entered into a synergic cycle 
that propelled new narratives that recognize differences but facilitate a stabilization of the 
asymmetric conflict through negotiation and social interactions. Key elements of these 
new narratives were President Obama’s disposition to negotiate with U.S. adversaries and 
Raul Castro’s offer of a new relation with Washington as part of the foreign policy 
associated to economic reform and political liberalization. But these new images of 
                                                          
234For instance, when Cuban nationalist discourse claims that the United States developed 
for Cuba a sophisticated form of neocolonialism around the Platt Amendment (1902-
1934) and even after during the 1934-1959, it is admitting that the annexationist project 
was unviable. But this implication does not mean the end of a sub-discourse that keep 
reminding Cubans about the danger hanging over Cuba’s independence; the annexationist 
idea that supposed to be long defeated. In the case of the United States the number of 
incompatible discourses that coexist is even higher. The same pro-embargo group that 
claims a Hayekian view about the liberating power of free trade and capitalism to 
criticize the Cuban government defends the idea that blocking trade and travel to Cuba is 




disposition to negotiate do not displace entirely stereotypes developed in previous 
periods. On the contrary, the adjustment of foreign policies between Cuba and the United 
States include situations in which different visions of hostility and understanding project, 
collide and at times overlap within the public spheres of both countries competing about 
the proper model of bilateral relations.  
 
7.3.1 Washington’s three false narratives about revolutionary Cuba 
Due to the asymmetric nature of the U.S.-Cuba conflict, the first obstacle to AFD 
stabilization comes from the absence of an American acknowledgement of Cuban 
sovereignty in its entirety. The United States was not always the hegemon in the Western 
hemisphere but after defeating Mexico in the struggle for the annexation of Texas and the 
control of the West in 1846-48, it became the strongest center of North America and the 
Caribbean. This situation, although harsh for some countries of the region that suffered 
several U.S. military interventions, the loss of half its territory (Mexico) or a province 
(Colombia with Panama) and the imposition of military dictatorships, created a more 
stable international system than the competition of empires in Europe and Asia that led to 





For decades, the United States look at Cuba as a potential addition to its territory 
or later as a subordinated country under the notion of limited sovereignty according to the 
Monroe Doctrine and the 1901 Platt Amendment. Cuba was during the XIX century- 
according to Thomas Jefferson in 1803- “the most interesting addition which could ever 
be made to our system of states” (Jefferson 1972).  This American perspective about 
Cuba was a major motivation in the proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine. By 1823, John 
Quincy Adams, the first half of the XIX century U.S. premier foreign policy grand 
strategist wrote that “It is scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of 
Cuba to our federal republic will be indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the 
Union itself” (Adams 1965).  
This self-representation of American superiority had clear racial and Anglo-Saxon 
cultural superiority undertones
235
.  Some of these images are not completely absent from 
the designers of current U.S. policy towards Cuba
236
, even if anti-Hispanic racism is not 
anymore at the core of U.S. foreign policy projection into the Western hemisphere. Still it 
                                                          
235Lars Shoultz (Schoultz 2011) and Louis Perez (Perez 2008) have well discussed most 
of the metaphors and discourses by which the United States self proclaimed its mission to 
uplift Cuba from its backwardness. 
 
236 Jesse Helms left a lot of evidences that confirms how he was a racist and racism was 
an intrinsic part of many of his foreign policy positions. He had very positive views about 
segregation and the South Africa apartheid regime. Relevant to Cuba, he was quoted with 
hard phrases about Mexicans and Latinos in general in several discussions about foreign 
policy in the Senate. Christopher Hitchens called his legacy for American policy, “a 




is worth to mention them because of two reasons: 1) racist assertions were original 
sources for implicit arguments in favor of an American political superiority with a right 
and duty to guide the destinies of its southern neighbors. 2) These racial, religious and 
cultural superiority undertones provide frequent ammunition to a radical Cuban 
nationalist narrative that see the Cuban revolution as the moment in which the Cuban 
people stand up from a century of Latin American humiliation.   
I will highlight three of the most relevant images about Cuba that remain relevant 
after the 1990’s in the making of U.S. policy towards Cuba: 
1) Cuba is a nation of the “Americas’ family” with “common values” 
in the Western hemisphere
237
. Cuba is- in this narrative- at U.S.’s “backyard” or 
“doorstep”, the region in which the United States would fulfill its “Manifest 
Destiny”
238
.When the preservation of the so called “common values” is discussed 
                                                          
237Louis Perez’s “Cuba in the American Imagination” presented and analyzed a historical 
collection of images about Cuba in the American mind (Perez 2008).  
 
238 Manifest Destiny is a concept attributed to NY journalist O’Sullivan by which the 
United States was destined to expand across the North American continent with its 
republican, federal and liberal institutions. The definition of the territories to acquire 
included parts of Mexico, Cuba and in some later readings Hawaii. The idea of Manifest 
Destiny is one of the best structured proposition that guided the transition of the United 
States to superpower status. Two books that cover the issue with important references to 
current U.S. foreign policy are “Special Providence” by Walter Russell Mead (Mead 
2002), and “From Wealth to Power” by FareedZakaria(Zakaria 1998). Zakaria made the 




in the context of an “American family”, the community center is the United 
States, the house of which Latin America or at least the Caribbean is the doorstep 
or backyard. 
2) Washington attributes to itself to be a “community of judgment” 
(Weber 1995) that evaluates the state of Cuban sovereignty.  In American 
narrative, Cuba’s sovereignty that supposed to naturally coincide with the values 
of “the Americas” is blocked by Fidel and Raul Castro. The embargo- in this 
view- does not violate Cuban sovereignty but try to restore it. The adoption of 
communism in Cuba-this narrative follow- is the exclusive outcome of deceitful 
and seductive tactics by a caudillo in connivance with the international 
communist movement. Eliminating the Castros appears as a U.S. duty, if 
supported by others better, if not; the United States should do it alone. It is its 
regional responsibility.  
3) The Cuban Revolution was an “accident of history”. It is history, 
therefore it shouldn’t count. From this benign premise, the Fulgencio Batista’s 
coup in 1952 was a rupture with Western hemisphere common democratic values.  
American support to this authoritarian dictatorship was an unfortunate mistake 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Super power was launched after the consolidation of important transformation of the 
executive branch and the governmental management of internal industrialization. The 
event that christened the launching of superpower status by the United States was the 
American-Cuban-Spanish War of 1898. This leftan important symbolic legacy for the 




that never justified anti-imperialist resentment. Fidel Castro took advantage of 
this situation and after he took power betrayed his own revolution. 
 As an accident, the revolution is simply a transitional phase of Cuban 
history without a legacy. Any major humanitarian cost of the sanctions or 
resentment created against the U.S. policy in Cuba or Latin America is a simple 
temporal pain to free the continent of bad influences, completely foreign to the 
values of the “American family”.  
4) Of the two previous premises, a conclusion emerges: Due to its 
conflictive nature with American liberal democratic values shared by the whole 
hemispheric family, the Cuban government is at its last throes and isolated. It has 
lasted for five decades because of Fidel Castro’s evil wisdom for seduction but 
after his death and that of his brother the system is destined to the dustbin of 
history.   
These three narratives are essentially false and present a clear lack of respect for 
Cuban sovereignty. Tzvetan Todorov said clearly:  
it is only by speaking to the other (not giving orders but engaging in a dialogue) 
that I can acknowledge him as a subject, comparable to what I am myself…unless 
grasping is accompanied by a full acknowledgement of the other as a subject, it 
risks being used for purposes of exploitation, of “taking” knowledge will be 





Not gratuitously Cuban nationalist historians argued that Cuba was in the period 
1902-1958 a “neocolonial republic”
239
.  
To begin, the Cuban government is entitled to sovereignty rights because it 
possesses all the characteristics of statehood and recognition by homologue states from 
all over the world. Yes, Cuba is not a liberal democracy but that is the case for the 
majority of the countries in international society. There are issues of human rights 
violations in Cuba but this is not an accident of history. Cuba lived a revolution that was 
not the outcome of any unusual seduction. Fidel Castro is not a historical aberration, his 
radical nationalist ideology and non-democratic projection were probable courses given 
the trajectory of the first sixty years of the Cuban republic and the American reactions 
towards nationalist movements in the hemisphere. Castro didn’t betray his nationalist 
revolution by choosing the alliance with the Soviet Union. In fact the majority of his non-
communist nationalist cadres remained loyal to his government after he chose the 
communist course.  
                                                          
239Not all nationalist historians and intellectuals remained loyal to Castro’s government 
after he took the communist path. Nationalist historians played a very important role 
developing a strong conscience and discussion of Cuba’s problems throughout their role 
in the universities and public schools. Some of them such as Ramiro Guerra and Raul 
Roa served as officials in various governments of what they called “the neocolonial 
republic”. A minimal list of these intellectuals includes Jose Luciano Franco, Jorge 
Manach, Emilio Roig de Leuschering, Julio LeRiverend, and HerminioPortell Vila. After 
the revolution of 1959 the nationalist trend intermingled with Marxist analysis in the 




Cuba’s processes of economic reform and political liberalization discussed in the 
first three chapters of this book exacerbate the incompatibilities between U.S. policy 
towards Cuba and the current liberal international order created under American 
leadership at the end of the Second World War. International acknowledgment of Cuba as 
a country in transition undermines the viability of any American call to isolate the island 
as the optimal policy to promote democracy and human rights. Inside the American 
society, Obama’s approach to countries in conflict provides a space of attention in which 
new discourses emerge. The new discourses that emphasize Cuba as a country in 
transformation, not a threat, carry on the justification for a policy of engagement and 
dialogue, regardless of the admission of some antagonistic conflicts of interests and 
values.  
 
7.3.1.2 Washington as a unilateral “community of judgment” of Cuban 
sovereignty 
At the core of Washington’s attribution to play a fundamental role in the destinies 
of Cuba is an imperial version of pan-Americanism
240
. The idea that the Western 
                                                          
240Here I distinguish between traditional Pan Americanism, a vision about the Americas 
as subordinated to U.S. interests and ideals from proposals of new Pan Americanism in 
which there is the idea of a Pan American multilateral community of equally sovereign 
nations that integrate economically and politically. New Pan Americanism does not 




Hemisphere constitutes a sub-community of international society does not amount to 
accept that the United States should dominate the region. Historically, Washington has 
followed a unilateralist hierarchical view of this hypothetical hemispheric community.  
Cynthia Weber has explained how Washington has taken in most cases the role of 
a community of judgment in itself. It is not throughout multilateral understandings of 
collective security and international law but by the mighty destiny of the American 
Republic that the boundaries between sovereignty and intervention are drawn and 
interpreted
241
. U.S. justification for having an imperial-coercive policy towards Cuba is 
based on similar arguments to the ones described by Weber about Wilson’s intervention 
in Mexico in 1917 (Weber 1995). The U.S.-Cuba conflict is one of sovereignty with 
deeper roots than the Cold War conflict.  
The structural core of the conflict is ideational. Conceptions of American status 
that include a responsibility to force American values that are allegedly universal 
remained prevalent in Washington. The idea is not that the United States interferes in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
there were proposals for a new Pan Americanism such as the Linowitz Report. A most 
recent proposal was L. Ronald Scheman “Greater America: A new Partnership for the 
Americas in the XXI Century (Scheman 2003).   
 
241Weber’s examples about interventions are mainly military ones but (Naples during the 
Concert of Europe, Mexico during President Wilson or Reagan administration’s 
intervention in Grenada) but the construction of the narrative, the speech is equally valid 




Cuban internal affairs since this will be a violation of the proclaimed right of self-
determination that Washington supposed to respect. The self-serving narrative affirms 
that the United States from a position derived from its democracy and higher 
development is using sanctions to uplift the Cuban people.  
Jutta Weldes analyzed the origins of current U.S. policy towards Cuba at the light 
of these self-serving paternalistic metaphors:  
if the Latin American states were ‘sisters’ in the ‘American family’, then the 
‘communist threat’ amounted to their ‘seduction’. The invocation of the particular 
metaphor brought with it the quasi-causal argument that, given the opportunity, 
‘the Communists’ will ‘seduce’ these ‘sister republics’ away from both their 
‘American family’ and from the path of virtue, that is, from the straight and 
narrow pursuit of the shared values of ‘American civilization’. As the defender of 
these values, it was the familial obligation of the US to prevent the ‘seduction’ of 
its ‘sisters’ by the Soviet Union or the ‘international communist movement’…. 
This argument implied as well that the US and OAS actions taken against the 
Castro regime, such as the trade embargo… were not violations of Cuban 
sovereignty. They were instead the fulfillment of a familial obligation (Weldes, 
Constructing National Interests: United States foreign policy and the Cuban 
Missile Crisis. 1999). 
 
According to this logic, Washington sanctioned the Cuban government because it 
is not only separated from the other countries in the hemisphere but also from the Cuban 
people. The Cuban government- according to this logic- is run by outsiders, almost non-




government is not part of the Cuban nation and the Americas but a group preventing the 
Cuban people from exercising its self-determination.  
These false premises are at the base of an anti-engagement bias because it refuses 
to acknowledge something central to the post 1959 revolutionary order: its nationalist 
roots. Even in its totalitarian features, the Cuban current system is not imported but the 
result of a rejection of liberal values by a significant segment of Cuban political society. 
This segment and others have a cynical and instrumental view about American promotion 
of representative. 
History is not destiny. Nothing stop the possibility that Cuban political culture 
evolve towards more tolerant attitudes (in fact this is what is already happening as part of 
modernization) but to begin from the assumption of a natural Cuban democratic order 
disrupted by Fidel Castro and his “commies” is simply an ideological construction 
without roots in history. These ideological premises appear even faker when the ghost of 
a history of American support for previous non-democratic anti-communist regimes 
hover over any discussion about human rights.  
The imperial character of this set of assumptions becomes evident when 
Washington confronts international norms and the judgments of the United Nations (UN) 
and even the Organization of American States (OAS), the latter of which Cuba is not 




conflict with some international human rights norms but their diplomacies consider the 
Cuban government as illegitimate or outside the community of states. Indeed, the United 
States assume a responsibility to promote democratic values in other countries such as 
China, or Vietnam with similar domestic arrangements as Cuba’s but American officials 
don’t begin from the premise that the rulers of these countries seduced the Chinese, the 
Vietnamese or for that matter the Saudi people away from the natural values that they 
share with the United States.  
The “Wilsonian” neoconservative policy towards Cuba poses some of the same 
questions that Cynthia Weber asked about the precedent of Mexico in 1917 when the 
United States intervened against revolutionary authorities there. The United States in the 
Cuban case simply does not accept a standard view of the right to self-determination of 
the peoples as defined by the resolutions of the United Nations or other multilateral 
bodies. As in the Mexico case studied by Weber, the U.S. does not discuss “how is the 
identity of the people decided” (Weber 1995, 27). It simply assumes that the Cuban 
government is the fundamental obstacle to put an undefined Cuban people (whose voice 
supposed to be represented by the Cuban-American dominant forces in South Florida
242
) 
                                                          
242Here it is important to notice how the American government’s narrative has chosen to 
ignore the numerous evidences about the non-democratic features of the Cuban American 
political subsystem in the United States. Organizations of civil liberties and human rights 
such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Amnesty International, and Human 
Rights Watch have dedicated reports to denounce serious threats and complicity of the 




in line with the “common values” of the “American family”, on a path of democracy and 
development, understood narrowly as what the Helms-Burton legislation said Cuba 
should be.  
This vision doesn’t recognize the complex civil conflict from which the Cuban 
revolution aroused and the Cuban condition of those who govern in the island nation and 
their support base. The Cuban government appears-according to this distorted vision- in a 
state of permanent war and deception against Cuban civil society. The government- 
according to this vision- is not in the hands of a Cuban political movement with roots in 
the island’s history but the legacy of a Cold War when manipulation and betrayal 
prevailed over the Cuban people’s desire for democracy. The revolution- in this 
narrative- was “betrayed” curiously by its main leaders who overwhelmingly remained 
loyal to the course it took.  
It is obvious that this narrative does not fit well with Cuba’s history and current 
reality. In order to solve this cognitive dissonance between the rejection of U.S. policy by 
the most relevant groups of Cuba’s civil society and the U.S claim to represent the Cuban 
people, the National Endowment for democracy has invented the concept of “independent 
                                                                                                                                                                             
rights within the Cuban American community (Americas Watch 1994). It also ignores the 
line of continuity of polarization in Cuban political culture in the island as well as in the 
diaspora. Nelson Valdez pointed out some of these features in his essay “Cuban Political 




civil society”. This segment gathers only opponents to the regime, “more than 29 000 
members”
243
 in a population of 11 million, supporting American policy of regime change.  
Even by their own calculus, the so called “independent civil society” does not 
match five percent of the CCP membership and twenty percent of those who assist 
regularly to Catholic mass. Yet members of Congress such as Senators Bob Menendez 
(D-NJ), Marco Rubio (R-FL) and Ted Cruz (R-TX) insist on keeping pro-embargo exiles 
and their sponsored dissidents as the most legitimate if not the only interlocutors from 
Cuban society. This approach of not acknowledging organizations, intellectuals, people 
who are considered “civil society” by the rest of the world in Cuba have created a schism 
between United States human rights policy and civil society promotion by other 
democratic countries.  
                                                          
243Normando Hernandez, a Cuban dissident who became the “expert” of NED on issues 
about Cuba told the U.S. Congress: “I use the terms true and emerging Cuban civil 
society to distinguish from those organizations that call themselves civil society, when in 
reality they are created and manipulated by the Cuban government. Independent civil 
society in Cuba is composed of self-created citizen groups-established without 
authorization from the government to defend their interest before the state. This includes 
what is known today as the dissidence, the peaceful opposition, the human rights 
movement, independent political parties, bloggers, and professional and intellectual 
associations”. Making clear who he meant in a population of more than 11 million, 
Hernandez said: “to give you an idea of the growth of the Cuban civil society, in 2003, 
the Institute of Independent Economists of Cuba counted in a census more than 29 000 
citizens as members and supporters of more than 450 independent, non- governmental 




American policy was so obsessed on promoting some particular groups that 
missed the non-governmental character of other actors renegotiating state-civil society 
relations from other perspectives. In a revealing line, one of the U.S. interests section 
2009 report about how to promote human rights in Cuba told the story of a meeting 
between Switzerland human rights special envoy and several Cuban organizations.  
“The Swiss Human Rights Special Envoy Rudolf Knoblauch met with his Cuban 
counterparts on November 12, government-organized groups (GONGO’s) and the 
Catholic Cardinal. He did not meet with civil society leaders nor make any public 
reference to Cuba’s human rights record” (Farrar 2009).  
 
Here it is worth noticing the oxymoron contained in the American diplomatic 
report. The Swiss Envoy met “the Catholic Cardinal” but the Chief of Mission of the 
United States reports that he “did not meet with civil society leaders” simply because the 
Swiss envoy never met members of opposition groups with a very limited appeal. The 
report later criticized the Swiss envoy for not raising the issue of human rights publicly or 
privately while mentioning his visit to Cuban prisons as part of European delegations 
concerned with the situation in Cuban jails. Another clear contradiction because 
improving the conditions for those behind bars is in most countries a concern the U.S. 





The presumption of American superiority to decide which organizations 
constitute civil society presents U.S. policy towards Cuba as imperial. An AFD solution 
is impossible when the United States policy pretend to dictate who “the Cubans” are or 
should be. The legacy of Cold War policies in the context of the 1990’s had dramatic 
negative consequences because in the absence of a critical mass of contacts with the 
plural identity of Cuban people, the United States projected a discourse that ignored the 
views not only of the government but also of important segments of civil society about 
the impact of the sanctions on the Cuban population. 
No matter how many international organizations, non-governmental groups and 
think tanks discussed the negative effect of U.S. policy on the human rights of the Cuban 
people, the U.S.  Government insisted on saying that the sanctions are fundamentally 
targeted against the Castro brothers. In their view, sanctions do not affect those they 
arbitrarily decided to consider “the Cuban people”. It might affect those under the 
leadership of the Catholic Bishops, the protestant churches, the Jewish community, the 
segments of the Cuban population who support the CCP for communist or nationalist. It 
might affect those who are neutral or oppose the Castro government and reject also the 
U.S. embargo. They are numerically a majority but in the National Endowment for 
Democracy’s programs, they are not the “real, true, and independent Cuban civil society” 





This American refusal to engage with Cuban society in its merits has important 
implications for American regional leadership from the perspective of asymmetrical 
relations. Relative imperial overstretch- from an asymmetric relations view- is not only 
about a gap between capabilities and commitments of the hegemon
244
 but also about the 
leader’s capacity to accommodate efficiently demands from smaller nations in its 
regional or world order. This leader’s capacity to accommodate hegemony, not 
domination, is more difficult when the hegemon does not even recognize realistically 
who the weaker side is.  
 
7.3.1.3 Second false premise: the CCP regime as transitional and temporary 
Another major obstacle to the necessary although not sufficient condition of 
American acknowledgment of Cuban sovereignty is the myth that present the Cuban 
government as separated from the Cuban people and therefore a temporary “accident of 
history”-in Senator Marco Rubio’s words. This premise presents the radical 
nationalism that demands an equal treatment from the United States, the 
                                                          
244The concept of relative imperial overextension or overstretch is well explained by Paul 
Kennedy in his theory of cycles of rise and fall of great power. A sign of imperial 
decadence occurs when a gap appears between the political commitments and the 





unconditional lift of the embargo and the devolution of the Guantanamo naval base 
as a temporary revolutionary fever to end with the Castro’s passing from history.  
The main problem of this argument is that assumes as temporary a nationalist 
movement that has existed for more than a century with no sign to abate. After the end of 
the Cold War, American diplomacy wasted until December 17, 2014 the possibility of 
exploring an AFD compromise with the Castros, who are at the dawn of their political 
career. Fidel and Raul are temporary but Cuban nationalism is not. The Castros, who 
resisted historical pressures from Americans, Russians, Europeans and Chinese are in the 
best position to sign up an AFD compromise. Nobody in the present or the future can 
question Fidel and Raul Castro’s nationalist credentials.    
Radical nationalism has been strengthened in Cuba’s political culture as result of 
the revolutionary regime’s successful resistance against the embargo. Nationalism is not 
only present in the institutions of the regime but also at the civil society, in publications 
of the Church, reform oriented magazines, etc. Cuba has paid a heavy price in terms of 
development and democratic development as result of the command economy, the partial 
reform adaptations and the national security state but the power of nationalist 





The Cuban revolution was not predestined to take a communist path but a radical 
turn was not an aberration. Between 1895 and 1959 (less than fifty five years), Cuba had 
three revolutions. The humiliation of the Platt Amendment in 1902 and the frustration of 
a previous nationalist revolution in 1933 fertilized the ground for the 1959 radical turn. In 
1952 General Batista’s second coup finished a very dysfunctional democratic system in 
which nationalist parties were already gaining traction.  
In 1959, there was significant admiration within Cuban society for the United 
States. Cuban elites and middle classes were very integrated to cordial relations with their 
northern neighbor. Yet a vision of the U.S. as an imperial superpower was not marginal 
in Cuban politics. Before the revolution Cuba was not guided by liberal and democratic 
“hemispheric values”. In fact, “hemispheric democratic values” of the “family of 
American republics” were not common practices. U.S. policy prioritized anticommunism 
over any liberal democratic concern until the Carter Administration
245
.  
The survival of the CCP regime two decades after the loss of its Soviet ally 
disproves the idea of communism as imported. U.S. post-Cold War diplomacy envisioned 
that the CCP would necessarily follow the destiny of its counterparts in Eastern Europe 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall. That was the central forecast for most of the 1990’s. This 
                                                          
245For a theoretical and historical discussion of the role of Human Rights in American 
policy towards Latin America see Kathryn Sikkins’ “Mixed Signals: U.S. Human Rights 




was changed later to the common notion that everything would fall apart as soon as Fidel 
Castro, the charismatic enchanter disappears. It didn’t happen.  
It is worth noting the contrast between the U.S. official discourse about Cuba and 
the sophisticated U.S. view about other countries ruled by non-democratic nationalist 
regimes. American policy adopted towards China and Vietnam is not based on the 
premise that their revolutions were an “accident” or “transitional” but an important stage 
in their nation-building
246
. Would it make any sense to say that every country in the 
world ruled by a non-democratic regime is “transitional” and not entitled to sovereignty? 
American foreign policy combines the idea of liberal democracy as a final criterion of 
legitimacy with the acknowledgment of sovereignty of many countries with whom 
Washington disagrees. With respect to China and Vietnam, United States’ solidarity with 
anti-government forces does not amount to an unrealistic confrontational approach.  
                                                          
246Ineed to make a distinction here between pre-Nixon and post Nixon policy towards 
China. During the Eisenhower Administration, John Foster Dulles who advocated for 
some restraint in the Taiwan Strait also argued that Communist rule in China was a 
“passing phase” because its repressive structure makes it unsustainable (Tucker 1990). 
The Kennedy Administration began to change the perception about communist rule in 
China as a political process to cope with a long term perspective. These changes in image 
are well explained by Evelyn Goh in “Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 
1961-1974. From Red Menace to ‘Tacit Ally” (Goh 2005). In the case of Vietnam after 
the U.S. defeat in the war and the rapprochement process of the 1990’s the Clinton, Bush 
and Obama administration followed a bipartisan policy that took a long term approach to 
the promotion of human rights. For a contrast between the Bush Administration 
statements about a constructive dialogue with the communist party of Vietnam and its 
policy towards Cuba see Michele Zebich-Knos’s “U.S. Foreign Policy towards Cuba: 





Cuban processes of economic reform and political liberalization favored the 
emergence of a counter-narrative in the U.S. to the theme of the transitional character of 
the CCP regime. One important contribution came from the unintended consequences of 
the proposed track II (people to people exchanges) of the Torricelli law (CDA) of 1992.  
Rapprochement with civil society was presented in the CDA as a tool for peeling 
off segments from the Cuban government’s political base.  But the “people to people” 
travel brought airs of change not only to Cuba but also to U.S. policy. American travelers 
saw the inadequacy of the embargo for Cuba’s reforms and American interests in the 
island.  Looking at Communist Cuba from a long-term perspective gained traction in the 
last two years of the Clinton’s administration. In what Patrick Haney, Maureen Haney 
and Walt Vanderbush describe as “Clinton’s Other Infidelity”, president Clinton allowed 
exchanges with Cuba that were out of line with the directly subversive line suggested by 
the same law he signed for Florida politics in 1996 (Haney, Patrick, Haney, Maureen & 
Vanderbush, Walt 2006).  
The pro-embargo sectors tried to slowdown these people to people contacts as 
soon as they realized the feedback pushing for a change to a more constructive policy 
towards Cuba. The 1996 Helms-Burton law was a substantial step against an AFD 
stabilization of the U.S.-Cuba conflict. It deepened the flaws of the politics of inattention 




two commissions for a Free Cuba (Commission for the Assistance to a Free Cuba 2004) 
under George W. Bush (2004, 2006) personalized the Cuban government in Fidel and 
Raul Castro (Zebich-Knos 2005).  Such diagnosis confused what democratization theory 
identifies as a post-totalitarian regime with a sultanistic one (Linz, Juan & Stepan, Alfred 
1996). From this wrong diagnosis came out the policy of waiting out the Castros since the 
regime is only based- it is presumed- on their control and terror of the other 11 million 
Cubans.  
President Bush’s restrictions against licensed travel to Cuba based on the idea of a 
regime on its last throes proved to be unpopular in the Cuban American community. In 
2004 and 2008 all democratic candidates with the exception of Senator Joseph Lieberman 
(in 2004) advocated for relaxing travel regulations to Cuba, primordially for family 
travel. Beginning in April 2009, president Obama allowed Cuban American unrestricted 
travel to Cuba setting an example that culminated with the 2015 January measures 
allowing twelve general licenses for non touristic traveling to Cuba. The expansion of 
society contacts favored the deepening of the processes of economic reform and political 






7.3.1.4 Third false narrative: The Cuban regime as an isolated and 
repudiated threat to international society 
The U.S embargo narrative until December 17, 2014 presented Cuba as an 
isolated country ignoring that Havana has relations with all the countries of the 
hemisphere except the United States. Actions to punish countries, foreign companies and 
banks from third countries as part of the embargo were conceived as legitimate since the 
Cuban regime-in this vision- was hated by the public opinion of those countries. 
Whenever United States’ allies in Europe and the Western hemisphere argued for 
engagement strategies, they were dismissed as motivated by selfish economic interest. 
Even the sanctions against third countries under the Helms law were approved without 
any sunset clause or mechanism for periodic evaluation of the effect of the sanctions in 
the Cuban population or U.S. relations with other nations
247
 despite the warnings of the 
State Department.  
                                                          
247For instance several European banks including French BNP-Paribas has been 
sanctioned by the U.S. treasure not for violating a European or even an international law 
or obligation from a U.S.-France or U.S-European treaty. The Bank was punished with a 
fine of more than 8 billion dollars fine for violating several extraterritorial U.S. laws with 
no consent in Europe. Although the U.S. succeeded in the imposition of sanctions, the 
debate about transferring operations of the banks to other currencies different from 
dollars has gained traction. This intangible issue might become tangible in monetary 





Most diplomatic reports from American allies’ embassies in Havana or even the 
U.S. Interests section 
248
 have disputed for decades the vision of the CCP regime as 
isolated. But the politics of inattention in Washington postponed a debate about the 
changes taking place in Cuba and the best strategy to coordinate diplomatic action with 
American allies. Due to American politics of inattention, Washington policymakers had 
taken long to realize how Cuba’s general position had strategically improved 
significantly since 1993 to the present in all the major strategic triangles with American 
allies and rivals. Cuba counted with some important support from China and Russia, a 
special relationship with Brazil and Venezuela, and better relations with Europe and 
Canada. The lowest point of Cuba’s post-Cold War weakness was already passed by 
2000.  
Washington missed the optimal moments to build an AFD solution when Cuba 
was less internationally connected and weaker. As former Ambassador and Cuban 
scholar Carlos Alzugaray pointed out the updating of Cuba’s foreign policy has preceded 
the launching of its economic reform (Alzugaray, La Actualizacion de la Politica Exterior 
Cubana 2014). Cuba has today diplomatic relations with 182 countries, with missions 
                                                          
248 I will not quote here Wikileaks cables due to the recommendation by the school that 
those are still secret documents of the U.S. government. Quoting or sharing them might 
be considered against potential applicants to jobs in the U.S. government but there are 
plenty of evidences that reports from the U.S. interests sections in Havana are on target 





(diplomatic, consular, and with international organization) in 133 countries. There are 87 
diplomatic missions in Havana plus direct missions of six international organizations. 
Havana was successively president of the Non-Aligned movement (2006-2009) just 
before the OAS lifted up the sanctions against Cuba, eventually inviting Cuba to the 
Summit of the Americas in Panama in 2015.   
 
7.3.1.5 How these three American narratives matter? 
These three narratives (Cuba without sovereignty, the CCP nationalist regime as a 
transitional phase, and Cuba as an isolated threat to international society) created a Cold 
War culture and set of official routines within American foreign policy disconnected 
from the realities of the island-nation. This hostility was institutionalized in presidential 
order and laws between 1959 and 2000. It was also internalized as a foreign policy 
culture and connected with other core beliefs of U.S. self-image, values and projections 
towards the Western hemisphere and the world. For decades, the belief of these three 
narratives led to a policy of low interaction between American and Cuban societies. This 
structural context, more than the power of the pro-embargo Cuban-American lobby, 
explains the success of the exile agenda of hostility and isolation. A vicious cycle took 




encouraged a situation of no-interaction in which the narratives were more difficult to 
disprove.  
The adoption of these three narratives preceded the creation of the Cuban 
American pro-embargo lobby in 1981.  Once it was created, the Cuban American 
National Foundation (CANF) and its derivates became active reproducer of the culture of 
hostility and misperception. The end of the Cold War and a change in the priorities of the 
United States and conditions deepened the politics of inattention and the institutional 
inertia of the U.S. official narrative about Cuba.  
During the 1990’s, the Cuban American pro-embargo lobby promoted the legal 
codification of the embargo policy narrative. The Cuban American National Foundation 
was successful in passing laws that cemented a maximalist agenda of regime change in 
Cuba as the policy of the United States. As David Campbell explained there is within 
American foreign policy a process of redefinition of dangers that does not begin from 
zero. “There has always been more than one referent around which danger has 
crystallized. What appears as new is more often than not the emergence to the fore of 
something previously obscured by that which has faded away or become less salient” 
(Campbell 1992, 196). A relatively low key designation of Cuba as a terrorism 
sponsoring country in 1982 as part of the rhetoric and accusations of Cold War 




Until May 2015, Cuba was still listed as a terrorist state by the U.S. Department 
of State despite the fact that no act of terror have been sponsored or organized by Cuba or 
any of the countries mentioned as supported by Cuba in all the previous reports. This is 
what the report of the State Department about Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism said in 
May 2014:  
Cuba was designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1982.   
 Cuba has long provided safe haven to members of Basque Fatherland and Liberty 
(ETA) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).  Reports 
continued to indicate that Cuba’s ties to ETA have become more distant, and that 
about eight of the two dozen ETA members in Cuba were relocated with the 
cooperation of the Spanish government.  Throughout 2013, the Government of 
Cuba supported and hosted negotiations between the FARC and the Government 
of Colombia aimed at brokering a peace agreement between the two.  The 
Government of Cuba has facilitated the travel of FARC representatives to Cuba to 
participate in these negotiations, in coordination with representatives of the 
Governments of Colombia, Venezuela, and Norway, as well as the Red Cross.    
There was no indication that the Cuban government provided weapons or 
paramilitary training to terrorist groups. 
The Cuban government continued to harbor fugitives wanted in the United States. 
 The Cuban government also provided support such as housing, food ration books, 
and medical care for these individuals”(Department, U.S. State 2014). 
 
The persistence of Cold War narratives in U.S. policy towards Cuba until 
December 17, 2014 confirms what David Campbell presented as “the reproduction of 
identity”. The end of the Cold War and Cuba’s alliance with the Soviet Union did not 
spark a re-analysis of the otherness Cuba represented for the United States establishment. 
On the contrary: “while the objects of established post-1945 strategies of otherness many 




the entailments of identity which they satisfied” (Campbell 1992, 195). With Cuba, 
enmity identities were reinforced soon after the United States enunciate a new hierarchy 
of principles for its foreign policy such as the promotion of democracy and free trade to 
replace the containment doctrine.  
The hostile narratives were embedded on the executive branch routines and 
colored the bilateral relations with a stain of suspicion and rancor. Cuba is object of much 
politicized scrutiny and hostile labeling. It was called in the 1990’s “rogue states”. The 
State Department highlighted every negative aspect of Cuba’s record in human rights, 
human trafficking, internet freedom, or religious liberties at times just for not 
cooperating. Since the hostile attitude was across the board every aspect feeds from the 
others. Congress appropriated funds between twelve and twenty million dollars every 
year to promote opposition activities. A constituency of groups profiting from those 
regime change activities appeared within the American bureaucracy and political society 
with counterparts in Cuba  (Brenner, Haney and Vanderbush 2008).    
The agreement of December 17, 2014 between presidents Raul Castro and Barack 
Obama closed a period in which the anti-Cuba narrative in the executive branch 
complemented a corresponding settled position in Congress. The Helms-Burton law is 
considered one of the more intrusive legislation on foreign policy presidential powers. 




would bring to relations with Cuba and third countries, because it will “damage prospects 
of a peaceful transition in Cuba” and “jeopardize key U.S. interests around the world” 
(Weinman 2004). With few exceptional terms such as the 2008-2010 term, most of the 
post-Cold War period Congress tried to obstruct any movement to relax it.  
That is why President Obama’s action to change the executive branch’s narrative 
about the policy towards Cuba is of utmost relevance. Because of the relative 
preeminence of the executive branch in the construction of American foreign policy 
narrative, the presidency has the most privileged position to alter or reproduce the images 
about Cuba. Gradually President Obama abandoned the image of Cuba as a threat 
replacing it with one of the island as a country in transition. By visiting Cuba in March 
2016, Obama reinforced the new post-Cold War narrative of a country in economic 
reform and political liberalization, Obama opened a chance of some AFD solution 








7.3.2 Cuban narratives of revolutionary resistance and solidarity: Another 
obstacle to AFD solutions? 
Given the disparity of power and the differences of perception of vulnerability 
between the United States and Cuba, it is impossible to expect that a nationalist Cuba 
could express deference to the United States’ great power status without getting first an 
assurance of respect for the island’s sovereignty. The most powerful self-image guiding 
Cuba’s foreign policy identifies the country as a Latin American bulwark of 
independence against United States domination.  
This narrative might be an obstacle to an AFD management of the asymmetric 
conflict for two main reasons:  
1) Cuba’s nationalism implies an active role bringing Latin American 
countries and markets together to gain leverage versus the United States. This is 
necessarily a challenge to American hegemony since Cuba’s projections towards 
hemispheric governance pursued organizations from which the United States is 
excluded as a way to articulate a Latin American agenda of claims and demands 
against the industrialized north and for a more balanced hemisphere
249
.  
                                                          
249This attitude is clearly expressed in Cuban government’s rejection of the OAS. Cuba 
was expelled from the OAS in 1962 on dubious arguments about lack of democratic 
governance (at the time the continent was plagued with anti-communist dictators that 
were never expelled) and alignment with “the Soviet-Chinese Axis”(when China and the 




2) Cuba’s post-revolutionary identity includes a nationalist 
component (sovereignty principle) and an internationalist impulse (communist 
solidarity). The internationalist impulse is expressed in Cuban foreign policy 
practices in two main forms: Third World internationalism and proletarian-
socialist internationalism. The internationalist principle implies a support for 
Cuba’s ideological homologues that in many cases have a conflictive relation with 
the hegemonic norms of a U.S.-led liberal order (free trade, liberal democracy and 
at times, sovereignty).  
These two obstacles are accentuated or mitigated by the structure of the 
international system and the agency developed by the Cuban state in the balance of its 
nationalist and internationalist impulse. Hostility from the United States and encirclement 
strategies that prevent American allies from a productive relation with Cuba reinforce the 
alignment between nationalist and internationalist impulses. In contrast, persuasive-
hegemonic contexts offer mutual benefits opportunities in which confrontations are 
counterproductive to the interests and reputation of Cuban elites.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
2009 had removed all sanctions allowing the return of Havana to the hemispheric 
organization. Cuba has expressed no intentions to join. Raul Castro has repeated several 
times Fidel Castro’s argument against “having the empire within the family” (F. Castro, 
Acto Central por el aniversario XX del Asalto a los Cuarteles Moncada y Carlos Manuel 
de Cespedes 2013)   and the option for a Latin American organization capable to deal 




In contrast to isolation, cooperation dynamics open possibilities for deference 
with the United States in the context of normalization (acceptance of international norms 
by Cuba and the United States).  The internationalist principle then can be expressed in a 
peaceful competition with the United States for influence in helping other countries
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and even in some cooperation against problems of underdevelopment or global 
governance with the United States.  
In terms of agency, there is an internal debate within Cuba post-revolutionary 
elites. There are positions that emphasize development and defense as the central 
priorities while other highlights issues of political control and offensive alliances to 
balance American real or potential hostility. In typical fashion of asymmetric relations, 
Cuba’s security debate is not only about current threats but also focus on the question 
“what if?” inquiring about possible future vulnerabilities.  
The image of Cuba as a Latin American David against an American Goliath is 
particularly powerful within the Cuban political culture for several reasons: 1) for its 
evocation of views expressed by Jose Marti, the father of Cuban independence, in his 
political testament. Within Cuba, coincidence with Jose Marti, “the Apostle” is a source 
                                                          
250This disposition was expressed by Fidel Castro even at the top moment of Cuban 
internationalist projection in 1979 when Cuba welcomed a 300 million dollars food aid 
offer by the United States to the National reconstruction government of Nicaragua after 
the fall of dictator Somoza (F. Castro, Acto Central por el aniversario XXVI del Asalto a 






, 2) For the grandiose role attributed to Cuba’s role in Latin America, a 
region of which Havana has been an important ideas powerhouse but never a locomotive 
for economic growth, 3) For the connection it builds between Cuban nationalism and 
revolutionary internationalism (Cuban independence was the Latin American cause 
célèbre during the second half of the XIX century and the Cuban Revolution made 
Havana a revolutionary Vatican against right wing dictators in the second half of the XX 
century).   
There are more perspectives emphasizing American democratic and republican 
dimensions as well as its condition of host of the largest Cuban emigrants’ communities. 
But the image of the United States as a threat to Cuban sovereignty is still prevalent. The 
image of a Cuban David against an American Goliath was used by Cuba’s national hero 
                                                          
251Different from other communist countries, Cuba is not characterized by a cult of 
personality of the kind that existed in The USSR with Stalin, in China with Mao Zedong 
and North Korea with the Kim family. As a Latin American country, Cuba is part of the 
Western Tradition. However there is a cult to Jose Marti, as Cuba’s national hero or the 
Apostle of Cuba-as he is known. Marti is at the same time the greatest Cuban political 
writer, and his most important poet. He lived half of his political life in the United States, 
Spain and Mexico, the three countries that played the most strategic role in Cuba’s 
destiny during the XIX century. There is a Marti’s sculpture in the central square of every 
Cuban town. There are two institutes in Havana to study his literary work and his 
political thoughts. Every primary, secondary, high school or University has a Marti’s 
sculpture and every year nationally there is a contest about interpretations and discussion 
of Jose Marti’s complete works that are available in every library of the whole country. 
Jose Marti proclaimed himself heir of Bolivar’s mandate for the integration of Latin 
America. Marti rejected integration between Latin America and the United States based 
on the difference of cultures and the exclusion and discrimination against Hispanics, 




Jose Marti to discuss his struggle for organizing the Cuban Revolutionary Party within 
the Cuban Diaspora in the U.S. Marti’s immediate goal was to achieve the independence 
of Cuba from Spain and contribute to release Puerto Rico from Spanish colonial chains. 
But in his political testament, Marti confessed the long term goal of his life: to block the 
United States’ expansion in the Caribbean and Latin America
252
.  
Marti lived in the United States for almost fifteen years of the last quarter of the 
XIX century and witnessed the impetuous industrial development of his time and the 
expansion to the West territories, from which Native Americans and Mexicans were 
displaced. Marti respected American republicanism but was not an enchanted 
Tocqueville. Marti proposed a different modernity open to the cultural-social pluralism of 
the Latin American population: Black, Indian and European immigrants that he saw as 
impossible in the short term in the United States. Marti proposed a Latin American 
republican paradigm but insisted on not using an “imported book” from Europe or North 
America.  
Marti alerted that the absence of balance between North and South America was 
an incentive for U.S expansion. In his essay “Our America”, Marti called Latin American 
governments to create an alliance and not to support any U.S. confrontation with Europe 
                                                          
252For a good selection of Jose Marti’s works see the Penguin Book reader (Marti, Jose 




or any European war against the United States. Marti explained his warning against U.S. 
expansionism based on his criticism of several features of American domestic politics.  
First, Marti developed a systematic criticism of the anti-Latino racism prevailing 
at the end of the XIX century in the United States. The Cuban apostle criticized white 
supremacist treatment of Native Americans, latinos, and blacks as result of American 
victory in the American-Mexican War of 1846-1848. He identified racism as a feature of 
the U.S. culture pushing for an expansionist policy. In his article “Vindication of Cuba” 
(Marti 2002), published on March 21 in “the Evening Post” he repudiated the 
discrimination of Cuban cigar rollers in Tampa and Key West by Whites.  Exalting the 
merits and laboriousness of the Cuban immigrants he rejected white supremacist 
propaganda treating it as a dominant element of American society  (Thomas 2008).  
About the possibility of conflict between the United States and Latin American 
states, Jose Marti wrote:  
the pressing need of our America is to show itself as it is, one in spirit and intent, 
swift conquerors of a suffocating past, stained only by the enriching blood drawn 
from the scarfs left upon us by our masters. The scorn of our formidable neighbor 
who does not know us is our America's greatest danger. And since the day of the 
visit is near, it is imperative that our neighbor know us, and soon, so that it will 
not scorn us (Marti, Our America 2002).  
Marti’s words got an aura of prophecy with the outcome of the Hispanic-Cuban-
American war of 1898. By this year, Jose Marti was already dead.  The American High 




El Caney and San Juan Hill. Garcia’s troops couldn’t enter into Santiago de Cuba with 
the racist pretext that the Cuban Army was full of black brigands. The U.S. intervention 
is not presented in Cuban history as one of American help to Cuban independence but as 
a late opportunistic U.S. military action to frustrate Cuban independence. 
The influential events of the XIX century led to the creation of the Cuban republic 
in 1902. The first Cuban republic came to live under United States’ interference in 
Cuba’s internal affairs. From the first constitutional assembly in 1901, the United States 
imposed an ultimatum to the Cuban legislators. The United States as an occupying power 
conditioned Cuba’s independence to the incorporation of a “permanent clause” 
authorizing American intervention in the island at will. The Platt Amendment (L. Perez, 
Cuba under the Platt Ammendment 1986) codified Cuban subordination to the United 
States in a kind of suzerainty similarly applied by Washington to other territories such as 
the Republic of Panama.  
A majority of Cuban legislators initially rejected in 1901 the Platt amendment but 
after tough negotiations in which the alternative seemed to be unlimited occupation, the 
Cuban Congress accepted. This episode coined a pejorative term in Cuban political 
culture: “plattista” that still is frequently used by nationalists to stigmatize Cubans who 
accept to bestow U.S. authorities with prerogatives that fall under Cuban sovereignty. 




that deposed Dictator Gerardo Machado in 1933 but was never recognized in 
Washington. By 1934, U.S. “good neighbor” policy designed by President Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt nullified the amendment understood as a test case for the seriousness 
of the new attitude towards Latin America
253
.  
This is not the space for presenting a whole history of Cuban nationalism. Suffice 
to say that the nationalist narrative became hegemonic in Cuba’s educational system even 
when the United States exerted political tutelage over the island. The time of the Cuban 
Republic before the 1933 revolution was crisscrossed by the dominance of nationalist 
ideology. Central themes of the twenties were the abolition of the Platt Amendment and 
American devolution of the island of Pines to Cuba’s jurisdiction.  
After the 1940 democratic transition, the Cuban state developed several 
institutions to expand Cuban sovereignty and negotiated some AFD successful 
arrangements with the United States.  The new political system was more autonomous 
from American interference than its predecessor (1902-1934). The main party of the 
period was called the Cuban Revolutionary Party, invoking Marti’s ideology and called 
itself the “autenticos”. It governed Cuba from 1944 to 1952 (Ameringer 2000). The main 
scenario of Cuba’s foreign policy was the Western Hemisphere where Cuba promoted 
                                                          
253For a discussion about the impact of the end of the Platt Amendment on U.S.-Cuba 
relations from an American perspective in 1935 see the report “Problems of the New 




coalitions of Latin American countries to fight for a developmental agenda and reduce 
American dominance. 
The autenticos governments had a policy of democratic solidarity with countries 
submitted to dictatorial regimes and in defense of Puerto Rico’s independence from the 
United States. During the 1940-1952 democratic experience, Cuba’s relations with the 
United States matured. A central issue of bilateral discussion was Cuban sugar quota in 
the U.S. market. The nationalist doctrine denounced economic pressures such as the 
cutting of market quotas as foreign aggression to force smaller ones to adopt detrimental 
policies to their national sovereignty and development.  
President Ramon Grau San Martin coined a foreign policy doctrine against 
economic aggression as a form of intervention. Cuba will oppose to any economic 
sanctions approved unilaterally. Cuban Secretary of State advocated for its codification in 
inter-American law at the founding conferences of the OAS and the Rio Pact. Cuba also 
opposed the veto right conferred to the five permanent members of the Security Council 
in the United Nations San Francisco Charter. Havana denounced the veto as opposed to 
the principle of sovereign equality. These two Cuba’s anti-hierarchy positions in 
international relations caused some frictions with the United States but they never 




American Cold War pivot to East Asia and Western Europe had a profound 
impact on U.S. Cuba relations. It lowered Latin America priority in U.S. foreign policy 
after 1947. In the absence of a security and foreign policy logic, the politics of inattention 
prevailed. Washington deferred to the interests of local beet and corn sugar producers in 
detriment of exports from Cuba. Under such conditions the Cuba’s position deteriorated 
versus the United States and experienced a cut down of the island’s sugar quota in the 
American market. In the middle of the 1952 presidential and congressional elections, 
General Fulgencio Batista returned to power through a coup d’ etat on March 10. Foggy 
Bottom welcomed the coup.  
The triumph of the Cuban revolution in 1959 happened in a context of profound 
resentment towards United States in the Western hemisphere. In the Caribbean, the 
United States supported the dictatorships of Trujillo en Dominican Republic, Perez-
Jimenez in Venezuela, Somoza in Nicaragua, Castillo Armas in Guatemala, and Batista 
in Cuba. In this context, American protests against the revolutionary summary trials of 
military loyalists of Batista’s regime sounded hypocritical (Chase 2010). It was the 
beginning of a difficult dialogue about human rights between the two societies. 
Cuba’s revolutionary foreign policy entered rapidly into conflict with American 
hegemony in the Americas. First, Fidel Castro promoted a political model domestically in 




socialist, if not already communist and procured from early on at least an equidistant 
relation with the United States and the countries of the communist bloc. This projection 
was in direct conflict with U.S.’s views of continental solidarity against communism 
(Guevara 1964). The revolutionary narrative did not limited to nationalism but included a 
permanent invocation of internationalist socialist solidarity. 
This double dynamics made almost impossible to advance an AFD solution to the 
bilateral conflict in the first decade of the asymmetric conflict. Not only because of the 
U.S imperial coercive policy. For Cuba’s revolutionary policy, deference to U.S. great 
power status was anathema. Castro’s Cuba worked feverishly to support revolutionary 
movements across the Latin American region, and the world (Africa for instance) in 
conflict with the U.S. led world order. The declared goal of the Cuban revolution was to 
make the Andes the “Sierra Maestra” of Latin America, creating- in Che Guevara’s 
words- “two, three, many Vietnams” against the United States. Most Cuban allies in the 
United States were affiliated to the new left, specifically the anti-war and black radical 
movements.  
AFD solutions require some historic maturity of asymmetric conflicts, difficult to 
achieve in the immediate aftermath of a revolution. The hegemonic great power looks at 
the weaknesses and disorganization created by revolutions and tends to believe on the 




assertiveness originated on the support by passionate masses. In terms of historical cycle, 
an AFD compromise in earlier moments of revolutions is improbable because there is no 
accepted stalemate or impasse between the contenders. The real balance of power is 
diffused and surrounded by a maximalist feeling not amenable to strategic cost-benefit 
calculation.  
As long as there was an implacable U.S. opposition to post-revolutionary Cuba, 
the internationalist impulse was part of the survival strategy. Washington’s 
confrontational attitude attracted support for Cuba from the communist bloc. Cuba’s 
posture was strengthened with every action in the world that distracted the efforts of the 
United States to put off anti-capitalist fires. Cuban revolutionary leaders demanded the 
USSR and the PRC to support their project as inseparable part of socialist struggle over 
the world (Guevara 1964).  
Reciprocally Cuba expressed a commitment to conduct its foreign policy towards 
the United States in coordination with the world socialist bloc. This was not an issue of 
only the 1960’s or 1970’s but also invoked in the 1980’s when Cuba was an active player 
in Angola. In 1985, Raul Castro told the then Secretary of the CPSU Mikhail Gorbachev 
how Cuba rejected negotiations with the United States as the Reagan Administration 




block and the U.S. in Europe (Castro, Woodrow Wilson Center of International Scholars. 
1985).  
According to a declassified report by Raul Castro of his conversation with 
Gorbachev: 
the Reagan Administration wrongly believes that we are desperate to negotiate. 
They are totally wrong. We want to complicate their aggressive policy. We are 
using our contacts with the printed press and TV, the Catholic Church to gain a 
political space. We want to influence liberal and moderate elements defeating the 
aggressive image about us presented by the Reagan administration within the 
United States.   
There is a cardinal factor too. We are not going to negotiate a regional détente in 
the Western Hemisphere, not with us, while there is not world détente, firstly with 
the Soviet Union. Cubans are not SamoraMachel in Nkomati” (Castro, Woodrow 
Wilson Center for International Scholars 1985). 
 
 
7.3.2.1 What changed with the end of the Cold War in Cuba’s narrative? 
The end of the communist bloc made potential AFD solutions more probable 
because the balance between nationalism and communism in Cuban identity moved in 
favor of the former. This was expressed in Fidel Castro’s discourse when he claimed that 
Cuba’s first internationalist duty was to survive itself and develop (F. Castro 1996). This 
shift in Cuba’s policy and Castro’s renunciation to any weapons of mass destruction 
provided security assurances to the United States and other governments in the 




military power because neither Havana nor any of these two countries were interested in 
this type of alliance.  
One area of direct impact on Cuba’s narrative was the gradual opening to a more 
dynamic relationship with his émigrés in the United States. In 1994, the ministry of 
foreign affairs created the Division of Cuban Residents Abroad Issues, known as DACRE 
for its Spanish acronym. The new division expressed a rapprochement policy of the 
Cuban government to émigrés beyond those who were part of the revolutionary solidarity 
movement
254
. The dialogue with moderate groups opened an agenda of limited 
reconciliation. This friendlier environment sparked increased Cuban-American travel to 
the island, communications and remittances.  
Politically, these new relations Cuba-Diaspora showed a new image of Cuba to 
the American society and a new vision about United States as a more Latin country and 
the home of 15 % of the Cuban population to Cubans in the island. A more nuanced view 
about Cubans living abroad including those who disagree with the regime emerged out of 
the contacts. Cuban-Americans travelled to the island since the Carter Administration but 
                                                          
254There are several groups involved in actions of revolutionary solidarity with Cuba in 
the United States. The pioneer of these groups was the Fair Play For Cuba Committee 
(FPCC) founded in 1960 and considered a precursor of the American new left. The 
Committee included cultural celebrities and journalists such as Allen Ginsberg, the 
sociologist Charles Wright Mills, William Worthy, an African American journalist who 
became famous for his defense of freedom of speech and the right to travel to China and 
Cuba (Gosse 1993). Later there are groups such as the Venceremos Brigade, Pastors for 




during the nineties the tone of the contacts and the contribution of émigrés to the 
population’s welfare reached a critical mass. These contacts, later food sales and 
humanitarian aid helped to mitigate an official line of permanent antagonism to the U.S.  
The massive travel of émigrés to Cuba changed political dynamics not only in 
terms of their direct role in Cuban society but on the government’s narrative about their 
potential constructive role in the United States. Since many of the travelers to the island 
opposed the U.S. embargo a new patriotic image of the Cuban American community 
emerged. Cuban expatriates and American political society appeared more as a pluralist 
polity, not a monolith against the Cuban revolution. This represented an opportunity for 
nationalists since many émigrés support trade and dialogue between the two countries.  
After the interlude when George W. Bush Administration attempted to stop the 
flow of travelers and remittances to the island, the Obama Administration expanded 
people-to-people contacts with Cuba. Cuba’s image in the American press began to be 
one of a country in transition, not a threat. Obama’s policy of dialogue bolstered a less 
hostile image by allowing cooperation between the two countries. One important case 
was Cuba’s contribution to the campaigns against Ebola and cholera pandemics in 





This logic provided incentives to American projections towards Cuba in which 
Americans adopted new roles as businessmen, tourists, and health personnel, social and 
environmental activists. Cuba’s rhetoric about the United States had to adjust in the form 
of “the two United States”, one imperialistic, the other popular and friendly. This dual 
image got momentum after president Castro referred to the American with respect and 
even admiration. The mood filtered into Cuban official discourse when reform oriented 
intellectuals and officials expressed desires for a more sophisticated vision about the 
United States in Cuba’s political discourse.  
 
7.4 Setting the Analytical Framework for stabilization (normalization) and 
Acknowledgement for Deference solution (Normalcy) 
Disparity is the distinctive feature of Cuba-US relations. Power asymmetry is not 
limited to differences of capabilities but entail systemic differences in the way Cuba and 
the United States assess security risks and define their interests and perceptions. As 
Brantly Womack explains 
An asymmetric relation is not composed of two similar actors who happen to have 
a difference in capacities. Rather, mutual perceptions and interactions in an 
asymmetric relation will be fundamentally shaped by the differences of 
opportunity and vulnerability each side confronts. In effect, the relationship of A 
and B is best viewed as a set of two very different sub relations, A →b and b →A 




Although equal sovereignty and Great Powers management are constitutive norms 
of international society (Bull 1977), tension exist amid those specified principles and 
their acceptance by respective governments. The English School, some constructivists 
(Wendt 1999) and asymmetric relations theory emphasize the role of history (Buzan 
2000) as a ripening factor of cultural structures (legal, behavioral and attitudinal) between 
states.  Governments have the ability to mature stable asymmetric relations through 
diplomacy and self-restrain.  
In contrast to visions that looks an asymmetric relation as unidirectional and 
signed by domination, asymmetry theory in international relations is dialectical and 
relational.  
It concentrates on the essential interdependence of the two sides of the 
relationship. Disparity is real and it structures the relationship so that the sides are 
not transposable. However, a normal asymmetric relation is a product of 
interactive negotiation (Womack, Asymmetry and International Relationships 
2016, 12). 
  
Normalcy in asymmetric relations is the result of negotiated arrangements in 
which the two sides manage their affairs constructively in ways that the sovereignty of 
the smaller side is not threatened and the great power status is recognized. The relevance 
of historical trajectories comes from the premise of interdependence theory that expects 




should reduce state-state frictions associated to lack of communication and create issue-
linkages opportunities.  
Perception and interactions between Cuba and the United States are in permanent 
flux. Great Powers leaders (In this case, the United States) have the choice to use self-
restraint as a prudent course to build stable relations with weaker neighbors (Cuba). 
Rationally the path of confrontation tends to be reserved for the gravest contingencies 
because they provoke unintended negative effects, costs and political backlash. 
International society had evolved in ways that limits significantly the utility and 
legitimacy of the use of force and sanctions between states.  
When using diplomacy, a liberal great power such as the United States enjoys the 
leverage of a peaceful order tailored according to their values. Disparity of power and 
material resources is still relevant but zealous defenders of their sovereignty have historic 
opportunities to build agreements with regional powers within their hegemonic orders. 
Such arrangement provides security assurances that allow Great Powers and weaker 
neighbors in peace to concentrate in economic and political development goals. From a 
foreign policy perspective, Great Powers can rationally adopt a hegemonic 






. This is the case of Cuba’s challenge to the U.S. led world order after 
the defeat of the Soviet Union.  
Asymmetry is not a transitional feature.  During the Cold War, the United States 
increased its absolute power in terms of economic and military capabilities while Cuba’s 
nationalist resilience also strengthened.  Cuba’s political position in terms of active 
relations with American strategic rivals, allies and regional actors gained considerably in 
autonomy expanding the island’s possibilities of surviving long periods of U.S hostility.  
An important factor contributing to this stalemate is the fact that asymmetric 
relations are made up of a sharp disparity not only of power but also of attention.  This 
feature mitigates the impact of power disparity because the smaller power rationally 
dedicates relatively more efforts, resources and attention to the bilateral ties. In these 
circumstances interaction between both nations raises the stakes to win by their ability to 
build a mature stable relation.  
Typical solutions to conflicts between successful nationalist resistance (Cuba’s) 
and a neighboring great power (United States), are the arrangement defined as 
“Acknowledgement by deference” (Womack 2006). In such arrangements, the stronger 
power acknowledges the sovereign status of the weaker one, and the latter, in turn, 
                                                          
255I admit that this is a questionable assertion because as Winston Churchill wrote 
although the most rational foreign policy would “appease the weak, defy the strong”, 





expresses deference in global to the hierarchy of the great power. This has been the case 
of the United Kingdom with Ireland; France and Germany with Belgium; Russia with 
Finland; China with Vietnam, and the US with Canada and Mexico.     
Reference to these arrangements place asymmetrical US-Cuba relations in a 
conceptual-comparative framework beyond Cuba’s transition and foreign policy 
challenges as exceptional. Logics of dominance and resistance don’t discard the 
possibility of a constructive diplomatic approach to disparity. Brantly Womack explains:  
…in a stable asymmetric relationship, each side has different basic expectations 
of the other. Because of its vulnerabilities, the smaller side needs 
acknowledgment of its autonomy from the larger side. Autonomy implies respect 
for the smaller side’s space, identity and interests. It does not require agreement 
with the smaller, but it does require that differences be negotiated or at least 
accommodated rather than forced. For its parts, the larger side requires deference 
from the smaller. The larger must be able to interact with the confidence that 
smaller side acknowledges the respective difference of capabilities, and does not 
deny or challenge them. Deference does not mean submission, but the expectation 
of deference is directly related to the willingness of the larger side to 
acknowledge the autonomy of the smaller side, since otherwise the larger would 
be granting space to a plausible usurper. By the same token, for the smaller to 
give deference without at the same time being assured of its autonomy would be 
to expose itself to domination” (Womack, Asymmetry and International 






Washington’s imperial- coercive policy is not necessarily a constant of US 
hemispheric strategy
256
.  Indeed it can be argued that a hegemonic-persuasive strategy 
toward the Americas is more realistic and functional to United States’ global leadership. 
Cuban nationalistic conviction is a permanent factor of the bilateral relations but its 
expression adjusts according to strength, alliances and contexts
257
. The revolution was 
embedded into world trends of mid-20th century such as decolonization and socialism. 
The aspiration to a respectful relation with the United States, its neighboring superpower, 




                                                          
256Here it is important to consult not only the dominant view in Cold War studies about 
the conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States in the Latin American 
battleground but also alternative views such as Tanya Hammer’s “Allende’s Chile and 
the Inter-American Cold War” that assigns a more important role to regional actors such 
as Cuba, Brazil, and Chile as the country in direct conflict with the United States in her 
study (Hammer 2014) 
 
257One of the main mistakes of the US diagnose on Cuba in the last decades, also typical 
of the greater powers in unstable asymmetrical relations, has been the personalization of 
the conflict on Fidel Castro, ignoring the appeal and mobilizing power of nationalism in 
Cuban culture as a structural factor     
 
258Here I use the concept of lockean culture advanced by Alexander Wendt (Wendt 1999) 
at macro-systemic level. Anarchic condition of the international system is compatible 
with different logics. Wendt proposes at least three: Hobbsean with a high rate of war and 
death of states, typified by identities of mortal enmity, lockean, with a culture of norms 




Post-1959 Cuba’s foreign policy has lived the tension –proper to revolutionary 
processes— between nationalism, centered on sovereignty, and internationalism, centered 
on ideological solidarity. This is the sort of tension that – as Fred Halliday demonstrated 
– exists as long as the revolutionary regime persists domestically but adopting different 
balances according to the dynamics of internal policies and the international system in 
which it operates (Halliday 1999). One possibility not explored so much by Halliday who 
concentrated on the study of military and ideological solidarity is an internationalism 
expressed within international norms, such as Cuban efforts in international health. 
Cuban resistance to US imposition developed a successful strategy of diplomatic 
attrition in which success implied just surviving and increasing the opportunity cost of 
American imperial policy. U.S sanctions were used as an alternative to the direct use of 
force because of its relative lower cost. But as it was recognized publicly by the Linowitz 
reports in the early seventies once Cuba broke the regional isolation in the Western 
hemisphere, Washington’s use of overt or covert force against Cuba would harm 
                                                                                                                                                                             
relative low rate of states’ death and Kantian, a type of supranational integration beyond 









Due to power disparity, AFD solution requires a specific sequence by which the 
great power (United States) dismantles first hostility structures and provides security 
assurances to Cuba. The dismantlement of hostility structures generally begin by the 
adoption of new images about each other. The accumulative effect of successive 
negotiations created a thaw in which stabilization and normalization became plausible. 
What happened on December 17, 2014 had precedents in several agreements 
between Cuba and the United States about airlines hijacking, fishing borders, migration 
and peace in the Southern Cone of Africa.  This is not a question only of outcomes but 
also of negotiating respect. After Secretary Henry Kissinger launched a major secret 
initiative towards Cuba as part of his détente policy, the rapprochement reached an 
important milestone when the Carter Administration and the Cuban government opened 
Interests Sections in both capitals. Although the sections model was short of the embassy 
status, it allowed better information and communication between the two governments.  
                                                          
259This position was expressed by several members of the Kennedy Administration but it 
was stated in the clearest way by the National Policy Paper-Cuba-United States Policy of 
July 15,1968, prepared under the leadership of Viron (Pete) Vaky (U.S. State Deparment 
1968). This document can be considered the first comprehensive argument in American 





Institutionalization of dialogue through the sections favored information flows 
between both governments and societies. Still given the nature of hostility and the 
sensitivities of American great power’s face (Ramirez and Morales 2014) and Cuban 
nationalism, most important negotiations were conducted in secrecy (Leogrande, William 
& Kornbluh, Peter 2014). In such emotionally charged environment, diplomatic 
institutions provided space for political catharsis and cooled down passions. The Interests 
Sections provided consular services, and management crisis mechanisms.  
The opening of the interests sections in 1977 represented a move in direction to an 
AFD solution. President Carter’s policy changes by the United States were predicated on 
the understanding that: a) imposing an imperial course to relations with Cuba was not 
worth its costs in terms of regional and global grand strategies, 2) a hegemonic 
persuasive logic could increase the asymmetric leverage promoting interests and values 
more efficiently than an imperial coercive policy. 3) A stable policy of self-restrain that 
guarantees predictability to a relationship with Cuba, allows the United States to focus on 
more significant issues (such as policies between great powers or regional hegemony 
management).         
American détente moves by the administration of James Carter, Barack Obama 
and Bill Clinton in a lesser extent put the ball at times in the Cuban court, generating 




relations with its neighbor Superpower. This debate is complicated by the revolutionary 
nature of the Cuban regime. Evidences show how Castro’s foreign policy changed not 
only in the national but also in the regional-global scenario. As predicted by Fred 
Halliday in his discussion about revolution’s foreign policy, Cuba didn’t abandon 
completely its revolutionary projection but calibrated its approach to regional and global 
affairs.  That did not mean the abandonment of revolutionary ideals but providing a 




After the experience of failing to consolidate an AFD solution with the Carter 
Administration, Cuban diplomacy embarked in a transition for a potential AFD 
opportunity by channeling the new internationalism into areas of civilian cooperation. 
During the 1980’s Cuba kept its internationalist presence in Angola, Ethiopia and 
Nicaragua together with some minor military support for insurgent groups in El Salvador, 
Guatemala and Chile. But for the most part, Cuba’s presence in the third world, after the 
end of the Cold War concentrated in civilian sectors such as education and health. Cuba’s 
                                                          
260Here it is important to remember that normalcy and normalization of diplomatic 
relations with a status quo superpower (the United States) have conformity costs for a 
revolutionary actor (Cuba) in terms of discourse, alliances, symbolism, etc. For instance 
better relations with the United States bring some logical uncertainty for the Chinese and 
Russian visions about Cuba. Notice how important members of the Cuban Cabinet, 
including president Raul Castro and vice-president Diaz-Canel visited Beijing and 
Moscow with clear statements of reassurances about Cuba’s special relations with the 




pre-eminent role in international health issues is not a challenge to the U.S. led world 
order, regardless of its political promotion of Cuba’s socialist values.  
One factor contributing to an AFD compromise under presidents Obama and 
Castro is the role of regional actors. Latin America and the Caribbean welcomed Cuba’s 
reforms. Most Latin American governments support Cuba’s gradual transition to a market 
economy with the patient hope that such a process will bring about deep political 
transformations. President Bush’s insistence on an imperial policy provoked sharp Latin 
American responses. Since the IV Summit of the Americas in Mar del Plata, countries 
started demanding that Cuba be incorporated into the hemispherical dialogue.  
The rapprochement between Cuba and the United States gained momentum in the 
VII Summit of the Americas in Panama in April 2015. Cuba harvested the benefits of a 
policy of raising the costs of American embargo not only in the bilateral but at the 
regional context (Lopez-Levy 2014-2015). In the V and VI Summits of Trinidad and 
Cartagena, several Latin American countries announced their intention not to participate 
in another hemispheric conclave if Cuba was excluded, just because the United States 
opposed. The VII summit appeared as a critical juncture, an event that raised the profile 
and attention on U.S. policy. This contributed to president Obama’s decision to end the 
policy of isolation from the executive branch and get the credit from the hemisphere for 







7.4.1 Normalization and Normalcy 
The agreement of December 17 2014 proved to be just the beginning of a process 
of normalization not its conclusion. Normalization as a process and normalcy as a destiny 
are related to the adoption by Cuba and the United States of behaviors and convictions 
aligned to the norms of current international society
261
. At the core of the conflict there 
are two challenges to the liberal international order:  
1) The sovereignty challenge. United States refuses to treat Cuba as a 
sovereign country with all the prerogatives of this status in the XXI century. In 
reaction to American interventionism in the first half of the XX century, Cubans 
developed a radical version of nationalism that is a predictable feature in Cuban 
politics for the near future. This nationalism although opposed to any American 
                                                          
261At the core of the current international order are two major international regimes, the 
sovereignty regime embodied in the UN Charter that rejects the use of force between 
states and the respect for sovereignty as the ordinal principle of international society and 
the International Human Rights Model in which the society of states have converged on 
the adoption of legitimacy criteria about the domestic relations between governments and 





tutelage in Cuba’s internal affairs did not make the island a threat to its neighbors 
and the international liberal order. Cuba is located in a region with a relatively 
strong normative regime in terms of human rights
262
, and regional security
263
.  
2) The heterogeneity challenge. Current Cuban leadership conceives 
Cuba not only as a sovereign but also a revolutionary state. This formulation 
implies contradictions with the international liberal order. Cuba does not accept 
representative democracy and market economics as principles of regional or 
international legitimacy. Cuban foreign policy not only rejects U.S. imperial 
policy towards the island or Latin America but also an international hierarchy that 
confers Great Powers unequal status, responsibilities, rights and prerogatives
264
.  
While acknowledgement of sovereignty depends on a U.S change of policy and 
roles (a great power doesn’t need to have an imperial policy towards a small neighbor), 
                                                          
262For a discussion on the inter-American human rights international regime see the 
volume “The Inter-American System of Human Rights” edited by David Harris and 
Stephen Livingstone (Harris 1998). 
 
263For a discussion of the dynamics of regional security see “States, Nations and the Great 
Powers: The Sources of Regional War and Peace” (Miller 2007). In his chapter about 
Latin America, concentrated in South America, Miller attributed Latin America’s 
relatively peaceful character to the consolidation of congruent national states in terms of 
a regional state-to-nation balance.  
 
264For a discussion of the issue of sovereign inequality in the international order see Gerry 




the heterogeneity problem is one that touches the identity of the two actors: The United 
States as a superpower and Cuba as a revolutionary state. As long as Cuba is a 
revolutionary state, its foreign policy would balance the nationalist pragmatic imperative 
with the internationalist revolutionary impulse. Even after the accommodation, 
revolutions continue to conflict with the international system. In the words of Fred 
Halliday:  
The central question is not whether the revolutionary state is “socialized” in its 
external relations, but whether in the longer run the pressures of the external 
context lead not just to changes in foreign policy but also to an internal change, 
whereby the commitment to an alternative path of social development is 
abandoned (Halliday 1999, 135).   
 
To recognize the duality and interdependence of these two conflicts is not to say 
that the two problems are equivalent. Cuban revolution, by reason of its radical ideas 
clashed with the status quo. It also generated solidarity and desires of emulation in other 
societies particularly in Latin America but also in what was later known as the American 
new left. It is false to say that Castro’s Cuba owes its internationalist orientation to 
American opposition to his nationalist revolution. Mark Falcoff and others demonstrated 
how Castro was a revolutionary with strong radical convictions and a decision to 
challenge U.S. hegemony in the Western hemisphere. William Leogrande and Peter 
Kornbluh documented several occasions in which the Ford and the Carter 




will accept to live within a U.S. led world. Fidel Castro did not totally rejected the idea of 
an accommodation but embarked on revolutionary endeavors in Africa and Latin 
America that made most difficult a political arrangement.  
That highlights the importance of the opening of the embassies and the creation of 
a climate of respect and negotiations after December 17, 2014. When the American 
executive branch commits to the dismantlement of an imperial policy such as the 
embargo, a normalization process undermine the vicious cycle of hostility built on the 
absence of cooperative interdependence. Brantly Womack said: “The best friend of 
normal asymmetric relationship is habit, and its worst enemy is novelty” (Womack, 
Asymmetry and International Relationships 2016, 69). Diplomatic negotiations provide 
the best mechanism to deal not only with bilateral problems but also with issues of 
misperceptions, a not minor problem given the propensity of asymmetry to magnify 
misinterpretation and uncertainty.   
A good step for managing well U.S.-Cuba asymmetric conflict was the creation 
by the two countries of a bilateral commission to address issues of cooperation, 
differences and contradictions. The commission provides a mechanism to evaluate 




into the trap of negative complementarity
265
. The Commission is not a panacea but fall in 
line with the creation of structures of bilateral normalcy and a virtuous cycle of 
diplomatic ritual (it includes periodic meetings to assess the general state of the relations) 
and habituation to constructive management of controversies (inclusive rhetoric, neutral 
zone, and issue routinization). Less than a year and a half after the December 17 
agreement, more than fourteen groups were negotiating issues of interests and multiple 
ministerial visits in Commerce, health, investment, and security cooperation were taking 
place.  
The intangible issue of inclusive rhetoric is deeply influential at the society level. 
President Obama’s multiple declarations of respect for Cuban sovereignty still contrast 
with the practices implemented as result of the Helms-Burton law and the presence of an 
unwanted naval base in Cuban territory but it helps to cool off some of the most 
intransigent Cuban discourses warning about an American invasion or war at every 
                                                          
265The problem of negative complementarity has been studied by Brantly Womack as a 
complication of asymmetric conflict. In the absence of asymmetry, many problems of 
misperception identified by Robert Jervis can cancel one another (Stein July 1982) but in 
asymmetric conflict crisis there is a propensity in the stronger power’s different apparatus 
to concentrate on the controversial behavior of the smaller one, magnifying a perception 
of threat and ignoring the general context of the bilateral relation (extrapolation). Since 
the smaller power tends to make its strategic calculus on the bases of worst case scenario, 
it look at the actions of the more powerful through its own over-attention to bilateral 
relation and connect dots of hostility that are not necessarily connected (interpolation). 
For a discussion of these issues, see Brantly Womack’s discussion of “misperception and 





instant. Cuba’s current domestic debate about policy towards the United States is one 
with references to challenges but also opportunities for Cuba’s reform and economic 
development.  
Obama’s inclusive discourse and reference to international norms during his visit 
to Havana addressed the historical reality that five decades of American imperial 
disrespect for Cuban sovereignty made a difficult relation intractable. American policy of 
regime change by coercion transformed a heterogeneity conflict into an existential one 
(sovereignty). In response to such imperial behavior, Cuba’s revolutionary government 
presented a foreign policy doctrine aligning Cuba’s most primary national interest 
(sovereignty) with a commitment to an alternative world order.  
Under those circumstances, the internationalist impulse to promote radical change 
beyond Cuba’s borders became the need not only of the revolutionary cause but also of 
nationalism. The alignment of the two conflicts (nationalism versus imperial policies, 
radical internationalism versus American liberal hegemony) mitigates the typical 
antinomies (Halliday 1999, 133-157) of revolutionary foreign policy. Instead of a tension 
between pragmatic nationalism and revolutionary internationalism, the Cuban leaders 
found a synergy between the nationalist and internationalist impulses.   
Since American policy didn’t give the Cuban government other choice than 




the safest way to preserve national sovereignty. No matter how much a fraction of the 
Cuban post-revolutionary elites could want accommodation with the United States, it 
cannot do it by itself without an American partner acknowledging the interests and 
nationalist values developed by the new elites after 1959. Obama’s explicit decision 
expressed in the 2015 State of the Union Address to reject the Helms-Burton law 
blueprint for a negotiation with Cuba was decisive to bring a comprehensive attitude of 
cooperation to the negotiation table
266
.  
                                                          
266The passing of the Helms-Burton law is in itself and example of how 
misperceptions dynamics typical of asymmetric relations in the absence of routines of 
negotiation, communication and partnership to diffuse negative actions by spoilers. When 
the Helms-Burton law was discussed in Congress, Secretary of State Warren Christopher 
warned the White House that such legislation would push the United States in a course of 
violation of international law, clashes with American allies and troubles to promote 
democracy in Cuba with flexibility. Still, when Cuba shutdown two civilian planes after 
reiterated warnings about violations of its air space the law was passed in the heat of 
1996 electoral year (Kornbluh, Peter & LeoGrande, William 2014). Cuba’s decision, 
admitted by Fidel Castro as a mistake in a message to president Clinton- according to the 
memoirs of the Arkansan- reflected a lack of information (The Clinton Administration 
had already revoked the flight license of those involved in the violation of Cuba’s air 
space). Cuba assumed a coordination and tolerance from the Clinton Administration with 
the violators that by 1996 was not so. Today, a confusion of such magnitude seems 
unlikely capable of derailing the rapprochement process. There are exchanges of 
information among officials of the two countries and especially military to military 
consultations. Corresponding experts and officials are developing a habituation to diffuse 
crisis with technical solutions. A qualitative sense emerges that differences can be 
bridged and crisis managed or solved peacefully. Obama’s unilateral steps of taking Cuba 
off the list of nations sponsors of terrorism and opening channels of interactions with 
Cuban society opened chances for Cuba adopting some deferential attitudes (Different 




Since the terms of accommodation contemplated by the United States in the 
Helms-Burton law are so humiliating to Cuban nationalists, negotiations under the 
Clinton and Bush administration occurred only in the margins. Then the statu quo of 
minimal interaction got reinforced because Cuba was a low priority issue on U.S. post-
Cold War foreign policy, and absent of a crisis there was little incentive for both sides to 
yield to a diplomatic settlement in which trade and travel relations could be normalized. 
Even under Obama, who had sent many proper signals to Havana from the electoral 
campaign, Cuban experts assumed normalization with the United States as a low 
probability event in the course of one-term administration. In consequence, the Cuban 
government sought partnerships with countries less vulnerable to pressures by the United 
States, such as China, Russia and later the new emerging markets from the South.  
The fact that Obama’s overtures to Cuba come from the executive branch without 
rejection or approval of Congress define its merits but also its vulnerabilities. Since the 
Cuban government as the smaller side in asymmetry tends to look at the bilateral ties 
with the perspective of “what if”, Havana would always include in its strategic 
calculation the possibility of a policy reversal under a different administration. The desire 
to counterbalance hostile relations with Washington remains at the core of Cuba’s 
triangular strategies. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Snowden or an opportunity for a stopover in a flight to Venezuela, Ecuador or Bolivia 




One way to grasp how U.S. hostility helped to push Cuba into a more traditional 
communist command economy and totalitarian regime is to contrast the type of system 
consolidated in the aftermath of the Missile Crisis and the paradigm Che Guevara 
described to Richard Goodwin in one of the first attempts to find an accommodation with 
Washington in 1962. According to Goodwin, Guevara told him that “in building a 
communist state they have not repeated all of the aggressive moves of the East. They did 
not intent to construct an iron curtain around Cuba but to welcome technicians and 
visitors from all countries to come and work” (Goodwin 1961).  
The possibility of a “modus vivendi” between the U.S. and Castro as a 
“nationalist communist Tito in the Caribbean”, distanced from Soviet military power, 
was never consistently explored by American policymakers until December 17, 2014. 
Cuba as a national communist regime could have satisfied the central concerns of United 
States containment strategy towards the developing world in the Cold War. A modus 
vivendi could have not peel Cuba off from the Soviet Alliance immediately but it could 
mitigate Moscow’s role in Cuban and Latin American affairs, and offer incentives to 
dissuade Cuba from a subversive attitude towards the U.S. led order.  
Reflecting on this counterfactual possibility, Richard Goodwin said years later: “It 
wasn’t a bad deal”- he wrote-“and given what was to come later, a detached analyst 




emotion that had always surrounded the “problem’ of Cuba had, if anything been 
heightened by our defeat at the Bay of Pigs. To make a deal with Castro, any kind of deal 
would have been politically difficult, perhaps, impossible” (Kornbluh, Peter & 
LeoGrande, William 2014). In brief, the United States couldn’t adopt a rational course 
because of imperial rancor and the structural design flaws of its Cuba policy in the 
context of asymmetry.  
Which were these structural flaws of American foreign policy that led to Cuban 
victory (asymmetric stalemate) despite the disparity of power? Pathologies of neglect and 
emotional distress aroused from the politics of inattention: 
A) A trend to personalize foreign policy as targeted to a leader not to a 
country. Rather than a policy towards a state-society complex, the political debate 
about foreign policy adopted the emotional soft/hard-doves/hawks divide about 
approaching a person: Fidel Castro. To grasp the attention about a negative 
development to its interests, Washington needs a face to oppose. Castro’s Cuba 
was one of many episodes together with Mao’s China, Allende’s Chile, and 
others.   
B) A trend to look at superpower’s statecraft mainly for coercive tools 
underestimating the mobilizing power of nationalism in asymmetric conflicts. In 




more powerful side. For two main reasons: first, because of the intangible 
importance of respect. Second, because the more powerful side have a safer 
ground to withdraw. But due to the hypertrophy of the coercive muscle in 
American policy toolbox, an AFD solution with Cuba was seen as a policy of last 
resort.  
C) A tendency to dismiss concessions to any non-democratic 
government as “appeasement”. American politicians and pundits abused the 1936 
Munich analogy with Cuba. The United States is the most powerful country in the 
world, not Czechoslovakia in 1936. As president Obama said to Thomas 
Friedman
267
 after more than fifty years of embargo:  
You take a country like Cuba. For us to test the possibility that 
engagement leads to a better outcome for the Cuba people there aren’t that 
many risks for us. It’s a tiny little country. It’s not one that threatens our 
core security interests, and so [there's no reason not] to test the proposition 
(Friedman 2015) 
 
D) In the presence of a non-priority as Cuba is for the American 
foreign policy establishment, absence of people to people contacts reinforced 
public perceptions of enmity framed by interested parties, particularly groups in 
the Cuban American community who were politically and economically profiting 
from the embargo policy.  
                                                          
267For a good discussion of the misuses of history in policymaking see “Thinking in 
Time” by Ernest May and Richard Neustadt(May 1986) with several successful and 




E) A tendency to underestimate the costs of economic sanctions and 
the difficulties to lift them once they are the law of the land. Sanctions are 
generally perceived as an alternative to war, not as a choice within a wider 
spectrum of options that might include AFD.  As part of a general attitude 
towards international law, American foreign policy does not align with 
international best practices of smart and well-targeted sanctions and does not 
contain sunset clauses that favor a reevaluation of its effectiveness. Once 
sanctions against Cuba were established, the embargo was difficult to reassess due 
to the status quo bias embedded in the American legislative process.   
F) Lack of empathy for the weaker side’s higher vulnerabilities in 
asymmetrical conflicts. Even when the United States explored an AFD agreement 
under the Ford, and Carter Administrations, policy makers insisted on reciprocity 
ignoring the differences between a superpower and a small country.  While the 
United States’ sovereignty was never at issue, Cuban policymakers had to 
calculate not only in terms of current dangers but responding the question “What 
if?” the political situation in the United States changes. The experience of dealing 
after Carter with Ronald Reagan’s aggressiveness proved them right from the 
worst case scenario point of view but it became also evident that skepticism in 
both sides slowed down chances to make more détente actions irreversible such as 




Although the negotiation processes between the United States and Cuba in the 
seventies did not reached normalcy, the opening of social and state-state contacts 
transformed the bilateral relationship. After the establishment of the interests sections by 
the two governments, a group of master variables began to play a socialization role of the 
two state-society complexes: 
a) A spike of Interdependence268as a result of licensing travel, 
remittances and trade as exceptions to the embargo impacted the Cuban-American 
community, cultural and educational constituencies, and farmers in the United 
States. In Cuba the contacts with the Cuban American community helped to 
initiate reconciliation processes at the family level and undermined adversarial 
images promoted by the government about the émigrés.  
b) Identification of common destiny communities and areas of 
cooperation (handling of tensions regarding Guantanamo Naval Base, Peace in 
Southern Africa, international health issues as a global public right as in the 
campaign against Ebola in West Africa ), with the coincidence of adversaries 
(international crime, terrorism, drug traffic, pandemics, natural disasters, etc.), 
and 
                                                          
268Robert Axelrod explained how interdependence generate stable and reciprocal 
cooperation(Axelrod 1984).The constructivist approach has rendered various case studies 
in which cooperation is not only an strategic rationale but also social, generating changes 




c) Homogenization269 processes (adoption and recognition of 
common elements as successful forms of organization or policies, for instance, 
features of market economy, Cuban acceptance in 1995  of deference to great 
powers in the 1968 Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty, and the beginning since 
2008 of economic and political liberalization).  
These three master variables (interdependence, creation of common destiny 
communities and homogenization) have prompted states’ socialization that undermines 
important pillars of the U.S. isolation strategy and Cuba’s revolutionary foreign policy 
projection. These processes are inserted on the dynamics of asymmetric conflict but they 
highlight gains to harvest from a potential AFD arrangement. They show to the United 
States the road to hegemony by détente while presenting the Cuban state-society complex 
with the dilemmas (costs and gains) of having a foreign policy guided by the 
internationalist impulse versus a narrower definition of the national interest.  
                                                          
269On the homogeneity of social, economic and political systems at the national level and 
the homogenization trend of the international, Fred Halliday recognized the explanatory 
power of realist and transnationalist views of international society. He added a third 
meaning to the concept, “a set of norms shared by different societies and which are 
promoted by inter-state competition. This is based neither on inter-state nor on 
transnational models, but on the assumptions of inter-societal and inter-state homology. 
This refers to a similarity of domestic values and organization, i.e. to what has been 
termed ‘homogeneity’, in the way societies are organized” (Halliday, International 





7.4.2 Hostility, stability and cooperation within an asymmetric conflict 
structure: 
The institutionalization of hostility towards Cuba in American laws and 
institutions stamped not only the routines of U.S. policy towards Cuba but also the 
character and identity of Cuba as a national security state. This action-reaction created 
predictability within conflict to the point that adding sanctions and responding to them 
became more a reiteration of paterns rather than substantially changing the balance of 
forces across the Strait of Florida or in Cuba. When comprehensive sanctions become a 
five decades routine, their political effect turns limited and fundamentally 
inconsequential except as reinforcing the security perception that war is always a present 
probability.    
Relations and conflict with the United States are external but not secondary issues 
in the design of Cuba’s political system. Resistance versus U.S. imperial impositions is 
invoked in the 1976 Constitution and the Constitutional reforms in 1992 and 2002. 
Defenders of the one party system openly argued its convenience on the basis that it 
rallies Communist and nationalist forces together against American pressures. Cuba 
responded the 1996 Helms Burton law with its own law 88 of defense of Cuban 




regardless if it is espionage, open subversion or part of a sequence to empower political 
opposition. For every action, there is a response
270
.  
In this action-reaction, governments imposed more restrictions to their 
populations
271
. The prevalence of U.S-Cuba conflict over Cuba’s domestic politics has 
devastating effects on democratic development chances. Cuban opponents of the regime 
are frequently presented through their attitude towards U.S. designs. U.S. manipulation of 
democracy discourse to defend the U.S. embargo made positive views about American 
democracy an anathema in a political culture dominated by a cult to sovereignty. The 
rejection of the embargo is prevalent among active and passive supporters of the regime, 
                                                          
270For instance, if the United States creates a program to undermine Cuban health 
diplomacy in the developing world by promoting defection of Cuban doctors and health 
personnel, Cuba increases the graduation of doctors and nurses, strengthening 
surveillance over those who works overseas. “As of April 2012 there were 38,868 Cuban 
medical professionals working in 66 countries-of whom 15,407 were doctors 
(approximately 20 % of Cuba’s 75 000 physicians. In Africa some 3000 Cuban medical 
personnel are currently working in 35 of the continent’s 54 countries, while in Venezuela 
alone there are approximately 30 000”- wrote Erisman and Kirk (Kirk, John & Erisman, 
Michael 2009), the premier experts on this area. The U.S Cuba Medical Parole Program 
(CMPP) created by the Bush Administration in 2006 provides information and 
encourages Cuba’s health mission’s personnel to defect by offering them a fast track 
asylum through embassies and consulates in third countries. The program has been 
criticized by Cuba and other countries as a violation of human rights and it came under 
political attack during Cuba’s rapid response to the Ebola pandemics in Western Africa. 
Data shows that only between 3-5% of the targeted personnel has defected (Blue 2010, 
34-35). The program mainly functions as an irritant to Cuba and the recipient countries.   
 
271Today it is paradoxical but after Cuba’s migratory reform in 2013, there is less 
limitations for a Cuban citizen to travel to the United States from the Cuban government 




and the defense and security institutions. It is also shared by many potential supporters of 
the political opposition. The identification of liberal democratic ideas with the agenda of 
imperial imposition undermines chances of convergence of values at the levels of the 
elites and the population.  
Asymmetry theory of international relations looks at the process of normalization 
of bilateral ties from an institutional and cultural perspective. The legacy of hostility, 
skepticism and suspicion institutionalized not only in policies but also in cultures and 
constituencies of confrontation cannot be removed by some years of limited social and 
state-to-state diplomatic interactions. Side by side with institutionalized structures of 
hostility, there are factors of stabilization that aroused from the two states’ need for 
elemental cooperation in international society and attempts to normalize bilateral 
relations. Despite the animosity between their states, both foreign policy establishments 
have strong rationale for managing conflict within a calculated risk.  
The creation of these structures for solving issues of mutual interests aroused 
from both sides’ conviction that a military confrontation will result in huge unjustified 
costs to the United States and the destruction of most Cuban national assets. Both nations 
acknowledge the need to have some institutional channels to prevent undesired disasters. 
For decades, most negotiations between the U.S and Cuba have used backdoor channels. 




who were feed by narratives of intransigence. This has been the case even when the 
issues of the dialogue were clearly in the interests of the two states. The 1973 
Memorandum of Understanding on Hijacking of Aircraft and Vessels and Other 
Offenses”
272
 is an example. 
American preferences for secrecy reinforce the taboo of negotiating with Cuba. 
Since 1988 until 2008, no presidential nominees declared upfront a desire to negotiate a 
settlement with “Castro’s Cuba”. By not discussing openly their efforts, politicians, in 
favor of a negotiated settlement with Cuba, did not prepare the political ground for it. 
Havana also had also a preference for secrecy according to the non-democratic security 
driven CCP rule and the convenience of reproducing the enemy image about the U.S for 
copying with domestic dissidents. This institutional preference for ad hoc secret talks 
made difficult a long term habituation to periodic negotiation as a method to solve 
differences.   
Since 1977, the interests sections in Havana and Washington helped to pave a 
road to institutionalization of negotiation of common interests such as emigration, fishing 
zones, maritime economic borders, meteorological and information exchanges. There 
were also low profile military cooperation around the Guantanamo naval base, anti-
                                                          
272For a Conflict resolution perspective on this episode see the work by Karen Feste 
“Reducing International Terrorism: Negotiation Dynamics in the U.S. - Cuba Skyjack 




narcotics interdiction and accidents in the high seas. The two countries also agreed to 
cooperate within multi- countries arrangements with other nations of the Caribbean 
Basin, in the eventuality of an oil spill in the Gulf. One of the most important activities of 
the sections is consular services, including the visa processes for visitors and immigrants.  
Although these structures were conceived as part of détente and rapprochement 
(The interests sections opened during the Carter Administration fall on this category), 
they were never insulated from the general mood of the relations and the problems of 
inattention and over-attention. At times of conflict, they even became grounds for 
confrontation and hostile rhetoric and actions. Fidel Castro explained several times that 
he was forced to use non-official emissaries to the White House because his official 
communications to the Chief of the Interests Section did not receive proper attention and 
response in Washington. The two governments have expelled American and Cuban 
diplomats accused of espionage or engaging in political activities incompatible with their 
diplomatic status. 
A extreme situation happened during George W. Bush Administration when the 
interests section in Havana got transformed by the Mission Chief James Cason in the 
headquarters of Cuba’s pro-embargo opposition. This misuse of the American diplomatic 
locals for meetings, workshops and conferences for opponents of the Cuban government 




course for the two countries
273
. A group of political appointed neoconservatives led by 
Ambassadors John Bolton, Roger Noriega and Otto Reich brought an ideological 




After they left their posts in the Bush’s administration, James Cason and Roger 
Noriega revealed their attempt to roll the bilateral relations back to 1977 when there were 
no interests sections in Havana and Washington. According to Cason and Noriega the 
goal was to create “chaos and instability” as a precondition for a collapse of the 
communist regime. The policy deviated even from American proclaimed goal in the 
Torricelli Act of a “peaceful transition” to democracy in Cuba. It was rejected by most 
civil society groups in Cuba and international human rights groups that found 
counterproductive to promote “chaos and instability” in the name of human rights (A. 
Lopez-Levy Sep/Oct2011). 
 
                                                          
273Interestingly some of the most scandalous meetings in which the interventionist regime 
change policy of the Bush administration got self-exposed were organized by Mr. Cason 
together with Manuel David Orrio, who was working as agent of Cuba’s state security.  
 
274In a famous episode involving a visit to Cuba by former president James Carter, 
ambassador Bolton was caught bullying analysts of the State Department and the CIA 





Removing the Interests Sections from both capitals proved not to be even the 
policy of Bush’s foreign policy team. In her memoirs, Condoleezza Rice, who was 
secretary of State, suggested the interests’ sections model as a way to stabilize relations 
with Iran. Rice described the Interests Section in Cuba as a good source of information 
about the island and a platform to interact with societies in hostile countries (Rice 2011). 
Under Rice’s leadership at the State Department, most of Mr. Cason’s most provocative 
practices against the Cuban government were dropped by his successors. Yet, the 
evidences of these attempts to torpedo the bilateral relations by a cabal of ideologically 
driven officials warn about the problems of irreversibility of détente steps and potential 
miscommunication.  
After July 2015, the interests sections were transformed in embassies raising the 
potential profile for negotiation and cooperation within the codes of the 1962 Vienna 
Convention of diplomatic relations.  In contrast to other approaches that focus on 
“deliverables”, asymmetry theory assigns great importance to diplomatic rituals because 
as Womack puts it: “without prejudicing either side in the give-and-take on specific 
issues, diplomatic ritual shows mutual respect” (Womack, Asymmetry and International 
Relationships 2016, 213). Official diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United 
States opened the door to meetings at the summit between presidents Castro and Obama 
and paved the way to a historic symbolic visit by president Obama to Havana raising the 




Economic contacts are a growing arena of stabilization. Their impact on the 
political scenes of Cuba and the United States make economic reform and political 
liberalization in Cuba a potential game changer. The core of these economic ties has 
changed over time on a trend to add new activities but also subjected to the ups and 
downs of the conflict and the political muscle of the business groups involved. Since 
1973, Cuba developed an important open trade with subsidiaries of American companies 
in third countries, particularly Canada, Argentina, and Mexico. This trade was conceived 
by the Kissinger team as a door opener for subsequent economic rapprochement after the 
U.S. public was softened and Cuba understands the benefits of a moderate posture 




President Obama’s policy of licensing most economic activities with Cuba 
allowed within the embargo framework is testimony of its relevance and limitations. In 
terms of the travel licenses and the authorization to commercial aviation companies to 
run flights to the island there is an enormous potential for improving and cheapening the 
                                                          
275The CDA opened the door for “people-to-people” contacts allowing some economic 
activities as part of this approach. The more important presidential licenses were for 
travel, remittances, and telecommunications. There were obvious stabilization effects 
related to the involvement of families, students, co-religionists, artists and sportspeople 
travelling, sharing economic assets or interacting by phone, e-mail or internet. But these 
constituencies were diffuse outside the Cuban American community, and some religious, 




contacts between the two societies but also challenges to the political management of the 
transition from the charters model to the more open logic of commercial flights.  
There is an industry of charter flights between the United States and Cuba 
fundamentally concentrated in South Florida and Havana but expanding to other cities in 
both countries. This industry produces a gross revenue calculated around 2.7 billion 
dollars in Florida just in authorized travel to Cuba. A penumbra of associated businesses’ 
profits, governments’ revenues and jobs surrounds flights, packages shipping and 
distribution, remittances, telecommunications, and financial support for these activities in 
both countries. After several years a set of industries such as charter flights, 
telecommunication companies, shipping and port companies, money sending businesses 
such as Western Union have developed pure economic interests in these exchanges.  
The importance for those industries of connections with Cuba is such that they are 
very sensitive to the debate in Washington about the issue. It is to be seen whether big 
American actors such as the commercial airlines or other companies would put the 
attention on Cuba developed by these actors since Cuba would have less relative 
importance in these companies’ general portfolio.  
In 2000 Congress passed the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement 
Act (TSREEA). This legislation opened a heavily restricted but substantial space for U.S. 




using agricultural export sanctions against several adversaries (North Korea, Iran, Sudan, 
Cuba and then Libya) but simultaneously denied any government assistance to American 
exports to these countries demanding payment in cash in advance for all transactions 
routed through third-country banks.  
Fidel Castro rejected to buy “one grain” under those terms. But after hurricane 
Michelle depleted Cuban government’s food stores in 2001, Castro contacted American 
Agricultural companies. Cuba’s purchases of U.S. agricultural products became a major 
feature of the relations. The Cuban side understood that the benefits of this trade 
outweighed the costs, which was not the case of medicines trade in which Cuba had 
developed a generic drugs national pharmaceutical industry and one in which the U.S. 
conditionality for sales was really intrusive. Business relations under TSREEA favored 
the emergence of constituencies demanding a better environment for their business 
opportunities.  
The U.S. agricultural sales to Cuba have attracted a powerful lobby of farmers 
and sellers to the debate about U.S. policy towards Cuba. The Cuban government 
targeted politicians by distributing food sales opportunities across different states.  The 
implementation of the law created also an ironical contradiction in the embargo 
legislation: it allowed American ships to carry food to Cuba while European and other 




months. The Cuban side highlighted this irony for third countries that, although rejecting 
the extraterritoriality of the embargo, accepted American limitations as a fait accompli
276
.  
In addition to clearly defined opposite structures of hostility and ad hoc 
cooperation there are institutions that supposed to be for an alleged benign purpose but 
legislation transformed them in sources of conflict. The Helms-Burton Act requests a 
regime change rationale for every action of every U.S. government agency towards Cuba. 
This openly proclaimed regime change narrative provides the Cuban government with the 
discretion to present any American action as an act of hostility when it is instrumental to 
its own political convenience.  
These action-reaction dynamics set a vicious cycle of polarization and suspicion 
favoring actors with contentious preferences over those with a dialogue agenda. The 
USAID Cuba program is the classical example. The Helms-Burton Act twisted the 
mission of this international development agency into a tool for regime change policy in 
charge of covert operations that are euphemistically described as “discreet”. Due to the 
logic of regime change that drives them, USAID programs did not ask the informed 
consent of its recipients. Programs that could be sources of dialogue and understanding as 
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process has been slow with concerns about vulnerability and food dependence beyond the 
costs issue. After increasing U.S. food imports from less than 1 million annually to a 
billion in just four years (2001-2005), Cuba began to reduce this unilateral “trade” 




it is the case in Vietnam are rejected by Cuban civil society groups that supposed to be 
their beneficiaries.  
 
7.5 Normalization, normalcy, and stabilization within the paradigm of 
Acknowledgment for deference 
The term normalization might be useful in the diplomatic lingua but it is a 
misnomer in the U.S.-Cuba case if the structure and paradigm of normalcy is not defined. 
The foreign policy establishments of the two countries assign disparaged content to what 
“normalization” means. For some of the U.S. establishment normalization of relations 
with Cuba means a return to what was “normal” before 1959, a time in which multiple 
Cuban governments and political actors complained about U.S. “undue” interference in 
the island-nation’s internal affairs. For other groups it means Cuba’s integration to the 
hemisphere according to the legitimacy principles of representative democracy, and 
market economics.  
In Cuba’s narrative, the five decades resistance to the U.S. embargo entitled 
Havana to Washington’s noninterference in Cuba’s internal affairs. Great power 
privileges apart, Cuba assume that the paradigm of relations between Cuba and Canada or 
Cuba and the European Union are the “normal” paradigm for the relations across the 




“normalization” as U.S. acceptance of Cuba as a communist state promoting revolution 
by all possible means all over the world. For others, the idea of normalization might 
include a democratization process in Cuba in line with hemispheric norms of democratic 
governance but preserving the privileges, interests, and socialist ideals of the current 
elites.  
Under these mutually exclusive expectations in which the two countries sleep in 
the same bed but with different dreams, full diplomatic relations cannot mean a solution 
of the conflict but merely a better management of it, an institutionalization of stability. 
The AFD formula provides a cultural structure for stabilization in which norms, 
institutions and routines can diffuse unnecessary conflict.  Stabilization is conceptually an 
intermediate stage in which zones of conflict enters into dynamics of manageability. 
Negotiation is favored over rhetorical hostility for specific algid points. 
Stabilization is an improvement from the condition of conflicted coexistence. I 
does not prescribe a transformation of the rivals’ culture of the relation but it makes it 
possible. Stabilization can occur while Cuba remains a revolutionary state committed to 
pursue a balance of power in the hemisphere in which Latin American countries integrate 
without including the United States. It might contemplate a Cuba that supports the 
independence of Puerto Rico as long as it is not by violent means. Stabilization can also 




one of change by rapprochement that does not accept the communist character of the 
Cuban political system. The United States and Cuba can have “normal diplomatic 
relations” of the kind Washington has with China or Vietnam while promoting liberal 
democratization. This seems to be the course proposed by Presidents Barack Obama and 
Raul Castro in their announcement of diplomatic relations on December 17, 2014.  
The concept of stabilization within the AFD framework is also useful to 
incorporate the interplay between low and high politics
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. The trajectory of U.S.-Cuba 
relations offers contradictory evidences about the relative insulation of security and 
hegemony-national sovereignty conflicts from improvement in communication, family 
travel, or even trade. One problem to judge the spillover effects of low politics into issues 
of security and political dialogue (high politics) is the fact that licenses to travel, trade 
and people-to-people contacts are openly conceived as part of a regime change policy, 
and severely restricted. For decades until December 17, 2014, low politics contacts of 
trade, remittances and travel were described as track II, a mere complement to track I (the 
embargo).  
                                                          
277The division between high politics and low politics presented by Stanley Hoffmann 
(Hoffman 1966)in the sixties is considered artificial by some authors (Ripsman 2000). 
Realists have emphasized the difference between high politics that encompass issues of 
national security and sovereignty and low politics that deal with issues of less urgent 
matter for survival of the state such as economic welfare, trade, scientific and educational 




The hostility structures of the embargo have a high degree of legal 
institutionalization while low politics rapprochement actions are entirely dependent upon 
the executive branch. This reality has an important effect on the Cuban side that judges 
the effects of any rapprochement gesture not only by the actions of the administration in 
office but alert about the possibility of a more belligerent president in the White House. 
After dealing with six decades of conflict, Cuban officials are familiar with Washington 
mechanics and know the collective action problems of coordinating a new policy 
throughout the bureaucracy. Executive actions to dismantle elements of the embargo 
require valuable political capital difficult to find given other domestic and foreign policy 
priorities.  
There is little evidence to confirm that in the presence of an asymmetric conflict 
such as the one between Cuba and the United States, a rise in soft transnational ties 
change the security dynamics in which cold politics dominate over warm culture, family 
ties, etc. It is not clear even that warm economic ties would decisively propel an AFD 
solution
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 of the sovereignty and heterogeneity conflicts. Given the asymmetries of 
power, the first step to stabilization (An AFD solution) is a completion of the 
transformation of U.S. strategy towards Cuba from an imperial coercive policy to one of 
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the context of Taiwan and China see “Warm Economic Ties, Cool Political Relations, 
Prospects for Cross-Strait Economic Integration after SARS and WTO” by Karen M. 




hegemonic persuasion. Although the two policies are based on American great power 
privileges, they are fundamentally different not only in terms of methods (coercion versus 
persuasion) but also about their attitudes to the multilateralism of a liberal world order.   
The same can be said about Cuba’s potential deference towards American great 
power status. Low politics contacts of people-to-people economic, educational, 
humanitarian and cultural ties thickened the volume of the bilateral relations and raised 
the cost of conflict for particular constituencies. But those issues are not the main drivers 
of Cuba’s revolutionary authorities’ decisions to act friendly or adversarial to the United 
States. Cuba’s deference to U.S. great power status depends on clear hard national 
security calculations. A potential redesign of Cuba’s grand strategy disaggregating 
nationalism and the internationalist solidarity impulse is a high politics issue. 
Whether Asymmetric interdependence (Nye 2001, 27) would be more effective 
for American policy goals towards Cuba than imperial confrontation is an empirical 
question. Under “normal” assymmetry, Havana could be more tempted to integrate into a 
U.S. led world order that is –in John Ickenberry’s phrase- “easy to join and difficult to 
subvert” but this is not a predetermined outcome. The Cuban and American governments 
are composed by social agents that could reproduce or change logics of conflict or 




The search for balance to the overwhelming weight of American influence on 
Cuban Affairs is a constant of the island’s nationalists’ grand strategy. How much the 
new generation of Cuban leaders who will replace Raul Castro after 2018 would sacrifice 
in economic development just to prefer economic, cultural and educational contacts with 
Russia, China or Venezuela rather than with Canada, the United States, the European 
Union, Brazil or Mexico is an open question. Different from the Cold War context, most 
of these governments are today wholehearted parts of the liberal order. Even if Cuba 
prioritizes its ties with China and Russia, these countries are already varieties of the 
capitalist market system partially integrated to the liberal world order. The goal of foreign 
policy diversification has been proclaimed by many Latin American nationalists but 












At the end of the VII Congress of the Cuban Communist Party in April 2016, its 
first secretary and president of the Councils of State and Government, Raul Castro, 
ratified the chronogram by which the “historicos”, the revolutionary group who fought 
the nationalist insurrection against dictator Fulgencio Batista, would complete the passing 
of the torch of the Cuban party-state to a new generation of leaders in 2018 (Reuters, 
2016). Almost one month before the CCP congress, U.S. president Barack Obama visited 
Havana after several waves of executive actions approved to circumvent the embargo 
legislation and increase travel and trade between the United States and Cuba (Leogrande, 
2016). In the two years before Obama’s visit, Havana welcomed the presidents of all the 
Latin American countries (except Panama) for the summit of the Community of Latin 
American and Caribbean States and joined the Summit of the Americas announcing the 
total end of Cuba’s separation from the Western Hemisphere.    
As Cuba enters a new phase of its political history, this dissertation made clear 
how important reforms have happened in the last two decades to adapt the economy, 
politics, leadership succession and foreign relations to the post-Cold War and post-Castro 
eras. The research developed its main arguments at the intersections between comparative 
politics, political economy and international relations. The goal was to understand the 




domestic level and the changes in Cuba’s foreign relations. This task requires a systemic 
approach aware of side effects and unintended consequences associated to changes in 
some subsystems (Jervis, 1997). It also takes into account the role of perceptions and 
misperceptions in the strategic calculation and the formation of attitudes and identities by 
the different domestic and international political actors (Jervis, Perception and 
Misperception in International Politics, 1976). 
The research provides confirmatory evidence for cultural and institutional change 
within the policy frontiers of Cuba’s one-party regime and for relevant progress towards 
stabilization, normalization and normalcy in the asymmetric relations between Cuba and 
the United States along the paradigm of an exchange of Acknowledgment of sovereignty 
for deference to the great power status (Womack, 2016). These changes increase the 
regime’s resilience and legitimacy zones in a much changed world and regional order. 
The emergence of a mixed economy model with a substantive role for the non-state 
sector (with small and medium scale national private property, foreign investment, and 
integrated institutional market relations between the different sectors), the liberalization 
and institutionalization of the one party-rule; the acceptance of a new social, economic 
and cultural pluralism, the generational renewal of the low and medium echelons of the 
CCP, and the defeat of the U.S. embargo policy mean that the collapse of Cuba’s 




However, the one-party regime faces considerable challenges ahead. The traps of 
partial economic reform equilibrium (Hellman, 1998)and the potential transformation of 
the failed imperial policy of embargo and regime change by coercion into one of a 
persuasive hegemonic character, according to the norms and institutions of a liberal 
regional and global order, are the most relevant ones. Cuban society is also becoming 
more plural and complex developing issue and interests groups that pushed for a less 
hierarchical relation between the party-state and civil society (Bengelsdorf, 1994).  
To recall, the crises of adaptation to the post-Cold War world were at the 
beginning of the XXI century of three types: 1) economic, based on the lack of viability 
of Cuba’s command economy in the absence of a benefactor as the Soviet Union was 
until 1991, 2) political, because the charismatic model of Fidel in command was 
unsustainable in the absence of the charismatic leader and the charismatic moment from 
which he emerged as the minimal winning coalition of Cuban politics, 3) of ideological 
trust, due to the lack of confidence by significant segments of the Cuban population, 
particularly within the new generations, in the capacity of the communist ideology to 
provide effective policies to cope with the structural problems of Cuba’s political 





The reforms of the last decade made important progress but these challenges are 
still far from being solved. In addition to these crises associated to the communist regime 
old politics and the flaws of command economy structures, the transformation of Cuban 
economy, politics and international insertion has created new dilemmas. Adding up to the 
test of creating new rules and routines for policy-making and intra-elite conflict 
management, Castro’s heirs will face six additional challenges that were presented at 
several moments of this dissertation:  
First, the partial economic reform equilibrium has an increasing economic, 
political and social cost. Rejecting shock therapy was the optimal approach to economic 
reform in the interest of domestic political stability but excessive gradualism reduces the 
quality of life of Cuba’s citizens by slowing down the complementary and interdependent 
effects of comprehensive adoption of a market oriented mixed economy.  
Second, a systemic corruption (Diaz-Brisquets & Perez-Lopez, 2006)has arisen as 
the result of the combination of traffic of influences and arbitrage opportunities for 
people in positions of power with lack of accountability, consumers’ protection, 
competition and transparency.  
Third, the new communications technology creates challenges derided from the 
educational boom developed by the revolution and the access to different political 




Fourth, the opening to the outside world and the economic reform create new 
losers with regional, racial, and gender gaps undermining the levels of equality achieved 
by the revolutionary project (Espina, 2010).  
Fifth, there are dangers derided from insufficient political reform (S. Eckstein, 
Back from the Future: Cuba under Castro)to manage the new pluralism of Cuban civil 
society and the demands for development within the dominant nationalist and socialist 
currents of supporters of the government.  
Sixth, for decades, the CCP elites relied on an under siege political unity around 
Fidel Castro’s charisma and resistance against the imperial-coercive policy of the U.S. 
embargo. The new course inaugurated on December 17 by president Obama of replacing 
the imperial-coercive embargo policy by a persuasive hegemonic one might erode the 
unity of the nationalist camp, creating opportunities for an acknowledgement of 
sovereignty for deference to great power status (AFD) solution and peeling off 
nationalists from the CCP.  
The dissertation studied Cuba’s adaptation to the post-Cold War world in two 
fundamental dimensions: its institutions and the mindset (the culture) of its political 
decision making process. Special importance is assigned to the conflict between Cuban 
nationalism and the American hegemonic presumption towards the Western Hemisphere, 




Cuba’s foreign relations is conceived as primarily of institutional and cultural nature. The 
dissertation presents the adaptation of Cuba’s one party regime as guided, shaped and 
conditioned by the focus of the decision-makers in Havana in two main purposes: 
domestic stability and international legitimacy.  
Different from other studies (Suchlicki, 1985), this dissertation looks at Cuban 
elites as a pluralistic group, divided by multiple factors (ideology (communist and 
nationalist), foreign policy mindset, generational gap, views about the market, etc). These 
divisions make a difference in terms of political paradigms, priorities and preferences in 
political organization and foreign policy. The content of reform, domestic stability and 
international legitimacy is contested by the different institutional factions and ideological 
currents that form “the revolutionary family” and conditioned by the nature and phases of 
the conflict between the post-revolutionary regime and the imperial policies of the United 
States’ embargo. 
 Yet there is a minimal consensus about what domestic stability and international 
legitimacy means as survival of the current regime and defeat of the American embargo 
as essentials to Cuban radical nationalism’s agenda.  The dissertation does not look at the 
regime’s capacity of resistance in mere material terms or limited to the current balance of 
forces. On the opposite, as it is essential to constructivist and asymmetry theories 




(Bunck, 1994)in the institutional development of the CCP repertoire of practices, 
resources and policies capable to guarantee its victory (defined as survival) versus the 
imperial policy of regime change imposed from abroad.  
The dissertation identifies four major arenas in which the adaptation is taking 
place: 
1) The economy, with particular attention to the institutions and 
conceptions that guide the relations between state intervention and 
markets (property rights, regulation or prohibitions of market 
transactions, relations between the state and non-state sectors). An 
important distinction is established between the functions and purpose 
of the dual track economy before 2006 under the Fidel-in-command 
model and later under Raul Castro’s leadership and the VI Congress of 
the CCP’s social and economic guidelines.  
2) The politics within the one-party system, as concerned with the change 
in state-society relations, role of rules and routines in the regulation and 
functioning of political society, as well as changes in the official 
attitudes towards loyal dissent, and the existence of social, economic, 




between factions and the two competing ideologies of the Cuban 
revolution: communism and nationalism. 
3) Leadership succession. The emphasis is on how the impact of the end of 
charismatic leadership reverberates in the legitimacy of Cuba’s political 
institutions and the position of the different echelons and political 
factions within them. Fidel Castro’s retirement and the anticipated end 
of Raul Castro’s rule at the top of the party-state combine two different 
transitions (one intra-generational that has been successfully managed 
and another, inter-generational) with important political turnover and 
consequences in the operation of the regime domestically and 
internationally.  
4) The struggle for international legitimacy as a national state and a 
revolutionary actor, two competing albeit not necessarily incompatible 
identities. There is a symbiotic relation between Cuba’s economic 
reform and political liberalization on one side and Cuba’s role in 
regional and world affairs. Economic reform and political liberalization 
push for a foreign policy driven by the national interest of promoting a 
world friendly to reform, not revolution. Such interests are affected by 




perceptions and misperceptions between Cuba and other foreign and 
international state and non-state actors.  
 In the discussion of the economic reform as well as in the chapters about political 
liberalization and foreign policy issues, the dissertation emphasized the role of the 
starting point of the transformation in 1989-1991. In Cuba, the starting point represented 
a centralized command economy under a communist one-party rule, in an economic, 
political and military alliance with the Soviet Union and subjected to a policy of 
economic isolation by the most robust great power of the international system, the United 
States. Half of the dissertation was dedicated to explore the impact of the international 
context in the design of the reforms, and how the reforms shape the identity and role of 
Cuba’s foreign policy.  
Not less important is the fact that the reforms occur as part of a political cycle that 
began with a revolution rooted in intense ideological mass mobilization of the 
overwhelming majority of the Cuban people and a large international support (Perez-
Stable, 1999). The ultimate goal of the revolution was communism, not capitalist 
development. This revolutionary identity plays an essential role in the politics of 
domestic reform and the making of Cuba’s foreign policy. It is not market’s invisible 




Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) the cultural and institutional bases behind a managed 
openness, decentralization, decollectivization and expansion of the non-state sector. 
Cuba’s initial conditions for reform highlight a combination of four important 
factors that make difficult comparisons with the processes of reform in communist 
regimes in China and Vietnam and the transitions to market in Eastern Europe: 1) Cuba’s 
economy was highly centralized as the ones in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the 
central unit was the ministries, not the provinces, a scheme that allowed in East Asia for 
more competition, experimentation and emulation of best practices, and for certain areas 
to take the lead in promoting foreign investment. 2) The strength and legitimacy of 
Cuba’s communist party-state in 1989 was closer to the position of Vietnam’s because it 
was judged as successful in terms of nationalist resistance to U.S. imposition. The CCP 
did not experience an implosion of the type that brought down its ideological homologues 
in Eastern Europe. Whatever his faults, until he fell ill, Fidel Castro governed Cuba and 
the CCP remained in control of state functions all over the country with no major 
political challenger in the horizon. 3) Cuba was already an urban and modern society 
with high standards in health and education. It was not, as China and Vietnam, an 
agrarian society capable to move population to new industries from the rural areas. The 
option of shifting large segments of the population into low wage manufactures for 
export is not available. It has to redistribute its labor force from inefficient industries and 




moving some population back to agriculture is a neuralgic point of the reform and the 
achievement of strategic food security. 4) Different from Vietnam and China (Womack, 
Modernization and the Sino-Vietnamese Model, 2013), Cuba is not located in a region of 
high economic dynamism as East Asia, and it was not attracted by the chances of joining 
a perceived successful economic integration scheme as the European Union was for the 
countries in Eastern Europe in the early 1990’s.  
In sum, comparisons are useful but it is always important to be aware of the 
exceptionalism of Cuba not only in Latin America but also in terms of its position in the 
spectrum of communist countries (Hoffman & Whitehead, Cuban Exceptionalism 
Revisited, 2007).  Ideas are important all the way down. Policies of opening to foreign 
investment, decollectivization, decentralization, acceptance of economic, social, cultural 
and political pluralism are familiar in the developing world and countries in transition 
from plan to market, but the flexible introduction of such policies by a communism 
inspired party-state are not (Brundenius & Weeks, 2001). China and Vietnam are the 
closest cases in which disillusionment with state socialism as a viable path of economic 
brought not a shift to open capitalism but the implementation of partial market overtures 
by the same party-states responsible for the failed socialist idealistic policies of 




When the dissertation uses the term “post-totalitarian” to qualify Cuba’s regime 
type is recognizing a systemic change that happened as result of the end of charismatic 
leadership, the ascendance of new types of pluralism, the decrease of popular 
mobilization and a decreasing role of communist ideology. But different from others 
(Latell, 2003)who treat the Castro brothers as opportunists and the CCP and FAR as 
cynical tools of domination for the post-revolutionary Cuban elites, I take seriously the 
role of ideology and institutional organization of Cuba’s political system. Fidel Castro, 
the main inspirational figure of the CCP is not only a nationalist but a revolutionary 
communist. References to Marxism-Leninism are together with Jose Marti’s Latin 
American nationalism central orthodoxy of the political education of the Cuban cadres 
and population at large. A Leninist party and the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) 
formed and educated under Leninist principles are at the heart of Cuba’s political system.  
Cuba remains after reform, at its core, a Leninist state. As Fred Halliday 
(Halliday, 1999)described in his discussion about revolution and international relations, 
the flexibilization of policies by revolutionary actors in specific sectors, such as foreign 
policy, does not mean the abandonment of their anti-systemic identity. Revolutionary 
actors tend to calibrate and rebalance their ideas and behavior to particular circumstances 
but as long as the revolution remains alive in the domestic arena, radical ideas have a 
space in the adopted policies. Cuba’s economic reform, political liberalization, leadership 




important changes in the political regime, its economic paradigms, and its international 
projection. However, this research shows how the expectation reiterated intermittingly 
(Lopez, 2002)that that the revolutionary spirit will fade away failed.  
It might happen that someday the anticipated change (Oppenheimer, 1992) occurs 
and the CCP losses its grip on the Cuban state. But twenty five years after the demise of 
the Soviet Union and ten after Fidel Castro’s retirement are enough to discuss how post-
revolutionary Cuba reformed and adapted rather than formulating the research puzzle as 
why the communist regime has not fallen yet (Lopez J. J., 2001). CCP’s adaptation to the 
post-Cold War world and the post-Fidel Castro situation provides a useful case study to 
understand the dynamics of post-totalitarian resilience and the challenges and dilemmas 
confronted by regimes of its kind (nationalist-communist) to achieve political stability 
and international legitimacy.  
 
Economic reform and political stability 
The first chapter covered the theme of Cuba’s economic reform as a tool to 
maintain political stability. The chapter established clearly that the transition to a mixed 
economy is managed first and foremost to contain liberalizing political effects. By 2009, 
when Raul Castro launched its efforts of economic reform, the academic debate about the 




in favor of gradualism. In 1999, Thomas Rawski said “we are all gradualists now” 
(Rawski, 1999, p. 153) referring to the contrasting successes of China’s incremental 
approach versus the disastrous experiences of Russia. As a late reformer, Raul Castro got 
the benefits of this consensus and launched the economic transformation under the rubric 
“Without haste, but without pause” (“sin prisapero sin pausa”) (Castro, 2014).  
Since the IV Congress in 1991, the political discourse of the CCP acknowledged 
that reforms were urgent. A conversation was noticeable in the public sphere about 
international experiences of transition from the old state socialism to other systems. Fidel 
Castro was horrified by Russia’s destructive record in the 1990’s and the CCP used the 
experience to persuade the population about the risks of a mismanaged transition to the 
market without a well-tested political leadership. The evidence of successful Chinese 
gradualism offered the opportunity to emulate an approach in which new reformed 
institutions were created without dismantling all of a sudden those that served the old 
command economy.  
However, Fidel Castro warned Cuban policymakers that the Chinese approach 
couldn’t be a model for Cuba given the historical, cultural, size and regional differences 
between the two countries. In 1993, he launched a version of the two tracks system with 
two currencies but not as vehicle of transition to market socialism but as a tool to rescue 




dissertation traces the transformation of the two track system into an explicit platform for 
a more market friendly model began to happen explicitly in Cuban economic structures 
and political discourse after the rise of Raul Castro to the helm of the Cuban state and his 
consolidation of power in the VI Congress of the CCP. 
The two tracks model (Roland, 2000)of reform has been used in three countries, 
China, Vietnam and Cuba. The three countries are very different and provide 
opportunities for comparison beyond the reach of this research. Thus far, the discussion 
of these experiences was limited to the context of East Asia. This dissertation explained 
how Fidel Castro’s initial conception of the two tracks system failed as a recourse to save 
the command economy but developed an institutional and political base for its 
transformation in a transition tool for a mixed economy.  The expansive nature of the 
market track and the constituencies that it developed within the system pushed for a use 
similar to the one observed in Vietnam and China: a transition to a market oriented 
economy, integrating the state and the non-state sectors in a single strategy of 
development. The evidence is conclusive that dual track economies led structurally to the 
integration of the market and the non-market oriented sectors, affecting in the end the 
behavior and conception of actors across the society.  
The research tracks how one of the most loyal institutions of the socialist system, 




profound transformation of the Cuban economy. It also shows the limits associated to 
such development when state socialism began to be replaced by structures of state 
capitalism with monopolist structures, not friendly to institutions of competition, 
transparence and consumers’ protection among other things related to a well functioning 
market economy. This is a fertile ground for situations of partial reform equilibrium.  
The political trap of partial reform equilibrium is an issue well explored in the 
research. Here it is important to distinguish the problems of partial versus comprehensive 
transition to a market economy, of socialist or other character, from the debate between 
shock therapy and gradualism. A transition from plan to market can be comprehensive 
and gradual as long as does not reach an equilibrium
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 in which a partial dismantlement 
of the command structures becomes a new steady state. This last scenario can happen 
also under a shock therapy case. The alternative between comprehensive and partial 
reform is relevant because markets are not natural outcomes that develop as result of 
some invisible hand but products of historical development of institutional capabilities. 
There are interrelated elements of complementarities and interdependence among market 
institutions playing a considerable role in efficiency improvements and capabilities 
building to cope with problems such as inequality, poverty, rent-seeking opportunities, 
and other issues (Hellman, 1998).  
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In Hellman’s model, partial reform equilibrium emerged in Eastern Europe as 
result of the role of “early winners” who acting as rent-seekers capture the policy making 
process and delay comprehensive changes to retain their privileged arbitrage and better 
position. In other explanations of partial reform, Victor Shih (Shih, 2006)explored the 
case of premier Zhu Rongji in China, showing how even insulated reform oriented 
bureaucrats are driven by their political and careerist goals, producing sub-optimal partial 
reform situation. This research contributes to the study of the partial reform problem by 
analyzing the role of national security concerns in shaping it versus the role of communist 
ideologues, losers and winners of the early stages of reform.  
Although reforms are conceived as “policies that enhance the efficiency in 
resources allocation” (Drazen, 2000), they depend on the political context in which they 
are designed and implemented. In the Cuban case, the national security state is the main 
filter that reform proposals have to pass. This research explained how national security 
logic has prevented structural and institutional variables from cascading into a more 
comprehensive reform effect. Different from some authors (Mesa-Lago & Perez-Lopez, 
2005)who underestimate the impact of the national security logic in the reform and 
highlight other factors (ideological rigidities, power control, etc), I argued here that 
national security concerns have been central to the adoption and design of the reforms. 
For instance, the opening to foreign investment or the creation of small and medium scale 




minimizing liberalizing effects and nipping regime change potential entrepreneurs in the 
bud.  
Then the partial reform issue brings us back to the question of the quality of 
politics and the public sector in context of economic transformation.  Making the 
situation more complex, other groups such as communist ideologues centered on political 
control not on economic development or early winners of the reform (rent-seekers) 
connect their agendas with the national security central logic. These intra-elites disputes 
define the character of the “gatekeeper state” (Corrales, December 2003) and its multiple 
uses
280
. The gatekeeper state could be a national security one, or one focused on 
sovereignty and development as nationalists want, or one focused on political control as 
communist hardliners prefer, or a predatory one, if captured by early winners and rent-
seekers of partial reform. Not surprisingly this is a question that cannot be answer in 
abstract outside time and specific government organisms. That is why it is essential to 
look at the dynamics of political liberalization since it is a factor that would shape the 
character of the Cuban state and its relations with Cuban society and international actors.  
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control described by Javier Corrales, Bert Hoffman has proposed a theory by which the 
state also plays a role in framing the terms of Cubans’ emigration as “exit” from the 




Political liberalization, and political stability 
Although several upper echelon officials of the Cuban government have claimed 
that political reform is totally off their agenda (Robinson, 2012), politics has not been 
insulated from the effects of generational, social, economic and cultural changes. 
Moreover, the Cuban Communist Party has engaged in its own set of political reforms as 
part of the process of adaptation to a post-Cold War, post-Fidel Castro world, preserving 
domestic stability and expanding international legitimacy. These policies have had an 
important impact on enhancing the zones of legitimacy of the CCP rule, improving the 
quality of the management of intra-elites differences, and decompressing the social 
pressures associated to the relatively low economic growth rate and the implementation 
of the economic reform.  
The political reform implemented by the Cuban Communist Party after 2006 can 
be resumed in four main lines: 1) the transition from a mixed system of charismatic-
weakly institutional rule to a robust Leninist institutional one, 2) A less vertical relation 
between the State and Civil society requiring higher levels of consultation between the 
party-state and the non-political organizations invigorated by the new social, cultural and 
economic pluralism 3) a process of social decompression based on significant 
improvements of the situation of some specific rights such as the right to own private 




policies of leadership succession and cadres education destined to outlast the passing of 
the “historicos”, the generation who led the revolutionary insurrection, and provide 
permanence to the post-revolutionary system (Berman, 2008).  
This research presents solid evidences that the Cuban political system is post-
totalitarian and becoming more Leninist in virtue of the institutionalization of the one-
party rule as a “vanguard party”. While there is an assumption that a Leninist system 
cannot be legitimate and stable because of its lack of democratic contestation, I argued 
that the system has developed and reinforced some zones of legitimacy beyond Fidel 
Castro’s charisma and the revolutionary aura of the first generation. Like other authentic 
revolution-based Leninist states, the original claim to legitimacy came from the fact that 
an overwhelming majority of the Cuban population gave their consent to the 
revolutionary discourse by supporting the revolution in 1959-1961. Secondly, a more 
ambivalent source was the nationalist and socialist ideological mixture proclaimed as a 
national credo, setting the policy frontiers of the intra-system politics.  But political 
legitimacy is not given once for all. The passing of the first generation of revolutionaries 
including charismatic Fidel Castro and the failure of the government to address the daily 
problems of the population within the margins of the official ideology began to empty the 




In response to those trends, a new political discourse emphasizing the themes of a 
“prosperous and sustainable socialism” began to emerge from the VI Congress of the 
CCP in 2011. The motto of “prosperous and sustainable socialism “emphasized 
nationalist goals of development, end of irrational prohibitions, empowerment of women 
and blacks, respect for sexual preferences and rights of the LGBT community. In terms of 
the economy, Raul Castro said “Either we rectify or we will sink” in a hard judgment that 
called the CCP not to allow the end of the work of several revolutionary generations 
(Vicent, 2010).  
The research argued that economic reform was mainly motivated by the political 
need to achieve some legitimacy by economic performance. But different from the cases 
of China and Vietnam, success has eluded the Cuban leadership in the economic realm. 
As Emily Morris (Morris, 2014)demonstrated Cuban economy’s performance after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union is close to the median of the economies in transition. This is 
enough to survive and claim a successful resistance against the hostile circumstances 
created by the U.S. embargo but not to claim economic performance as a source of new 
legitimacy.  
But this dissertation explains how even in the absence of East Asia-style growth 
rate, the CCP regime has developed zones of legitimacy in which it is expanding its 




acknowledgment of religious liberties, and social, cultural and economic pluralism) and 
overcoming governance challenges (successful foreign policy versus American policy of 
isolation, adoption of term-limits for government and party officials as vehicle for elite 
renewal, decentralization of the decision making process to provinces and companies, 
constitutional reform to allow citizens to travel abroad and the expansion of small and 
middle size private companies, etc.).  
The ideological shift to more nationalism from state socialism orthodoxy in the 
political discourse and intra-system culture widens the frontiers of the policy debate. In 
economic terms, it means a higher priority for the question of economic efficiency and 
development, ending the stigmatization of private property and market mechanisms. In 
political terms, it reduces the excessive focus on political control versus opening a 
discussion about varieties of socialism and the effectiveness and relevance of the 
bureaucratic agencies and the republican institutions of horizontal accountability such as 
the anti-corruption agency, the parliament and the courts. 
Such dynamics opened space for a debate about revolutionary history and 
injustices and insufficiencies of the post-1959 political system without giving up the 
central pillar of CCP-one party rule but rectifying some major policy failures. Although 
the Cuban government doesn’t formally negotiate or acknowledge anti-system opposition 




critical opinion and steal issues from the opposition or critical dissent agendas whenever 
it found them useful and manageable to bolster its legitimacy. The dissertation discusses 
Cuba’s emigration reform as a case in which a controversial issue of opening towards the 
outside world was presented as a test case by the United States government, members of 
the opposition and critical dissenters within the system. The research traces how this 
political liberalization change took place.  
The dissertation discusses the question of political stability in the context of 
institutionalization of the CCP Leninist rule. Samuel Huntington stressed a positive 
correlation between strong or high institutionalization and stability (Huntington, 1968, p. 
18). The idea was ratified by Guillermo O’Donnell who saw “institutional weakness” as 
increasing the probability of “interruption and breakdown” (O' Donnell, January, 1994). 
Linz and Stepan sustain that post-totalitarian leadership tends to be more technocratic and 
bureaucratic but they do not conclude that more institutionalization under this context 
makes the political system more stable. The reason is that a gap appears between the 
weakened ideology driven utopian goals of the system and the “ideology’s irrelevance to 
policymaking, or worse, its transparent contradiction with social reality” (Linz and 
Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South 




This dissertation discusses how a rebalancing of the regime’s ideological matrix 
in favor of nationalism (an option that was not available to the Soviet Union propelled 
Eastern European regimes after the 1968 Prague Spring) allows the post-totalitarian 
variant to adopt a more market friendly position. Under those circumstances, 
institutionalization of intra-elite conflict tend to produce a more stable setting since 
bureaucratic routines make political life and leadership transitions more predictable 
without making the ideology of the system a “living lie”. Hypothetically, the limited 
party-bureaucratic- technocratic pluralism under a nationalism oriented post-
totalitarianism can authentically co-opt non-regime elites. This is what has partially 
occurred in Cuba in the cases of leaders of religious groups, business oriented segments, 
women, LGBT activists and émigrés whose sectarian interests fit and even can be more 




The Cuban Communist Party is structurally in a position in which the survival of 
its rules depends more on the implementation of its own designed reforms than in the 
capacity of other forces to displace it from power. Cuban leaders extracted important 
lessons from the demise of communism in Eastern Europe and the adaptation of 
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official ideology because of the gap between concrete policies and anti-market 
communist principles. That said, the CCP has emphasized its opposition to concentration 
of wealth and property as well as its commitment to the state socialism companies as the 




communist parties’ rule in East Asia. The party leaders have conscience on the pertinence 
of the adoption of market mechanisms without giving up their gate keeping powers. They 
understand that political institutionalization of collective leadership is necessary not only 
to consolidate their power against domestic opposition, exiles and U.S. regime change 
policy but also for the convenience of their own functioning: a) to manage economic 
reform, b) to provide the end of Fidel Castro’s charismatic leadership with stabilizers, c) 
to smooth intra and inter-generational political transition and presidential succession 
preventing the appearance of a leader like Gorbachev committed to an agenda of big bang 
democratization d) to enhance the international legitimacy of their system.  
 
Cuba’s change of leadership: political stability and international legitimacy 
Although the first two chapters of the dissertation emphasized the structural 
dimensions of adaptation, the research also explores the question of political stability 
from the point of view of the agency of Cuban leadership and the path created by the 
intra-generational transition after 2006 for the coming inter-generational transition after 
2018 when biology if not politics would motivate the passing of the first leadership 
generation of revolutionaries.  
The research reached ambivalent conclusions from the fact that the regime 




who looked at the system as “a single fail point mechanism” (Leogrande, William & 
Kornbluh, Peter, 2014) and anticipated a collapse without Fidel Castro at the helm. Raul 
Castro proved to be right when on August 18, 2006; he ridiculed President Bush’s 
bravado about the impossibility of a succession without transition in Cuba. In an 
interview published in Granma, the newspaper of the communist party, Raul Castro 
declared that the government was “working smoothly”. No major political problem was 
faced until 2010 when a hunger striker died in a Cuban jail demanding better conditions 
for political prisoners. Raul Castro’s government’s response was a release of most 
political prisoners of the Black Spring of 2003 in coordination with the Catholic Church 
and the Spanish government of Jose Luis Rodriguez-Zapatero. Fidel Castro never 
returned to the presidency, succession did produce a significant change in economic 
terms, and political liberalization, but the regime continue to function stably.   
But this research concludes that the success of the intra-generational succession 
does not mean that the coming inter-generational transition will be necessarily as smooth 
as the one that took place. The intra-generational transition benefitted from the hybrid 
character of the previous leadership system (charismatic and weakly institutionalized) 
and the stabilizing factors of Fidel Castro’s endorsement, Hugo Chavez’s economic 
support and Raul Castro’s condition as leader of the dominant factions in the CCP (the 
provincial party czars and the organization department) and the Revolutionary Armed 




the new generation, with a civilian, Miguel Diaz-Canel, as the most probable successor at 
the head of the State and party. Raul Castro seems to understand that because in the VII 
congress of the CCP in 2016 announced a project of constitutional reforms before the end 
of his second and last presidential term in 2018.  
The passing of the generation of leaders “historicos” (those who fought for the 
revolution against the previous dictatorial regime) poses a legitimacy dilemma for the 
institutions of the system, precisely when it is most needed by the successors.  As a 
central problem the dissertation calls the attention on civil-military relations given the 
contradiction between the position of the FAR as the most powerful actor in the Cuban 
system and the role assigned to the CCP in the Leninist model as the central core of 
decisions. Helping a successful presidential succession the dissertation lists four major 
factors: 1) the appeal of Miguel Diaz Canel as a leader educated and trained in the 
different areas of the system by the organization department of the CCP with regional 
constituencies in two of the most important provinces (Holguin and Villa Clara) as well 
as the support of the high military command. 2) the intergenerational transition that 
already took place with the renewal of the party-state cadres at the intermediate and lower 
levels, something that happened in a well organized and institutionalized manner. 3) The 
common political experience of the third generation of leaders, born after 1959 and 
trained in the politics of internationalist missions of Africa and Central America, the 




and age limits for the cadres has proven to be an effective institutional incentive for 
stability in communist regimes presidential succession in Vietnam (Pike, 1989) and 
China (Shirk, 2012).  
The discussion about leadership succession and political liberalization led to 
questions about whether there are connections between liberalization and democratization 
in the long run. The dissertation builds on the experience of other processes in China, 
Vietnam, Taiwan, Korea and Mexico. Based on the evidences of the Cuban case, it 
concludes that although liberalization represents a significant improvement in some 
human rights and liberties, and promises a potential significant improvement in economic 
efficiency, it does not mean a necessary transition to a multiparty democracy or even 
higher contestation within the margins of the one-party system. That is why it is 
important to look at the issue of Cuba’s foreign relations and the role of Cuba’s principal 
economic and political partners as suppliers of political models to emulate  
 
Cuba’s role in World Affairs  
The discussion about Cuba’s role in world affairs began by questioning the 
repeated mantra that U.S.-Cuba relations after 1991 were a remnant of the Cold War. 
Instead of blaming Florida politics for the continuation of the embargo policy beyond any 




American policy making process about Cuba change after the end of the Cold War? How 
did those changes enable a relatively weak Cuban American pro embargo lobby to 
impose its agenda in ways that were not even possible before 1990? What changed in the 
asymmetric relations between Cuba and the United States after the end of the Cold War? 
Why Cuba survived the strictest embargo declared by the United States against any 
country in earth short of a war? Which foreign policy strategies the Cuban government 
employed to outmaneuver American hostility and overcome attempts to isolate it? How 
the process of economic reform, political liberalization and leadership succession shape 
Cuba’s new role in world affairs?  
In response to these questions, the research focused on the roles of history and 
attention in asymmetric relations. The Cold War left for U.S.-Cuba relations a legacy of 
American inattention due to the lowering of the island’s relevance in U.S. central security 
issues: non-nuclear proliferation and terrorism. On the American side, a lack of grand 
strategy rationality made possible the continuation of hostility, given the political inertia 
from the Cold War and the difference of values between American liberal democracy and 
Cuba’s communist regime. On the Cuban side, the United States remained the central 
target of Havana’s grand strategy that perceived an existential threat in the policy of 
embargo and the possibility of an American military intervention. This disparity of 




advantage versus the overwhelming disparity of military and economic resources in 
United States’ favor.  
Cuba’s central focus on the asymmetric conflict with the United States allowed 
the CCP government to design a post-Cold War foreign policy pre-empting the worst 
scenario of confrontation (international security). Once this outcome was granted by 
Cuba’s military preparation and reluctance to engage in a competition for weapons of 
mass destruction (that could attract the repulse of the international community and 
American security establishment’s attention), Havana exploited the hegemonic paradox 
that placed the United States in conflict with the norms of the liberal global and regional 
order Washington pretended to lead.  Since 1992, Cuban diplomacy worked on a United 
Nations General Assembly condemnation of American policy towards Cuba. It has 
achieved so for twenty five years.  
The research employed a process-tracing method to explain the outcome of the 
conflict between Cuba and the United States at the multilateral level. Chapters IV explain 
how the process of partial economic reform and political liberalization impacted Cuba’s 
foreign relations, creating dynamics of rapprochement with several U.S. allies interested 
on helping Cuba’s soft-landing in market oriented structures. Contrary to views of Cuba 
as frozen in the Cold War, the study explained how interactions which were originally 




and a trend to homogeneity between Cuba and international normative regimes in several 
areas, particularly in the economic and social realms. Although these trends to 
international homogeneity and interdependence did not translated immediately into 
Cuba’s domestic political order, they mitigated the conflicts that the American strategy 
tried to exacerbate pursuing a collapse of the Cuban economy and thus, of the political 
regime.  
Cuba’s grand strategy achieved an asymmetric stalemate in which the great 
power, in this case, the United States, was unable to translate the disparity of power in 
domination, while the resistance of the smaller, Cuba, is not strong enough to force a 
change in the great power’s confrontational policy. This grand strategy included different 
dimensions such as hiding in the nuclear issue, and buffering and beleaguering in the 
regional scenario as ways to prevent a scenario in which Cuban isolation could become 
possible. Havana’s diplomacy did not abandon its Cold War allies but combined several 
competing identities, including the socialist and revolutionary one, to attract support and 
solidarity from other international actors. The study provides confirmatory evidence for 
Fred Halliday’s theory (Halliday, 1999) about revolutions, the international system and 
the policies of revolutionary actors.  
After presenting the features of the impasse that placed U.S.-Cuba ties in the 




shock on the statu quo in search for stabilization and normalization, with a possibility of 
normalcy (Brenner, 2016). By using the methodology of asymmetric relations and the 
paradigm of Acknowledgement of sovereignty for deference to great power status (AFD) 
developed by Brantly Womack (Womack, Asymetry and International Relations, 2016), 
the dissertation allows us to have a comparable case with situations of similar nature in 
the relations between great powers and smaller neighbors such as Russia and Finland, 
China and Vietnam, United States and Mexico or Great Britain and Ireland.  
In the case of the U.S.-Cuba relations, the reestablishment of diplomatic relations 
after the agreement of December 17, 2014 and the beginning of a process of stabilization-
normalization was possible because three factors converged: 1) the accumulation of 
spaces of interactions between Cuba and the United States allowing the development of 
constituencies in favor of engagement. These spaces of interdependence, licensed travel, 
and sale of food contributed to the creation of engagement- favorable constituencies in 
the two societies. 2) the emergence of a post-post Cold War world in which strategic 
rivalries with China and Russia  take center, combined with the need for a coherent 
policy towards the Western hemisphere (Hershberg, 2016)raised the profile and attention 
of the Cuban issue as a test case in American foreign policy. 3) These two trends were 
bolstered by Cuba’s economic reform  (Torres, 2016) an political liberalization 
(Leogrande, The end of the bogeyman:The political repercussion of U.S.-Cuba 




communities of common destiny and sparked coalitions against common enemies 
between Cuba and the countries of the Western hemisphere (international criminal 
networks, terrorism, natural disasters, etc) including the United States (Ebola in Africa).  
As result of these dynamics and the presence in the White House of the Obama 
Administration with a desire to align American role in world affairs with the principles of 
a liberal international order (promotion of international trade, multilateralism, diplomacy, 
dialogue and negotiation rather than use of force), a change of Cuba’s image in the 
American official discourse was possible (Lopez-Levy, 2016). Eventually Cuba was 
taken off the list of terrorist countries of the State Department and a series of negotiations 
about more than fourteen topics (protection of the coral reefs, cooperation in the case of 
natural disasters or oil spills in the Gulf of Mexico, law and order, rescue and salvage, 
immigration, human rights, among other issues took place leading to the first American 
president’s visit to Cuba in March of 2016.  New dynamics of cooperation are beginning 
to operate in parallel to the permanence of the policy of the embargo that it is still in 
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